The Unseen War

by Lambeth, Benjamin S.

  Even before the start of focused planning for the impending campaign, the RAF already had in place a well-functioning presence of some 25 aircraft and associated personnel in the Gulf region. On February 6, 2003, Britain’s secretary of state for defence disclosed that the RAF’s contribution to Iraqi contingency response needs would be increased to 100 fixed-wing aircraft manned and supported by an additional 7,000 uniformed British personnel. This increased force contingent included E-3D Sentry AWACS and Nimrod and Canberra PR9 reconnaissance aircraft, VC-10 and Tristar tankers, Tornado F3 counterair fighters, Tornado GR4 and Harrier GR7 strike aircraft (with Storm Shadow missiles fitted to the GR4), and C-130 Hercules intratheater transports. The United Kingdom fielded 46,150 service personnel, 8,100 of whom were to support the impending RAF air operations. The deployment reinforcement provided 115 fixed-wing RAF aircraft and about 100 helicopters, including 27 RAF Pumas and Chinooks that were fielded by Joint Helicopter Command. Among the numerous RAF ground support assets were Rapier SAMs, force protection units, and explosive ordnance disposal and expeditionary airfield units.42

  The roster of committed British equipment included a third of all of the tanks that were available to CENTCOM’s land component. It featured a force of Challenger 2 tanks, Warrior infantry fighting vehicles, AS90 self-propelled guns, and some 28,000 personnel drawn from British Army units in the United Kingdom and Germany. For maritime operations, Naval Task Group 2003 was led by the aircraft carrier HMS (Her Majesty’s Ship) Ark Royal and accompanied by the helicopter carrier HMS Ocean, which operated Royal Navy Sea King and Royal Marine Gazelle and Lynx helicopters.43 It further included two nuclear fast-attack submarines (HMS Splendid and HMS Turbulent) armed with TLAMs. In all, the United Kingdom’s contribution of military personnel came to about 10 percent of the coalition total of roughly 467,000. This deployment into CENTCOM’s area of responsibility began in January 2003 and was accomplished with 670 airlifter sorties and 62 ship moves. During the course of the deployment, the RAF’s four C-17s and other mobility aircraft transported roughly half of the personnel and equipment that needed to be moved by air.44

  A potential spanner in the works that complicated this deployment evolution for planners at Strike Command entailed keeping the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD, pronounced “tip-fid”) on track in the presence of continued uncertainty, right up to the very eve of combat operations, as to whether Turkey would support the coalition’s impending campaign. Some senior RAF officers felt that CENTCOM’s leaders had taken Turkey’s prospective support more for granted than they should have, possibly in part because Turkey was in EUCOM’s area of responsibility rather than CENTCOM’s, and accordingly was not an object of daily attention and concern on CENTCOM’s part. After the Turkish government declined at the last minute to support the coalition, the United Kingdom’s TPFDD essentially went out the window as ships that had been dispatched to the eastern Mediterranean in anticipation of offloading their troops and equipment in Turkey were rerouted instead to the North Arabian Gulf and Kuwait via the Suez Canal.45 (The initial planning for Operation Telic had envisaged significant British air and land forces operating out of Kuwait in the south and from the north through Turkey. As a hedge against the possibility of Turkish noncooperation, however, alternate plans were developed for a British air contribution solely from the south. That hedge turned out well in the end, because the ability of Hussein’s Ba’athist regime to resist in the north proved to be extremely limited.)

  RAF Strike Command also looked at first for additional bed-down space to the south of Iraq for its Jaguar GR3A attack aircraft that were flying reconnaissance missions out of Turkey in support of Operation Northern Watch. In the end, Air Marshal Burridge concluded that such a move would have been both impossible and unnecessary given the existing tactical reconnaissance capability already present in the RAPTOR (for “reconnaissance airborne pod for Tornado”) kits that had been fielded for the Tornado just the year before, to say nothing of additional U.S. Air Force and Navy reconnaissance assets. Ultimately, as the three-week phase of major combat began winding down in early April 2003, the joint reconnaissance pods that had been attached to the Jaguars were removed and refitted to the RAF’s Harriers that were operating out of Al Jaber Air Base in Kuwait.

  Australia committed more than two thousand ADF servicemen and -women to the impending campaign against Iraq. The principal equipment contribution consisted of fourteen F/A-18 Hornet multirole fighters from 75 Squadron of the RAAF’s 81 Wing that deployed to Al Udeid Air Base via Diego Garcia from RAAF Base Tindal in Australia’s Northern Territory. The Hornet’s multirole capability made it a clearly preferred choice over the RAAF’s only other combat aircraft alternative, namely, its single-mission F-111C long-range maritime strike aircraft. In addition, the profusion of U.S. Navy and Marine Corps F/A-18s that were also committed to the campaign offered the added advantage of commonality with respect to munitions, spare parts, and overall mission capability.46

  The F/A-18s that the RAAF contributed to the campaign were all Hornet Upgrade (HUG) 2.1 jets that had recently been provided with improved APG-73 radars, APX-11 combined interrogator transponders, and an ASN-172 GPS provision embedded within the aircraft’s inertial navigation system. Because the upgrade program was still in an early phase at that time and only HUG variants were to be sent forward to Al Udeid, HUG aircraft had to be marshaled from all three of the RAAF’s combat-coded F/A-18 squadrons.47 Six aircraft came from 75 Squadron at Tindal, and four each were drawn from 3 and 77 Squadrons based at Williamtown. A select group of twenty-two experienced pilots was also gathered from the RAAF’s three operational Hornet squadrons.48

  Group Captain Bill Henman, the commander of the RAAF’s air combat wing deployed for Operation Falconer, later explained that the twenty-two pilots

  were selected from across the wing so that we could have a suitable residual capability, continued training, and preparation for rotation back in Australia. This was part of my challenge as the commander of 81 Wing at the time, because there were obviously going to be some fairly disappointed people not going in the first tranche, [so we accordingly] avoided any reference to an A-Team or a B-Team. . . . We wanted a balanced force in Australia preparing and ready to deploy on rotation, and therefore the first group that went over was not in any way seen or judged to be better than those people who remained behind. . . . If Iraq had put up stiffer resistance [and] we got into a prolonged campaign, it was hard for us to see, as planners, that we should plan only for three months and then not consider a rotation. So our eye was always on a sustainable rotation through to at least six months, rotating at the three-month period, and that’s what we considered.49

  En route to Diego Garcia from Tindal, the F/A-18s conducted seven in-flight refuelings from a U.S. Air Force KC-10, which itself had been topped off by a U.S. Air Force KC-135 tanker. After spending two nights on Diego Garcia, the pilots pressed ahead to their final destination at Al Udeid, again accompanied by a KC-10 tanker escort and a support element of some 250 RAAF personnel. This detachment represented the largest deployment of RAAF fighters for combat since the Korean War. On arrival, 75 Squadron was embedded in the U.S. Air Force’s 379th Expeditionary Air Wing, which had also deployed to Al Udeid. In addition, the RAAF contributed two C-130Hs from 36 Squadron and one C-130J from 37 Squadron of the RAAF’s 86 Wing headquartered at RAAF Base Richmond, New South Wales; and two AP-3Cs from 92 Wing headquartered at RAAF Base Edinburgh, South Australia, each with appropriate combat support personnel. (The AP-3C, which had just entered line service in the RAAF the year before, is a much-upgraded Orion configured with a variety of sensors that include a digital multimode radar; electronic support measures; and electro-optical, acoustic, and magnetic detection equipment.)

  Finally, the RAAF provided an air forward command element consisting of 42 of its best air warfare experts to further augment CENTAF’s overall CAOC staff of around 1,700 U.S. and allied personnel at Prince Sultan Air Base. Tha
t liaison element was responsible for coordinating RAAF air operations with the other two coalition partners and providing national control of all RAAF assets that had been seconded to the coalition. Elements of an expeditionary combat support squadron were also deployed forward to fulfill security, logistics support, airfield engineering, administrative, medical, communications, and other essential support functions. Of this group, 79 servicemen and -women drawn from RAAF units around Australia supported the F/A-18s, 75 supported the AP-3Cs, and 66 supported the C-130s.

  Target Approval Provisions

  The British contingent was directly involved in CENTCOM’s early selection of more than nine hundred target areas of potential interest throughout Iraq. The target approval machinery for the British portion of Operation Iraqi Freedom was developed in close consultation between the MoD, Permanent Joint Headquarters, and the in-theater national contingent commander, who worked together to create the most expeditious approval arrangement possible. That machinery was developed and put into place to head off the sorts of target approval delays involving coalition partners that had afflicted NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 1999 and Operation Enduring Freedom two years later, when British government approval was required before CENTCOM could attack emerging targets with American aircraft that operated out of Diego Garcia or had just taken on fuel from RAF tankers. (The Australian target approval process was very similar to the United Kingdom’s process.)

  Target approval in the southern no-fly zone had proceeded at a relatively slow pace, and decisions were routinely referred back to Permanent Joint Headquarters and the MoD.50 The anticipated rapid tempo of Operation Telic, however, would not allow that luxury. Target approval decision making would have to go from “sedate” to “fast and furious,” in Air Chief Marshal Burridge’s formulation.51 That requirement, in turn, dictated significant delegation of target approval authority to Burridge and his targeting board. As was the case for the U.S. side within CENTCOM’s chain of command, powers delegated to the in-theater British national contingent included the authority to attack emerging targets quickly as actionable intelligence on them became available. Air Chief Marshal Burridge later summed up his role in this respect succinctly: if a target was to be attacked with a British platform, either he or someone in the British contingent to whom he had delegated authority had to approve it. The same applied in the case of a U.S. heavy bomber operating out of a British facility such as Diego Garcia or RAF Fairford.52

  Target nominations that required approval at the highest levels were submitted through Permanent Joint Headquarters to the MoD’s targeting organization, whose principals would present the target requests to the appropriate ministers for approval. Such ministerial involvement with target approval was kept to an absolute minimum in the campaign. The secretary of state for defence laid out the broad parameters of what was acceptable and what was not, and reserved beforehand certain target categories that only minister-level authority could approve; those categories, however, were very few. As one minister put it, “the military men were given maximum flexibility within those parameters to go about their task.”53 Air Marshal Torpy could not recall a single situation in which the British contingent’s need to seek political clearance conflicted with immediate campaign operational requirements, because so many contingencies had been anticipated and planned for in advance.54 The only targets within the United Kingdom’s cognizance that really needed London’s approval were command and control targets that could result in a significant amount of collateral damage.

  Consistent with the laws of armed conflict, target nominations stipulated that no target attack would be carried out if any anticipated loss of noncombatant life, injury, or other harm were deemed excessive in relation to the direct and material military advantage anticipated from the attack. Air Vice-Marshal Torpy was the designated “red card” holder should any suggested target over which the United Kingdom had veto power prove unacceptable for any reason. Furthermore, with strong British concurrence, CENTCOM planned effects-based operations and selected all targets with a view toward achieving a particular military effect. Air Chief Marshal Burridge observed in that vein that “there are other ways of doing shock and awe than by breaking things.”55

  British command elements did sometimes influence the selection of targets over which the United Kingdom did not wield veto power, as well as some targets that lay outside its formal purview altogether. In such cases the American side freely accepted proffered British advice, even when not required to do so. Air Chief Marshal Burridge later explained that the British contingent felt that it provided valuable input “in saying yes, okay, this is an American target, American platform, no British involvement, but actually let me just say how this might be viewed in Paris, Berlin, or wherever.”56 In its after-action report, the MoD noted that there had been no instances in which such proffered British advice had not been accepted. It further noted that the targeting authority that was delegated to British commanders was “significant” and allowed for flexible and responsive operations.57

  As in the case of the United Kingdom’s involvement in coalition planning and decision making, RAAF and Australian SOF legal officers were also assigned to the CAOC to ensure that targets assigned to 75 Squadron were “appropriate and lawful.”58 The combined targeting coordination board (CTCB) was chaired by Major General Renuart, CENTCOM’s director of operations, with the United Kingdom and Australia represented, respectively, by Burridge and McNairn. As did Burridge, Brigadier McNairn provided senior military campaign advice to the CTCB as he deemed useful and appropriate. ADF commanders also had service lawyers at their side who vetted targets on CENTCOM-developed strike lists that were assigned to 75 Squadron and assessed them in accordance with Australian legal obligations. Several target categories were subject to ministerial approval, and, as was the case with all other coalition aircrews, Australian pilots could, and did, abort attacks when there was concern for collateral damage or if the assigned target could not be identified and validated from the air.59 In a belated but ultimately helpful additional contribution to this effort, the Australian Department of Defence announced on March 31 that it was sending six RAAF imagery analyst officers and airmen to support U.S. Air Force U-2 operations to help assess wet-film target images taken over Iraq, select targets, and assess strike results. In addition, a four-person RAAF battle damage assessment team was embedded within CENTCOM’s headquarters at MacDill AFB, Florida.

  Reflecting on the instant trust relationship that he established with General Moseley on arriving in the CAOC, the Australian air contingent commander, then Group Captain Geoff Brown, commented:

  I think we lucked in with the fact that he was in charge of CENTAF at the time, because my first day there, he sort of grabbed me, there was an RAF air commodore and I’m [just] a group captain and he’s the three-star general, and he took me under his wing and bang, sat me down at the table with him at the first [video teleconference] he was having. . . . It was interesting the way he treated me . . . he let the rest of his colonels know that I had direct access to him. At the time, I didn’t realize the value of that. . . . But the reality was that they were incredibly inclusive of us in the planning side. . . . [We weren’t even sure yet that we would get the F/A-18s there at all], but they allowed us to have a look at the plan, where we wanted to go, how we wanted to operate, they pretty much allowed us to do what we wanted to do. . . . [General Moseley] was just happy to have us there.60

  Punctuating this point, the commander of the RAAF’s 75 Squadron later remarked in his own postcampaign reflections: “If you ever have to go to war, go to war with the Americans. They set things up very well.”61

  Overall Combat Performance

  The second Persian Gulf War was a genuinely combined operation when it came to British and Australian involvement, with RAF and RAAF sorties wholly integrated into the CAOC’s daily air tasking flow. For the RAF these included offensive strike, defensive counterair, surveillance and reconnaissance
, tanking, intratheater lift, and aeromedical sorties. Offensive strike missions included firing a number of air-launched antiradiation missiles (ALARMs) at Iraqi SAM radars.62 In all, the RAF flew 2,519 sorties, approximately 6 percent of the coalition total of 41,000.63 RAF tankers dispensed some 19 million pounds of fuel, more than 40 percent of which was transferred to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps strike fighters.64 (RAF tankers, with their drogue refueling system, are compatible with probe-equipped U.S. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, whereas many U.S. Air Force tankers, which mainly employ the boom refueling system, are not.)

  One clear lesson the RAF had learned from its experience in Operation Allied Force was the need to improve its all-weather strike capability. After the Kosovo campaign the RAF stepped out smartly to acquire antiarmor Maverick missiles and enhanced Paveway LGBs equipped with additional GPS guidance, thus building on its existing Paveway LGB capability. (The enhanced Paveway II and Paveway III have a dual-mode laser seeker and GPS guidance kit and can be delivered both by laser spot tracking, if accurate target coordinates are not available, and by GPS guidance should weather or other factors prevent target designation.) The RAF also increased the number of Tornado GR4s and Harrier GR7s that were capable of delivering such munitions.

  The RAF in Operation Iraqi Freedom operated out of eight forward locations in various countries throughout the region.65 It employed fewer aircraft than it had in Desert Storm, but its greatly expanded use of precision munitions allowed those aircraft to produce substantially greater combat effects than before. RAF aircraft released 919 of the 29,200 munitions expended by the coalition, with roughly 85 percent of the 919 being precision-guided. Weapons released on RAF sorties included Storm Shadow, Paveway II, enhanced Paveway II, enhanced Paveway III, Maverick, ALARM, and unguided general-purpose bombs. The 138 unguided bombs included 70 cluster bombs that were used against enemy troops and armor in the open, primarily in the vicinity of Baghdad. The RAF also delivered a number of precision-guided inert 1,000-pound bombs in an effort to minimize collateral damage, but these concrete-filled shapes, which relied on kinetic energy, often did not produce the desired effect when they hit their designated aim point.