American Jihad: The Terrorists Living Among Us

by Steven Emerson

  ISNA has assisted in the formation of a number of troubling organizations within the United States. One such was the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (see Chapter 5). Before it was incorporated under the name “The Occupied Land Fund” in 1989, HLF had been a subsidiary of ISNA, using the same mailing address in Plainfield, Indiana.

  ISNA’s Islamic Horizons, which often contains anti-Israel, anti-American, and anti-Semitic sentiments; and which has voiced support for fundamentalism in Sudan, Turkey, and Algeria. The editor is Omer bin Abdullah. ISNA and Islamic Horizons have been outspoken in their support for the fundamentalist Islamic regime in Sudan:

  Such activities [conversion to Islam of thousands in Sudan and the use of Sudanese media for da‘wa purposes] were instituted by the National Salvation Revolution government which took over power in Sudan in 1989. The revolution rid the people of a backward government which was usurping the nation’s wealth and draining the military in a losing war in the South. The public trusted the people behind this revolution, who were yesterday’s Islamic political prisoners….

  Today, Sudan’s Popular Arab Islamic Conference, headed by Dr. Hasan Turabi, a Sorbonne-educated lawyer, is shaping to become nothing less than the next United Nations.78

  In the January/February 1997 edition of Islamic Horizons, the United States was attacked as a “big bully” against “Islam, the United Nations and people of color throughout the world”:

  Is it an accident that of the four self-proclaimed mortal enemies of America (Libya, Iran, Iraq, and Cuba) three fourths are Muslim countries?…Is America the home of a politically powerful, well-organized and financially strong Christian fundamentalist movement whose primary aim is to convert the Muslims throughout the world to Christianity? Is “Israel”, the American military-industrial complex, the Christian church, Western multinationals and the Western media united to destroy Islam?…Some might well see correlations in their economic crisis with the increased perception of the United States as a big bully—especially regarding Islam, the United Nations and people of color throughout the world.79

  ISNA’s annual conferences are usually held in the Midwest. According to figures reported by ISNA, about 10,000 people participated in its September 1997 conference in Chicago, Illinois. These conferences provide a fundraising platform for radical Islamic groups. The Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP), the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF), and the Marzook Legal Defense Fund all have substantial ties to Hamas and have been among the groups allowed to participate in an active capacity in ISNA conferences.

  These conferences feature speakers ranging from moderate to radical. ISNA has brought in speakers such as Murad Hofmann, a convert to Islam and a former ambassador from Germany to Algeria and Morocco. In the September/October 1997 edition of Islamic Horizons, Hofmann denied that both Hamas and the Lebanese Hizballah are terrorist organizations: “Perceptions of ‘terrorism’ are just as warped when countries considered responsible for harboring, training, and financing ‘terrorists’ are listed, always several supposedly ‘antiwestern’ Muslim countries are on the list, as are such movements as Hamas or Hizballah (now synonyms for ‘terrorism’).”

  Appendix D

  A Brief History of Islamic Fundamentalism

  In the wake of September 11, 2001, there has been a great deal of discussion about the “true” nature of Islam and the roots of the militant tradition. What follows is a brief history and analysis which shows that fundamentalism has been a part of Islam from the beginning—but that the modern militant version is a product of the twentieth century.

  With Islam there is no separation of church and state. Muhammad himself was a prophet, a warrior, a military general, a lawgiver, and the political head of the Islamic jama‘at (community). Although many leaders of Muslim countries have tried to establish secular governments, they are constantly exposed to the claim that they are abandoning the true religion.

  For this reason, Muslim “fundamentalism” began almost the day the prophet Muhammad died in 632 C.E. The Prophet had a large family and many followers and the war for succession began almost immediately. This was indeed a “war,” characterized wholly by violence, intrigue, and battle. Over the centuries a tradition of peaceful succession among the mullahs—religious leaders—has evolved, just as it has in all other religions. But the melodramatic battle over the true succession of Islam continues even today. Moreover, the extreme purity and austerity of the religious ethos allows an endless parade of reformers to come forth claiming to be the purveyors of the true religion. These “fundamentalists” find continuing support in the poor and dissatisfied masses—although the tiny percentage of fundamentalists who resort to terrorism are often relatively affluent and elite.

  It began almost with Muhammad’s death. The two main contenders for his position as head of Islam were Abu Bakr, father of Aisha, the Prophet’s youngest and favorite wife, and Ali ibn Abi Talib, the Prophet’s cousin who was married to his daughter Fatima. During the last week of Muhammad’s life, there was much jockeying for position. Abu Bakr had led public prayers during his illness, but Ali had been chosen by the Prophet to wash his body.

  Immediately after Muhammad’s death, the Muslims of Medina met to choose his successor. Abu Bakr heard of the meeting and rushed to Medina to argue that one of the Prophet’s earliest Meccan followers should be the rightful heir. The Medina council agreed and chose Abu Bakr. He died two years later, however, and passed the scepter to Umar ibn Khattab, another Meccan who was the father of Hafsa, another of the Prophet’s wives. Ali, a more scholarly man, was disappointed at being passed over again but withdrew to compile an authoritative version of the Koran.

  Umar pulled together the Islamic armies and invaded Syria in 638. The following year he advanced to the Euphrates and conquered what is now Iraq and part of Iran. Four years later his armies vanquished Egypt. He set up a system of taxation whereby the Muslim armies were largely supported by revenues raised from the conquered peoples. Within five years of the Prophet’s death, Islam controlled most of what is now called the Middle East.

  These conquests and all that followed were undertaken under the principle of jihad, or “holy war.” The term is used in the Koran and has been interpreted in a number of different ways. In the beginning it did not mean “forced conversion.” Rather it meant “the expansion of Islam, by force if necessary.” In practice it meant seizing political control, rather than slaughtering unbelievers. Christians and Jews were respected as “people of the book” and were allowed to keep their faith. They were required to pay a sizable tax and many Christians and Jews converted rather than bear the burden. Only pagans were forced to convert or die.

  Umar also assumed Muhammad’s duties as judge, but here his talents were questionable. He made several highly controversial decisions and Ali began to criticize them in public. Finally Umar ruled against Firuz, an Iranian slave of an Arab master. The slave was so infuriated by the decision that he assassinated Umar in 644. On his deathbed, Umar appointed an electoral college of six elders, including Ali ibn Abi Talib and Uthman ibn Affan, both of whom were married to daughters of the Prophet.

  The college offered the caliphate to Ali—but only under the condition that he rule according to the Koran and accept the precedents established by Umar’s many decisions. Ali was a man of principle and refused the offer. Uthman was given the same offer and accepted.

  Under Uthman, the caliphate degenerated into a cabal of the Meccan clan of the Ummayads, who were the dominant clan before the rise of Muhammad. The Hashimi, who had ascended with Muhammad, were once more in eclipse. Large landholdings in Mesopotamia were handed out to Ummayads and resentment in the provinces grew. In 656 Uthman’s house in Medina was besieged by discontented troops from Egypt and Iraq. Two months later, Uthman was murdered. Ali—still highly regarded as the “first of Muslims”—was finally appointed as caliph.

  But the Ummayad old guard—particularly Muwaiya ibn Abi Sufian, the gove
rnor of Syria, and Aisha, the Prophet’s last surviving wife—demanded revenge for Uthman’s murder and refused to accept Ali’s succession. Aisha raised an army and attacked Ali’s forces at Basra but was quickly defeated. Then Muwaiya advanced from Syria with his own army. This time the outcome was not clear-cut. When Muwaiya’s forces began to lose, they impaled copies of the Koran on their lances and the fighting ceased. Ali and Muwaiya agreed to arbitration with one representative appointed from each side.

  Even before the arbitration began, a faction of Ali’s followers rebelled, arguing that arbitration was not in the Koran. Calling themselves the Kharajis (“Outsiders”), they also claimed that any Muslim could become caliph—whereas Ali and his main followers wanted to maintain the bloodline through Ali and Fatima. Ali defeated them in battle but enough survived so that they became yet another rebellious faction.

  Meanwhile, the arbitration between Ali and Muwaiya also failed. The two parties supposedly agreed to reject both leaders’ claims and appoint a third candidate. Ali’s arbitrator, being oldest, announced the decision first. But when it came turn for Muwaiya’s representative to speak, he reneged on the agreement and declared Muwaiya caliph. This set off a new pandemonium and the two factions remained at war.

  In 661 Ali was stabbed to death while at prayer in a mosque by one of the Kharajis. His son Hassan replaced him. By this time the superior social resources of the Ummayad were prevailing, however, and Hassan did not attract many followers. Muwaiya persuaded him to accept a pension and promised that on his own death the caliphate would be returned to Hassan and the Hashimi clan. Hassan was poisoned in 669, however, and once again Muwaiya reneged, appointing his own son Yazid as successor. By the time Muwaiya died in 680, the Ummayads had consolidated their power.

  The followers of Ali—now calling themselves the Shia—were not through. In 681 Hussein, Ali’s oldest son, revived the claim, declaring himself caliph. Dissident factions rallied to his standard, particularly in the city of Kufa in southern Iraq, a rebel stronghold. With his family and an entourage of 40 horsemen and 32 footmen, Hussein began a triumphant procession to meet his supporters in Kufa.

  Yazid acted quickly. He dispatched his principal aide, Ubaidullah ibn Ziyad, with an army of 4,000 foot soldiers and cavalry. Ubaidullah quickly quelled dissent in Kufa, then intercepted Hussein’s entourage some thirty miles outside the city and demanded his surrender. The ensuing standoff, beginning on the first day of Muharram, the first month of the Islamic year, lasted eight days. Despite being hopelessly outnumbered, Hussein stood firm and refused to surrender his claim. Finally, donning the Prophet’s sacred robe, he led his 80 men into battle against 4,000, with martyrdom his reward. One by one his forces were killed, Hussein falling last. His severed head was presented to Yazid.

  So ended the first era of dynastic wars among the Muslims. But the matter was not settled. The Sunna—“Followers of Tradition”—were triumphant. But the Shia—the “partisans”—maintained their claims that Ali was the true successor and the mullahs his infallible representatives. Shia Islam took root in Persia, while Sunni Islam prevailed in the Arab countries from Egypt to Iraq. Every year Shiites recite the narrative of the “Ten Days of Muharram,” recounting Hussein’s deliberations and martyrdom. Professional readers recite the story in mosques and meeting halls, accompanied by frenzied wailing and self-flagellation from the congregations. When Shah Reza Pahlavi tried to establish a secular regime in Iran, one of the first things he did was to outlaw this Islamic “passion play.” The “Ten Days” has been performed regularly since the rule of the mullahs returned with the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979.

  Even the death of Hussein did not end the conflict. Islam settled down to two separate strains, the Sunni, who represented the Ummayads, the old Meccan aristocracy, and the Shiites, who represented just about everybody else. Muslim suzerainty now spread far and wide, from Spain to Sind, a northwest province of India, with the caliphate at Damascus. As administration grew more complex, Christian bureaucrats from the Byzantine Empire took over. This roused intense resentment among the mullahs. Non-Arabs were also considered second-class citizens—malawis—and their resentments mounted. Then there were the descendants of Ali’s line, now called Fatimids.

  In 750 C.E., all these coalesced under Abu Muslim, a former slave, who overthrew the Ummayad dynasty once and for all. In 754 he established a new city at a convergence of the Tigris and Euphrates, Madinat as-Salam, “The City of Peace,” more commonly known by its old Persian name, Baghdad. The change was more than geographic. Freed at last from the old Arab aristocracy, Islam finally became a cosmopolitan civilization, a meritocracy that drew its talents from all over the Empire and from all social classes. Reverting to the old Mesopotamian tradition, the caliph became “God’s Deputy on Earth,” without the need for intercession by the Prophet. The caliph’s power was military, but the government was administered by a bureaucracy whose head was the Wazir. As the empire progressed, the army was increasingly composed of specially trained slaves known as Mamluks, mostly of Central Asian Turkic origin. As one Arab historian put it, “This dynast ruled the world with a policy of mingled religion and kingship. The best obeyed by religion while the remainder obeyed from fear.” The empire was self-sufficient, growing its food in the fertile Mesopotamian valley and drawing metals from Africa and India. Trade flourished everywhere. Arab coins from the era have been found as far north as Scandinavia. This was the Golden Age of the Arabian Nights.

  The caliphate was overextended, however, and broke up quickly. Provinces in Spain and Africa rebelled and became virtually independent. As in Rome, the caliph lost power to his bodyguard and army, who began choosing their own rulers. In 935 a Persian governor conquered the caliph and the rule of Baghdad was over.

  A tribal warrior captured Baghdad again in 932 and a kind of division of labor finally evolved. The king exercised political authority while the mullahs maintained spiritual authority. This division created stability but was disapproved by many as contrary to “true Islam.” The Shiites mounted a fundamentalist revolt in Tunisia, then moved east, establishing Al Qahira (Cairo) as their palace city. Other schisms occurred. One group of Shiites, the Jaafaris, came to worship Muhammad al-Muntazar (literally, The Awaited Muhammad), who is the infant son of the Eleventh Imam. According to this belief, the Hidden Imam, as he is known, went to sleep in a cave in 873 and will awaken some day to rule Islam. This sect still flourishes in portions of the Middle East today.

  The Crusades, which began in 1095, created a huge crisis in the Islamic world. With the loss of Jerusalem in 1187, the caliph at Baghdad suffered a tremendous loss of face. The result was another fundamentalist revival of the Fatimids, who spread their revolt from North Africa across Syria and the Arabian Peninsula. Only Iran and Iraq remained under the caliphate. But this was answered by the rise of Saladin, a Kurdish general who climbed through the ranks and energized the Seljuks, a warlike tribe of Central Asian nomads. These mounted a counterattack on the Fatimids and reconquered most of Islam for Sunni rule. Since then the Shiites have been in decline. Today, they comprise no more than about 15 percent of all Muslims, mostly concentrated in Iran.

  Because in Islam the sacred and the secular are one, the battle of “who rules society” is far more intense and is fought as an all-or-nothing affair. Groups such as the Taliban—an organization of religious students who fought for and won political hegemony in Afghanistan—are virtually a constant throughout Islamic history. By contrast, in Western history—in many but not all countries, since the Middle Ages—there are two scepters and the competition for power is alleviated. In Islamic societies, there is only one scepter and the battle is far more intense.

  The Wahhab Movement of the eighteenth century, centered on the Arabian Peninsula, revived the idea of pure Islam. Militant Islamic reform emerged once again in the 1920s under the Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt by Hassan al-Banna. Although dedicated to establishing an Islamic state, al-Banna was also moved to reform
the inequities of Egyptian society. Over time the Brotherhood has spread throughout the Arab and Muslim world. It became fiercely antiWestern in the 1940s and 1950s under the direction of Sayd Qutb, an Egyptian fundamentalist.

  Qutb had a particular animus against the United States. In 1946 he wrote in Al-Risala, an Egyptian cultural magazine: “All these Westerners are the same: a rotten conscience, a false civilization. How I hate these Westerners, how I despise all of them without exception.” This was not simply the envy of an outsider looking in. In many ways, Qutb felt Muslim civilization was superior. “[The American’s] favorite music is Jazz,” he wrote in 1951. “This is the kind of music the Negroes invented to satisfy their primitive inclinations…it rouses their animal instincts.”

  Although Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser ruthlessly repressed the Islamic revivalist movement, it developed tentacles throughout the Muslim word, financed largely, even to this day, by wealthy Saudi Arabian and Persian Gulf donors. By the early 1980s, the Iranian Revolution had given it a powerful impetus. The assassination of Egyptian president Anwar Sadat by Muslim extremists at the height of his world power was a strong reminder that even the most esteemed Muslim leaders—be they proWestern or antiWestern—cannot rest their heads at night without worrying about radical fundamentalists in their own ranks.

  Only a few years ago, Libya’s Muammar Qaddafi was regarded as the world’s most prominent agent of state-sponsored terror. He is still the prime suspect in the downing of Flight 103 in Lockerbie, Scotland. Yet today Qaddafi himself is strangely quiet on the issue of Osama bin Laden and Muslim fundamentalism. The reason is because he himself is now considered “too Western” by fundamentalists and is threatened by radical militants in his own country. In Algeria, tens of thousands have been killed in a struggle between the socialist military dictatorship that holds power and the Islamic Salvation Front, which advocates an Islamic state. Hamas has been active in the Middle East ever since it was founded in 1987, and it quickly spread to the United States.