by Tom Clancy
Eventually, the Air Force took a hard look at the F-111A. It was reworked and committed to combat in Vietnam with some success. Though technically a fighter bomber (FB-111), it was dedicated to a strike role and eventually became a countermeasures platform in the EF-111A "Raven" configuration. Australia became the only foreign user, with — C and — G models.
MEANWHILE, the best example of a joint-service aircraft had already proven itself: McDonnell Douglas's long-lived, enormously versatile F-4 Phantom. Originally a Navy design, it was also flown by the Marine Corps and became an Air Force icon. Nearly a dozen other nations also became "Phantom Pflyers."
Therefore, the JSF concept had some appeal, especially its multi-mission capability and lower cost. Two industry teams were awarded development contracts: Boeing and Lockheed Martin. It was touted as a head-to-head shootout; a financial dogfight with the winner taking home the biggest defense contract yet. Boeing's X-32 and LM's X-35 both had to meet design specifications, but were free to interpret the best approach.
It was a daunting task: meeting the needs not only of the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, but of the British Royal Navy as well. The latter two organizations required a short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) capability to replace the aging Harrier and Sea Harrier. Consequently, the design teams opted for a modular approach in three iterations: a strictly land-based (Air Force) version, a conventional carrier aircraft (Navy), and the STOVL machine (Marines and Brits). The program called for at least 70 % commonality of airframe parts with the same basic engine. Both teams succeeded: Lockheed Martin's design was selected.
The USAF version is the F-35A. And, incidentally, don't ask why the American fighter series jumped from FA-18 to F-35, even discounting Northrop's dead-end F-20 Tigershark (a sad story, deserving the thanks of every taxpayer for Northrop's venture capital effort). Purists were justifiably upset, just as they were when the F-117 designation was chosen. The "stealth fighter" is no fighter at all — it cannot carry air-to-air weapons, but there is no requirement for consistency or logic in the U.S. government.
The JSF X-35C (CV) cruises over open country on a flight from Edwards Air Force Base, California, to Naval Air Station Patuxent River, Maryland, in February 2001.
Lockheed Martin
The best explanation available is from an industry source: "During the JSF down-select announcement on October 26, 2001, Air Force Secretary Roche referred to the JSF as the 'F-35'… and sort of looked around the room for confirmation. A few months later the government made F-35 the official designator!"
Beltway insiders compare the F-35 moniker with Lyndon Johnson's transposition of the designators in the RS-71 Blackbird. After Johnson referred to it as the SR-71 in a speech, the designation was changed in order to prevent a minor embarrassment to the commander in chief.
Meanwhile, students of aircraft nomenclature note that the JSF has a pure fighter designator (F-35), while the original Raptors (FA-22s) have no strike capability. "Go figure" is an oft-heard phrase.
Anyway, the Air Force wanted to streamline its tactical air wings, replacing existing types with JSFs. Consequently, the F-35A is slated to take the slots on the ramp currently occupied by A-10s and F-16s, beginning in 2011. The long-range goal was for "migration" (another Pentagon buzzword) to an all stealth fighter force around 2025.
ONE SIZE FITS ALL?
The Joint Strike Fighter became the closest thing to a one-size-fits-all warplane. In addition to the Air Force variant, the Marine version is an F-35B with 600 some aircraft to replace Harriers, as well as F/A-18C and — D Hornets. The Bravo model JSF will have the vertical and short takeoff capability of the Harrier, which also suits the British Royal Navy requirement.
The U.S. Navy F-35C differs in having catapult fittings and a tailhook plus larger wing and horizontal tail surfaces. The airframe is beefier to withstand the high sink-rate shock of carrier landings. The Navy buy is expected to run to 480 to relieve the early model Hornets. F/A-18E and — F (two-seat) Super Hornets are a growth industry and will be around well into this century. The naval JSF variants are expected to reach squadrons beginning in 2011.
Thus, the JSF is intended to replace most of a generation of current tactical jets: Warthogs, Falcons, Harriers, and the older Hornets.
Simply building the most efficient aircraft was not the be-all and end-all of the JSF contract. Maintainability figured heavily in the equation, as sortie generation rates were an important part of the concept. So were survivability and lethality, though the required stealth element was a given, as was the variety of ordnance required. Both competitors were capable of a "first look, first pass" kill of a variety of targets with current and planned ordnance. Precision-guided munitions (PGMs) were going to be a factor in JSF regardless of the version chosen.
According to industry reports, some 250 officials were involved in making the selection. That's a committee by any standard, and everybody knows what committees are like. Many of them tend to analyze, cuss, and discuss a subject to tears. But JSF was different. Rather than the traditional fly-off, the Boeing and Lockheed Martin prototypes were evaluated not head to head, but side by side. At a 2002 briefing a manager said, "They were evaluated not against each other but in comparison to how well they fit the requirement."
Experienced test pilots in the audience shifted in their seats, muttered to themselves, and essentially said, "Batguano." The explanation sounded like doublespeak, and in a sense it was. Whether the X-32 and X-35 flew against each other or were rated separately, it was still a competition. The winner was the one that looked most promising in the context of the criteria.
At least that was the official view. Some insiders postulated that there wasn't enough technical or operational difference between the two designs, so the contract went to the company with greater need. If so, that was LM, since Boeing had sold the Super Hornet and was doing well in other areas, including its acquisition of McDonnell Douglas (nee Hughes) Helicopters.
Or perhaps there was another factor at work. Two military pilots known to the author have stated, "Man, I'm not gonna fly anything as ugly as the Boeing JSF!"
WANTED: ONE BOMB TRUCK
One phrase often heard in JSF briefings during the 90s was "bomb truck." The services began sorely missing aircraft such as the Phantom and Grumman's veteran A-6 Intruder which could carry significant payloads long distances. The Navy was especially hurt by the first Bush administration's mismanaged A-12 Avenger II, intended to replace the A-6 in carrier air wings. The Intruder could carry up to twenty-eight 500-pound bombs with an unrefueled tactical radius of 200 miles. However, with one-fifth the external drag, the same Intruder could take four half ton Mk-84s some 450 miles from the carrier. But that wasn't all. Because KA-6Ds had provided most of the carriers' tankers, Navy battle groups became dependent upon the Air Force for tanking, and radius was limited to the Hornet's 300 miles. The capability tail was wagging the mission dog.
Therefore, nearly everybody in the TacAir business was interested in a next-generation bomb truck.
The problem with merely counting bomb racks is that it ignores the technological revolution of the 1990s. During Desert Storm, precision-guided munitions received a hugely disproportionate share of the ink, as PGMs accounted for barely 10 % of the tonnage dropped in Kuwait and Iraq. A decade later the numbers had nearly reversed: reportedly PGMs accounted for as much as 70 % of the ordnance used against Taliban and Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan during 2001-02, and the trend continued during the invasion of Iraq.
As one Air Force officer explained, "We used to talk about the number of aircraft needed to destroy a target. Now we talk about the number of targets per aircraft." One "fighter jet" with four PGMs aboard could strike four targets with an awesome probability of a hit, and an excellent chance of destruction. Restrikes remained important, but the ordnance millennium had arrived.
Meanwhile, the number of F-35s available to conduct those missions remained negotiable. In 2002 the Air Force's J
SF buy was reduced from 2,036 to 1,763 at a flyaway price of $37 million to $48 million. Meanwhile, another 1,239 JSFs are on order for U.S. and British naval models. Further changes undoubtedly will occur in the Byzantine labyrinth of the American weapons acquisition process.
Says one consultant, "Three years of working in the Pentagon showed me some really squirrelly things in the area of procurement. The system is hosed and nobody wants to fix it because they may lose something."
IN SEARCH OF AIR SUPREMACY
To return to our question: What price air supremacy? Especially when superiority is likely good enough? The plain fact is, in the thirty years since the Vietnam air war, Americans have rarely been engaged in aerial combat. Through Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003, U.S. aircrews shot down 53 hostile aircraft; 46 of those by Air Force Eagles and Vipers. In that same period the Air Force lost no planes to enemy aircraft; the Navy lost one and maybe two. Meanwhile, the U.S. lost nearly 60 combat aircraft to SAMs and AAA.
Therefore, how do we justify gold-plated fighters such as the FA-22? The Air Force is 48-zip against Libya, Iraq, and Yugoslavia. We have not engaged a major air power since Korea, though we certainly had problems with the Vietnamese. But occasional heavy losses to Hanoi's MiGs was in no way due to inferior technology; quite the opposite. Some MiG killers insist that part of our problem was overreliance on gadgets at the expense of tactical stick and rudder skills. Top Gun, Red Flag, and other programs obviously solved those problems.
JSF is likely to live a double life in tactical squadrons. It can be employed early in an air campaign, relying on its stealthiness to attack targets within the air defense envelope while other birds (presumably B-2s) attack the hard targets at the core. When the SEAD phase has largely been completed, F-35s can then become bomb trucks, packing larger (nonstealthy) loadouts to other targets.
Close air support also is a JSF mission, though the Air Force remains institutionally indifferent. A-10s have been related heavily to the Guard and Reserve, which deploys frequently, as joint operators constantly laud the Warthog as the most valuable bird in the barn. The type is long out of production but the CAS mission just won't go away. Therefore, the F-35 will likely have a 25mm cannon for tank busting, though a 27mm was considered.
SUPER SAMS
With no comparable enemy fighter on the horizon, the FA-22 is likely to remain semi-inviolate in the air-to-air arena. Not so from the ground. We may be entering an era in which the initiative is swinging toward the defense for a change, with the major opposition to FA-22 and F-35 coming from ground-based air defenses, primarily new or upgraded surface-to-air missiles.
In recent years, Russian SAMs have progressed from the "single digit" types (SA-2 through 9) into the next-generation "double digit" variety. The SA-10 Grumble, with a range of nearly 50 miles, is optimized for use against tactical aircraft, and, with a Mach 6 sprint speed, very quick off the mark.
The SA-12 Gladiator already is available in A and B models. Similar to the Patriot concept, it's intended to knock down tactical ballistic missiles within 60 miles but is probably adaptable to aircraft.
The SA-20 Triumph represents a major leap: with a published range of nearly 250 miles, it has three times the reach of the still formidable SA-6, and is automatically operated with digital programming.
Furthermore, all three double-digit SAMs can be integrated into a combined missile and radar network affording low to high altitude coverage of a considerable area. The Russians, perennially cash-poor, have exported the missiles individually but also collectively as the S-300 system. A follow-on S-400 option is likely.
For clients farther down the scale, improved SA-2s through -9s have been upgraded with digital avionics, more sensors, and improved guidance packages. That translates into greater range and reliability, which means more lethality.
New-generation SAMs will constitute a far greater threat than enemy aircraft. SA-20 in the S-300 air defense system has the potential to destroy tankers, AWACSs, and even J-STARSs, or at least push them farther from the combat arena. The latter would result in a denigration of the almost unlimited aerial refueling and battle control that we have taken for granted for so long. The actual loss of a tanker, let alone an AWACS, probably would produce the same result.
HOW MUCH AIR-AIR?
Over North Vietnam, U.S. aircrews faced a paradox. Well, all right, a lot of paradoxes, including running orders which, distilled to their essence, said, "Don't lose but don't win." From the tactical perspective, we found ourselves frequently opposed by motivated young men who may never have driven an automobile but could do a creditable job in a MiG-21. The Air Force's premier combat leader in that theater, Colonel Robin Olds, was an ace in two airplanes during World War II but he envied his Vietnamese counterparts. "Hell," he insisted, "if I'd have been one of them I'd have got fifty of us!"
The Vietnamese quickly mastered the canned intercept: following GCI vectors to the point of a six o'clock low pop-up from the weeds, hosing a couple of Atolls at a formation of Yankee Air Pirates, and ducking back to paddy level to escape. One such loss per mission was enough to discomfit many Americans. Vietnamese hit-and-run tactics could not affect the outcome of the air war — and in fact did not — but they inflicted frequent losses on the strike package. Besides, it was humiliating to lose a $2 million aircraft flown by a professional with a master's degree to a former peasant.
The next enemy could plan to emulate the NVAF, though the God's-eye view provided by AWACSs and J-STARSs reduces the possibility. Nevertheless, it happened in Desert Storm when concern about blue on blue incidents allowed a red bandit to mix with the friendlies and bag a Navy F/A-18.
A lingering concern is adequate air-to-air training, as adversary units have been substantially reduced from the pinnacle of 1990. Things went so well in Desert Storm (34-0) that the Air Force did away with its aggressor squadrons entirely. The Navy and Marines retain dedicated "red bandits" but there are so few that civilian contractors now help to fill the gap. Meanwhile, other gaps remain…
THE ECM GAP
Electronics are here to stay: They have become at least as important as airframes. Electronic warfare (EW) goes hand in glove with electronic countermeasures (ECM), with an aviation heritage dating to the Second World War. Jamming hostile radars and communications has become even more important since Vietnam, as it not only helps prevent friendly losses but contributes to achieving the specific mission.
However, the U.S. Air Force got out of the ECM business after Desert Storm in 1991. With retirement of the EF-111 Raven, the blue suits were forced to rely on the Navy and Marine Corps to save their electronic bacon. EA-6Bs, or "Purple Prowlers," were integrated into operational plans (purple being the mixture of two shades of blue with Marine green).
It goes even beyond that. Air Force pilots and WSOs are flying Navy Prowlers today. But it does not solve the Air Force's long-term ECM problem.
The good news: Purple works. As usual, the operators sort things out and work together if for no other reason than their mission (and perhaps their existence) requires it. However, since the Navy and Marines decided to replace the long-serving Prowler with the EF-18G, the Air Force anticipates problems. The "Electric Hornet" lacks some of the Prowler's versatility, but at least it's a dedicated EW platform capable of operating with the strikers. However, some Air Force careerists are nervous about swabbies and jarheads becoming involved in USAF expeditionary wings. It looks bad, they admit behind closed doors, to remind budgeteers and congressmen that the USAF must rely on Brand X and Y for a crucial combat role: jamming enemy radars and radios.
The Air Force conducted a Prowler replacement study in 2002 and concluded that buying its own EF-18s was not an option. Certainly there was no historic reason for the decision, since the Air Force readily adopted the F-4 Phantom and A-7 Corsair II, both of which enjoyed long non-carrier careers. But, whatever its reason for passing on the Hornet, the Air Force decided to build new pods for the B-52H which will assume a stand-off
jamming mission among its other tasks. The Air Force also intends to launch a hurry-up program for electronic warfare UAVs (Unmanned Air Vehicles) equipped with jammers, affording an "overhead" ECM capability to enhance the B-52. There have been references to a couple of "black" programs that may or may not work out, but in either case they will involve considerable expense.
We can expect the 366th Wing of the future to include both standoff and overhead jammers, with increasing reliance on UAVs. While some things may indeed last forever, not even B-52s fit that category!
The Air Force's current tactical aircraft have job security for the near term, and even beyond. Some 700 A-10s were delivered from 1976 to 1984, and though the latest Warthogs are nearly twenty years old, upgrades are planned on remaining aircraft beginning in 2004. The big, ungainly looking Thunderbolt remained beloved of infantrymen in both Iraq wars, and A-10 pilots insist there's nothing comparable on the horizon: not even the Joint Strike Fighter affords as much bang for the buck. Consequently, Warthogs could still be flying in 2028.