Hastings to Culloden - Battles in Britain 1066-1746

by Glen Lyndon Dodds

  The right wing was drawn up in two lines with six squadrons in the first line and five in the second, and each line was supported by bodies of musketeers. The wing was commanded by Prince Rupert and probably comprised over 1,600 cavalry and 200 musketeers.

  The left wing was led by Sir Marmaduke Langdale and was also drawn up in two lines with musketeers in support. Its composition and strength is uncertain. Some are of the opinion that its troopers all belonged to the Northern Horse, which may have been nearly 1,500 strong at Naseby. Others are of the opinion that the wing also contained troopers belonging to the Newark Horse, a view followed here. Furthermore, according to Sir Bernard de Gomme, Sir Horatio Cary’s regiment—which had been 200 strong at the siege of Leicester—was with this wing. In all, then, there were probably nearly 2,000 troopers supported by 200 musketeers.

  The redoubtable Lord Astley, who had been Sergeant-Major-General of the foot since the commencement of the Civil War, led the centre. Here were perhaps nearly 3,500 infantry deployed in two lines. The first, and strongest, contained from left to right, the brigades of Sir George Lisle, Sir Henry Bard, and Sir Barnard Astley, Lord Astley’s son. The foot of the second line was interspersed by about 880 horse of Colonel Thomas Howard’s brigade who were in three ‘divisions.’ To the rear was King Charles and the reserve. Its composition and strength are disputed. In part, it is known to have consisted of the king’s Lifeguard of Foot and Prince Rupert’s regiment, the Bluecoats. According to Walker, these units totalled 800 men. However this seems rather high. 700 men is perhaps nearer the mark. And what of the cavalry? Some are of the opinion that the only unit of horse in the reserve was the king’s Lifeguard commanded by Bernard Stuart, the Earl of Lichfield. At Leicester this had been 130-strong, but Walker states that at Naseby it numbered about 500, a figure which is hard to credit, even allowing for the addition of numerous courtiers and gentlemen volunteers. Other historians are of the opinion that the reserve also contained the 800 or so Newark Horse known to have been at the battle. This may have been the case, but there is reason to believe that at least some of these troopers were with Langdale’s Northern Horse for Walker comments that the Royalist left wing consisted of both the Northern and Newark Horse. To conclude, if the foregoing discussion of the king’s reserve is correct, Charles probably had about 500 Newark Horse and a Lifeguard perhaps 300-strong in addition to the foot referred to.

  It is said by Sprigge, that in their march from the East Farndon ridge the Royalists had ‘made so much haste, that they left many of their Ordnance behinde them.’ What few guns they did have on Dust Hill were undoubtedly sakers.

  The Parliamentarian left wing facing Prince Rupert was commanded by Henry Ireton, ‘a grave and solid person’ according to a contemporary, Lucy Hutchinson. He was to become Cromwell’s son-in-law. Fairfax had made Ireton second-in-command of the horse earlier in the morning at Cromwell’s bidding. The newly appointed 34-year-old had approximately 3,200 horse deployed in two lines, with six squadrons in the first and five in the second. The wing consisted of five regiments of New Model cavalry and a squadron of the Associated Horse. Ireton opted to ride with his first line.

  The right wing was led by Cromwell. It was drawn up in three lines and the ground before it was rough, included a rabbit warren, and fell away more steeply than elsewhere. In the front line were five squadrons under his kinsman Edward Whalley. Like the majority of troopers under his command, Whalley had served in the ‘Ironsides.’ To the rear of the squadron on the right of the line, and somewhat to the right, was half of Colonel Edward Rossiter’s regiment—a unit that had just arrived on the scene in time to participate in the battle. Then came the second line under Cromwell. This consisted of four squadrons covering the intervals between those of the first line. Behind, three squadrons made up the third line. This consisted of the remainder of Rossiter’s regiment, half of Colonel Fiennes’ regiment (the rest of which was in the second line), and a squadron of the Associated Horse. It will be remembered that Fiennes’ regiment and the Associated Horse were non-New Model units. In all, Cromwell probably had about 3,500 men.

  Sprigge relates that a forlorn hope consisting of about 300 musketeers was deployed in front of the infantry in the centre, ‘down the steep of the hill towards the enemy, somewhere more than Carbine shot from the Main battail, who were ordered to retreat to the battail, whensoever they should be hard pressed upon by the enemy.’ Behind, the infantry under Skippon was marshalled in two lines, with five regiments in the first line and two in the second, together with half of Edward Harley’s regiment: the rest of his unit formed the reserve. As for the artillery, the majority of guns were placed in pairs in the intervals along the front line.

  And what of Okey’s dragoons? Okey tells us that he was giving his men ammunition in a meadow half a mile behind the rest of the army, when Cromwell rode up and ordered him to flank the New Model’s left wing. As a result the dragoons took up a position along Sulby Hedges, which ran north from near Ireton’s wing towards Dust Hill. The hedges were long and winding, no doubt thicker in some places than elsewhere, and contained at least one close.

  It seems that the battle began just after Okey’s men took up their position, or indeed before they had fully deployed. It was probably approaching 11.00am when it did so, and it was the Royalists who took the offensive. Their battle cry was ‘Queen Mary’, (the Parliamentarians’ was ‘God our Strength’), and presumably the signal for the advance was a salvo from the biggest guns. Events on the west side of the field will be discussed first.

  If Okey’s account of the battle is accepted at face value, some of Rupert’s horse fanned out to the west and advanced on the far side of Sulby Hedges while the remainder moved directly towards Ireton. However, Okey’s account is rather garbled and it is generally accepted that Rupert’s wing in its entirety advanced to the east of the hedges.

  It is sometimes said that Rupert allowed Astley’s foot in the centre to progress well across Broad Moor before he moved forward, and that his horse would have been abreast of the infantry within a few minutes. But de Gomme’s sketch-map mentioned earlier shows that Rupert’s horse were supported by musketeers, and it is thus reasonable to suppose that the prince advanced at the same time as Astley, or at most very shortly thereafter.

  As cavalry can walk faster than men, especially men encumbered by weaponry, Rupert no doubt drew ahead of the infantry and his supporting musketeers. At some point he therefore halted. Sprigge relates that: ‘Upon the approach of the Enemies Right wing of Horse, our left wing [drew] down the brow of the hill to meet them,’ and that it was this slight advance on the part of Ireton which caused the Royalists to halt ‘as if they had not expected us in so ready a posture.’

  It seems, rather, that Rupert drew rein in order to let his musketeers catch up, dress the lines of his horse, and allow Astley to draw abreast, or even ahead somewhat. For his part, Ireton likewise halted. Sprigge relates that upon seeing Rupert halt the Parliamentarian commander ‘made a little stand also, partly by reason of some disadvantage of the ground, untill the rest of the Divisions [squadrons] of horse might recover their stations.’

  Presently, ‘the Enemy advanced again’, and Ireton responded in kind. Of this phase of the battle, Young has commented:

  The Prince, satisfied that his musketeers had caught up, and that Astley’s orderly tertias were progressing relentlessly across the valley, gave the signal to continue the advance. Almost at once the opposing regiments were in motion, and in an incredibly short space of time were within range. The panting musketeers doubled into the gaps between the squadrons and loosed off their volleys at the Roundhead horse. This was the moment for the charge.

  According to Okey’s account, as the Royalists drew near, his men ‘with shooting and rejoycing received them.’ Moreover another New Model officer, Colonel Edward Wogan, states that the dragoons ‘did mightily annoy the King’s right wing of h
orse, as they advanced towards us’, while a Royalist veteran of the battle, Sir Henry Slingsby, tells us that the Parliamentarians ‘possess’d an Hedge upon our right wing wch they had lin’d wth Musqueteers to Gall our horse, (as indeed they did) before we could come up to charge theirs.’

  In view of this, it seems likely, contrary to Young’s opinion, that the Royalist musketeers did not have an opportunity to fire at the Roundhead horse for their own cavalry, galled somewhat by the fire of Okey’s dragoons, must have very soon accelerated to the charge leaving them behind and most, if not all, of them likely fell back to join Rupert’s second line.

  According to Sprigge, it was the left-hand squadrons of the Royalist front line which clashed first with the enemy. They did so against squadrons on the right of Ireton’s first line, i.e., Ireton’s own squadron and the right squadron of Vermuyden’s regiment, a regiment led at Naseby by Major Robert Huntingdon. They did not do well. Prince Maurice’s regiment was routed by Ireton, while the left squadron of Prince Rupert’s regiment was overcome by the other Roundhead unit. Between the Royalist bodies referred to was the Queen’s regiment and Sprigge comments that although this did not come to blows with Ireton’s second squadron—which failed to charge home—it was nonetheless ‘carried away in the disorder’ caused by the failure of Prince Maurice’s regiment and the left squadron of Prince Rupert’s.

  Perhaps this was so. But it also seems possible that Ireton’s second squadron failed to close with the Queen’s regiment because the Roundhead units flanking it advanced with more alacrity than it, and for one reason or another, encroached on the ground over which it would have ridden. If this were so, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Queen’s regiment saw some action and that its discomfiture was at least partly due to an assault by troopers belonging to Ireton’s own squadron and the right squadron of Vermuyden’s regiment, which together outnumbered the combined strength of the three Royalist units referred to.

  According to Sprigge, after the failure of the left-hand squadrons of Rupert’s front line, Ireton saw ‘one of the enemies Brigades of Foot on his right hand, pressing sore upon our Foot,’ and thus charged against it at the head of his squadron. When it is borne in mind that the infantry battle was raging further back than where Ireton clashed with Rupert’s horse, it becomes clear that such a move would have necessitated a retrograde movement on his part. Perhaps this was the case. It seems more likely, though, that Ireton rode against the right flank of Astley’s second line. Whichever view is correct, Ireton’s assault must have come as an unpleasant shock to the men he rode against and no doubt caused some disruption. Nevertheless in the encounter the Royalist foot (who were perhaps supported by some of Howard’s troopers), evidently came out on top. Ireton himself, had his horse shot from under him, was struck in the thigh by a pike, and hit in the face by an halberd. He was compelled to surrender, but managed to regain his freedom later in the battle.

  On the other hand, the right squadron of Vermuyden’s regiment had charged on towards Rupert’s second line, only to be routed by the opposing Cavaliers. This also seems to have been true of Ireton’s left-hand squadron.

  And how did events unfolded elsewhere on this wing? Did the Roundheads also at least initially prevail against the opposing squadrons, or was it a different story? It was a different story. The left-hand squadron of Vermuyden’s regiment clashed with the remainder of Rupert’s regiment, while the two squadrons of Colonel John Butler’s regiment (which was on the left of Ireton’s front line), came to blows with the Lifeguards of the prince and his brother, Maurice: for some reason, perhaps more difficult going, Butler’s men had not advanced as far as the squadrons to their right. How long the opposing units were engaged is uncertain. But sooner or later, as Walker notes, and despite the losses sustained by fire from Okey’s dragoons, the Cavaliers ‘did so well, and were so well seconded [by troopers of the second line which consisted of the regiments of the Earl of Northampton, Sir William Vaughan, and perhaps Sir George Boncle], that they bore all down before them.’

  Hence Butler’s regiment and the left-hand squadron of Vermuyden’s were overcome. So too, for that matter, were the squadrons of Ireton’s second line which consisted, from left to right, of the regiments of Colonel Nathaniel Rich and Colonel Charles Fleetwood, and a squadron of the Associated Horse. As Lord Belasyse recalled of events here, the cavalry under Rupert ‘beat the enemy off their ground, and pursued them.’ The pursuit will be discussed later, but before turning attention to the infantry battle, we should note that by this stage in the proceedings Rupert’s supporting musketeers were evidently engaged in a fire-fight with Okey’s dragoons, who it seems at some point also received the attention of Royalist horse. Of this more will be said later.

  In the centre, a fierce battle was raging. As Astley’s foot had drawn near, the Roundhead forlorn hope fired before falling back towards Skippon’s front line, and Sprigge relates that: ‘Upon the Enemies approach, the Parliaments army marcht up to the brow of the hill .... The Enemy this while marched up in good order, a swift march, with a great deal of gallantry and resolution.’

  Of the resultant clash, Walker recalled:

  our Forces advanced up the Hill, the Rebels only discharging five Pieces at them, but over shot them, and so did their Musquetiers. The Foot on either side hardly saw each other until they were within Carbine Shot, and so only made one Volley; ours falling in with Sword and butt end of the Musquet did notable execution; so much as I saw their Colours fall, and their Foot in great Disorder.

  On the right of the New Model front line Fairfax’s regiment of foot fared well, for as Sprigge notes it was not ‘much pressed upon.’ This was because the Parliamentarian front line was longer than that of the numerically inferior Royalists. The rest of the line consisted, from left to right, of the regiments of Skippon, Sir Hardress Waller, John Pickering, and Edward Montagu, and here, as noted, on the whole the Roundheads were in trouble.

  It is not just Walker who states that this was so. Sprigge, for instance, wrote:

  Almost all the rest of the main Battail being overpressed, gave ground and went off in some disorder, falling behinde the Reserves; But the Colonels and Officers, doing the duty of very gallant men, in endeavouring to keep their men from disorder, and finding their attempt fruitless therein, fell into the Reserves with their Colours, choosing rather there to fight and die, then to quit the ground they stood on.

  Even if allowance is made for exaggeration, it is clear that the situation was serious for the Parliamentarians. Skippon was one of the New Model officers who did his best to prevent the line from disintegrating. After the battle, Fairfax wrote of him, that though he ‘was shot thro’ his side . . . he continued in the ffielde with great resolution,’ and when told by Fairfax to retire, retorted that ‘he would not goe so long as a man would stand.’

  It was Fairfax who restored the situation. He ordered forward the remainder of the foot. The regiments in question were those of Edward Harley (commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Pride), Robert Hammond, and Thomas Rainsborough. According to Sprigge, the arrival of these units did more than restore matters. It turned the tide, repelling the enemy and ‘forcing them into a disorderly retreat.’ That the Royalist foot were sooner or later pushed back in disorder, despite intervention by their second line, is undoubted. But as will be seen, there is reason to attribute this, at least in part, to the action of others.

  Why did the Royalist front line initially do so well? It is often said that its success was due to the fact that it was mainly comprised of veterans, in contrast to the Roundhead line it came against. That the bulk of Astley’s foot consisted of experienced soldiers is a reasonable view, but it is incorrect to view the New Model foot as primarily composed of recent conscripts. The majority of Skippon’s men had belonged to the three armies merged to form parliament’s new war machine and many were thus not strangers to battle.


  It is surely more reasonable to attribute the Royalists’ success primarily to the speed and ferocity of their assault. Instead of halting when near the enemy and engaging in a fire-fight, they closed in for the kill after firing only one volley. As Barry Denton has commented, ‘the volley and quick charge had its success this day.’

  Furthermore, Skippon’s wounding must have played a part in unsettling the Roundheads, a factor mentioned by Wogan, ‘our foot gave ground and were in a manner running away’ owing in part to ‘Skippon’s being desperately wounded.’

  It is time to discuss the clash between Cromwell and Langdale. As has been noted, the ground before Cromwell’s position fell away more steeply than elsewhere on the field and was more treacherous. Consequently, it seems likely that Cromwell came to blows with Langdale after Ireton and Rupert had engaged on the other wing.

  Sprigge relates that Cromwell, ‘not thinking it fit to stand and receive the Enemies charge’ advanced against the oncoming Royalists. Edward Whalley’s two squadrons on the left of Cromwell’s front line were the first to clash with the enemy after they, and their adversaries, had fired their pistols at each other at almost point-blank range. The troopers then set to work with their swords. Whalley’s men apparently quickly triumphed, and their opponents fell back towards Rupert’s Bluecoats where ‘they fled for shelter, and rallied.’

  And what of the remainder of Cromwell’s command? How did it fare? According to Sprigge, after advancing ‘with great difficulty’ owing to the presence of gorse bushes and the rabbit warren, the other squadrons of the front line engaged the rest of Langdale’s first line before the collapse of the Royalists assailed by Whalley. Weight of numbers soon told. The Cavaliers were pushed back and, to add to their difficulties, were attacked on their left flank by Rossiter. Furthermore, following the success of Whalley, Colonel Sheffield’s regiment on the left of the Parliamentarian second line, advanced and evidently attacked the right flank of the hard-pressed Royalists. Thus, not surprisingly, sooner or later the remainder of Langdale’s men—who seem to have received support from some of the Newark Horse of the king’s reserve—gave up and, like their comrades routed earlier, fell back in disorder. Presumably many of the troopers quit the field altogether.