Five Days in London, May 1940
Page 14
Churchill now made a brief statement about the fighting spirit of the French army; he had heard that morning that there was some improvement there. “Otherwise everything would rest on us. If the worse came to the worst, it would not be a bad thing for this country to go down fighting for the other countries which had been overcome by the Nazi tyranny.”
Halifax now had had enough. He began by saying that he largely agreed with Chamberlain. ‘“Nevertheless, he was conscious of certain rather profound differences of point of view that he would like to make clear” (my italics).
He could not recognize any resemblance between the action which he proposed, and the suggestion that we were suing for terms and following a line which would lead us to disaster. In the discussion of the previous day he had asked the Prime Minister whether, if he was satisfied that matters vital to the independence of this country were unaffected, he would be prepared to discuss terms. The Prime Minister had said that he would be thankful to get out of our present difficulties on such terms, provided we retained the essentials and the elements of our vital strength, even at the cost of some cession of territory.
Here was Halifax’s attempt to nail Churchill down. He went on:
On the present occasion, however, the Prime Minister seemed to suggest that under no conditions would we contemplate any course except fighting to a finish. The issue was probably academic, since we were unlikely to receive any offer which would not come up against the fundamental conditions which were essential to us. If, however, it was possible to obtain a settlement which did not impair those conditions, he, for his part, doubted if he would be able to accept the view now put forward by the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister had said that two or three months would show whether we were able to stand up against the air risk. This meant that the future of the country turned on whether the enemy’s bombs happened to hit our aircraft factories. He was prepared to take that risk if our independence was at stake; but if it was not at stake he would think it right to accept an offer which would save the country from avoidable disaster.
Churchill said “that he thought the issue which the War Cabinet was called upon to settle was difficult enough without getting involved in the discussion of an issue which was quite unreal and was most unlikely to arise. If Herr Hitler was prepared to make peace on the terms of the restoration of German colonies and the overlordship of Central Europe, that was one thing. But it was quite unlikely that he would make any such offer.”
Chamberlain “thought that if concrete proposals were put before the War Cabinet there would be no difficulty in settling what were and what were not essential.”
This was a suggestion of compromise between Halifax and Churchill. But Halifax spoke up once more:
THE FOREIGN SECRETARY said that he would like to put the following question. Suppose the French Army collapsed and Herr Hitler made an offer of peace terms. Suppose the French Government said: “We are unable to deal with an offer made to France alone and you must deal with the Allies together.” Suppose Herr Hitler, being anxious to end the war through knowledge of his own internal weaknesses, offered terms to France and England, would the Prime Minister be prepared to discuss them?
What is significant in this discourse is that the “Suggested Approach” involving Mussolini and Italy no longer figures in Halifax’s argument. His question was, simply and bluntly, Would Churchill consider any peace terms, at any time? And now Churchill thought that he could not answer with a definite no: “He would not join France in asking for terms; but if he were told what the terms offered were, he would be prepared to consider them.”10
Chamberlain thought that Hitler’s tactics would likely be to make a definite offer to France and, when the French responded that they had allies, then he would say, “I am here, let them send a delegate to Paris.” “The War Cabinet thought that the answer to such an offer could only be ‘No.””
Very well: but Halifax still insisted that he did not wish to “send a flat refusal” to the French. It was then agreed that Reynaud should get a draft along the lines that had been suggested by Chamberlain. The meeting ended with a brief discussion about the United States and the British fleet: “President Roosevelt seemed to be taking the view that it would be very nice of him to pick up the bits of the British Empire if this country was overrun. It was as well that he should realize that there was another aspect to the question.”11
But the essential matter was the split in the cabinet. Hadn’t Halifax, if somewhat obliquely, suggested that he might resign? And now came the walk in the garden, about which, alas, we have no account either from Halifax or from Churchill. For now Halifax asked Churchill “to come out in the garden with him” for a talk. Before that Halifax told Cadogan, “I can’t work with Winston any longer.” Cadogan: “I said ‘Nonsense: his rhodomontades probably bore you as much as they do me, but don’t do anything silly under the stress of that.’”12 What exactly Churchill told Halifax in the garden we do not know; neither man left a record of their discussion. It
“Halifax [right] told Cadogan, ‘I can’t work with Winston any longer’ Cadogan: ‘I said “Nonsense: his rhodomontades probably bore you as much as they do me, but don’t do anything silly under the stress of that.”’”
is unlikely that Churchill had some kind of secret intelligence information that he could impart only to Halifax. What is more likely is that he was able to charm and soothe Halifax somewhat (he had done this once in the past)13 but, more important, that he impressed Halifax that his resignation from the government would open up the gravest possible national crisis. Still it is very doubtful that during that brief stroll Churchill was able to convince Halifax of the tightness of his own views.14
There was, again, a third War Cabinet that day, at the unusually late hour of ten o’clock. It dealt almost exclusively with the consequences of the Belgian surrender. The minister of information, Duff Cooper, “suggested that the public should be given some indication of the serious position in which the B.E.F. had been placed.… There was no doubt that the public were, at the moment, quite unprepared for the shock of realisation of the true position.” Churchill “thought that the seriousness of the situation should be emphasised, but he would deprecate any detailed statement or attempt to assess the results of the battle, until the situation had been further cleared up. The announcement of the Belgian Armistice would go a long way to prepare the public for bad news.”15
Before this last session Churchill had received a long dispatch from Spears in Paris, who had had a long talk with Reynaud.16 Churchill retired at midnight, after having asked for “a very weak” whiskey and soda. His spirits were better than they had been the night before. But his situation was not secure. After two days of protracted and exhausting debates his resolution had not, after all, carried the day.
Despite the secrecy of the War Cabinet, for the first time some word of what had happened there filtered out. John Colville wrote in his diary: “There are signs that Halifax is being defeatist. He says our aim can no longer be to crush Germany, but rather to preserve our own integrity and independence. Fortunately Ironside is gone.”17 Hugh Dalton wrote in his diary: “After having studied the most important and secret papers, I am told at the Ministry that I am not wanted at the Cabinet this morning as only War Cabinet members will be there.… Some streaks of defeatism are visible in some of the private papers.” Dalton saw Attlee briefly after lunch, “Ministers and high officials will all get a high directive from the P.M. not to talk or look defeatist.”18 In neither the published nor the unpublished diaries of Harold Nicolson is there any indication that he knew about the bitter debate in the War Cabinet.19
Nancy Astor (the American-born politician who became the first woman to sit in the House of Commons) wrote in a letter that day, “The news is bad but I am told it is not as bad as it looks.”20 The Manchester Guardian of 27 May cited Nicolson’s word for rurnormongers: “chatter-bugs.” “We are now suffering from a virulent form of the rumour epidemic.�
�� The day before, Duff Cooper had broadcast to France in French. This was reported in the Times of 27 May under the headline “German Peace Trap for France,” suggesting that at least something of the secret discussions about a possible French withdrawal from the war did filter through. (People often called Duff Cooper’s public opinion reporters “Cooper’s Snoopers”) The Daily Express as well as the Yorkshire Post suggested that Mussolini’s entry into the war may now have become well-nigh inevitable. The Rome correspondent of the Daily Telegraph reported the portents: “The Duce received his military advisers today. Fierce statements on Italian radio. Remains true that ‘ordinary Italians’ remain most friendly, but afraid they will soon be involved in the war.” That same day: “New productions at London theatres this coming week … despite the present difficulties.”21 A front-page news item in the Daily Mail reported that fifteen towns on the southern coast were to be declared “evacuation areas. Children whose parents wish them to be evacuated are to be sent to Midlands and Wales.” These towns included Ramsgate, where hotels and boardinghouses “for vacation” were still being advertised in the same paper.
Items about the war were often inaccurate, misleading, or even false. (News Chronicle: “Calais Is Definitely in Our Hands.” “300 Austrians Mutiny in Norway.” “French Hold Upper Hand on Somme.” “60,000 Nazi Wounded in Austria.” Daily Herald: “Allied Troops Are This Morning Firmly Holding the Channel Ports of Calais, Dunkirk, Ostend and Zeebrugge”) Yet the general impression from the press was still that of a somewhat astonishing calm at home. The stock exchange showed no considerable fluctuation (but then neither had the stock exchange of Paris). In Westminster Cathedral Cardinal Arthur Hinsley’s sermon was interrupted by a woman who shouted “Peace!” No charges were brought against her.22 A vignette in the News Chronicle: “A man walked last night into a pub near Staines.” A cricketer, in white flannels. A red-faced man spoke up: “He ought to be ashamed of himself.” “Talking about me?” “As a matter of fact I was. With the war in this state it’s no time for cricket.” “Well, I’ll ask you a question. What did you do this afternoon?” “Read the papers, watched the wireless, and worried myself sick.” “You’d have been better off playing cricket.” One or two days later, the weary but smiling masses of soldiers in the trains, just back from Dunkirk, could glimpse white-flanneled men playing cricket on the greenswards of Kent, at some distance from the stations of the Southern Railway, where large crowds of Englishmen and women had spontaneously gathered to present tea and lemonade and sandwiches to the troops and cheer them on.
The 26 and 27 May summaries of Mass-Observation, Morale: Sunday and Monday, reported that “there is noticeable a small, but significant increase in fatalism again, in general interest and quality of opinion. Absence of news as a deliberate policy, if long continued, is likely to increase this. There are dangers involved.” On Sunday, 26 May: “There is, however, an increase in the remarks showing distrust of the papers which is not specifically connected with the official announcement about news.” On Monday, 27 May: “Opinion today is still rather confused. People are in a state of suspense, waiting for definite news. There is an undercurrent of anxiety present, although there are as many who say we shall come through all right as there are those who show anxiety.… There is a growing section of women who say that they prefer not to think about it, and who deliberately refrain from listening to the wireless.” “In Bolton there was an increased reluctance to express an opinion, as in London. In Liverpool, the opinions expressed show a great advance in ‘realism’ and decline of ‘wishful thinking’ as compared with some weeks ago.” “East Suffolk remains calm as ever, despite extensive military and flooding operations—the latter much to the annoyance of some farmers.” “Oxford: Several complaints of the papers’ lack of news which on the whole is taken to mean bad news. But everybody is quite confident we shall win in the end. Several favourable comments on the new Government.”23
The General Morale: Background Situations, issued a few days later, summed up the past week: “Throughout morale investigations in late May, innumerable unconscious tributes to Hitler, and innumerable expressions of an inferiority feeling towards Germany were obtained.”24 A numerical “Ratio of Optimism to Pessimism” (with “optimism an index figure of 1 throughout”) showed pessimism increasing after 21 May: 22-24 May, 1.24; 25-27 May, 1.04; rising to 2.17 on 28-30 May; but then declining to 76 on 31 May – 2 June, when at last the better news from Dunkirk was coming through.
CHAPTER SIX
Tuesday, 28 May
Morak, opinion, and the press. – “We cannot possibly starve the public in this way.” – Foreigners and refugees. – Churchill’s instructions and the first War Cabinet. – His statement in the Commons. – The second War Cabinet. – Churchill’s coup. – He comes through.
Let us now reverse the usual sequence of these chapters, beginning rather than ending with a survey of British morale and opinion. Throughout this period information, opinion, and even sentiment customarily lagged behind what was happening, but now there were were some indications of public opinion catching up with the military situation. Still, except for literally a few men, most people knew nothing about the conflict between Halifax and Churchill in the War Cabinet—that is, about a challenge to Churchill’s leadership and to the course that he was setting. This condition worked in Churchill’s favor. Of course, public knowledge of a division in the War Cabinet would have affected and even threatened British morale at this crucial time. In retrospect, too — and I do not mean only the retrospect of decades, including that provided by the recent availability of cabinet documents to historians — the absence of knowledge about this governmental crisis contributed to the national inclination to believe throughout this period, as well as later that summer and during the Battle of Britain, that ever since Churchill’s assumption of the prime ministership on 10 May his leadership of the nation was not only popular but unquestionable and unquestioned. Charles de Gaulle would admire Churchill’s ability “pour remuer la lourde pâte anglaise,” his capacity “to stir up the heavy English dough”: a fine Gallic phrase, referring to the power of Churchill’s speeches — but in June and July.
The people did not know what was “really” happening at Dunkirk. But by 28 May the first news about the possibility of the loss of the entire British Expeditionary Force was beginning to surface — at the very time when the tide at Dunkirk, in the direction of a more or less successful mass evacuation, was about to turn. There was, then, still a time lag; Margery Allingham recalled that day, about the desertion of the Belgian king: “Of all the blows in the wind, and there have been many, this I think was the most sudden and annihilating.” And: “Hard on the heels of Belgium came the news of Dunkirk.”1 This corresponds with the Mass-Observation report of 28 May—“all observers agree that the [Belgian] news had given people a great shock, and really shaken them up” — but “the general impression is not on the whole pessimistic, and people are still saying widely that we will pull through in the end.”2
The general Morale Survey reported “a new feature … that many people who, while making confident or other remarks, use phrases and metaphors which imply a considerable uncertainty or an admiration for Hitler’s tremendous abilities.… For many [women] he has become a secret and somewhat mystical astrological figure. Whatever he said he would do, he would do it. Low’s cartoon in the Evening Standard [of 30 May, presumably drawn one or two days before], showing Hitler in a charabanc looking across the Channel, and on the side of the machine LONDON AUGUST 18, on the back a list of other capitals and dates, each successfully ticked. Apparently intended to make Hitler look ridiculous, the unconscious effect on ordinary people was precisely the opposite.”3 Yet more important: “We do not think that people are essentially or positively apathetic. They are merely negatively apathetic, because they do not know what they ought to do or how they ought to do it and under the new Churchill leadership they still fail in many respects to conform with what might well
be regarded and easily framed as minimum requirements for civilian knowledge and co-operation — e.g. knowledge of how to deal with an incendiary bomb, in its earliest stage.…There is a tendency among, for instance, people in the Ministry of Information to think that because the Government is changed, because there is a lively Minister and a lively Parliamentary Secretary, therefore, that the mass of people have been changed too.” Yet there was positive comment in the Morale Today report of 28-29 May about Minister of Information Duff Cooper’s radio speech of the twenty-
eighth: “Generally well received, and about half of the people had listened to it. Most were grateful for his frank statement of facts, and were impressed by his confident manner. General opinion was that he spoke the truth, grave though it was, and generally gave his listeners more confidence thereby.… Each time, a sympathetic and intelligent liking for his broadcasts had become more marked, and people are beginning almost to rely on him to tell them how the situation should be looked at. In this connection it is, of course, imperative that under no circumstances would he in any way ‘let them down,’ in the future, as so many leaders have done in the past.”4
The analysis in the Morale Today report of 29 May is so detailed and intelligent about the complexities of public opinion that it may be worth quoting some of it in detail. “Opinion is still very much in a state of shock as a result of the news of the Belgian surrender. Morale is, however, on the whole good. People are if anything calmer. There is no very great personal anxiety of invasion fear at the moment, but concern for the B.E.F. is growing as the realisation of the real situation grows.”
As the Belgian news came through in the early afternoon a tremendous shock was received. But even so the full realisation of the situation was not borne in on many people. In particular they were protected against facing the full facts by rather confusing broadcast and press statements to the effect that the Belgian Government had decided to carry on with its own army, etc., etc.… People continued to believe this partly because many of them do not completely understand any news or news bulletin, and partly because they wanted to believe this.…