But as an eminent medievalist, May McKisack has observed:
Edward II had not been many months on the throne before it became apparent that English policy towards Scotland would no longer be guided by any consistent or statesmanlike purpose...Scottish affairs and the defence of the northern border would always be subordinate to his private loves and hates.
The same could be said of other aspects of royal policy. In short, Edward soon showed that he was unfitted for kingship and his irresponsible behaviour, such as his addiction to a favourite, Piers Gaveston, (‘the king would speak to no one save in his presence,’ states the Vita Edwardi Secundi), produced a reaction. In 1311 the king was forced to accept the Ordinances, regulations ordained by a committee of magnates intended to safeguard the interests of the realm. Among other things, Gaveston was banished. He soon returned however, but was subsequently captured by a group of earls and executed on 19 June 1312. ‘From that day,’ Edward’s biographer records, ‘a perpetual enmity grew up between the king and the earls.’
Obviously Edward’s incapacity and the problems it caused, presented Bruce with a golden opportunity to further his aims and he seized it with both hands; besieging castles in Scotland held by the English; waging war against the relatives and friends of Comyn ranged against him; and raiding the north of England thereby gaining great sums of money for his war-treasury from the local populace who purchased truces.
In fairness, on occasion Edward did make an effort in Scotland during this period. In 1310, for example, he advanced through the Scottish Lowlands at the head of an army towards Linlithgow. If he had expected to be confronted by Bruce, he was disappointed. Robert proved elusive, keeping to ‘caves and wooded places’ states Edward’s biographer, and limited his response to attacking foraging parties.
By 1313 most of Scotland was controlled by Bruce and early in that year his campaign to oust the English resulted in the capture of the castles of Perth, Roxburgh and Edinburgh. By spring, Stirling Castle was the only fortress of any consequence and strategic importance still in English hands.
Its commander was Sir Philip Mowbray, and in the summer shortage of supplies led him to come to an agreement with Bruce’s brother, Edward, who was besieging the castle. Edward agreed to raise the siege on condition that Mowbray would surrender Stirling if a relieving English army did not appear within three leagues (nine miles) of the castle by Midsummer Day, 1314.
Mowbray subsequently hastened south to make Edward II aware of how vitally important it was that Stirling be saved. Hence, by late 1313 Edward was planning to lead an army north, and he proceeded to raise a formidable force without obtaining parliament’s consent. This was an infraction of the Ordinances, but since Gaveston’s death the king’s position had been strengthened somewhat because a number of formerly disaffected nobles had aligned themselves with him. One such was Aymer de Valence, who had become Earl of Pembroke in 1308.
Edward Bruce’s chivalrous decision to accept Mowbray’s proposition therefore placed his brother in a difficult position. Hitherto, as has been seen, Robert had deliberately avoided fighting a pitched battle with the English. Falkirk had destroyed, or at least seriously damaged, Wallace’s reputation and Bruce was not eager to risk all he had achieved by confronting an English army in view of what had transpired on that occasion. However, if he failed to confront the expected English army then perhaps his position among the Scots would be undermined. The stage had been set for a showdown: Bruce decided to accept the challenge.
By mid June the English army had mustered on the border. On the 17th Edward crossed the Tweed at Berwick and began marching towards Edinburgh. Some have maintained that he did so along the coast, via Dunbar. However, though slight, the evidence—such as an order issued by the king at Soutre in Lauderdale within days of leaving Berwick—points in another direction: up the Tweed valley and then north through Lauderdale. Edward entered Edinburgh on the 21st. On Saturday 22nd he pressed on again and arrived at Falkirk that evening. He was twenty miles west of Edinburgh, and ten miles from Stirling to the northwest.
Meanwhile, Bruce had assembled his forces in Torwood, a forest between Falkirk and the Bannock burn, a tributary stream of the Forth about two and a quarter miles from Stirling. He had then taken up a position on a fairly well wooded plateau north of the burn to counter a move by Edward up the road from Falkirk to Stirling. To strengthen his position Bruce had a series of pits dug on either side of the road. They may have contained pointed stakes and were camouflaged by grass laid on sticks. Moreover, although Bruce could not be outflanked to the west owing to the densely wooded nature of the terrain, there was a possibility that the English would attempt to reach Stirling by making their way across low ground to the east—the Carse—and thus part of Bruce’s army was deployed to overlook the area. This is especially true of a battle under Bruce’s nephew, Thomas Randolph, Lord Moray, who was stationed to the rear of the army besides a church, St Ninian’s.
On the afternoon of the 23rd the English army approached the open ground in the valley of the burn separating Torwood from the area where Bruce was stationed. Edward was now joined by Sir Philip Mowbray, who had returned to Stirling following his visit to England. Mowbray reminded him that under the terms of the agreement with the Scots, Stirling Castle was now relieved because the English army was within three leagues of it: Edward did not have to press forward. However the king and his captains were intent on confronting and destroying Bruce. Nothing less would do.
Lord Robert Clifford and Sir Henry de Beaumont were subsequently despatched with a force of about 300 men-at-arms to make their way across the Carse and head for Stirling Castle. There they would temporarily augment the garrison and be well placed to harass the Scots if they commenced withdrawing.
When they were not far from St Ninian’s Kirk, Clifford and Beaumont saw that Moray was moving against them, having been ordered to do so by Bruce. The English thus prepared to charge. One source for the Battle of Bannockburn is the Scalacronica, composed in 1355 by an English knight, Sir Thomas Gray of Heton, whose father (also called Thomas), was with Clifford and Beaumont. From this we hear that Beaumont commented as the Scots approached: ‘Let us wait a little and let them come on’, and that Gray then observed: ‘Whatever you give them I doubt not that they will have all soon enough.’ Then, stung by Beaumont’s rejoinder that he could quit the field if he wished, Gray charged alone and was captured after his horse had been brought down by the Scottish pikes. Another knight, Sir William Deyncourt, followed Gray and was killed.
Soon the rest of the cavalry force charged Moray’s schiltrom. Fierce fighting ensued. Repeatedly the English men-at-arms tried to penetrate the ranks of their opponents. Despite their efforts, they failed. Indeed, they were thrown onto the defensive and sooner or later were put to flight. Some made for the castle. The rest headed back to rejoin the king. During the encounter, James Douglas, the commander of one of Bruce’s other schiltroms, had begun moving to assist Moray and it is possible that the sight of his approach may have played a part in undermining the morale of the men under Clifford and Beaumont.
While these events were unfolding, the English van under the Earls of Hereford and Gloucester crossed the Bannock burn and began ascending the ground leading to Bruce’s position. As it did so, a knight at the head of the column, Hereford’s nephew, Sir Henry de Bohun, spotted the Scottish king mounted on a grey palfrey and distinguished by a crown worn over his helmet. Bruce was in an exposed position. He is often said to have been reviewing his lines, but it is possible that he deliberately rode out to challenge the Englishman. Upon seeing the king, de Bohun spurred his charger forward, his lance aimed at Bruce. The king responded calmly. At the last moment he swerved aside, and thus John Barbour (whose work, The Brus, was written in 1385), records: ‘Sher Henry myssit the nobill Kyng’. Bruce, however, found his target. He turned in his saddle and cleft de Bohun ‘to the brisket.’ The exulta
nt Scots who witnessed the incident then rushed forward against the dead knight’s shaken colleagues and inflicted some loss on them as they withdrew to the main body of the army south of the burn. According to the Vita Edwardi Secundi, Gloucester was unhorsed during this rather humiliating episode for the English.
Evidently, Edward and his captains decided that it was too dangerous to move directly against Bruce’s strong defensive position. Thus, on the evening of the 23rd, the English army began making its way across the Bannock burn somewhere to the east of the Falkirk-Stirling road and proceeded to spend the night (or what remained of it, for the crossing would have been time consuming), somewhere on the Carse. As the Scalacronica comments, ‘they came out on a plain fronting the Water of Forth, beyond Bannock Burn, a bad, deep, streamy morass, where the said host of the English settled down.’ Most of the extensive baggage train was no doubt left on the south side of the burn. Indeed, some of it may already have been left at Edinburgh.
Edward II and his Army
Edward was born at Caernarvon on 25 April 1284, the fourth son of Edward I by his much loved wife Eleanor of Castile. Like his father, he had a strong physical presence for he was tall and muscular, but unlike him he was not a martial figure. For instance, he did not love tournaments. He did, however, excel at horsemanship, but most of his pursuits were more plebeian such as digging, thatching and boating. Nonetheless, Edward was not uncultured. He loved listening to minstrels, had literary interests, and was interested in architecture.
Edward became heir to the throne in 1284, within months of his birth, and was granted the royal lands in Wales and the earldom of Chester by his father on 7 February 1301. From May of that year until his accession he was termed Prince of Wales. Though disinclined to military matters, he participated in four Scottish campaigns while heir to the throne. In July, 1306, for example, he led an army into Scotland from Carlisle, received the surrender of Lochmaben Castle, and marched to Perth ravaging the countryside as he did so.
The Lanercost Chronicle describes Edward as ‘chicken-hearted,’ but in fact he was no coward. However as this comment makes clear, he did not command respect. His rustic pursuits and almost certain homosexual relationship with Gaveston (the son of a Gascon knight who had served in Edward I’s household), alienated people. His addiction to Gaveston, for instance, resulted in his not treating his ‘natural counsellors’ the barons with the attention and respect that they deserved. Edward’s laziness, lack of judgement and extravagance only added to the low opinion many of his subjects had for him. Michael Prestwich has plausibly suggested that Edward’s personal inadequacy was perhaps partly ‘the result of his relationship with his formidable father, who must have been a hard man to live up to.’
The size of Edward’s army at Bannockburn is uncertain. Barbour states that it numbered 190,000 men but he clearly inflated its strength to reflect glory on his hero, Bruce. Some modern writers are of the opinion that Edward had 2-3,000 cavalry and around 20,000 infantry. On the other hand, in a stimulating account of Bannockburn, Major Becke has argued that the cavalry probably did not exceed 550 men and that the infantry was between 6,000 and 6,500 strong.
It is true that Edward’s earls, with the exceptions of Hereford, Pembroke and Gloucester, refused to participate in the campaign and only sent their feudal quotas. It is also true that the writs—issued at Newminster near Morpeth on 27 May—which summoned 21,540 foot were issued at a late date and that not all men requested for a campaign made an appearance anyway: in 1300 of 16,000 infantry called upon for a Scottish expedition only 9,000 mustered at the rendezvous. Nonetheless, Becke’s figures are too low. 12,500 infantry alone had been summoned from the northern counties where many communities had suffered from Scottish raids and where a desire for revenge no doubt resulted in a positive response. In short, it seems reasonable to conclude that Edward had nearly 2,000 cavalry and about 16,000 infantry. Indeed these figures may be slightly too low.
The core of the army was formed by the royal household cavalry. This consisted of the bannerets (knights who could bring a retinue to the field under their own banners), knights, squires and sergeants-at-arms of the king’s household, and the retinues of the bannerets and knights in question. The royal household could provide a substantial cavalry force. It provided 800 cavalry for the Falkirk campaign of 1298 (at which time the total cavalry force may have numbered 3,000), whilst two years later some 850 men-at-arms participated in another Scottish campaign.
The rest of the cavalry was partly comprised of men-at-arms brought on campaign by lords performing feudal service—men who had to serve at their own expense for forty days, after which they could return home or stay in royal pay. Furthermore, there were men-at-arms brought by lords on a voluntary basis in addition to their obligatory quotas.
The heavy cavalry formed the elite component of the army. They rode great war-horses that often had splendid names and both horse and rider were protected by armour. They must have been an impressive sight. This would have been particularly true of the lords, bannerets and knights, with their emblazoned surcoats and shields, and their banners (in the case of the first two categories) and pennons fluttering from their lances.
Most men-at-arms possessed a lance and sword, and all would have had a dagger. For protection they wore coats of mail, though plate armour was used to protect knees, elbows, shoulders and shins. Shields afforded additional protection, as did helmets, many of which completely enclosed the head.
At a later stage in the Scottish wars it became common for English men-at-arms to fight on foot. They did so for instance at Halidon Hill in 1333, ‘contrary to the old habits of their fathers’ as Geoffrey le Baker noted. But in 1314 they still fought on horseback, the traditional mode of fighting for chivalry, and a charge by heavy cavalry was an awesome spectacle which often struck fear into opposing infantry.
The infantry in Edward’s army came from Wales, the northern counties of England, Lincolnshire, Warwickshire, and Leicestershire. The men were recruited by commissioners of array acting in accordance with the summonses issued on 27 May. It was the commissioners’ duty to select the best men available, and the communities from which the men came were supposed to provide them with suitable equipment for war.
A notable weapon common among the infantry was the longbow, a weapon which is first recorded as having been used by the men of South Wales in the twelfth century and was subsequently adopted by the English. The longbow, which was often made of yew, could be a potent weapon in strong and experienced hands. Indeed, the penetrative power of an arrow fired from such a bow is said to equal that of a rifle bullet. The accurate range of the longbow was about 250 yards and a skilled archer could loose off up to twelve arrows a minute, and when a large number of archers fired in unison the noise of the arrows as they flew through the air frequently frightened adversaries and their mounts.
In addition to his bow and quiver of arrows, an archer carried a sword or axe for close combat. Spears and swords, of course, would have been the principal weapons of infantrymen who were not archers. The infantry wore thick quilted jackets which afforded them some protection, as well as headgear such as the chapelle-de-fer, an iron hat with a brim and low comb.
Robert Bruce and his Army
Robert Bruce was born in Scotland on 11 July 1274, into a family which held estates in both England and Scotland. The Bruces were of Norman origin—they had come to Britain with the Conqueror—and in common with some other Norman families had acquired land in Scotland during the reign of David I (1124-53), a man who had spent much time in England and of whom Austin Lane Poole observed: ‘David’s court was a Norman court and in his reign Scotland became a feudal country.’
Thus Bruce had an Anglo-Scottish background and this helps to explain why he was not a constant Scottish nationalist in his early years. For example, like his father, he supported Edward I against Balliol in 1296 and swore fealty to him
at Berwick on 24 August. In the following year, however, he sided with Wallace and laid waste lands of adherents of the English king. There is no evidence that he fought at Stirling Bridge or Falkirk, but what is known is that shortly after the latter he was appointed one of the Guardians of Scotland by the nationalists and though he subsequently resigned, remained opposed to Edward until 1302 when he came to terms with the king and fought on his behalf against the nationalists in 1303-4. Edward I was not the most generous of English kings and it may well have been the case that Bruce did not feel that he received adequate reward for his services. This seems likely in view of the fact that in early 1306 he risked all by leading the rising which led to his enthronement.
There is no doubt that Robert Bruce was a brave man. We also know that he was physically prepossessing for he was 6ft tall and powerfully built. Though at times impetuous, he was shrewd and intelligent, a born leader who could endure hardship and prove resourceful, a man to be reckoned with.
At Bannockburn Bruce had about 500 cavalry and around 6,000 infantry. Moreover, there was a miscellaneous body, perhaps 3,000 strong, of camp followers and ill-equipped and inexperienced patriots, the ‘small folk.’
Bruce’s army had many veterans in its ranks. This is certainly true of its commanders for his lieutenants included able and experienced figures such as James Douglas, whose exploits had earned him an heroic reputation. As W.M. MacKenzie has commented:
Years of common activity had given these men knowledge of each other’s qualities and respect for them, and their reputations were buttresses to the host....Hard circumstances had developed and given edge to what was most necessary in the scottish leaders; in comparison, the English, equally brave and high spirited, were but amateurs or of undeveloped talents, with a few veterans.
Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746 Page 5