SOE

by Fredric Boyce

  Annoyance and frustration among troops in confined spaces – such as U-boats or tanks – can result from the presence of persistent body odours, especially when the source is not obvious. Such circumstances can be exploited by providing agents with capsules of malodorous or noxious liquids. Dr Haas and Col King devised appropriate formulations leading to the S-capsule, which contained a blend of higher fatty acids. Besides being useful in rendering the atmosphere in poorly ventilated spaces – such as bars – unpleasant, they could be used more directly, leading to embarrassing situations and annoyance if an agent could get close enough to a dignitary to discharge some onto his clothing. At about this time, the story circulated at Station IX that von Papen, Hitler’s Foreign Minister, was attending a prestigious formal reception in Ankara when an agent succeeded in squirting some S-capsule liquid on to his coat. He made a sudden departure, much to the consternation of his hosts. A similar mixture was incorporated in drags intended to put dogs off the scent of an escaping agent.

  It was a short step to consider means of demoralising the German forces by rendering their food supplies unappetising by the clandestine introduction of substances having either offensive smells or tastes. As early as 1941 Haas had been experimenting with the production of bad tastes and smells and laxative action by the tainting of sardines with unpleasant contaminants. His report was resurrected in 1943 when, as part of the anti-U-boat campaign, L/IT approached DSR asking for suggestions for adulterants of wine and olive oil which would make them unpalatable but not poisonous. Apart from allowing the wine to go sour, or adding vinegar, Haas suggested the addition of butyric acid or iso-valeric acid, the latter creating the bonus of an offensive odour which could readily be blamed on accidental infection or abnormal fermentation. Olive oil could be made to taste or smell objectionable by the addition of paraffin oil (kerosene), oil of turpentine or camphor. Croton oil, on the other hand, would be undetectable but could prove fatal if more than a carefully measured small quantity was added.

  Dr Haas extended his research into making wine and olive oil unfit for consumption by altering its colour. In May, DSR reported that two dyes had been found. While discolouring white wine was easier, they could turn red wine a deep inky blue with 10 gm/100 litres or a deep green with 30 gm/100 litres.

  More drastic effects were to be expected from the use of purgatives which, in Haas’s genteel words, caused ‘loss of bowel control’. There was a rumour in 1943 that, on the eve of a crucial battle in the Italian campaign, the wine consumed by the Italian High Command had been doped with a mild purgative – phenolphthalein – which by the following morning had a dramatic effect: they lost not only bowel control but also the battle. Whether or not this was true, the story was good for the morale of those working on this mild form of chemical warfare.

  Later, Professor J.H. Gaddum, FRS, was consulted and drew attention to a much more powerful group of purgatives. If very small amounts of Carbachol (or Doryl, or Carbamylcholine) which was made in laboratory quantities by Burroughs-Wellcome were mixed with common salt and introduced into the food, it would produce a very powerful evacuation of the bowels. It was claimed that no medical examination or even post mortem could detect the drug. Two other powerful cathartics were also suggested: Isachen and Colocynth, the latter thought to be less detectable by taste if put in beer. A paper entitled ‘Evacuation against Evacuation’ was prepared, proposing that packets of the chemicals be made up by SOE and distributed with instructions for use. Whether this was ever put into effect is not known.10

  Among the means of publicly denigrating the enemy occupying forces was the use of graffiti on walls and windows. However, most of the paints then available could be removed without too much difficulty. The need was expressed for a more permanent means of daubing offensive and obscene remarks on shop windows or German vehicle windscreens. Considerable effort was expended, with the help of ICI, in developing an etching formulation of finely ground ammonium bifluoride which would etch glass and be essentially non-removable. Eventually it was possible with the use of gums and dispersing agents to produce a material which could resemble sun pigmentation cream, Nivea face cream or toothpaste. This was provided camouflaged in two forms, either in tins or tubes of a popular shaving or toothpaste packing, neither of which would create any suspicion in a search. To complete the deception, clandestine consultations with a London toiletry firm produced perfumes which were tolerable imitations of the scent of the creams they were meant to simulate. There was, however, a snag. Early in 1943 a consignment of ‘toothpaste’ was sent to North Africa without instructions. It was issued as genuine toothpaste with devastating effect on both the teeth and morale of some agents – and a furious cable to HQ.

  MISCELLANEOUS SABOTAGE MATERIALS

  A wide range of equipment and materials was needed to meet the diverse and often bizarre operational concepts being developed at HQ, as well as the immediate requirements of agents in the field.

  Since many sabotage operations were carried out at night it was important that members of a team were kept in touch with one another. This was not too difficult in moonlight but less easy on a really dark night. The use of luminous tapes attached to clothing was an obvious solution, but most available luminous materials which were activated by exposure to light faded after a few hours in the dark. The Polish Section came up with a more radical solution by using discs coated with a radioactive paint which retains its luminosity indefinitely. Depending on the size of the disc and the concentration of radioactive paint, they could be clearly seen over a distance of several metres. Did the Poles wish to emphasise the practical application of Madame Curie’s discoveries? When samples of these discs were sent to Station IX for test Dr Haas was horrified: the radiation from them was dangerously high and he judged that if left in contact with the skin for a few hours they would produce a severe burn. Geiger counters were not available. He recommended strongly that, because of the danger of putting them into inexperienced hands, they should not be issued, except in very special circumstances; and they should be stored in lead-lined boxes. It would appear, however, that the enthusiasm of Country Sections overcame these concerns and they were duly included in the Catalogue without any warning as to their potential danger and no indication as to how they should be stored. These discs were also considered for use for the location of parachute containers in the dark (see Chapter 11). Again, there was reluctance to do so since they would automatically be acquired by agents unaware of the danger involved in their use.

  There was also a desire to provide agents with night glasses especially for use around dusk and in moonlight. Presumably the cost of high-grade binoculars ruled out their general issue and an alternative, less expensive, lightweight binocular fitted with plastic lenses with a magnification of X2 was tested. It certainly helped to pick out dimly-lit objects, but the Technical Review confirmed the view of the Trials Committee that they were not suitable for arduous use because, among other things, of the need to protect the plastic lenses from scratching.

  Station IX was also called upon to test a variety of other materials such as soluble paper which enabled messages to be destroyed if the agent was caught. An oft-repeated call from the field was for waterproof clothing. Obviously, it was not acceptable to provide anything manufactured in Britain or identifiable as originating outside occupied Europe. The alternative was to provide agents with a means of waterproofing their own clothing. Discussions with ICI and tests at Station IX led to the development of Dipsanil V, a wax-based emulsion in a formulation which could be applied domestically using only normal kitchen equipment. The burst of enthusiasm for camping and outdoor sports since the war has seen the extensive availability of similar formulations on the domestic market.

  Among other requests from agents in the field was one for a purpose-made jacket for carrying special stores during operations. Another was for silent footwear and a plea that SOE be granted special facilities to obtain the necessary rubber, such was the wartime shortage of
this precious commodity.

  Research was conducted in December 1942 into ways of detecting when envelopes had been opened and resealed or tampered with in other ways. Work was also undertaken on special torches with infra-red filters. Available for issue was a waterproof torch, designed and made at Station XII for use by both SOE and CCO. Despite being an everyday item, the SOE-designed waterproof version (some with a long, conical-shaped lens shade) was not a great success, the chief problem being waterproofing the switch. Another device was an apparatus for distilling volatile spirit from rubber. This was intended to provide fuel for one of the several types of battery charger developed at Station IX; but, since rubber was as scarce as petrol, it was of little use in Europe. In the Far East, however, it was expected to be of some value.

  Haas and his group were active in investigating a wide range of problems. He became an expert in the use of secret inks and was presumably responsible for the extensive range of ingredients listed in the SOE Syllabus.

  They also produced items of make-up intended for disguise. Some were temporary and some, like Mepacreme, dyed the skin yellowish after 12 doses and a deep brown if continued. Carotene was made from the pigment of carrots, while so-called ‘wrinkling cream’ did not wrinkle the skin but produced an unhealthy pallor.

  PHYSIOLOGICAL SECTION

  The Physiological Section took on the bacteriological and toxicological aspects of Professor Newitt’s organisation in 1941 and dealt with the clandestine aspects of small-scale chemical and bacteriological warfare. A great deal of their work was to find chemicals and the means of administering them which could enhance an agent’s performance and others which would degrade to various degrees that of the enemy. The chemical agents under investigation were classified according to their speed of action and their lethal properties. Slow-acting poisons were required to have a delayed action so that the agent administering it could distance himself from the victim before the effect (which was not necessarily fatal) became apparent. On the other hand, quick-acting poisons should have an immediate effect and in the form of suicide pills lead to the death of the agent before he or she could be interrogated.

  From 1942, Station IX had regular informal contact with the Chemical Defence Experimental Station at Porton Down under the ‘Kummerbund’ project for biological matters and the ‘Saccharine’ project for chemical matters. A whole range of poisons were subjected to experiments, though they were not necessarily produced in other than laboratory quantities, let alone being issued to agents in the field. Some of the laboratory test samples were prepared by Imperial College, London and some by Cambridge University, academia being a rich source of scientific expertise.

  The ‘Saccharine’ project resulted in Porton Down supplying SOE with:

  Stores A – a lachrymatory substance for use in a tear-gas grenade.

  Stores B – a thickened mustard gas in a toothpaste tube for smearing on items that were likely to be handled by the enemy.

  Stores C – a smoke and lachrymatory generator.

  Among the chemical agents developed at Station IX and available to agents for ‘Special Requirements’ were the A’ tablet, ‘B’ tablet, ‘E’ capsule, ‘K’ tablet, Mecodrin tablet and ‘L’ tablet.

  The ‘A’ tablet was for air sickness and was similar to those commonly available after the war. It was actually in capsule form and the agent was required to take one half an hour before take-off, another fifteen minutes after take-off and then a third an hour after take-off. The maximum dosage was three per flight. The ‘B’ tablet was Benzedrine, already in use pre-war, and used to stave off tiredness or to give an extra spurt of energy. The maximum dosage was two. The ‘E’ capsule, actually an ampoule of possibly ether-based solution, was a quick-acting anaesthetic which produced half a minute’s unconsciousness half a minute after administration. The ‘K’ tablet was a Morphia-based sleeping draught to be used offensively. One tablet would put an average-sized man to sleep for four hours. For a large person it was better to use two tablets to be sure. Agents were warned to dissolve the tablets before putting them into a beverage and not to administer them in tea due to the bitter give-away taste the two produced. Eight tablets were a lethal dose.

  Mecodrin tablets were amphetamines or ‘speed’ and were provided on certain operations to give a boost to the agent. Other drugs available included ascorbic acid tablets; caffeine tablets; halazone water-purifying tablets; halibut liver oil capsules; Mepacrine tablets – an anti-protozoal drug which can also be used in the treatment of malaria; morphine hydrochloride for pain relief; and quinine bihydrochloride tablets.

  During its lifetime, SOE produced several variations on the ‘suicide pill’. Some were tablets which dissolved in the body’s natural juices and released their contents. Some contained the active cyanide ingredient within an impervious capsule which had to be bitten, while others acted most rapidly when sucked. In July 1942 ‘L’ tablets were lethal cyanide pills. If sucked, rapid and painless death was said to ensue in 30 seconds. If swallowed death might take up to five minutes. In an actual reported case a convulsive death occurred after an hour and a half, but the victim had been unconscious and incapable of being interrogated, which was the object of this drastic action. C.H. Mackenzie, Director of Delhi Group, advised officers to ‘play up to the agents’ beliefs and emphasise the potency of the drugs’.11

  Some suicide tablets were very small, five of them making the diameter of an old penny. They were claimed to act within a minute or two and could be used offensively by being dropped into the victim’s drink. Another type had a triple coating of insoluble bedacryl (methyl methacrylate). These could be easily secreted in the mouth until chewed to dispense their poison into the system. It is interesting to note that test tablets were produced containing methylene blue which showed up in the urine if the coating were damaged. These were intended to give the agent confidence in the triple coating. One report tells of Dr Paul Haas and some others deciding to test some cyanide capsules by sleeping with them tucked into their cheeks. This would appear either foolhardy in the extreme or a demonstration of absolute confidence in their product, for if it had been accidentally bitten or had leaked they would not have woken. One Danish group reported that their ‘L’ tablet was ‘very effective’, though they didn’t specify how they knew this. They also considered them to be somewhat compromising in a search and suggested that they be camouflaged in the form of a button, a good idea, but it is not known if it was ever taken up.12

  Biological warfare was outlawed by the Geneva Protocol of 1925 to which Britain (but not the USA) was a signatory. But when it was learned in 1936 that Germany was researching in this field a review of the situation was undertaken.

  The investigations carried out at the Chemical Defence Experimental Station at Porton Down into the offensive use of biological agents were, it was said, in order to devise countermeasures to any attack upon our troops or this country. These bacteriological agents, by their very nature, took several days to produce their disabling effects and so were totally unsuitable for offensive use in a conventional assault. But they could conceivably be used by saboteurs. One of the most toxic, botulinum toxin ‘X’ was found to be most effectively introduced through the skin. Infected darts and .22 ammunition contaminated with ‘X’ were successfully tried on animals. There is evidence of a silenced pistol and ammunition being provided by SOE to Porton Down and one can imagine the trials being carried out using the same means of delivery as in the field. It was also established that a small bomb which had been coated with the organism would provide fragments which remained biologically lethal. Furthermore, Porton investigated the use of this toxin as a poison administered by mouth.13

  The War Cabinet Bacteriological Warfare Committee was concerned in the early months of the war at the possibility of German agents using bacteriological sabotage in this country and issued warnings and guidelines to police forces throughout the land. An instance of probable, though unproven, sabotage occurred against the
French in Africa when it was thought that one ampoule containing tetanus toxin was substituted for an anti-meningococcal vaccine, resulting in the deaths of 43 Africans.14

  The Government’s concern extended to the risk presented by the initiation of epidemics of a range of diseases including bubonic plague, rabies, cholera and typhoid fever, anthrax, psittacosis, tularaemia, pneumonic plague, typhus, yellow fever and foot and mouth disease, the last named not being serious to humans but, as is now known, having the potential for a catastrophic effect on the nation’s agricultural industry. On 19 January 1942, Lord Hankey wrote to Gladwyn Jebb at the Ministry of Economic Warfare to say that, in the event of the enemy contravening the international agreements relating to biological warfare, SOE should be in a position to take immediate retaliatory action. As there was unlikely to be much warning, ‘the Government should put in hand measures to make our action effective’.15

  Two stories have grown up over the years concerning the use by SOE of chemical and bacteriological agents. Both are of doubtful veracity. One story alleges that the bomb thrown by SOE-trained agents to assassinate Reinhard Heydrich, the Nazi Reichsprotektor in Prague on 27 May 1942 was poisoned with botulinum toxin ‘X’. Heydrich died from infection on 4 June. Again, there is no firm evidence to support this supposition and although records show that Porton Down did indeed provide SOE with two small amounts of toxin ‘X’, it was not until 10 November and 6 December 1943. What SOE had in mind to use it for is not recorded.16 Indeed, knowing of the somewhat basic laboratory equipment Station IX had to work with, one wonders what risks were taken in handling such organisms. Modern containment cabinets, or even simple glove-boxes, were not available. But in those days microbiologists relied for safety on meticulous laboratory technique and a certain amount of luck when working with these substances. A scientist would lay out a lint pad soaked in a chlorine-based disinfectant and work above it so that any spillage was mopped up by the pad. But over-energetic use of a pipette could give rise to aerosols and had to be guarded against. It is perhaps an interesting coincidence that in April 1942 a gourd of the rapidly fatal curare poison was procured by British Security Coordination (an umbrella organisation that eventually represented MI5, SIS, SOE, and PWE throughout the Americas) from up-country Venezuelan Indians and forwarded to London. Its destination is not known.17