SOE

by Fredric Boyce

  W/T EQUIPMENT

  In addition to attacks on communications, a major role of guerrilla groups was the collection of local intelligence and its transmission to field commanders. The provision of reliable W/T equipment was therefore essential and much of Everett’s time was taken up with discussions on the problems of the functioning of radio equipment under tropical conditions. The main concern was the effect of humidity and high temperature on the components. On the whole most sets stood up well to these conditions but some components failed through corrosion, and it was worrying that on occasion equipment was already unserviceable on arrival from the UK. The most widely used set was the BII, but agents complained about its weight. Although when in its carrying case it was reasonably waterproof, the rubber gaskets which sealed it perished rapidly. If it did become wet in high humidity, then a few hours in front of a fire seemed to restore it to normal. A feature not initially recognised in the UK was that under certain circumstances the morse key could develop a high voltage and give the operator an electric shock. In the Type A Mark III this was overcome by adding a Bakelite protective cover. The MCR (Miniature Communications Receiver) was generally regarded as satisfactory although difficulties were often experienced in setting the voltages, partly because the meters tended to stick, while some of the resistors had a short life.

  Since mains supplies of electricity were not generally available reliance had to be placed on means of recharging the batteries. There were a number of solutions. Hand generators (usually operated by local recruits) took some four hours to charge a battery. It was hard work and the fibre gear drive tended to strip. On continuous working, fresh gears were needed almost every day and spares were hard to get. The pedal generator was also tedious in use. The saddle was too high so that, without modification, it could not be used by diminutive natives whose legs were too short to reach the pedals. In addition, the lack of handlebars meant that the operator had to balance on the saddle while the feet tended to be chafed by contact with the moving parts of the drive mechanism. They were not at all popular. The steam generator also had its drawbacks. A pressure of at least 40 lb/in2 was needed to get four amps, so that it took most of a day to recharge a 40AH accumulator. It was noisy in operation but the use of a silencer reduced its output by 20 per cent. It could be used with various fuels. When operated on oil it used ½ gallon a fortnight. But it too had problems with maintenance. The rubber gasket had a very short life and only four spares were provided.

  The ‘S’-phone had been requested from the UK but it was not clear how many had been received. One report said that three out of four had vibrators which were unserviceable on arrival. Knowledge of the ‘S’-phone’s capabilities was lacking and Bovill’s report on it had not been distributed (nor can a copy be found now). This was only one example of poor communications encountered. Lack of instruction manuals was a general complaint. Capt Ellis handled the distribution of technical literature but the mechanism became confused on his transfer from Kandy to Poona.

  AIR SUPPLY: PACKAGES AND CONTAINERS

  The Packing Station and Air Despatch Airfield for Force 136 operations into Burma were located at Jessore, some 50 miles NE of Calcutta (now in Bangladesh). The Packing Station (and its main storage area) was on one side of the airfield and was responsible for the packing of both containers and panniers for despatch by a squadron of Liberators and Dakotas whose base was on the other side of the airfield. The packed containers and panniers were loaded (‘bombed up’) on to the aircraft by personnel of an armament detachment.

  On arrival at Jessore on 4 April Everett was surprised to see that ammunition boxes and other munitions were stored in the open under scorching sun and subject to temperatures of up to 135°F and frequent heavy rain. Similarly, packed containers and panniers were stacked in the open. A casual glance showed that under these conditions of high humidity exposed metal was already showing signs of rust. In particular, many of the No. 77 phosphorus grenades were seen to be badly pitted. About noon on that day it was reported that one of the AP8 panniers had begun to emit smoke. It soon became apparent that a No. 77 grenade had burst open and set fire to other contents of the package. Very soon a number of adjacent packages were also affected by the fire which began to spread. After carefully separating and opening the packages, some 600 grenades found to be unsafe were thrown into a nearby rubbish pit which emitted a huge pall of smoke. But the cloud of smoke was mistaken by those in the Operations Room for a crashed aircraft. Very soon the furious Station Commander appeared at high speed in a jeep and proceeded to give Everett a dressing down for not seeking formal permission before taking action. He was soon pacified when it was pointed out that had not swift action been taken the whole dump, which included a substantial amount of explosive might have gone up. Maj Goodall RASC who came up from Calcutta to oversee the clearing up.

  When this incident was over Everett began his task of inspecting the methods being used to pack stores for dropping. The contents of each type of package were identified by a serial code. It was found that in general the packing methods were satisfactory although detonators were not always packed securely and kept well away from other sensitive stores. Where possible stores were packed in their original boxes and surrounded with one or two inches of Koran. Some inadequate packaging was identified. A number of Type-C containers were so badly packed that the contents rattled around when they were handled. Particular attention was paid to the type of webbing harness used for panniers. Whenever possible this was arranged so that the package landed on its base. In all some two dozen package types were examined and, where appropriate, recommendations were made to bring the packing up to the standards established by Station IX. Particular attention was paid to the packing of W/T material which in general was more subject to damage than most other equipment. Typically, panniers were packed in two layers. The bottom layer was protected by a layer of cotton waste and contained spares for a BII set and two empty 6v 40AH accumulators. On the top layer was a BII set on a layer of Koran and two bottles of acid for the accumulators. Since there was a tendency for acid to leak, the bottles were contained in a box filled with whiting and well wrapped in Hairlock. All spaces were filled with packing material. One important finding was that Koran wrapping should not be used in contact with tins since it led to corrosion.

  AIR SUPPLY: PARACHUTES

  The most urgent problem being encountered at this time was the alarming failure rate of supply-dropping parachutes. This was particularly serious since in the early part of April the 14th Army under General Slim was pressing down the Sitang Valley towards Rangoon and was almost entirely dependent on air supply to maintain its momentum. There was already concern at Kandy at reports of a substantial loss of valuable equipment caused by parachute failure and Everett was asked to investigate. The problem was more serious than expected. Everett examined a series of reports from aircrew during recent operations and was deeply concerned that in one short period, out of 131 loads dropped, on at least 50 occasions the parachutes had failed to open. Something was obviously very seriously wrong. To identify this deplorable state of affairs he decided that he would inspect personally all the containers and packages loaded on to the aircraft in preparation for delivery on the next sortie. He spent the whole day working in the intolerably hot and humid atmosphere of the bomb bays and by evening he had inspected all but a few of the loaded aircraft. His findings were devastating. The loading had clearly been carried out carelessly and in a high proportion of instances the parachutes were doomed to fail. The most frequent and inexcusable fault was the complete absence of a static line, or when present it had not been attached to the breaking tie in the aircraft. In some instances string had been used to lengthen the static line. On one Liberator all the chutes had been loaded upside down so that it was difficult to withdraw the release pin. In a number of cases the safety pins on C-type containers had been removed while at least one C-type was damaged and unserviceable. Of more than 24 aircraft inspected only three or fo
ur were judged to have been loaded neatly and correctly. All these faults were rectified.

  There were no reported parachute failures on this sortie.

  This appalling state of affairs could only be symptomatic of a serious failure to train, supervise and inspect the work of the loaders. While there was said to be an acute shortage of staff and the working conditions were stressful, this was no excuse for such laxity which could seriously affect operations in the field. Following his visit to Jessore, Everett wrote a critical report on the problems of air supply in the Far East. In this he made a number of recommendations. In particular he stressed the urgency of appointing an officer with the responsibility for the inspection of parachutes both before issue for operations and after ‘bombing up’. It is thought that in subsequent operations the failure rate was much reduced although in Operation Bison on 21 April one arms container exploded in the air and the failure rate of parachutes was 5 per cent. Some internal modifications to the Liberators such as the fitting of more robust strong points in the aircraft and the provision of snap hooks and safety pins were recommended.

  By the time Everett returned to Baker Street the war in Europe had ended and hostilities in the Far East would have just three months to run before the atomic bombs were dropped and Japan surrendered.

  SEVENTEEN

  OVERALL ASSESSMENT

  The centre of SOE’s research and development effort was amid the magnificent Victorian arboreal collection at The Frythe. Working here for the Inter Services Research Bureau was for many an enjoyable and stimulating experience. Not only was the rural location in deepest Hertfordshire pleasant and safe from the nightly attention of the Luftwaffe, but the accommodation and catering for Service personnel was superior to that in most military establishments. The large number of highly intelligent specialists from industry and academia formed a select establishment which generated and regenerated its own morale and enthusiasm while the security surrounding the work served to impress on staff its importance to the war effort. The scientists were able to engross themselves in their sometimes highly original work knowing it was contributing to Allied successes. At the same time the engineering and technical staff had an intensely interesting range of novel problems to solve.

  The Armed Forces, the Civil Service, industry and academia had been scoured for recruits into ISRB. Many of the senior scientists and engineers engaged were experts in their fields, though totally inexperienced in the work they were to be faced with. Those engaged by the Research and Development Section, whether based at Headquarters, Station VII, IX, XII, XV, temporarily posted to one of the subsidiary locations such as Staines Reservoir or Fishguard, or working on a joint project with other organisations like the RAE or the AFRE, were a dedicated, hard-working band. The work they were engaged on was usually of a generally offensive nature and therefore contained more than an element of danger, be it with a weapon, an explosive device, a new type of submersible or a technique for dropping containers from low-flying aircraft. Nevertheless, no records of serious accidents have been found or recalled by those former serving members interviewed for this work.

  The size of the R&D effort grew as SOE became more established and successful. A War Office establishment document showed that the stations featured in this account of ISRB employed over 2100 personnel in June 1944, made up of the following numbers:

  TABLE 51

  Establishments of R&D Stations

  In the period when ISRB was expanding, recruitment and retention of skilled technicians against poaching by other Service organisations was a serious problem. It is interesting to note that as other demands allowed, the Engineering Section was permitted to develop some devices of its own. It would be fascinating to know what they came up with and whether they were put into production. As an illustration of the expansion which took place at The Frythe, by 1944 the Engineering Section staff alone had increased from four to 160 and the workshops had expanded by over 30 times their original area.2

  There was no doubt that Station IX was busy. SOE as a whole was busy. A large Country Section such as ‘F’ (France) sent over 400 agents into the field and there were around fifteen country sections. During 1942 SOE establishments dealt with an average of an operation every week, mostly concentrated in the weeks immediately before and after the full moon. This entailed one or more technical conferences, preparation of stores, preparation of mock-ups for training, visits to other technical establishments for information, trials, etc. Operations covered anything from the smallest drop to large raids such as that on St Nazaire. Senior officers at The Frythe had to be available to partake in these preparations if needed.

  More than once during Station IX’s existence SOE suffered criticism from other Services envious of the degree of independence it enjoyed. In 1943 there appears to have been concern that relations with other establishments might not be all they should be and that therefore some duplication of effort was likely to be taking place. In response to implied criticisms, a report by the Director of Scientific Research dated 29 June 1943 stated that the assistance of other Service departments had been sought and as far as was known, no work was being done at Station IX which could appropriately be done elsewhere and he was not aware of any overlap. As a sign of his commitment earlier long term projects were suspended.

  SOE maintained some rooms at the Natural History Museum in London where they displayed the special stores available through them. At the end of the war this became an exhibition advertising (to a selected few from Whitehall and the Military) their achievements. Some of the statistics displayed at this exhibition give some idea of just how much assistance was given to Resistance movements and which weapons were the most sought after.

  TABLE 6

  ISRB production up to June 1945

  Clams

  68,000

  Railway charges

  48,000

  S B Charges

  900

  Limpets

  56,000

  Standard charges

  79,000

  General purpose charges

  316,300

  Shipped to European groups and missions

  Sten Gun

  600,000

  Revolvers

  320,000

  Time pencil fuses

  9,000,000

  Tyre bursters

  630,000

  Rounds of Sten ammunition

  387,000,000

  Rounds for revolvers

  19,000,000

  Limpets

  36,000

  Tons of food

  8,000

  Incendiaries sent to the field up to June 1945

  Tyesules

  200,000

  Fire pots

  300,000

  Pocket incendiaries

  800,000

  ML flares

  200,000

  For the scientists and engineers there, the atmosphere in the Research Section was one of dedicated hard work and the organisation of the work possessed a curious flexibility which fostered creativity. Typically, many of the staff worked at least a twelve- to sixteen-hour day for a twelve- or thirteen-day fortnight, with weekend leave every three or four weeks. Not only was the Victorian work ethic not dead but the desperate need to defeat the enemy was deeply felt. Those working at The Frythe felt uplifted and motivated by being in the company of others equally devoted to their work. This atmosphere, in the words of John Brown of the Wireless Section ‘drove the whole engine’.

  Evenings when they were not working were spent by many of the scientists in the handsome drawing room, mostly quietly with devotees of chess and The Times crossword setting the tone. Occasionally, however, there was a lighter atmosphere. There were one or two boisterous characters, among them the huge 6 ft 4 in Norwegian, Air Force Capt W. Simonsen from the Wireless Section, whose infectious laugh lightened any atmosphere.

  In the smoking room, adjacent to the dining room, was a rarely played organ of the type that had a hydraulic blowing engine
in the cellar; when it was being played an assistant was required to control the water. John T. van Riemsdijk occasionally played the organ when he was duty officer at weekends and an employee by the name of George Hill, described as a sort of butler, carried out the cellar duties. ‘Play’ ard, sir,’ he would exhort the organist, ‘or the cellar will get flooded.’3

  The lives of the scientists and engineers were not without their lighter moments. It did not take much of an excuse to throw a party, the occasional one getting a little out of hand, such as the occasion when the organ in the smoking room was dismantled by a somewhat over-enthusiastic group of inebriated officers in order to confirm some theory about the effect of blowing down an organ pipe. The resultant noise was, it is reported, less than musical and there was some doubt as to whether the pipes were replaced in their original positions. The commandant was not amused.4