The Muslim Brotherhood

by Alison Pargeter

  The Brotherhood may have been able to justify such behaviour in the past by the difficult circumstances it was forced to operate in and which necessitated a degree of secrecy. Now, however, the movement can no longer hide behind such explanations. The Brotherhood, or its political parties at least, have no choice but to do things out in the open and in the eye of full public scrutiny. Yet the Brotherhood is painfully aware that opening up and reforming its own way of doing things risks the coming to the fore of the factionalism that has dogged the movement for generations. If it abandons the principle of complete obedience in favour of true democracy within its ranks, the Brotherhood may inadvertently find itself a more factionalised and weaker organisation as a result. Thus while the Brotherhood is likely to engage in some cosmetic attempts at opening up and proving that it is operating in a more transparent fashion, it is unlikely to change the habits of a lifetime.

  Moreover, while the Brotherhood leadership might have been keen to promote the concept of democratic principles in recent years, these ideas have rarely filtered down to the grass roots.14 The reform platforms the movement came up with in the 2000s, for example, remained in the realm of the Guidance Office and the elite of the movement and the ideas expressed in them weren’t incorporated into the movement’s teaching. As one Egyptian commentator has observed, ‘The Muslim Brotherhood presents a political discourse that asserts its acceptance of democracy and pluralism, but this is not clearly reflected in its literature, nor in its educational system. Many of the books they teach inside the organisation rely upon literature and books which Al-Jama’a claim they have gone beyond.’15 The Ikhwan allegedly still teaches the works of some of its most conservative thinkers, including not only the works of Sayyid Qutb, but also Mustafa Mashour, including his book Tariq al-dawa bayna al-isalah wal inhiraf (The Path of Al-Dawa: Between Reform and Deviation) which teaches that any difference of opinion in ideology is something that has to be avoided at all costs.16 As Tamam has observed, ‘There isn’t one book that consolidates democratic values. Rather they have books that reject differences and pluralism inside the Ikhwani idea itself.’17 That there is such a limited culture of democracy or democratic tradition within the Brotherhood (and among its grass roots especially) is hardly surprising. The Ikhwan emerged in a part of the world that prior to the Arab Spring had little direct experience with democracy other than through the sham elections instituted by the former regimes. It is perhaps not surprising, therefore, that for the Ikhwan, democracy is still essentially about elections and voting rather than being a wider concept of democratic culture related to individual rights and freedoms. One of the Brotherhood’s anxieties with liberal democracy is that it prioritises the individual over society, which for the movement has a negative impact on public morality. As Brotherhood spokesman, Mahmoud Ghazlan, has remarked, ‘Ultimate sovereignty in Western democracy belongs to the people, and that gives them the right to legislate anyway they want, regardless of what is considered from a shar’i point of view as halal (licit) or haram (illicit), or even if it contradicted moral principles, such as not to commit adultery, homosexuality, alcohol, and gambling … All these are deplorable issues, but still are considered legal in the West.’18 Even al-Ghannouchi’s concept of Islamic democracy asserts that Muslim societies can follow the same democratic political traditions and processes that are employed in the West, but that the ‘Islamic contribution’ should be ‘primarily in the form of a code of ethics, a transcendent morality that seems to have no place in today’s democratic practice … What Islam provides is not only a set of values for self-discipline and for the refinement of human conduct but also a set of restrictions to combat monopoly and a set of safeguards to protect public opinion.’19

  These anxieties over public morality have been present in the Ikhwan since its very beginnings. Hassan al-Banna’s first forays into Islamic activism were through a series of Islamic societies that focused their efforts on preventing moral offences such as the Society for Moral Behaviour whose activities included composing and distributing ‘secret and often threatening letters, to those they regarded as living in violation of the teachings of Islam’.20 Moreover given that the Ikhwan is among the most conservative forces in the region, it is hardly surprising that such concerns feed right into the heart of its debates about democratic models. In the Egyptian Ikhwan’s reform initiative of 2004, alongside the talk about the commitment to ‘freedom of individual beliefs’, the Brotherhood also asserts that cultural reform will be undertaken in ‘papers, magazines, radio and television, so as to establish its material and work on Islamic values and principles … This protects the individual from ignorance and Westernisation and does away with messing up with moral principles and falling into sins and trivialities.’21

  Similar concerns have continued to preoccupy the Brotherhood into the post-revolution phase. In a statement posted on its website in November 2012, the Brotherhood declared, ‘Sharia awakens faith, reforms behaviour, improves the general environment of the whole society, and polishes morals, through persuasion and education, with no coercion whatsoever.’22 For all its talk of democracy therefore the Brotherhood remains intent on reforming the individual, suggesting that the movement sees no real distinction between being the guardian of morality and being the ruling power. This poses serious concerns not only for Egypt’s liberal elements, but also for the country’s minorities.

  Given these concerns, all eyes have been watching how the Brotherhood and its counterparts have dealt with the constitution writing process. The challenge has perhaps been easier for the Libyan Ikhwan, where given the conservative and traditional orientation of the population that is almost exclusively Sunni Muslim, there is a broad consensus that Sharia should be cited in the constitution as the main source of legislation. However, there is still likely to be some disagreement among the various political players in Libya over the extent to which Sharia should be implemented and institutionalised.

  An-Nahda, meanwhile, chose to play it safe. In line with its more progressive outlook, the party opted not to push for any change to Article One of Chapter One of the 1957 constitution, which states that Tunisia is ‘a free, independent and sovereign state. Its religion is Islam, its language is Arabic.’ An-Nahda’s decision not to push for Sharia to be cited as the primary source of legislation was controversial, particularly among the more hard line elements within the party who objected to such a stance. However, the more moderate and dominant wing prevailed.

  The Egyptian Ikhwan, however, faced a far more troublesome dilemma in this respect. This is because the Brotherhood found itself caught between two opposing camps with vastly divergent views on the constitution, neither of which the movement could afford to ignore. On one side were the secular liberals, who feared that enshrining a greater role for Sharia would limit personal freedoms and individual rights. With them were the Copts, who were particularly anxious about explicit references to the Islamic identity of the Egyptian state. On the other side of the debate were the Salafists, who were insistent that the constitution prioritise the role of Sharia even more forcefully and who went as far as to demand that Article Two of the old constitution which states that the ‘principles of Sharia’ are the main source of legislation be altered in order for the document to specify that Sharia be implemented in its entirety. To complicate matters further for the movement, it was not only the Salafists that the Brotherhood had to please on this front. Many of the movement’s grass roots supporters were also expectant that the Brotherhood would move to implement Sharia law. Indeed, this is what many believed they voted for when they gave the Brotherhood their support in the elections.

  As such the Brotherhood found itself having to tread a careful middle path. While ideologically and religiously the movement broadly supported the Salafists’ position and would have liked to have backed the full implementation of Sharia law, in the end it sought to appease both sides by taking a characteristically gradual approach. Thus, while it did not seek to alter the wo
rding of Article Two of the constitution, content to rely on ‘principles of Sharia’ being the main source of legislation, it pushed for the inclusion of a new article (Article 219) which stipulated that ‘The principles of Islamic Sharia include general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community.’ It also pushed for the inclusion of a new clause stipulating that the official religious establishment of Al-Azhar should be consulted on matters related to Islamic law. Thus while it did not push for the full implementation of sharia law, it sought to amplify the Islamic nature of the constitution. This may have caused uproar among Egypt’s secular elements, but it was a clear bid by the Brotherhood to maintain its religious legitimacy while working within the constraints it was being forced to operate in.

  Maintaining its religious legitimacy has been more essential than ever for the Brotherhood. This is because the Arab Spring not only catapulted the Brotherhood into the mainstream, it also unleashed the Salafists, who have emerged as a powerful and growing force not only in Egypt, but across the region. Salafist currents in their various forms and shades were gaining in popularity prior to the Arab Spring. Indeed, the growth of Salafism was a key preoccupation for the Brotherhood at that time, with the movement fearing that the Salafists were muscling in on its natural constituency. The flourishing of the Salafists after the revolution, the decision by some Salafist elements to form political parties, and, in the Egyptian case, the surprise success of the Salafists in the parliamentary elections, have been a sobering wake up call for the Brotherhood. As one member complained, the Salafists in the form of the Al-Nour party are ‘directly attacking our core’.23

  The Salafists with their more rigid and ‘purer’ interpretation of Islam are serving as a serious pressure on the Brotherhood across the region. This is particularly the case in Tunisia where some Salafist groups have steadily upped the pressure on the ruling party. In perhaps the most extreme example, in November 2012, Salafist cleric, Nasr al-Din al-Alawi, appeared in a television interview alongside Interior Minister Ali Larayed in which the former called upon Salafist youths in Tunisia to declare jihad against An-Nahda.24 But in all three countries the Salafists are condemning the Brotherhood for not being Islamic enough.

  This leaves the Brotherhood in a serious dilemma. The movement is painfully aware that the more it concedes on core religious principles and the more it is forced by the demands of realpolitik to compromise on issues such as foreign policy, minority rights and the role of women, the more it risks losing some of its more conservative support base to the Salafist current. In order to get around this problem, the Brotherhood may ultimately choose to play it extra tough on issues of public morality, in the hopes that this will satisfy its support base and thereby give it the flexibility it needs in other spheres, such as the economy or foreign policy.

  Yet foreign policy, or rather the Brotherhood’s relations with the Western world, presents a particular challenge for the Brotherhood. Like the nationalist regimes before it, the Brotherhood has always relied upon anti-Westernism as a rallying cry and as a means of securing popular support. This does not mean that the movement has been averse to engaging with the US government where possible. Even prior to the revolution, while it was spouting anti-US rhetoric, some Egyptian Brotherhood parliamentarians proved willing to meet with US diplomats. After the revolution, the Egyptian Brotherhood was equally keen to meet with US officials, clearly calculating that the regional and international legitimacy it stood to gain from being recognised by Washington outweighed the populist kudos it might have won from a premature clash with the US.25

  Now, however, the Brotherhood has to forge a new relationship with the West and with the US in particular. This is particularly pertinent for the Egyptian Brotherhood. Given that Egypt receives around $1.5 billion dollars in US aid plus other support each year, the Brotherhood can hardly afford to turn its back upon such an important donor. Yet the movement knows that its support base remains largely sceptical at best about US intentions in Egypt and in the region more widely. The strategy adopted by the movement therefore has been to take a middle course, to demonstrate that it is not hostile to the US, but to make it clear that the Brotherhood intends to establish a more balanced and equal relationship with Washington than the former regime. During his election campaign, President Mohamed Morsi pledged to rework Egypt’s relations with the US based upon ‘independence of decision’ and an end to ‘subordination’, asserting that he would ‘seek to replace all political economic, military and other forms of subordination in the longer term, with new forms of relationships based on balanced joint gains’.26 Indeed, Morsi has to prove to the Egyptian people that he can stand up to Washington when it counts. It is for this reason that in his first public speech following his election as President, Morsi vowed to free Omar Abdel Rahman, the blind Egyptian sheikh, imprisoned in the US after having been convicted of helping plan an attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 1993. Morsi knew that such a demand would be out of the question as far as the US was concerned, yet he knew he could get some popular mileage by raising it.

  It is clear therefore that while the Brotherhood will continue to cooperate with Washington, it is not going to abandon its populist verbal assaults on the US. Likewise it will continue to use the Palestinian issue as a means of bolstering its popular support base. For all that it is bound by realpolitik to uphold Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel and for all that it might see advantage in positing itself as a new mediator in the region, the Brotherhood cannot abandon its support for the Palestinians or for Hamas. Indeed, Morsi’s first election campaign pledge in his list of foreign policy promises was to, ‘Support the Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to restore their rights, establish their own State and liberate their land.’27 Given the mood on the streets, the movement has no real choice but to rely upon anti-Zionist and anti-Western rhetoric as a means of shoring up its popular support base. In fact, if the going gets tough, such rhetoric is likely to increase.

  And things will get tough for the Brotherhood as it struggles to manage the needs and expectations of the populations who risked life and limb for their revolutions. This is particularly true in the Egyptian case. The Egyptian Ikhwan came to power on a ticket of Islam and poverty alleviation. It wasn’t for nothing that the movement mobilised its charitable and welfare networks in the run up to the parliamentary elections to offer free or discount food and goods in some of Cairo’s poorest neighbourhoods. Moreover, Morsi’s campaign platform promised a ‘Renaissance Project’ to save Egypt from decline across the education, health, science and technology sectors. As such, many Egyptians are looking to the Brotherhood to solve their day-to-day problems of poverty, lack of jobs and dismal services.

  Yet fixing the nuts and bolts of a society in which two fifths of the population live around the poverty line and are dependent on state subsidies (which eat up one third of the state budget28), and in which corruption is endemic and bureaucracy stifling, is not going to be easy. What makes it harder for the Brotherhood is that expectations are so high. As one Egyptian analyst explained, ‘The expectations that he [Morsi] would deal with all injustices quickly created an atmosphere of hopes that are very high and unrealistic.’29 The Freedom and Justice Party’s failure to meet some of these expectations has already prompted a wave of strikes and industrial action across a range of sectors. There have also been criticisms that the new President has failed to meet many of his ambitious list of sixty-four pledges, ranging from rubbish collection to improving Egypt’s gridlocked traffic, that he vowed to achieve within his first 100 days of office.

  Likewise, An-Nahda has struggled to respond to the needs and demands of a population that wants jobs and better services, as well as an end to corruption and to the stark regional inequalities that have dogged the country since independence. Like Egypt, Tunisia has seen a wave of public strikes and sit-ins and, despite its efforts, the government is provin
g unable to push economic reforms through quickly or forcefully enough. Whilst the Libyan Brotherhood, as a partner in the government is less in the firing line, it is still part of a ruling elite that is struggling to meet the everyday needs of the population, despite the country’s enormous oil wealth.

  How long those who gave the Brotherhood their vote will continue to support the movement has yet to be seen. The more the demands of governing force the movement to compromise on its core principles, the more it risks alienating its core support base. Indeed, the Brotherhood is still a movement that is rooted in its own traditions and in the past. Whether this large and lumbering force will be able to rise to the challenge of the modern age has yet to be seen.

  Yet for the time being, this is still the Brotherhood’s moment. For all that the movement has proved itself to be utterly self-serving, to have a questionable commitment to democracy in its wider sense, and to be unable to work economic miracles, for now, the Brotherhood and An-Nahda still seem to enjoy popular trust and support. While this is partly because the liberal and Salafist elements are in such disarray, meaning that there is still no credible alternative, it is also because the Brotherhood is more than a political party. It is a jama’a. Even An-Nahda has a role that extends beyond the realm of most conventional political parties. The Brotherhood did not come to power on account of its political or economic agenda alone. The Brotherhood’s strength turned out to be what it had always been, its grass roots support base that sees in the movement a force that is morally untainted and that resonates with tradition and security. More importantly, perhaps, this grass roots continues to view the movement as synonymous with Islam.