Is There a Middle East?
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51. Barker, “A Tale of Two Deserts.” Barker explains that Roman smelting, rather than overgrazing by Bedouin as commonly claimed, degraded Wadi Faynan in Southern Jordan.
52. See Perevolotsky and Seligman, “Role of Grazing in Mediterranean Rangeland Ecosystems” and Ballais, “Aeolian Activity, Desertification and the ‘Green Dam’ in the Ziban Range, Algeria.”
53. Anderson, Eroding the Commons; Arnold, Tropics and the Traveling Gaze; Arnold and Guha, Nature, Culture and Imperialism; Bassett and Crummey, African Savannas; Grove, Damodaran, and Sangwan, Nature and the Orient; Grove, Green Imperialism; Kull, Isle of Fire; Leach and Mearns, Lie of the Land; McCann, Green Land,Brown Land, Black Land; Neumann, Imposing Wilderness; Rajan, Modernizing Nature; Showers, Imperial Gullies; Tiffen, Mortimore, and Gichuki, More People, Less Erosion.
54. McNeill, “Observations on the Nature and Culture of Environmental History.” A recent book, however, does explore the environmental history of the Middle East and North Africa from a critical perspective; see Davis and Burke, Environmental Imaginaries of the Middle East and North Africa.
55. For details of the extent of these projects, see Ouis, “‘Greening the Emirates.’”
56. See Sowers, Allocation and Accountability.
57. Quote from a story on the BBC World News television broadcast, February 16, 2006.
Chapter 9
1. Thompson, Colonial Citizens, 1.
2. The effects of defensive developmentalist policies in the Middle East are summed up in Gelvin, Modern Middle East, 73–87.
3. See Gelvin, “Developmentalism, Revolution, and Freedom in the Arab Middle East,” 62–96; Thompson, “Climax and Crisis of the Colonial Welfare State in Syria and Lebanon During World War II,” 59–99; Vitalis and Heydemann, “War, Keynesianism, and Colonialism,” 100–148.
4. Economic Nationalism in the post-1952 Middle East is well known. For the pre-1952 period, see Weinryb, “Industrial Development of the Near East,” 471–99; Sayigh, Economies of the Arab World, 323–25; Franck, “Economic Nationalism in the Middle East,” 429–54.
5. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change,” 379–415.
6. Block, Origins of International Economic Disorder, 32. See also Frieden, Global-Capitalism, 279.
7. Woods, Globalizers, 33.
8. Borgwardt, New Deal for the World, 112.
9. Ruggie, “International Regimes, Transactions, and Change,” 398.
10. Murphy and Augelli, “International Institutions, Decolonization, and Development,” 71–85. See also U.S. State Department, “Interim Report of Special Committee on Relaxation of Trade Barriers,” December 8, 1943, RG 59/Lot 1/Box 7, National Archives.:
11. Newsom, Imperial Mantle, 50; Borgwardt, New Deal for the World, 254. According to a position paper issued by the Colonialism Working Group of the State Department,
We must attempt to convince the colonial powers that the growth of nationalism in dependent territories is inevitable and irreversible and to persuade them that the continuing close relationships between them and their present dependencies required by our interests as well as theirs can best be assured by moving with or, better, anticipating this trend. The fact that some dependencies have not yet been significantly affected by nationalism should be regarded by the metropoles as an opportunity to prepare for an enlightened and moderate nationalism, not as a cause for complacency. We should make it clear that except in extraordinary circumstances we cannot support or assist them in suppressing bona fide nationalist movements.
U.S. State Department S/P Colonialism Working Group, “A Reconsideration of US Policy Toward Colonialism,” June 6, 1956, RG59/LF 66D 487/Box 106, National Archives. For a more nuanced view of British interests in the Middle East the United States might want to support, see “The British Position in the Middle East” (n.d., n.a.), RG 59/Lot 61D214/Box58, National Archives.
12. See Alterman, Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 46–50; “Saudi Arabia—An Economic and Financial Survey,” April 20, 1965, RG59/DM/65/24:254074, National Archives; “Development Projects and Planning in the Arab States and Israel,” RG 59/Lot 55D643/Box 3, December 29, 1949, National Archives.
13. Escobar, “Planning,” 137. See also “Development Projects and Planning in the Arab States and Israel,” December 29, 1949, USNA RG 59/Lot 55D643/Box 3, National Archives.
14. In the words of Manfred Halpern, perhaps the most vigorous promoter of this view, “In this century, army coups have ceased to mirror merely the ambitions of individuals. Instead, they reflect larger forces and issues than were once involved in the frequent changing of the guard. The army has become the instrument of the new middle class.” Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa, 253. See also Pye, “Military Development in the New Countries.”
15. See Abdel-Razek to Gardiner, November 23, 1953, RG 59/Lot 57D298/Box 4, National Archives; “Development Projects and Planning in the Arab States and Israel,” December 29, 1949, RG 59/Lot 55D643/Box 3, National Archives; Sayigh, Economies of the Arab World, 364.
16. For general discussions of the place of land reform in American policy toward the developing world, see Loftus to McGhee, “Some Notes on Agrarian Reform,” December 7, 1950, RG 59/55D643/Box 6, National Archives; Baran, Political Economy of Growth, 167–70, 263–36; Alterman, Egypt and American Foreign Assistance, 30, 42–43; Tannous, “Land Reform,” 1–20.
17. See Packenham, Liberal America and the Third World; Brown and Opie, American Foreign Assistance, 383–85; Streeten, “Development Ideas in Historical Perspective,” 21–52; Frankel, “United Nations Primer for Development.” 301–26.
18. For an overview, see Girvan, “Economic Nationalism,”149.
19. el-Barawy, Military Coup in Egypt, 83; el-Barawy, Economic Development inthe United Arab Republic (Egypt), 20–21; Polk to Rostow, November 15, 1965, RG59/Lot 71D139/Box 302, National Archives.
20. For those core assumptions, see Gelvin, “Politics of Notables Forty Years After,” 19–31. For a good overview of the influence of modernization theorists and their theories, see Gilman, Mandarins of the Future; Weiner, Modernization. For Third Worldism, see Malley, Call from Algeria.
21. For the isomorphism of the civic order constructed in the revolutionary republics, see Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” 34.
22. For an excellent discussion of the first and fourth factors leading to the civi corder but within a different analytical framework, see ibid., 29–34.
23. Murphy, Emergence of the NIEO Ideology, 60; Girvan, “Economic Nationalism,” 149; Grant, “Development,” 44–45.
24. Nesadurai, “Bandung and the Political Economy of North-South Relations, 13–14.
25. Murphy, Emergence of the NIEO Ideology, 93–94.
26. Ibid., 60–65; Krasner, Structural Conflict, 85–86.
27. Akinsanya, “Third World Quest for a New International Economic Order,” 208–17; Krasner, Structural Conflict, 6–7.
28. For a good overview of the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system and its causes, see Solomon, International Monetary System. According to Joel Krieger, the American share of the total manufacturing goods in the West had declined from 60 percent to 30 percent in the thirty years between the founding of the Bretton Woods system and the breakdown of that system in 1971. Krieger, Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Decline, 116.
29. Murphy, Emergence of the NIEO Ideology, 92–93, 98–99; Murphy, “What the Third World Wants,” 62–63, 67–68.
30. See Mikdashi, “The OPEC Process,” 205.
31. Cooper, “Developed Country Reactions to Calls for a New International Economic Order,” 245–46; Murphy, Emergence of the NIEO Ideology, 112–14.
32. For a more extended discussion of how this occurred, see Cohen, “Approaches to the International Economic Policy-Making Process,” 147–74. See also Solomon, International Monetary System, 291.
33. Bergsten, “The Threat
from the Third World,” 106–10.
34. Bergsten, “The Response to the Third World,” 6–7.
35. Bergsten, “Interdependence and the Reform of International Institutions,” 363–64.
36. Ibid., 365.
37. See Cooper, “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the Seventies,” 159–81.
38. Tickner, “Reaganomics and the Third World, 56–60; Feinberg, “Reaganomics and the Third World,” 151–52; Alissa, “Political Economy of Reform in Egypt: 13–14; Rist, History of Development, 162–69.
39. See Esteva, “Development,” 14–15; Murphy, Emergence of the NIEO Ideology, 131–39; Paolillo, “Development Assistance,” 108–12; Grant, “Development,” 43–45; Streeten, “Development Ideas in Historical Perspective.”
40. Krasner, Structural Conflict, 26–27. The report itself can be found at Share the World’s Resources, “The Brandt Report,” http://www.stwr.org/special-features/the-brandt-report.html, accessed May 3, 2010.
41. “NSSM 174 Report: National Security and US Energy Policy: Executive Summary,” August 1974, Nixon Archive/NSC/H-174–5, National Archives; van Lennep, “Interdependence of Nations,” 16–18.
42. Sewall and Mathieson, “United States and the Third World,” 86.
43. Quoted in Newsom, Imperial Mantle, 142.
44. Augelli and Murphy, America’s Quest for Supremacy and the Third World, 161. For a historical overview, see James M. Boughton, “From Suez to Tequila: The IMF as Crisis Manager,” WP/97/90, Doc. #213834, IMF Archives.
45. Boughton, “From Suez to Tequila”; Tickner, “Reaganomics & the Third World,” 67; Augelli and Murphy, America’s Quest for Supremacy and the Third World, 160–61.
46. “Survey of Multilateral Debt Renegotiations Undertaken within the Framework of Creditor Clubs, 1975–80,” December 22, 1980, SM/80/274, Doc. #174836, IMF Archives; “Developing Countries’ Indebtedness to Official Creditors - Supplementary Information,” 1 March 1, 1985, SM/85/62, Doc. #98852, IMF Archives.
47. See Nau, “Where Reaganomics Works,” 14–37; Livingston, “Politics of International Agenda-Setting,” 313–30.
48. James M. Boughton, “The IMF and the Force of History: Ten Events and Ten Ideas That Have Shaped the Institution,” May 2004, Doc #216230, IMF Archives.
49. Augelli and Murphy, America’s Quest for Supremacy and the Third World, 182–83; Oye, “International Systems Structure,” 26; Feinberg, “Reaganomics and the Third World.”
50. Feinberg, “The Reagan Administration’s Economic Policies and the Third World,” 20, 22.
51. Bergsten, “Economic Imbalances and World Politics,” 770–94.
52. For Iran’s participation, see Murphy, Emergence of the NIEO Ideology, 112–14.
53. States whose economies were dependent on the export of basic commodities such as cotton fell victim to the stagflation in the industrialized North, as did those whose overseas citizens had found employment there as guestworkers. Turkey, for example, fits in both categories. See “Turkey—Use of Fund Resources,” November 3, 1975, EBS/75/394, Doc. #230271, IMF Archives; “Turkey—Recent Economic Developments,” March 17, 1976, SM/76/51, Doc. #172301, IMF Archives; “Morocco—Use of Fund Resources—Compensatory Financing,” March 29, 1976, EBS/76/152, Doc #230794, IMF Archives; “People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen—Use of Fund Resources—Compensatory Financing (Reclassification),” April 20, 1976, EBS/76/178, Doc #230519, IMF Archives.
54. Spiro, Hidden Hand of American Hegemony, 69–74, 128; Frieden, “International Finance and the Third World,” 4, 6–7; Frieden, Global Capitalism, 369–70; Tina Rosenberg, “Reverse Foreign Aid,” New York Times Sunday Magazine, March 25, 2007, 16. The lower figure for Euromarket holdings of OPEC deposits comes from Spiro, the higher from Frieden (1983).
55. Krasner, Structural Conflict, 106–7. For the effects of oil wealth on the Syrian economy and state, see Richards, “Economic Reform in the Middle East,” 57–128. For its effects on Jordan, see Satloff, “Jordan’s Great Gamble,” 129–52.
56. Beinin, Workers and Peasants in the Modern Middle East, 150–51.
57. Richards, “Economic Reform in the Middle East,” 76–77; Henry, Mediterranean Debt Crescent, 3.
58. Karl, Paradox of Plenty, 25–31; Clawson, “What’s So Good About Stability?” 214–15.
59. Bellin, “The Political Economic Conundrum, 6.
60. Henry and Springborg, Globalization and the Politics of Development, 35; Charlene Barshefsky, “The Middle East Belongs in the World Economy,” New York Times, February 22, 2003, 17; Chaudhry, “Economic Liberalization and the Lineages of the Rentier State,” 8–9.
61. Boris Bernstein and James M. Boughton, “Adjusting to Development: The IMF and the Poor,” March 1993, PPAA/93/4, Doc. #58017, IMF Archives. From 1980 to1984, 41 percent of recommended adjustment programs capped or reduced consumer subsidies. Amuzegar, “IMF Under Fire,” 103.
62. Bernstein and Boughton, “Adjusting to Development,” 6; Sadiki, “Popular Uprisings and Arab Democratization,” 71–95; Brumberg, “Survival Strategies vs. Democratic Bargains”, 73–74; Ryan, “Peace, Bread and Riots.”
63. Such protests continued in Iran which, in the wake of eight years of war, followed logic of its own. Bayat, “Activism and Social Development in the Middle East,” 4.
64. See Richter, “Political Economy of Regime Maintenance in Egypt,” 186–88; Bernstein and Boughton, “Adjusting to Development,” 6.
65. Heydemann, “Social Pacts,” 30–31.
66. Alissa, “Political Economy of Reform,” 7.
67. Alissa, “Rethinking Economic Reform in Jordan;” Lawson, “Domestic Transformation,” 51–53; Sfakianakis, “Whales of the Nile,” 77–100.
68. Richards, “Economic Reform in the Middle East,” 87.
69. Bayat, “Activism and Social Development in the Middle East,” 4. Note: I completed this chapter in April 2010. Subsequent developments in the region have more than borne out this conclusion.
Chapter 10
1. Davison, “Where Is the Middle East?” Also, see the discussions in various chapters in this volume.
2. Thomas L. Friedman, “Drowning Freedom in Oil,” New York Times, August 25, 2002; Friedman, “First Law of Petropolitics”; Luciani, “Economic Foundations of Democracy and Authoritarianism.” See also Ross, “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?”
3. Ajami, Arab Predicament; Kedourie, Democracy and Arab Political Culture.
4. Lewis, What Went Wrong?
5. Rogers, “Exceptionalism,” 7.
6. Ibid., 23.
7. Dodds, Geopolitics, 42–49. See also Ó Tuathail, Critical Geopolitics.
8. Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics.
9. See Said, Orientalism.
10. Gregory, Colonial Present, 17. See also Said, Orientalism, 54.
11. See Adelson, London and the Invention of the Middle East, 22–23.
12. Said, Orientalism, 43. On Mahan’s cultural reading of the region, see Barbir, “Alfred Thayer Mahan, Theodore Roosevelt, the Middle East, and the Twentieth Century.”
13. See Deudney, “Geopolitics and Change.”
14. Agnew, Geopolitics, 1.
15. See Jones, “Global Strategic Views.”
16. See Blouet, Geopolitics and Globalization in the Twentieth Century.
17. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
18. Dodds, “Cold War Geopolitics.”
19. Cairncross, Death of Distance; O’Brien, Global Financial Integration.
20. Agnew, “New Global Economy,” 135.
21. Aarts, “Middle East,” 911.
22. Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree.
23. See Agnew, Hegemony.
24. Rogers “Exceptionalism,” 23, as cited in Vitalis, America’s Kingdom, 7.
25. Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree, 324.
26. Thomas L. Friedman, “Censors Beware,” New York Times, July 25, 2000.
27
. Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree, 325.
28. Friedman, World Is Flat, 412, 493.
29. Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree, 325–26.
30. Ibid., 329.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., 325, 375.
33. Thomas L. Friedman, “Clinton’s Last Memo,” New York Times, January 12, 2001.
34. Thomas L. Friedman, “Don’t Look Back,” New York Times, July 17, 2001.
35. Thomas L. Friedman, “Iraq of Ages,” New York Times, February 28, 1998.
36. Friedman, World Is Flat.
37. Ibid., 485.
38. Ibid.
39. Keohane, Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 275.
40. UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2002; UNDP, Arab Human Development Report 2003.
41. Thomas L. Friedman, “Arabs at the Crossroads,” New York Times, July 3, 2002.
42. Ibid.
43. Thomas L. Friedman, “Under the Arab Street,” New York Times, October 23, 2002.
44. Ibid.
45. Thomas L. Friedman, “Thinking About Iraq (I),” New York Times, January 22, 2003.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Thomas Friedman, “Four Reasons to Invade Iraq,” Slate. com, January 12, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2093620/entry/2093763/.
49. Ibid.
50. Ajami, “Iraq and the Arabs’ Future,” 3.
51. Ibid., 2.
52. Barnett, “Pentagon’s New Map.”
53. See Roberts, Secord, and Sparke, “Neoliberal Geopolitics.”
54. See Barnett, Pentagon’s New Map.
55. Ibid., 48.
56. Ibid., 49.
57. Ibid., 150.
58. Ibid., 217–18.
59. Ibid., 286.
60. Ibid., 48.
61. Thomas P.M. Barnett and Henry H. Gaffney Jr., “Global Transaction Strategy,” Military Officer, May 2003.
62. See Luce, “American Century.”
63. See Peter Waldman, “A Historian’s Take on Islam Steers U.S. in Terrorism Fight,” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2004.
64. Barnett, Pentagon’s New Map, 6.