Captain Elliot and the Founding of Hong Kong
Page 24
By mid-July Elliot had moved to White Sulphur Springs, a short distance to the southeast, and in August was in Washington DC. After letting the Foreign Secretary know that he had been in correspondence with Henry Clay, and was therefore retaining some involvement with the political situation, Elliot referred to the opportunity he had been given to leave North America:
Your Lordship will have observed from my despatches that I did not consider it suitable to avail myself of the permission to return to Europe in the condition of affairs which had come about, by the time that it reached me, neither have I liked to do so till replies to the intelligence of the failure of the treaty shall have reached me, either directly, or through Mr. Pakenham. In the mean time I am glad to find that Mr Pakenham agrees with me in thinking there is no need for my return to Texas till we shall be further instructed from England.18
and he ended with his now familiar expression of dutiful availability ‘Your Lordship is aware that I am ready for any service that may be charged to me’.19 He was reassured to have Pakenham’s endorsement of his continuing absence from Texas, though it was probably given at least partly because Pakenham thought Elliot had been away for so long that he would be unable easily to pick up the reins again and might do more harm than good if he were to return. The Elliots moved on again during August. Charles’s health may have been gradually improving, but Clara was in poor shape; Emma was informed from ‘near New York’20 that she was again ‘very alarmingly ill’.21
Clara duly recovered enough to travel. On his way up to New York, Elliot had visited Pakenham in Washington DC and at the same time had written to Aberdeen seeking authorisation to delay his return to Texas until the beginning of November. He was torn between the call of duty, which told him he should be back in Galveston as soon as possible, and a personal desire to stay away as long as he could, not only for the sake of his own and Clara’s health, but because of a strong dislike of Galveston itself with its primitive amenities, lack of agreeable distractions, and inhospitable climate.
At the end of October he wrote to the Foreign Secretary from Philadelphia, indicating his intention to leave for Texas between the 7 and 10 November, having first called in to see Pakenham again. As if to underline his seriousness about returning, he concluded ‘May I request that any despatches to my address may once more be addressed to the care of Her Majesty’s Consul at New Orleans.’22
Charles Elliot arrived back in Galveston on 7 December, but without Clara and their 2-year-old daughter Emma. He later said in a letter to Aberdeen ‘owing to the severe sickness of my child I have been compelled to leave my family amongst strangers in a hotel at Philadelphia’.23 Clara and Emma were to remain in the north, Elliot hoped, for as long as their health and recuperation required. He would have wished to stay there with them, but duty dictated that he re-immerse himself in diplomacy in Texas without further delay.
Elliot’s first reports to London on his return to Texas were taken up with his initial impressions of the annexation situation, and with the substance of a meeting in Washington-on-the-Brazos with Anson Jones, now installed as President, who like his predecessor was not wholly committed either to independence or to annexation. Elliot was in less doubt than perhaps he should have been that the Texan government was opposed to annexation, but made clear to the President his view that if the popular will was in favour then that would prevail. For Elliot, there was even now a chance that if Mexico would recognise Texan independence, the popular preference for annexation would fade. He reported that Jones too
did anxiously hope that Her Majesty’s Government would use it’s immediate and decisive influence with Mexico, to propose the recognition of Texas…. He does not doubt if it were in the power of this Government to declare to the people of Texas that such a proposal was before them, He and his friends would have strength enough to turn them aside from any further thought of annexation.24
Aberdeen was also supplied by Elliot with a pen portrait of the President, so that he would be able to assess Jones’s trustworthiness and his likely approach to the annexation question and reaction to any British proposals. Elliot thought the President
remarkably cautious and reserved, and with a moderate degree of the skill and firmness of his predecessor he will probably be able to controul affairs very materially with much less appearances of direct interposition than General Houston, and with less stormy opposition.25
This favourable assessment of Anson Jones was in stark contrast to the letter (marked Secret) composed the following day about the disruptive activities of General Duff Green. Green had been in Texas as US Consul since the end of November, living up to his reputation for mischief making and irresponsible business activity. It was not strictly necessary to trouble the Foreign Secretary at this juncture, but in part to show that he was now fully functional again, and in part consistent with his innate tendency to dramatize, Elliot wrote:
circumstances satisfy me that his true position here is that of secret agent to the unshrinking advocates of annexation in the United States, or should I rather say of extended mischief against Mexico, for it is manifest that their objects are not limited to the annexation of Texas only…. The foundation of all his Schemes is the incorporation of a land Company … with the management of their affairs in the hands of a Director appointed by themselves, powers to levy and maintain troops for defence against Indians.26
Elliot’s conclusion was that Green was not planning against Indian attacks, but for aggressive action against Mexico, and that to this end Green was seeking ‘to transfer almost all the powers of the Constituted Authorities of this Country … to a Confederacy of political Speculators and Capitalists in the United States.’27 Whether or not Elliot was right about Green’s intentions, Green had overstepped the mark as far the Texan President and Attorney General, Ebenezer C. Allen, were concerned. Green had publicly maintained that it was Elliot, not the government, who was shaping Texas’s policies, a claim also reflected in his correspondence with Major Andrew Jackson Donelson, the US Charge d’Affaires in Texas: ‘Capt. Elliot arrived here [at Washington-on-the-Brazos] last night. He promises that in case Texas will pledge herself against annexation England will obtain the consent of Mexico for her Independence.’28 President Jones accordingly cancelled Green’s authority to function as Consul, a development subsequently reported by Elliot to Aberdeen.29
The early months of 1845 brought differing perceptions of where the annexation issue stood. The election of James K. Polk as United States President, due to assume office in March, reinforced the determination of the pro-annexationists in the United States, even though their opponents still thought Congress would never agree. In Mexico the Foreign Minister in the post-Santa Anna government, Cuevas, showed some inclination to entertain recognition of Texan independence but before going further sought rather more robust evidence of support from Britain than had so far been forthcoming. Aberdeen held to his position of moral support for Mexico but nothing more tangible. He urged Mexican recognition of Texas but wished at all costs to avoid any confrontation with the United States. In Texas itself Jones, like Houston before him, professed himself against annexation, but was now more aware that the wishes of his fellow Texans might leave him no choice.
Charles Elliot continued to hope and believe that Mexico could be persuaded to recognise Texas and that annexation could be avoided. He was low in spirits; he was without his family; he not heard from London for some months, and he had not yet fully re-engaged with developments after his absence in the United States. His frustration found expression in a communication to the Foreign Secretary which, with its enclosure of over 7,000 words, was one of the longest he ever sent. The enclosure consisted of notes he had written for possible future use, angrily criticising Calhoun’s pronouncements that abolition in British colonies had been a failure, and that the decreased production of sugar in those territories ‘he considers to be entirely attributable to the change from forced to free labour’.30 There was much invecti
ve against Calhoun personally for his ‘incredible ignorance’ and other alleged shortcomings, but Elliot’s main thrust was that abolition was not primarily, or even at all, about economics.31 It was a matter of common humanity, and history would ‘record this measure of emancipation … as the worthiest deed … the mightiest victory that any people ever achieved over their selfishness and cupidity, for the sake of justice, and the cause of the helpless and oppressed, to the end of time’.32 It was not surprising that he put pen to paper about Calhoun’s views; he felt passionately about slavery and his work in British Guiana thirteen years earlier had supplied him with first-hand knowledge and experience. That he chose to send these notes to Aberdeen at this particular time was perhaps an indication of how his mood was affecting his judgement, and he knew that it was quite possible that they would be of no interest, in which case ‘I will take the liberty (with my excuses for the trouble to which I have exposed Your Lordship) to ask that they may be forwarded to my Sister Lady Hislop.’33
On the same day, no doubt with Calhoun in mind, he wrote gloomily to Emma: ‘You will imagine that I am leading a wretched life enough in this vile hole … this Texas question has come to be the grand centre of all the lies and [?injury] and knavish tricks of the American Politicians...’34 In February, however, Elliot received an instruction from Aberdeen dated 31 December requiring him to act with extreme caution over the annexation question – a policy which, he was gratified to note, he had already been following.
In the last week of March the policy of caution gave way to bolder tactics. In a despatch of 23 January the Foreign Secretary set out the views of Her Majesty’s Government on the Texas independence issue as they then stood, but the substance of his communication was a November report from Bankhead in Mexico of a meeting he had had with Santa Anna. The President had indicated that Mexico might at last be prepared to entertain the idea of Texan independence. There were, needless to say, conditions, some of which were unacceptable, but it was a start, and Aberdeen was now moved to seek French support for a new joint initiative. The following week, on 3 February, he forwarded to Elliot a copy of a parallel communication from Guizot to the French Chargé d’Affaires in Texas, Alphonse Dubois de Saligny. ‘Upon receipt of this Despatch [his 23 January letter]’, Aberdeen instructed Elliot, ‘you will immediately confer with the French Charge d’Affairés … and you will lose no time in bringing the subject jointly before the Texian Government’; and he concluded, ‘you will do well to avoid all unnecessary mention of the Government of the United States, and all comment upon their Policy’.35
March 1845 was a critical month in the annexation saga. Just as a more positive stance was being adopted by Mexico, in the United States the outgoing President Tyler had obtained the formal support of the Senate and issued instructions to Donelson to make an offer of annexation to the Texan government. Concurrently, Elliot was meeting with Ashbel Smith, now returned from Europe and appointed Texan Secretary of State. Smith was sure that the mood of the Texan population was inclining more towards independence, provided of course that Mexico would recognise it on acceptable terms. He asked that Elliot convey to Aberdeen – which he did – the basis on which Texas would wish to proceed and to which he believed Mexico would consent: that Mexico would immediately recognise Texas as independent; that Texas would undertake never to annex to, or be annexed by, any other country; and that the matter of territorial boundaries and indemnities be subject to negotiation, with external arbitration if necessary.
At the end of the month Charles Elliot found himself centre stage. Following Aberdeen’s instructions, Elliot and de Saligny met in Washington-on-the-Brazos with Ashbel Smith and Anson Jones. The outcome, as reported by Elliot, was threefold: an agreed memorandum pledging Texas for ninety days not to annex to any other country, and including the basis for proceeding which Smith had previously discussed with Elliot; agreement that as evidence of goodwill and serious intent Smith should return to London, where he was much respected; and that Elliot should go ‘with the utmost despatch and secrecy to Mexico in order to make a fresh explanation to the Ministers of our Courts there of the extreme difficulty of the President’s situation, and the urgency of immediate promptitude, and exact conformity to the preliminary arrangement here submitted.’36 Here, more than three and a half years after leaving China, was an opportunity for some action, a prospect Elliot welcomed. He did express reservations to Aberdeen about the plan: ‘Personally considered, if I may venture to include a personal consideration, it is distressing to me on several grounds; but the President attached so much importance to it, and my Colleague [de Saligny] advocated it so strongly that I have thought it my duty to go’.37 Since he had himself proposed the mission in the first place, this was a little disingenuous. He was quick to move into cloak-and-dagger mode:
I shall of course take every practicable precaution to keep my visit there strictly secret and shall not remain one day longer than may be necessary for the purpose of full explanation. With the intention of concealment I shall cause it to be understood that the Electra has gone to Bermuda with dispatches to meet the homeward Mail, and that She will drop me at Charlestown, to which place I have for some time been expecting that Mrs Elliot would pay a visit.
I shall also ask the Commander not to anchor at Vera Cruz, but to send me into any English or French Man of War lying there, as an officer charged with despatches for Her Majesty’s Minister at Mexico, and the ship will go away, and be reported by another name. It is also my purpose not to return to this place [Galveston] or New Orleans from Mexico, but if possible to land somewhere in the United States where I am not known, and to return to New Orleans in some unobserved manner. I hope to be there by the 1 May in time to receive my despatches by the April Mail.38,39
The following day, 3 April, HMS Eurydice arrived at Galveston with communications from Bankhead in Mexico, and it was to that ship that Elliot transferred after leaving Galveston for the voyage to Vera Cruz, from where he travelled up to Mexico City.40
Elliot’s mission to Mexico had to be conducted so as not to arouse United States’ suspicions of British interference, and it had to be carried out quickly to avoid undue delay before the US annexation offer was submitted to the Texas Congress. It went well to the extent that the objective with Mexico was realised. The Mexicans agreed to cease hostilities with Texas on the assumption, subject to negotiation on the details and confirmation by the Mexican Congress, that Texas would continue independent.
When news of Elliot’s intended visit to Mexico reached Aberdeen he was at once concerned, not about its aims but the manner of its execution. He conveyed his worries to the Prime Minister, Peel:
The only part of the transaction which I do not much like, is the journey of Capt. Elliot to Mexico at the request of President Jones, and his attempt at concealment. This cannot succeed, and it will make English agency appear too active, and too hostile to the United States. The Texian Government has taken a great responsibility on themselves by acting in opposition to the wishes of the people, and after all it is very doubtful if their decision will be confirmed by the Congress [of Texas]. Much will depend on Mexico and here unfortunately there is very little reason to expect anything like discretion or common sense. It is their last chance, and if they do not now secure the independence of Texas, annexation is certain.41
Peel agreed; but in Mexico, Elliot, Bankhead and the French and Spanish ministers (with whom Bankhead had been working on the Texas question) were elated at the positive response from the Mexicans, which was formally confirmed on 19 May. On his way back to Galveston on the French brig La Perouse Elliot even allowed himself some upbeat comments to his sister, writing (after describing ‘all the suffering of the last two months’):
But praise be to God, my first item of business has come to a right conclusion and I am now going back to Galveston with the preliminaries of peace signed upon the basis of acknowledgement of Texas by Mexico. It is hard to think that the Texians will prefer annexation u
pon disadvantageous terms, with the certainty of a war, to peace and independence.42
On his arrival in Texas Elliot began to realise that his optimism had been misplaced. President Jones announced the agreement of Mexico in a proclamation, in which it was clear that the British had played a key part in the negotiations. He recommended a Convention for wider discussion and to try to head off the annexationists. The proclamation had the effects of alarming American agents and officials, re-igniting suspicions of British plots and intrigue against the United States, and laying Jones open to charges from the people that his government was being manipulated by Britain. Well before the proclamation rumours had begun to circulate in the United States that Britain had been involved. At some point during his mission Elliot had been identified, as Aberdeen and Peel had feared, and reports of ‘The Man in the White Hat’ appeared in the US Press. Once the outcome of the mission had been made public, no attempt was made to conceal Elliot’s role in it. Sensing that his continued presence in Texas was likely to be inflammatory and counterproductive, he decided to leave for the United States. He wrote a private letter to Bankhead explaining that
I am on the point of leaving this Country for I really do not think it proper to remain here whilst this Convention is sitting. The Measure is purely revolutionary, and I see no suitable excuse for remaining in Texas whilst the people are unlawfully, or at all events beyond the Law, debating on the extinction of their Nationality, and the violation of their compacts with the Powers who have treated with them.43