Federal troops were ordered to pull out during the night and headed for the shelter of Malvern Hill and the Federal gunboats in the river beyond. They had fought tenaciously to hold their ground—now they were giving it up. Worse, they had to leave many of their wounded comrades behind to the mercy of the Confederates. The men were exhausted and hungry. It was a very hard night for them.
Willis Church. Author’s collection.
The Nelson house was surrounded by Confederate troops, and both Confederate and Federal wounded were being attended. A Federal later wrote, “There were very few complaints amongst our men…they mentioned with gratitude many acts of kindness.” It was that kind of war. Violent efforts to kill and maim would often be followed by mercy and compassion when the fighting stopped. For some, the end of the fighting was eternal. A Federal veteran later said that “there were ten or more lying side by side. The dew had fallen heavily on their faces, and the light of the rising sun glittered on their brows like gems.”171
The next morning presented a terrible scene to the Confederates:
Yonder stood those grim guns; yonder lay the dead from the Federal infantry supports, behind improvised breastworks of rails, sods, anything, however frail, that promised protection from the leaden hail. On the right of these guns stood a small cabin, literally honey-combed by shot. Around in ghastly heaps lay the dead more of gray, alas, than blue! Gallant fellows! How could they stem that torrent of flame and capture those guns, whose grim mouths were black from hurling death!
Grave in the Willis Church yard. Author’s collection.
The same soldier wrote of a mother returning to the field, holding her child: “She stood gazing upon the bloody scene.”172
By nightfall, Longstreet’s and A.P. Hill’s divisions had failed to break through and seize the Willis Church Road. Both sides had fought desperately, with men displaying incredible bravery and devotion. Yet when all was done, both sides were roughly in the same positions as they had been when the day began. McClellan was able to complete his escape; his army would not be cut in two and would survive to fight another day. Why had the Confederate effort failed? What were the costs of this long and miserable day? What would be the repercussions?
While not the bloodiest of the Seven Days Battles (Gaines’s Mill would claim that distinction), the results of the action at Frayser’s Farm were nonetheless horrific. Exact totals are impossible to know for certain, but total losses range from 6,300 to 7,400 killed, wounded and missing for both sides, out of 42,700 troops involved. This equates to casualties of between 14.75 and 17.3 percent.
CONFEDERATE
Porter Alexander estimated Longstreet’s losses at 2,600, killed, wounded and missing. He said that A.P. Hill suffered about 1,700 casualties, for a total Confederate loss of 4,300. Other estimates vary slightly. Brian Burton placed the Confederate casualties at about 3,500, and Louis Manarin estimated them at 3,615. Leon Tenney calculated 3,573. Some of the regimental losses were appalling. Micah Jenkins’s Palmetto Sharpshooters suffered 39 killed and 215 wounded out of 375 men, a 67 percent loss. The 11th Alabama had 49 killed and 121 wounded, a 50 percent casualty rate.173
James Kemper reported his brigade’s loss at 44 killed, 205 wounded and 165 missing, for a total of 414 men. Branch stated that he suffered 800 casualties. In his report, Wilcox lamented his loss of 471 men; Strange claimed a loss of 228 out of 728 available.174
Whatever the precise totals were, the losses were severe for the two divisions involved. For their efforts, the Confederates captured fourteen guns, some small arms and Union general George McCall. Of greater importance, the Union army escaped intact to fight another day.
UNION
It was also a bloody day for the Federals. Brian Burton estimates their losses at 2,800 killed, wounded and missing. Louis Manarin wrote that the Federal casualties were 2,853. Uzal Ent agrees closely with Manarin, citing Fox’ Regiments: 210 dead, 1,515 wounded and 1,130 missing, giving a total of 2,855. Leon Tenney, in his study of the losses of the Seven Days Campaign, estimated 2,935. William Powell, in his comprehensive history of the Fifth Corps, said that McCall’s division lost 1,113. This was out of a unit that had already been reduced to 6,000 men after its actions at Beaver Dam Creek and Gaines’s Mill.175
There were recriminations on the Federal side. In his report of July 15, Hooker said, “The whole of McCall’s division was completely routed,” with fugitives running through and disrupting his lines, some who “actually fired on and killed some of my men as they passed.” An exchange of letters ensued, with McCall being defended by a number of commanders from the Pennsylvania Reserves. Hooker held firm to his position, but in one letter he did state that McCall’s command “nobly redeemed themselves at South Mountain and Antietam.” It is doubtful that this was enough to remove any strain from their relationship. Longstreet later said of McCall, “He was more tenacious of his battle than any one who came within my experience during the war, if I except D.H. Hill at Sharpsburg.”176
Of the day, McClellan (who was not there) wrote to Edwin Stanton, “Another day of desperate fighting. We are pressed by superior numbers.” As was typical, he continued, “I fear I shall be forced to abandon my material and the cover of the Gun Boats. You must send us very large reinforcements.” The patience of forceful commanders like Hooker and Kearny was wearing thin. The day following the battle at Malvern Hill, McClellan was to order a retreat to the safety of the Federal gunboats. A soldier in the 1st New Jersey remarked on McClellan’s absence, “He had withdrawn himself from the immediate vicinity of the battle-field where, had the consequences been averse, his army would have been lost.” Of McClellan’s lack of aggressiveness, Kearny was to say that McClellan’s actions were “prompted by cowardice or treason.” These were harsh words, but McClellan had taken his magnificent army and surrendered the initiative to his opponent. In the end, it was the leadership of corps, division and brigade commanders that saved the Union army from a potential disaster.177
In the end, the Federals had escaped. Lee’s trap had failed to close. His plan should have worked; Lee seemed to have his men in the right place at the right time. The Federal troops were strung out, somewhat haphazardly, sometimes not even connected to one another. They were tired after fighting days of consecutive battles, followed by nights of exhausting marching. Their commander was nowhere to be found; instead, he was on board the Galena in the James River. Despite these disadvantages, the Federals enjoyed some very good fortune this day. Although their forces were strung out in long retreat, three of their best fighters just happened to be in perfect position when Longstreet attacked. Phil Kearny, who had a solid reputation as an experienced and aggressive battlefield commander, was on the right. “Fighting Joe” Hooker was on the left, and George Gordon Meade, the future commander of the Army of the Potomac, was a brigade commander under McCall in the center. Luck could hardly have better blessed the Federal army.
Everything seemed to be lined up for Lee. Huger was nearly in position to launch the day’s battle by attacking the Federal center on Charles City Road. Holmes was at the end of the line, near the river, apparently ready to strike at the head of the Federal column and possibly seize Malvern Hill, the dominant topographical position. Magruder’s command, tired after its limited action at Savage’s Station, was in reserve behind Longstreet and A.P. Hill. Their combined force should have been able to strike toward the crossroads and seize the Federals’ route of escape, the Willis Church Road. Finally, Stonewall Jackson, the fearless and aggressive leader of the Valley army, would pounce on the Union rear guard at White Oak Swamp. If all went according to plan, at least half of the Army of the Potomac would be cut off. Perhaps the entire army would be destroyed. Were that to happen, what would be the resulting outcome on the course of the war? Would the Federals continue the fight with the core of troops stationed near Fredericksburg, or would there be a call to negotiate? Answers to these questions will never be known.
For Lee, almost nothing went
right. While fortune smiled on the army in blue, it seemed to completely abandon the Confederates. Huger did not launch the keynote attack. Instead, he was bogged down removing trees and cutting a new road. His total lack of aggressiveness cost the Confederates heavily that day, and it would cost him personally. Holmes, down by the river, accomplished nothing. Union general Fitz John Porter seized and fortified Malvern Hill, leaving Holmes’s force as barely a distraction. John Bankhead Magruder, who was to provide a reserve for the main Confederate attack of Longstreet and Hill, instead was sent down to the river to support Holmes; then, after the issue in the center was already decided, he was recalled. The action at Frayser’s Farm became a battle of reinforcements. When the Confederates drove McCall from the center and had the greatest opportunity to seize the Willis Church Road, the Federals were able to pull men from Huger’s inactive front and from the White Oak area. These troops arrived in time and saved the Union route of retreat. Were Magruder’s men in place backing Longstreet and Hill, it is conceivable that they could have given the Confederates enough force to seize and hold the road. Sadly for the Confederacy, Magruder accomplished nothing that day, although he can hardly be blamed.
The greatest disappointment, of course, was the behavior of Stonewall Jackson. The legendary leader of the astonishing Confederate victories in the Shenandoah Valley, Jackson continued the dilatory performance he had exhibited so far in the outskirts of Richmond. This was probably the nadir of his career, and the timing could not have been worse. He had failed to strike a blow at Franklin, who was commanding the tail of the Federal army. He had not examined opportunities to cross where Hampton had suggested and had not checked out the crossing at Brackett’s. Either might have placed him on one of Franklin’s flanks. Brackett’s would have also placed him on Slocum’s flank. Not only did he fail to damage the Federals before him, but his inactivity also allowed troops to be pulled from his sector and sent to the Glendale area just in time to shore up the Federal defenses that were crumbling.
Longstreet, who was one of the few generals following Lee’s plan, had problems of his own. His attacks were disjointed, with Kemper’s men rushing out in front of other units, and Micah Jenkins, Branch, Strange, Wilcox, Featherston and Pryor were unable to attack in unison. Instead of having the division attack as one, each brigade’s attack was made on its own, allowing the defenders to shift troops to meet different threats. This scenario would repeat itself, on a larger scale, in the Union actions at Antietam a little over two months later. While there were reasons for each failure to coordinate, the effective power of one massed attack on McCall’s division was lost. Add to this the failures of Huger, Holmes and Jackson, and the wasted day of marching Magruder’s troops back and forth, and the Confederates had a recipe for failure, if not disaster. It was a testament to the bravery and hard fighting of the troops who did attack that they were able to come even remotely close to their goal. One other thing stood in Lee’s way, and its importance cannot be minimized: the bravery and determination of the Federal soldiers who opposed him.
If these weren’t problems enough, Lee had even more. His army was new, especially to him. He had a small, inexperienced staff, not big enough to control an army that was so large and dispersed. The staff officers were also new to him and were unfamiliar with his methods. Lee’s standard mode of operation was to draw up his plan, communicate it to his subordinates and then let them work out the details and execute it. He relied heavily on his commanders’ ability to carry out his orders. On this day, Lee had four commanders who were not performing up to expectation (Huger, Holmes, Magruder and Jackson). He would have been much better if he had an experienced staff to keep an eye on each segment of the battle and ensure that his orders were followed. Lee did not have the reach to monitor each of his subordinates’ performance, nor did he attempt to. As a result, his plans were not carried out. Alexander later commented, “An army is like a great machine, and in putting it into battle it is not enough for its commander to merely issue the necessary orders. He should have a staff ample to supervise the execution of each step & to promptly report any difficulty or misunderstanding.” This shortcoming was crucial.178
The Army of Northern Virginia was not yet organized into corps, unlike its Union counterpart. This forced Lee to have direct command of a large number of subordinates, which was unwieldy. The staff issues compounded the problem. It would prove to be more effective to have direct command of only two or three. Lee would soon remedy this situation.
Another problem for his army was the poor quality of the maps available of the outskirts of Richmond. Lee had been stationed with the high command in Richmond. He was an excellent engineer, but little had been done in the way of producing accurate maps prior to June 1862. When Lee took command of the army, he made the creation of maps a priority. Unfortunately, much of the land the army would need maps of was, at that time, behind Union lines. Maps could not be created in time, so reliance would have to be placed on some sketched maps that were not wholly accurate, as well as the guidance of locals.179
After the end of the campaign, Lee took quick action to remove what he considered weaknesses in his higher command. Huger was sent away. Holmes and Magruder were banished to the Trans-Mississippi. Holmes and Huger were totally ineffective; Lee was right to move them out. At first, it might seem unfair that Magruder was replaced. He had bad luck at Savage’s Station and was completely mishandled at Glendale. The next day, he would come under fire for beginning the ill-fated attack on Malvern Hill, but it is questionable that he deserved all of the blame. Where Lee was perceptive, and correct, was that Magruder was too excitable to handle the responsibility that would be required of him. The most interesting decision involved Stonewall Jackson. He had been no less a failure than the others and was a greater disappointment. Lee, however, had seen the flashes of brilliance in the Valley. Fortunately for the Confederacy, Lee very wisely took no action against Jackson. This would prove to be one of Lee’s greatest decisions.
Some saw their reputations enhanced. Longstreet and Hill came out of the battle appearing to be solid and aggressive combat commanders. Wilcox and Jenkins were also aggressive. Realizing that he needed to have better control of his army and enhanced coordination of their actions, Lee decided to reorganize it. The Confederate government had not authorized a structure that included corps (a corps is a group of two or more divisions placed under one overall commander). Getting around this limitation, Lee proceeded to form two “wings.” One would be under James Longstreet, and interestingly, if not presciently, he assigned the other wing to Jackson. The army would achieve great results under this structure and with these two commanders.
In the end, it was a day of great disappointment for Lee’s army and for the Confederacy. Remarkable victories were to follow and the legend of the Army of Northern Virginia would be born, but one of the South’s greatest opportunities had eluded it. Would it ever be this strong again, and would it ever have such an opportunity? Lee’s early biographer, Douglas Southall Freeman, noted:
It was the bitterest disappointment that Lee had ever sustained, and one that he could not conceal. Many times thereafter he was to discover a weak point in his adversary’s line or a mistake in his antagonist’s plan, but never again was he to find the enemy in full retreat across his front. Victories in the field were to be registered, but two years of open campaign were not to produce another situation where envelopment seemed possible. He had only that one day for a Cannae, and his army was not ready for it.
Despite the disappointment, the Federal threat had been driven from the gates of Richmond, and as one Confederate soldier remarked, “One thing it has accomplished, it has imbued every man of ours with a determination to fight like demons.” Cadmus Wilcox said, “Had the orders of the Confederate Commander been carried out as contemplated…[it] would have been most disastrous, in all probability, to the Federals.” As for Union cause, General Phil Kearney noted that the battle was “one of the most desperate of
the war, the one most fatal if lost.”180
Thinking of Lee, Porter Alexander summed it up: “I have often thought that in his retrospect of the war no one day of the whole four years would seem to him more unfortunate than June 30, 1862. It was, undoubtedly, the opportunity of his life, for the Confederacy was then in its prime, with more men available than ever before or after. And at no other period would the moral or the physical effect of a victory have been so great as upon this occasion.”181
It was a great tragedy for the Confederacy and a fortunate day for the Union. The immediate struggle, however, was not over; it would be played out in violence and blood the next day on the gentle slope of Malvern Hill.
Appendix I
FLAG OF THE 11THALABAMA
To paraphrase Robert E.L. Krick, historian of the Richmond National Battlefield Park, one of the most compelling things about Civil War battlefields is to take human-interest stories and attach them to the ground where they happened. This is indeed the case with the flag of the 11th Alabama. On June 27, at Gaines’s Mill, Cadmus Wilcox attacked the left of the Union Fifth Corps in Lee’s attempt to break the enemy’s line and crush the portion of Federal army north of the Chickahominy.
Near the climax of the battle, Wilcox’s brigade crossed Boatswain’s Creek to attack the Union defenders on the opposing ridge. The first person to carry the flag of the 11th was a man named Maxwell, who upon first appearing in front of the enemy was riddled with thirteen bullets and killed. The next soldier to pick it up was a teenage farmer named Danbury Jones, who grabbed the flag and led the charge across the creek. He was hit first in the arm, which was broken by the impact of the bullet. Soon he was hit in both legs and then in the other arm. The flag was taken from him, but Jones protested. He said that although he was shot in both legs, he could still walk, and as for his arms, he asked that the flagpole be tied to his body. This was not done, and the regiment swept by on its way to routing the Union defenders.
The Battle of Glendale Page 11