Pay Any Price: Greed, Power, and Endless War

by James Risen

  As Bowen began to investigate cases of fraud and corruption, his old allies at the White House grew angry with him. Iraq had become a political sinkhole for President Bush, and Bowen’s investigations were threatening to make things worse. Working through friendly Republicans in Congress, the White House quietly tried to eliminate Bowen’s office and shut down his investigations as soon as he began to ask questions about sensitive topics. But Bowen was tipped off about the effort and was able to warn his own allies in Congress, including Sen. Susan Collins, a moderate Republican from Maine, who blocked the White House effort. By October 2004, she had begun to move to place Bowen’s job on more solid footing.

  It did not take Bowen and his investigative staff long to start asking questions about the cash flights and the CPA’s use of the DFI. Bowen and his staff couldn’t believe the amounts of cash that were being flown to Baghdad, and were shocked by the fact that the CPA was unable to account for so much of it.

  Bremer now says that he agreed with the inspector general that there could have been better accountability on the spending that took place in individual Iraqi ministries. “The issue is what happened to the money once it was distributed through the Minister of Finance,” Bremer said in an interview. “We had a very clear record of funds going to the Iraqi system. The funds were all distributed to the minister of finance. The inspector general implied we should have established better controls in other ministries. That would have been a very nice thing to do but it would have required hundreds of internationally trained auditors. It would have taken us at least three years to set up that system.”

  For his part, Bowen is dismissive of Bremer’s defense of the CPA’s actions. Rather, Bowen says he found the CPA’s handling of the cash and its distribution arbitrary and capricious. One stunning example came when CPA officials decided that the Kurds in northern Iraq should get a cut.

  The Kurds were in the process of carving out their own semi-independent state of Kurdistan in northern Iraq, and they had powerful leaders whom the Americans wanted to keep happy. And so, in June 2004, three Chinook helicopters were loaded with $1.6 billion in cash freshly offloaded from a U.S. Air Force cargo plane. The three helicopters flew from Baghdad airport to Erbil in Kurdistan, where the money was delivered to a branch of the Iraqi Central Bank.

  The cash arrived without warning. None of the officials at the bank branch in Erbil knew the money was coming, and they had no idea at first what to do with it. The Americans unloaded it into piles, after which it was stored in the bank building until bank officials could figure out what to do next.

  Later, after senior American officials realized that the cash had been left with bank officials who were entirely unprepared to receive it, they called back to the bank branch in Erbil to check on it. The American officials were told that the cash had been taken care of and that everything was fine, according to staffers with Bowen’s IG office.

  The CPA never saw the money again, never knew where it went or how it was spent.

  It almost certainly disappeared into the private bank accounts of powerful figures in Kurdistan.

  The CPA’s management of Iraq came to an end on July 1, 2004, as an interim government was installed under Prime Minister Ayad Allawi. His government was a temporary placeholder until Iraq could hold elections, but there was no doubt at the time that Allawi was the man the United States wanted to become the permanent leader of Iraq. In fact, Allawi was known in Iraq as “the spymaster’s favorite” because of his longstanding ties to the CIA.

  When the CPA accelerated the cash flights from New York in the final two weeks of its existence, the Americans already knew that Allawi would be taking over as prime minister—and that he would be facing a tough election campaign to keep the job. As an exile who had spent much of his adult life in London, he was far more popular with the Americans and British than he was with the Iraqi people. He was a Shiite but also had a past as a Baathist, and thus lacked solid Shiite support, which was crucial in a majority-Shiite nation.

  His popularity in Washington and his political vulnerability in Baghdad raise an interesting question—was the decision to suddenly accelerate the cash flights in the CPA’s dying days part of an effort by the Bush administration to give Allawi a financial edge, to bolster him and consolidate his hold on power?

  Similar questions have been raised in the past. In 2005, Seymour Hersh, the investigative reporter for The New Yorker, wrote that the Bush administration had in the spring of 2004 engaged in a secret debate over whether to provide financial support to Allawi and his political allies while also using American money to stunt the power of more radical Shiite Iraqi figures. The United States feared the Shiite parties and their suspected ties to Iran. The CPA was coming to an end, but the White House wanted to maintain its influence over the Iraqi political process to go along with the massive American military occupation, and Allawi seemed to be its best bet. Hersh wrote that President Bush had secretly authorized a covert action to back Allawi’s campaign, but that once congressional leaders were briefed on the plan, Nancy Pelosi, the California Democrat who was then the House minority leader, objected. Hersh reported that Bush then circumvented Congress and Pelosi’s objections by arranging an operation “that was kept, in part, off the books” to support Allawi. Hersh wrote that the operation “used funds that were not necessarily appropriated by Congress.” If they weren’t using U.S. funds, according to Hersh, then it would be much easier to hide the operation from Congress.

  In the 2005 elections, despite whatever cash assistance he may have had, Allawi’s ties to the Americans damaged his credibility and he was routed, losing to Shiite political leader Nouri al-Maliki. Hersh wrote that there was evidence that Allawi had plenty of money at his disposal during his failed campaign.

  Bremer denied in an interview that the cash flights were accelerated at the last minute to help Allawi. “That’s nonsense,” Bremer said. “We didn’t know as of June or May whether Allawi would even be a candidate in 2005. It had to do with the fact that the government would need $5–6 billion until they could get procedures in place with the Fed.” Bremer further said the flights were accelerated because the Iraqi finance minister wanted to get the funds, because he was concerned that the new Iraqi government would be unfamiliar with the procedures used to arrange the cash flights, and thus the government might have to go without funds as a result.

  “The Iraqi minister of finance contacted us in, I think late May or early June,” Bremer said. “[He was concerned] there might be hesitation on the Iraqi side or the Fed side to transfer funds.”

  For years, Stuart Bowen and his investigators were frustrated that they could not get any answers about what had happened to the cash. They could trace it from East Rutherford to Andrews Air Force Base, from Andrews to Baghdad International Airport, and from the airport to downtown Baghdad. But they had no idea what happened after that; the records were abysmal. Billions of dollars had simply disappeared into the CPA and the Iraqi government

  That did not mean it had all been stolen. It meant that no one could prove that it hadn’t been, and so Bowen’s office did repeated audits of the cash from the Development Fund of Iraq, and with each new report, complained about the suspicious absence of adequate recordkeeping for so much money.

  Gradually, Bowen’s staff made progress. His office concluded that as much as $1.3 billion from the cash flights had gone into a corrupt deal arranged in 2004 by the Iraqi minister of defense, Hazim al-Sha’alan. The defense minister, working with a key aide, Ziyad Qattan, created a fraudulent defense contract to make it look like the money was being used for equipment purchases to help rebuild the Iraqi Army, Bowen’s office concluded. They fled Iraq but were able to move the money out of the country without being detected. They were tried and convicted in absentia in Iraq on corruption charges.

  The most explosive investigation Bowen’s office ever conducted began in 2010, when Wael el-Zein, a Lebanese American who was then serving as a special assista
nt and translator for Bowen, relayed highly sensitive information that led Bowen and his team on a secret mission to find a hidden treasure trove of missing cash and solve one of the biggest mysteries of the Iraq war.

  Wael el-Zein, who worked for the U.S. Army before joining Bowen’s staff, had been told that billions of dollars from the jingle flights had gone missing and was now being hidden in Lebanon. Based on el-Zein’s information, Bowen’s office opened the most secret investigation that it conducted during the entire Iraq war. Bowen’s investigators code-named the case “Brick Tracker.” The case has never been previously disclosed.

  Eventually, Bowen’s investigators obtained information from an informant in Lebanon who identified a bunker there that contained mountains of U.S. dollars, staggering amounts of cash that had been shipped from Iraq for safekeeping and was being carefully hidden. There was between $1.2 and $1.6 billion in cash in U.S. dollars in storage. In addition, there was approximately $200 million in gold—belonging to the Iraqi government. Bowen’s investigators were also told that some powerful Iraqi political figures had ties to the bunker and the cash.

  Eventually, the special inspector general for Iraq and his team became confident that they had discovered the secret hiding place of a major portion of the U.S. currency that had been missing since the cash was shipped to Baghdad. The investigators determined that there was so much cash that the people hiding it were reluctant to try to move it.

  In addition to the cash in the bunker, Wael el-Zein said he later discovered at least several hundred million dollars more in U.S. currency hidden in other locations in Lebanon. Including this cache, the total amount of U.S. currency flown from the United States to Iraq and then stolen and hidden in Lebanon was approximately $2 billion.

  Some of the serial numbers on the U.S. currency flown from the United States to Iraq had been recorded by the U.S. government, which would have made it possible to trace. But slipshod recordkeeping in the early days after the U.S. invasion meant that not all of the serial numbers had been recorded by the Americans before the cash departed, and it is not known whether the stolen currency now hidden in the bunker in Lebanon and elsewhere is among the former or the latter, according to former staffers with Bowen’s office who investigated the matter. Even with the records of the serial numbers for some of the cash, however, the chances that the United States would ever be able to trace and prevent the cash from being used is remote.

  Still, the people controlling the hidden cash have apparently been hesitant to move it in large quantities into the international banking system and so have mostly been spending it in Lebanon. Wael el-Zein said he had received reports that some had been used to buy weapons for backers of several political parties in Iraq. It is believed that several powerful Iraqi political figures have been involved with the stolen cash, and that they still control the money with the help of the Lebanese money launderers who first provided the bunker and other secure hiding places.

  Meanwhile, Bowen found to his dismay that no one else in the U.S. government seemed particularly interested in uncovering the truth. By the time Bowen’s team discovered the cash-laden Lebanese bunker, most of official Washington had long since forgotten about the cash flights. The Obama administration was in the process of winding down the war in Iraq, and the White House was not interested in opening up old wounds. Since the cash from the Development Fund of Iraq was not American taxpayer money, administration officials were not especially interested in getting it back. The Obama White House wanted to forget about Iraq.

  Another possible explanation for the lack of interest in Washington could be that the White House did not want to pursue an investigation which might implicate some of the most powerful officials in Iraq. The United States needed to continue to work with them.

  When Bowen’s staff met with CIA officials to discuss the cash-laden bunker, agency officials showed little interest and made it clear that they were not going to cooperate with Bowen’s staff in any probe of the matter.

  (Long before I learned that Bowen’s office was also investigating the same case, a former CIA officer told me in an interview that he had learned of the existence of a secret hiding place in Lebanon filled with U.S. dollars shipped from Baghdad to Lebanon by powerful Iraqi leaders. This source said that he had been told about it by a contact in Syrian intelligence.)

  When Bowen and his staff tried to conduct an investigation of the missing cash in Lebanon, they also met with resistance from the U.S. embassy in Beirut. U.S. Ambassador Michele Sison denied Bowen country clearance, meaning that he was not allowed to travel to Lebanon on official business. Two of his investigators who did go to Lebanon were also denied permission from the embassy to visit the bunker themselves. Embassy officials told them that it was too dangerous for American government officials to travel to the area. Bowen saw it as another sign of how little interest the U.S. government had in conducting any investigation into the missing cash.

  Bowen’s staffers were able to meet in Beirut with Lebanon’s prosecutor general, Said Mirza, who agreed to cooperate on an investigation. Mirza said that he would conduct a raid on the bunker and help to recover the funds. Bowen would then be able to trace the origins of the cash back to Iraq and perhaps to East Rutherford.

  But after his initial promises, the Lebanese prosecutor started dragging his feet, pledging an investigation and raid but never delivering. Bowen eventually realized that the Lebanese prosecutor was unwilling to move against the bunker, and that he may have been pressured to abandon his plans.

  Bowen’s investigators also discussed the case with the FBI in Washington, but FBI agents told them they did not believe they had any jurisdiction to pursue the matter. The FBI never launched an investigation. Bowen and his staff were frustrated, but they kept their work secret, never mentioning in public that they were on the trail of the missing cash.

  During a private meeting in Baghdad in either late 2011 or early 2012, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki casually asked U.S. Ambassador James Jeffrey what the U.S. government knew about reports of a bunker in Lebanon filled with U.S. currency brought from Iraq. Jeffrey told him that he had heard the reports but did not know any details, Jeffrey said in an interview. Jeffrey told Maliki that the American official who knew the most about it was Stuart Bowen, and that Maliki should talk to him about it.

  “He said, hey, I’m hearing all these rumors about this money, what do you know,” recalled Jeffrey, who was U.S. ambassador to Iraq from 2010 until 2012. “And I told him to talk to Stuart Bowen.” When Bowen met with Maliki in Baghdad in 2013, the prime minister questioned Bowen about the missing cash. Bowen said that Maliki made it clear to him that he knew about the bunker in Lebanon, and Bowen came away from his meeting convinced that the theft of so much Iraqi money after it was so cavalierly handled and shipped by the Americans still angered the prime minister.

  Yet despite Maliki’s signs of personal interest in the matter, the Iraqi government has not taken any action to go after the cash in Lebanon. The Baghdad government may be paralyzed because no one really wants to pursue the powerful Iraqi figures involved with the theft.

  The mystery surrounding the cash and the Lebanese bunker is one that the American government, with all its bureaucratic rules and limitations, was unlikely to ever solve, and it also seems unlikely that the Iraqi government will ever try to get the money back. Most of the original $2 billion in uncirculated U.S. currency is believed to still be sitting in the bunker and other locations in Lebanon, waiting to be spent by powerful Iraqis.

  And so, today, the bunker full of cash in Lebanon serves as a fitting monument to the excesses of the American war on terror. It certainly seems like a more appropriate symbol of the American adventure in the Middle East than the half-forgotten statue of Saddam Hussein in Firdos Square that was pulled down on the April day in 2003 when Baghdad fell.

  2

  The Emperor of the War on Terror

  Greed and power, when combined, can be devastating. In
the case of the missing cash of Baghdad, greed tempted Americans and Iraqis alike, while the power of the Coalition Provisional Authority to make fast, sweeping decisions with little oversight allowed that greed to grow unchecked. Billions of dollars disappeared as a result.

  Throughout the war on terror, greed and power have flourished just as readily back home in the United States, where the government’s surging counterterrorism spending created a new national security gold rush. The post-9/11 panic led Congress to throw cash at the FBI, CIA, and Pentagon faster than they were able to spend it. Soon, a counterterrorism bubble, like a financial bubble, grew in Washington, and a new breed of entrepreneur learned that one of the surest and easiest paths to riches could be found not in Silicon Valley building computers or New York designing clothes but rather in Tysons Corner, Virginia, coming up with new ways to predict, analyze, and prevent terrorist attacks—or, short of that, at least in convincing a few government bureaucrats that you had some magic formula for doing so.

  Consider the example of Dennis Montgomery. He provides the perfect case study to explain how during the war on terror greed and ambition have been married to unlimited rivers of cash to create a climate in which someone who has been accused of being a con artist was able to create a rogue intelligence operation with little or no adult supervision. Crazy became the new normal in the war on terror, and the original objectives of the war got lost in the process.

  Whatever else he was, Dennis Montgomery was a man who understood how best to profit from America’s decade of fear. He saw the post-9/11 age for what it was, a time to make money.