Fighter Wing: A Guided Tour of an Air Force Combat Wing tcml-3

by Tom Clancy

  A cutaway drawing of the Texas Instruments AGM-88C1 High speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM).

  Jack Ryan Enterprises, Ltd., by Laura Alpher

  Just aft of the seeker section is the warhead section. This is a 145 lb./65.9 kg. blast fragmentation-type unit, with a laser ranging proximity fuze, similar to that of the Sidewinder and the AMRAAM, which spews its twelve thousand tungsten cubes into the heart of the target radar. Behind the warhead section is the guidance/control section, which flies the missile during flight. This is accomplished by a digital autopilot equipped with a strapdown inertial guidance system, driving a series of electro-mechanical actuators which control the large guidance fins mounted along the mid-body of the AGM-88 airframe. Like the Paveway III, the autopilot allows the missile to fly the most energy efficient flight profile and make the most of the "smash" provided by the HARM's rocket motor. Located just aft of the guidance section is a TX- 481 dual-grain (two-stage), low smoke (to prevent observation), solid fuel motor supplied by either Thiokol or Hercules. It is this motor that generates the incredible speed that gives the missile the first letter in its designation. The top speed, while classified, is probably greater than Mach 3, possibly as high as Mach 4 or 5. This allows it to outrun almost any SAM system in a "quick draw" contest, should that occur. It also provides for a vast increase in range over the Shrike, probably up to a maximum of perhaps 80nm./ 146.3 km. from high altitudes (say 30,000 feet/9,144 meters), and 40 nm./ 73.2 km. when launched as low as 500 feet/152.4 meters. Normally, these ranges would probably be halved, to maintain a performance advantage over any SAMs that might be counterfired against the launching aircraft. The AGM-88 is normally carried on an LAU-118 standard launcher.

  From the very beginnings of the HARM program, the Air Force maintained an interest in the new ARM. They too wanted the benefits of such a weapon, and joined in the program at their first opportunity. Initially, their participation included the development and integration of the APR- 38 (later upgraded to the APR-47 standard) RWR suite on the F-4G Wild Weasel variant of the Phantom, which was the primary USAF aircraft assigned to the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) mission at the time. The APR-38/47 is a group of RWR systems, tied together to allow the F-4G WSO (technically called an Electronic Warfare Officer or EWO, but known traditionally as the "bear") to accurately plot the positions and characteristics of hundreds of enemy threat emitters. By integrating HARM with this system, the F-4G became a radar hunter of amazing lethality, taking only one loss during Operation Desert Storm — and that happened because an Iraqi AAA round punched a hole in the aircraft's fuel tank; it wasn't able to land before running out of fuel. The crew survived the mishap without injury.

  In addition to the dedicated Wild Weasel aircraft, the Air Force made several of their other new aircraft designs capable of carrying and firing the new ARM. Both new variants of the F-15 and F-16 can do so, given the right RWR systems, launch hardware, and software. And the F-16C has been extensively used to augment, and now replace, the aging F-4Gs that are on their last legs of service. As the last of the precious F-4Gs are going to the boneyard for a well-earned retirement, the F-16 is taking over all of the SEAD/HARM mission, thanks in part to the introduction of the ASQ-213 HARM Targeting System (HTS) pod. By combining the HTS pods with data exchanged from other F-16s via the Falcon's IDM, a rough approximation of the F-4G's SEAD capabilities can be reconstituted, without a gap in this badly needed resource.

  So how would a pilot fire such a weapon? Well, let's imagine that we're flying a Block 50/52 F-16C, equipped with an ALR-56 RWR and an ASQ-213 HTS pod attached to the Station 5 (right) pod mount point. You and your wingman each have two HARMs on LAU-118 launchers at Stations 3 and 7. The two of you are flying a loose hunting formation ahead of a strike force, with a lateral separation of about 5 nm./9.1 km. You have been briefed about hitting a pair of Buk-1M/SA-11 Gadfly SAM sites on the ingress route of the strike force, and told to look out for possible mobile SAM launchers, which may have been moved into the area. The two of you have set up your IDMs to exchange HTS data and are flying subsonic at about 350 kt./640 kph into the target area. Down on the multi-function display at your right knee is the readout for the HTS pod data, showing a rotating acquisition radar of the type used to pass targeting information to SAM transporter erector launcher and radar (TELAR) vehicles. At approximately 30 nm./54.9 km. to the target area, the two of you set up a pair of diagonal racetrack-shaped patterns and wait for the action to begin.

  As the strike force begins to come up, you see a pair of symbols titled STA 11 come up on the MFD, with indefinite range indications. You call a warning to the strike force to go "heads up" for a possible SA-11 threat, and go to work. In a matter of seconds, your and your wingman's HTS pods have worked out approximate range and bearing to both sites. This done, the two of you each set up a HARM in RK MODE (RANGE KNOWN) and get ready to launch. Within a few seconds, the range to both SA-11 TELARs has settled down, and been fed automatically to the HARM, and you see the two vehicles going for a lock-on with their radars on your RWR. You select MASTER ARM ON and pull the trigger once to launch the missile from Station 3. As the missile flies off, you turn to keep on the edge of the TELAR's maximum range. Thirty seconds later, you see the symbology from both TELARs go off the air as they are destroyed by the two AGM-88s. The two of you now move out in front of the strike force to continue escorting them to the target area. About 10 nm./18.2 km. to the target, you get a sudden warning alarm from your RWR, indicating that a missile-tracking radar has just locked up your Viper. A quick look at the RWR shows the STA 8 symbology indicative of an SA-8 Gecko TELAR somewhere off to the right front. You quickly select the SP MODE from the HARM options, the azimuth setting being automatically sent to the remaining HARM at Station 7. You squeeze the trigger one more time, call a warning to the force, and begin evasive maneuvers, punching out chaff as quickly as you can. Within a matter of seconds, the SA-8 TELAR goes off the air, another victim of the superior speed of the AGM-88. Meanwhile, the one missile it launched at you goes "stupid," flying off to self-destruct somewhere else. The force is safe for now, and you move to a covering position to make sure no wandering MiG tries to hassle your wingman or the rest of the force. Just another day's work.

  Today the Texas Instruments AGM-88 production line is going strong, continuing to build the 2,018 replacement HARMs that were contracted to replenish the stock fired during Desert Storm, as well as the foreign orders that are being serviced. There are no known plans to replace the AGM-88 at this time; and there will probably be none in the near future, given the general stagnation in the worldwide SAM development market and the remaining growth potential in the HARM airframe. As for the AGM-88 HARM, it should remain the premier ARM in the world for at least the next ten years.

  THE FUTURE: TSSAM AND BEYOND

  The future of U.S. long-range air-launched standoff weapons is, to put it mildly, in disarray. This is the unhappy result of the cancellation of a weapon that the USAF and USN had bet the farm on — the Northrop Grumman AGM-137 Tri-Service Standoff Attack Missile. TSSAM was to have been a stealthy, superaccurate, long-range (180 nm./300 km.) guided missile with versions for the Navy and Air Force, and even a ground-launched version for the Army. Unfortunately, development and program management problems drove up the cost of the program. And it took a severe hit when the Army dropped out several years ago.

  Since the TSSAM program was canceled, the Air Force has been scrambling to figure out how to provide their combat aircraft with a viable precision standoff missile. The current plan has the USAF buying more of what they already have, ALCM-Cs. Several different options are under consideration to fill the gap left by the cancellation of TSSAM. Some of these include:

  • Buying the clipped-wing version of the AGM-142 Have Nap, and fitting it to the B-1B, the F-15E Strike Eagle, and the F-16C. This would provide a large part of the capability promised by the original TSSAM program.

  • Retrofitting the IIR seeker deve
loped for TSSAM to existing missile airframes like the AGM-86C/ALCM-C or the AGM-84E SLAM/ SLAM-ER, which is a development of the Navy Harpoon anti-ship missile.

  • Producing a reduced-cost version of the AGM-137 TSSAM, with the stealth features installed only on the frontal surfaces of the airframe. This is probably the least likely option, given the current budget climate and the general lack of funding for new weapons systems.

  Whatever the decisions reached in the halls of Congress, the Pentagon, and the USAF Material Command, there will have to be new gopher zappers, which will undoubtedly be joint programs with the Navy, and perhaps even foreign partners. That is perhaps the greatest impact of the New World Order on the worldwide weapons market — only through cooperation will the industry survive.

  Air Combat Command: Not Your Father's Air Force

  ONCE upon a time in America, there was an Air Force. It was created in 1947 as a separate service (from the U.S. Army), with a simple set of goals: to deter our primary Cold War enemy, the Soviet Union, from expanding beyond its borders, and, if deterrence failed, to successfully fight the Soviets with the other armed services and achieve victory. For over forty-five years, the United States Air Force stood up to the challenge and outlasted its opponents. This is not to say it did so in the most efficient, economical, or even acceptable way. Its bitter turf battles with the U.S. Navy are legendary around Washington, D.C. Also, like all large organizations, the USAF was prone to internal conflicts. Throughout the Cold War, there were continuous squabbles between the primary commands of the USAF. The bomber pilots and ICBM missileers that made up the leadership of the Strategic Air Command (SAC) were always at odds with the fighter pilots who led the Tactical Air Command (TAC). If this was not divisive enough, the "combat" fliers at SAC and TAC scorned those who flew the transports for the Military Airlift Command (MAC), whom they considered "trash haulers."

  And in 1991, the U.S. Air Force suffered the greatest disaster (save defeat in battle) that can befall a military force. Its primary enemy, the Soviet Union, collapsed as a result of the failure of the August Coup. Of course, only a truly sick and cynical observer of world events would have wished the Cold War to continue indefinitely. Yet scarcely anyone foresaw the end of the conflict between the U.S. and the USSR and the end of the bipolar world we'd known for half a century. Now, if you think you were surprised, you should have seen the shock of the armed services leadership!

  Within the halls of the Pentagon, the leadership of the Air Force was quick to realize that with their primary threat nullified, and with severe budget cuts already planned by the Administration of President George Bush, they would have to remake themselves if they were to survive the coming lean years of the 1990s. Thus, in early 1992, USAF Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak ordered a complete, USAF-wide reorganization. But don't call it a reorganization. Call it a revolution. It so stunned members of the service, they are still trying to fully understand it.

  The three traditional flying commands, SAC, TAC, and MAC, were abolished, with combat aircraft (fighters, bombers, electronic warfare and theater transport aircraft) going to the newly formed Air Combat Command (ACC) headquartered at Langley Air Force Base. Virtually all heavy airlift (C-141, C-5, and C-17) and airborne tanker (KC-135 and KC-10) aircraft went to the newly formed Air Mobility Command (AMC), based at Scott AFB, Illinois. The strategic nuclear mission was handed off to a new unified (i.e., joint USAF/Navy) command called Strategic Command (STRATCOM). Incidently, STRATCOM does not own any of the bombers, submarines, or missiles that it operates.

  On June 1st, 1992, when the reorganization took place, it was as if every major airline in America (and a few large service companies as well) had merged overnight and thrown their individual corporate cultures to the winds. As might be imagined, this has caused a great deal of stress and personal disorientation. It has also created one of the most powerful and diverse fighting forces in the world. Definitely a revolution! Let's take a look at it.

  TAC TO ACC: THE GREAT MERGER

  When ACC was formed in June 1992, the man who was tasked as its first commander had the advantage of also being the last commander of TAC. Thus, General Michael Loh, USAF, had the unique distinction of commanding major USAF military commands on both sides of the great merger. A career fighter pilot, he suddenly found himself leading a force that would have been inconceivable just five years ago.

  General Loh makes no secret of his tactical bias in the eternal struggle between the fighter pilots of TAC and the bomber pilots of SAC. It is even conceivable that on the night of May 31st, 1992, he may have hoisted a beer or two to celebrate the end of TAC's "true" enemy, the Armageddon-oriented bomber culture of SAC, which was to vanish at midnight that evening. But to listen to him now is to understand the transformation of the old Air Force he grew up in into the new one that he helped create. Gone is the cocky, triumphant fighter pilot. As he hands off command of ACC to General Joe Ralston there is an intense (you could define intensity by spending an hour with General Loh!), almost desperate drive to weld the formerly distinct elements of his new command into a single fighting force. Not in ten years, or even five. But now! Before they are needed again in some far-off, dangerous place. This is the reality that he faced as he finished his final year of command at ACC (he retired in the summer of 1995). His challenges have been simple but formidable. They included:

  General M. "Mike" Loh, USAF. General Loh was the first commander of the USAF Air Combat Command (ACC).

  Official U.S. Air Force Photo

  • Merging personnel, bases, and aircraft from all three of the former major flying commands (bombers from SAC, medium transports from MAC, and tactical aircraft from TAC) into a unified combat flying command.

  • Continuing modernization of ACC aircraft, weapons, and equipment, despite the fiscal limitations of the 1990s.

  • Maintaining operational and tactical proficiency when out-of-area (i.e., overseas) operations rates (Op Tempos, as they are known) for our forces have never been higher, and operations and maintenance budgets (per pilot and aircraft) have never been lower.

  • Supporting Administration plans to be able to fight in two near-simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs) of the size that might be anticipated in Korea, or perhaps Iran.

  • Doing all this in a time of planned drawdowns and budget shortfalls that are challenging even to those who survived the dark fiscal days of the 1970s.

  ACC currently has units spread over the globe, conducting missions on a global scale. In Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Italy, ACC aircraft are helping to enforce no-fly zones over Iraq and Bosnia. In Korea, ACC aircraft and personnel are providing muscle to diplomatic efforts to maintain peace and stability in that troubled region. And U.S.-based ACC aircraft were key to the recent efforts to build and enforce democracy in Haiti. All this while trying to maintain normal commitments in NATO, Latin America, and the Far East, as well as providing continental air defense for North America.

  THE ACC MISSION

  All this brings us to the question of just what are normal operations for ACC. To understand this requires a short history lesson. Back in the mid-1980s, during the Reagan buildup, questions were asked about the effectiveness of the military the buildup was buying. Less-than-perfect joint operations in Grenada (1983) and Libya (1986), along with the disaster of our intervention in Lebanon (1982 to 1984), were disturbing signs that more than just money was needed to get the most out of the American forces. The Congressional response was the Military Reform Act of 1986, known more popularly as Goldwater-Nichols, after its sponsors. Goldwater-Nichols reformed the various military chains of command, and concentrated actual power to command forces in the field in the hands of regional commanders in chief, or CinCs as they are called. These CinCs, of which there are currently eight, control all forces, regardless of service, that are assigned to their geographic area of responsibility (AOR) in the world. These joint commands range from the Middle East (U.S. Central Command, CENTCOM) to forces based in
Europe (U.S. European Command, EUCOM). For example, anyone assigned to operate in Latin America would come under the command of General Barry McCaffrey, USA, who (at the time of this writing) is CinC of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) based in Panama. In addition, the Goldwater-Nichols bill strengthened the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), so that the billet is now considered a cabinet-level position and the President's senior military advisor. The underlying idea was to clarify the chain of command between the civilian leadership of the national command authority in Washington, D.C., and the forward leadership of our armed forces in the field.

  So far, Goldwater-Nichols seems to have worked, with joint operations from Panama to the Middle East running more smoothly than those of the post-Vietnam era. This is not to say that poor political objectives can't cause such operations to fail, as was proven in Somalia in 1992. On the contrary, Goldwater-Nichols places a much greater burden of responsibility for military operations on the civilian leadership of the United States, something future Presidential candidates might be wise to consider before seeking the office.

  At this point, you might ask just what all this has to do with getting a wing of combat aircraft into action somewhere in the world? More than you might think, actually. Since the end of the Cold War, the military of the United States has increasingly become a home- or continental-based force. Just in the last five years, we have closed the bulk of our overseas bases in the Philippines, Germany, Spain, and many other countries. This means that interventions by U.S. armed forces are increasingly made at the request of a host nation or as part of a coalition of forces. Thus, the current U.S. military basing strategy has relatively few units forward based, with the CinCs frequently owning few or no forces of their own.