by Tom Clancy
The F-15C/D is expected to retire in 2030, and though the air superiority Eagle has met only sporadic opposition since 1991, it's still the world standard. Meanwhile, the F-15E remains in low-rate production (as few as three per year), but the newest "mud eagles" are rated at 16,000 service hours: double the lifetime of earlier F-15s. Their dual-purpose mission ensures that they will be occupied well into the future.
Meanwhile, the F-16, still in production, remains a growth industry, especially for the export market. Even Poland is expected to obtain several dozen Falcons under generous terms.
FUTURE WARS
The past quarter century has tossed up some oddball wars: Britain versus Argentina; America versus Iraq (twice); and America versus Afghanistan, of all places. Even including the Balkan mini-wars of the 1990s, U.S. air supremacy never was remotely in doubt. Therefore, some pundits are inclined to wonder why we are spending (in the late Carl Sagan's words) billions and billions of dollars on gold-plated new flying machines when we do just fine with what we already have.
The official reason has to do with worldwide threats: We cannot assume that recent trends will continue indefinitely. After all, the last time an American plane was shot down by an enemy aircraft was 1991, and the previous air-air loss was 1972. One month's routine peacetime flying in the States is far more dangerous, statistically speaking. But there are still threats on the horizon, and some of them could represent serious opponents. We have to be ready to play in the big leagues, even if we practice in the minors.
The other reason, of course, is politics. Which is to say, money. Today, most large defense programs represent subcontractors in most states. Among 1,150 firms involved in the FA-22 program, the Raptor managed to miss only four states, while adding Puerto Rico for good measure. That translates into jobs, which translates into votes. If that seems cynical, so be it: scratch a cynic and I'll show you a realist. In short, expensive Pentagon projects combine powerful elements: jobs, votes, and power to defend America.
Besides, the record shows that on occasion America does need defending, even if only through deterrence.
China, for instance.
The PRC has one of the largest air forces on earth; it is also one of the least capable. RAND projections estimate that in 2005, the People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) will count 120 bombers, 325 attack aircraft, and 2,000 fighters. Of the latter, half are aging J-6s (Chinese built MiG-19s of mid-1950s origin), while later designs such as Su-27s and -30s require Russian support. Airlift is surprisingly small: only 425 transports of all types for a 1.8 million man army with 40 maneuver divisions and as many brigades.
Other shortcomings include aerial tankers and airborne early warning types, while there seems to be no capability to suppress enemy air defenses. Foreign observers note a remarkable lack of integration in China's own defense network, partly due to interservice rivalry that negates joint operations.
China is upgrading some of its tactical squadrons, but slowly, and without the ability of indigenous support. In other words, 50 % of the PLAAF will be eligible for the Antique Aircraft Association. With large starting numbers, the Chinese could "surge" hundreds of sorties against a specific area on Day One; thereafter the figures would decline dramatically, both from attrition and deferred maintenance.
Meanwhile, China has acquired SA-10s and is working on something in the SA-20 class.
Obsolete technology represents only part of the PLAAF's problems. Institutionally, it has suffered from inexperienced leadership — the first pilot to command the service only took office in 1985; the first post-Korean War pilot to lead the PLAAF assumed command nine years later. The air arm exists primarily to support the army, and probably runs behind the navy in political influence.
According to one study, Chinese aircrews lack adequate flight time. Reportedly, bomber crews average eighty hours a year, fighter pilots barely 100. The published figure of 150 hours annually for attack pilots clearly demonstrates the PLAAF's priorities: supporting the army. By comparison, NATO standards call for at least 180 hours per annum with a far wider variety of capabilities: strike, air combat, night and all-weather flight, and low-level navigation. PRC sortie generation is classed as miserable: one flight per four or five days.
In the 1990s the PLAAF began acquiring small numbers of world-class aircraft, notably Russian-built Sukhoi-27s and -30s. SA-10 surface-to-air missiles appeared, as did Iluyshin-76 transports. But the PRC has been too cash-poor to obtain, let alone produce, such sophisticated equipment in quantity. That may explain Chinese efforts to acquire foreign technology by other means: the reputed scandals involving Israeli sales of Patriot missiles and airborne radars being two examples.
In short, if there's ever to be a fourth generation of American fighter aces, it may well come at expense of the PLAAF — though China could still win the war. In fact, in 2004 America's first Eagle ace may not yet be born.
Another potential opponent (we don't have "enemies" anymore), of course, is post-Soviet Russia.
Russian military aviation remains potent but aging. As of 1997, Frontal Aviation included 180 bombers, 940 fighters (mainly 400 MiG-23s and 345 MiG-29s), 1,070 attack types (including 360 Su-24s), 760 recce and EW types, and 1,450 transports.
The Air Defense Force (a separate organization) included 860 fighters (300 MiG-31s), while Naval Aviation numbered 270 bombers or strike aircraft, 210 fighters, and almost 100 recce/EW birds.
However, despite the impressive numbers, about 70 % are late 1970s to early 1980s models, and 80 % continue operating beyond their normal overhaul period. High fatigue life will only continue to reduce availability.
The most advanced bandit flying today — and likely in the foreseeable future — is the Sukhoi-30. It is highly capable, relatively affordable (flyaway cost is pegged at under $40 million), and may be built in China and/or India. However, as of 2003 it remains in low-rate production.
The Su-30 has demonstrated adaptability to thrust vectoring (tests were flown in 1997), so presumably the option for future models remains open. But nobody has tangled with the Sukhoi yet, and based on the historic record, there is little cause for concern.
Other regional competitors such as North Korea and Cuba are nonstarters. Their pilots typically log ten to twenty hours annually, and, according to one consultant, "They spend their flight time trying not to die."
If history is any indicator, the next war is likely to flare up in an unexpected corner of the globe. Most likely the opponent will be a relatively small nation or alliance of such states, short on hardware but possibly long on determination and innovation. (Who, for instance, anticipated that America would be run out of Somalia by local clansmen wielding rocket-propelled grenades as effective anti-aircraft weapons?)
JOINT TACTICS
How will Raptor and JSF be employed?
Nobody's speaking for the record yet, but here are some options:
Two-plane sections will penetrate enemy airspace at supercruise or better, perhaps with three or more UAVs preceding the fighters. Drones are likely to become a familiar aspect of Raptor ops, even an essential one. They can provide decoys, overhead jamming, and perhaps enhanced SEAD capability. Control of UAVs may be from ground or airborne operators.
Raptors will live and operate with JSFs. It's entirely possible that the Bold Tigers and Wild Boars will work together in those types.
Sometime after 2012, FA-22s and F-35As would be expected to fly complementary missions. Raptors would gain air superiority over perhaps more numerous, but less capable, enemy fighters, permitting JSFs to attack targets in hostile territory. Strike planners explain that in the opening hours of conflict, F-35s carrying two one-ton precision weapons internally would dash in at supersonic speed, stealthily delivering their ordnance against command and control targets: essentially the Desert Storm scenario. The Suppression of Enemy Air Defense mission is generally expected to proceed quickly. At least that's the plan.
Once the SEAD phase is accomplished,
and stealth is presumably unnecessary, F-35s would switch to external ordnance loads. At that point, greater weight of bombs on target would offset the reduced stealthiness of the JSF, since external loadouts increase radar signatures.
Raptors also are likely to escort B-2s on deep penetration missions, affording an all stealth strike package. Based on previous experience, however, ultra high ticket items such as B-2s will still have jammer support, contrary to the Spirit's "sales brochure" which convinced Congress that stealth bombers are self-supporting. (Before World War II, Congress accepted the Air Corps' concept of the self-escorting bomber, which would "always get through." While dedicated crews inevitably reached their targets, equally dedicated young National Socialists extracted a potentially prohibitive price until the advent of the P-51 Mustang. There may be a lesson for today's world.) At more than $2 billion per airframe, however, the Air Force understandably wants to hedge its bets.
Still, despite fighters and jammers, there will be losses, to our own defenses if not to the enemy. And therein lies the next phase in military aviation: pilotless aircraft.
PLANES, NOT PILOTS?
Almost fifty years ago, test pilot Scott Crossfield stated that there will always be a need for pilots because no other guidance system can be produced so cheaply by unskilled labor. While the wisdom of his humor remains uncontested, there is a growing trend toward unmanned aircraft for aerial combat.
Today, Pentagon pundits anticipate the day when drones will rule the sky. The buzzwords are many: "pilotless aircraft," the un-PC "unmanned air vehicles," and the more politically correct (and more absurd) "uninhabited air vehicles." All refer to the same concept — an airframe remotely controlled from the ground or another aircraft.
The phrase "pilotless" aircraft is not strictly correct. Drones or UAVs will certainly have pilots — but not on board. The "pilots" will control their birds via data link from afar, safely out of danger from flak, SAMs, and interceptors. There are advantages and disadvantages:
While the FA-22 may be the Air Force's last manned "pure" fighter, the close air support mission is another matter. Though forward air controllers presumably could direct drones to battlefield targets, that's a separate issue from air superiority. At present, few people are standing up to predict CAS drones as an alternative to strike and interdiction vehicles. Friendly fire incidents are too common now: adding remote-controlled aircraft to the mix does not seem to bode well for drone use.
However, for air-to-air combat, a drone should be unbeatable. Theoretically, anyway. Once at the merge, no human could compete with a UAV pulling 20 or more Gs. With thrust vectoring, a drone would be an even more formidable dogfight opponent. The preceding, of course, assumes that the ninety-year history of aerial combat continues unimpeded, and that even in the advanced missile era, aircraft will continue meeting at "the merge" and maneuver for a firing solution. All aspect missiles are a reality, and it remains to be seen how often increasingly rare fighter versus fighter encounters develop. "Launch and leave" missiles that provide their own homing have vastly simplified the pilot's combat tasking, but they are complex systems that do malfunction. If history is any yardstick, there will still be some yanking and banking after the initial AAM picket is launched.
With the potential for in-flight refueling, UAVs possess almost unlimited range or endurance, since aircrew fatigue is not a factor. Looming brightest of all, of course, is the human factor. With no onboard pilot or crew, the UAV may be exposed to high threat levels without endangering a life. Or, more precisely, without endangering friendly lives.
Rating high on the disadvantage scale is SA: situational awareness. At present a drone operator, no matter how well informed by various media, cannot visually track multiple bogies (let alone bandits) like an experienced fighter pilot. On the other hand, it's been noted that drones don't come with oversized wristwatches or egos, and they don't require retirement pensions. It should be noted, however, that it's far too early to speculate upon the individual and collective mindset of increasingly youthful computer nerds who provide a growing pool of potential UAV pilots.
THEORY AND PRACTICE
All of this is well beyond the theoretical stage. The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) jointly manage the effort to produce unmanned fighter aircraft. The Future Aircraft Technology Enhancements (FATE) program is working toward UAVs for air superiority, among other things.
First in line was the X-39, a designation requested by AFRL. The concept combines several technologies including advanced materials, wings that change shape rather than use ailerons, advanced computer flight controls, and artificial intelligence (no snide remarks about the intellect of fighter pilots is implied, nor should any be inferred). The project is so "black" that at this writing it is uncertain whether an X-39 aircraft has actually been produced. Some observers speculate that its various components have been tested without assembling an entire airframe.
Other Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAVs) certainly are under way, including designs meant to perform their missions in space. But we are concerned with air combat within the Earth's atmosphere, and several designs are taking wing. Most notable is the X-45A, which first flew in May 2002. Resembling a baby B-2, the X-45 has met with initial success, and Popular Mechanics quoted the program manager who described the flight as "a significant jump in our quest to mature the technologies and systems required to integrate UCAVs into the future Air Force."
According to industry reports, an X-45 (with a 33-foot span versus 172 for the B-2) can be produced and operated for 65 % to 75 % less than conventional stealth aircraft. Consequently, it's far more expendable: capable of flying into the teeth of tomorrow's more lethal air defense networks and knocking off some of those radars and SAMs. That means that UCAVs lend themselves to the dangerous SEAD mission — suppression of enemy air defenses — which are vastly more threatening than any hostile fighters now flying or likely to fly in the near future. As of 2003, the X-45 was expected to become operational in 2008.
Not to be left behind, the Navy X-46 and X-47 concepts are being developed by Boeing and Northrop Grumman, respectively. The latter first flew in 2003. Meanwhile, the Army and Marine Corps are interested in the X-50, which is intended to operate without conventional runways. A combination fixed- and rotor-wing aircraft, the Dragonfly offers VSTOL performance and then some.
How UCAVs are likely to be employed in combat is an exciting what-if. Tactical integration is well under way with current fighters and attack aircraft, but the path to the future assumes an all-drone force later this century.
That eventuality certainly will be no cause for celebration in the 366th Fighter Wing.
Conclusion
Airpower is a tool with many limitations, but in its short history it has profoundly transformed the nature of war. As a navy can move across oceans to strike without warning at a hostile shore, so too aircraft can appear over the very heart of a country on the first day — or in the first minutes — of hostilities, bringing the war instantly to people and places which in the past could only be reached after years of campaigning and the loss of countless lives. At the same time defenses against air attack — interceptors, ground-based anti-aircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles — have also improved rapidly, in testimony to the threat of this new military capability. But the race in military history between offensive and defensive technologies generally works in favor of the offense.
America has recently developed two revolutionary offensive capabilities. The first, stealth, denies an enemy the ability to detect, and therefore protect against, a deep and damaging strike. Stealth is not black magic; it is a technical fact. When used properly in the design of an aircraft, missile, ship, or even submarine, stealth gives the attacker a decisive advantage over almost any kind of sensor from radars to sonars. The second capability, precision-guided munitions (PGMs), gives the attacker the means not so much to do explosive "surgery" as to use his weapon
s with a far higher degree of efficiency. No longer is laying down a carpet of bombs on a target a viable political or military option. Given the worldwide abhorrence of collateral damage from air strikes, use of PGMs is not only desirable, but may become required in the future. The combination of these two technological capabilities offers our national leadership opportunities unknown since the demise of a small and vicious sovereignty in the Middle East whose name has come into the English lexicon as a curse — Assassin. During the Middle Ages, from their mountain fortress in Lebanon, the military-religious Order of the Hashishin preserved their independence by killing any caliph, khan, sultan, emperor, or shah who dared to threaten them.
War is, after all, nothing more than organized murder, sanctioned by a government. And while war might sometimes be necessary, the more quickly and efficiently it can be concluded, the less harm is done to innocent people in the process. The very horror of war has, in recent times, sometimes deterred its necessity. This is a source of hope for the future survival of our species. The first sign of that hope was the inability of "civilized" nations to bring themselves to use their most potent weapons — thermonuclear arms — during the Cold War.
Despite deep and fundamental differences in philosophy that throughout history were the basis for major conflict, the balance of terror that thermonuclear weapons imposed (known euphemistically as Mutually Assured Destruction or MAD) kept the peace, such as it was. The weapons and the military units designed to use them, we ought to remember, were in place for two generations, always ready for a push of the button. Yet the button wasn't pushed, because rationality somehow took precedence over ideology. Thank God.