Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  A situation must not arise where cooperation in the Atlantic between U-boats and the Luftwaffe breaks down because certain mistakes are made which actually have nothing to do with the fundamentally sound principle of cooperation. Such errors might lead to the false generalization that cooperation is useless. The Führer agrees fully with the views expressed and stresses once more the tasks, prospects and possibilities which our own air force would have in the Atlantic. He then closes with the words: ‘It seems that long-range bombers should be sent into the Atlantic area.’61

  In the spring of 1943, at a critical stage in the U-boats’ Atlantic campaign, a decision was taken – as a first step towards building a dedicated long-range maritime reconnaissance force – to form a new specialist unit in the form of Seeaufklärungsgruppe (SAGr) 129, equipped with the Blohm & Voss Bv 138 and huge Bv 222 flying boats. The tri-motor Bv 138 had a range of 4300 km, but early examples suffered from a poor serviceability rate, particularly associated with its engines and with the hull and floats during bad weather. Although these problems were eventually solved, and the aircraft enjoyed a reputation for toughness and versatility, as the war progressed, the Bv 138 was really capable only of undertaking coastal patrols and anti-submarine work because of its lack of speed and relatively short radius of action.62 The six-engined Bv 222 became the largest flying boat to see operations during World War II. Conceived originally to fly passengers from Berlin to New York, the prototype had first flown in 1940 and in Luftwaffe use it was given the name ‘Wiking’. Fitted with FuG 200 radar and formidable armament, from late 1942 it was decided to utilize the very few Bv 222 prototypes that were available as a long-range maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The aircraft had a ferry range of 6100 km and an endurance of 28 hr at 245 km/h at sea level.

  To this end, a first Staffel, 1./SAGr 129, was formed on 13 July at Biscarosse on the French Atlantic coast from the Aufklärungsstaffel See 222 and elements of 3./Kü.Fl.Gr.406. It was envisaged that further Seeaufklärungsgruppen would be established during 1943.63

  Hitler again met with Admiral Dönitz at the Wolfsschanze, his headquarters in the mosquito-ridden forests of East Prussia, on 8 July 1943. Once more a discussion took place on naval aviation during which Hitler reassured Dönitz that all effort was being made to speed up manufacture of the Me 264, which would be used ‘later’ to work in conjunction with the U-boats. Hitler further promised that he would do everything in his power to deliver the aircraft and avoid false hopes. Dönitz respectfully expressed ‘his conviction that efficient reconnaissance in the Atlantic will always be needed even after the new submarines are at our disposal.’64

  A typical Atlantic convoy would have to cross 3,000 miles of ocean within 19–20 days running westbound, and within 15–18 days heading eastbound. In May 1940, convoys usually comprised 46 vessels, a figure that stayed fairly constant until 1943, when the optimum number increased.65 In terms of the general composition of Allied convoys, for the period July–October 1943, the Luftwaffe recorded the following information:

  Troop convoys usually consisted of 5 to 20 large passenger vessels or large freighters suitable for use as troop-transports. Supply convoys generally comprised 20 to 25 freighters. Both types of convoy, and tankers in particular, are extremely important objectives and their destruction has a lasting effect on the enemy war effort.

  The strength of the escorting force varies widely and is provided according to the value and importance of the convoy. A temporary shortage of warships has also probably enforced restricted employment of escort vessels. For example, a convoy of 14 troop-transports was escorted by 1 auxiliary cruiser, 1 depot ship, 3 auxiliary aircraft carriers, 2 destroyers and 6 small escort vessels. The composition of escorts for freighter convoys varies a great deal, ranging between 5 and 18 warships for every 45 freighters. So far no aircraft carriers have been reported acting as escorts and even a cruiser is rarely seen.

  The US–Britain convoys move from the large ports of the American East Coast along the Great Circle to the northern entrance of the Irish Sea. If U-boats attack, or even if they are located, the convoys take evasive action by moving below the coast of Greenland and Ireland. According to statistical data, which extends over a sufficiently long period, one troop-transport convoy runs at the same time interval on this double route every sixth or seventh day and one freighter convoy every thirteenth day. Convoys from the US to Britain generally comprise 35 vessels escorted by a varying number of destroyers and corvettes, and frequently by cruisers as well according to the value of the cargo.66

  One historian describes the battle in the Atlantic from the Allied perspective as being no more than an ‘acceptable running skirmish’ by the autumn of 1943.67 On the German side, September saw a decline in U-boat losses to just nine submarines, but the tonnage sunk amounted to only 156,419 tons of which just 43,775 tons were achieved in the Atlantic.68

  By late 1943, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OKL) and the Kriegsmarine concluded that the recipe for success in cooperation in convoy warfare lay in the Luftwaffe carrying out four fundamental tasks:

  1.The location of convoys by long-range reconnaissance.

  2.The mounting of aerial torpedo attacks against enemy aircraft carriers, if present, and which were anticipated as accompanying ‘all convoys in future’.

  3.The jamming of enemy radio and radar, and hence the effectiveness of convoy defence.

  4.The sinking of as many enemy ships in the convoy as quickly as possible.

  If these four measures were carried out effectively, then it would be the mission of the U-boats to attack and completely destroy a scattered and defenceless convoy.

  It was recognized, however, that significant success could only be achieved if the U-boat and air forces summoned by shadowing aircraft to attack convoys were able to deal crippling blows in combined attacks.69 The problem, however, was, in the opinion of some senior German naval officers, that Göring simply did not understand how air power could contribute positively to the war at sea.70 Not only that, but the Fliegerführer Atlantik, Generalleutnant Ulrich Kessler, had become dismayed over the low priority given to his command, probably a result of Göring’s indifference. ‘Before taking up my command, I was informed that Fliegerführer Atlantik was to be built up to at least division strength,’ Kessler wrote to Jeschonnek on 5 September 1943. ‘Nothing of the kind has taken place. On the contrary, my strength has been steadily reduced.’71

  In an assessment of the ‘strategic air situation in the Atlantic 1943/44’ the Luftwaffe noted that, ‘There is no longer a gap in the Atlantic. The enemy can cover the whole of the North Atlantic from Bermuda, Newfoundland, Iceland, the British Isles, Gibraltar and the Azores.’72

  In a somewhat optimistic tone, a Luftwaffe report declared in January 1944 that, ‘German U-boats from French and Norwegian bases have created a serious threat to enemy sea routes. The Luftwaffe is also advancing further and further into the Atlantic.’73 But the same report contained the following warning:

  There have never yet been any miracles in a war … Military miracles arise only from intense preparation and the use of adequate, first-rate forces at a favourable moment, at the same time having nullified possible enemy counter-measures. The air war over the Atlantic, which may be further intensified in the future, must also be considered in this light. However, a sudden change in the supply battle against Britain and America cannot be expected immediately. Success will rather be achieved only after a lengthy period of operations by numerically and technically adequate forces. This must be clearly understood.

  However, it is all the more necessary to adhere to the primary strategy in the West, namely the widest possible employment of the Luftwaffe in cooperation with U-boats against Anglo-American supply lines. Plans should be made and put into operation on a long-term basis irrespective of any theories and obstacles which can only weaken in every possible way any decision which may be made.74

  In very early 1943, following instructions from the Ob.d.L.,
the General der Aufklärungsflieger, Oberst Karl-Henning von Barsewisch, ordered the establishment of a Fernaufklärungsgruppe to be equipped with ‘four-engined aircraft’ for reconnaissance over the Atlantic specifically to assist the U-boats. It was intended to use the Junkers Ju 290 to fulfil this role.75

  CHAPTER TWO

  JUNKERS’ COLOSSUS:

  THE JU 290

  It really was a giant piece of hardware…

  Hans-Werner Lerche, Rechlin test pilot

  BUILDING A GIANT

  As with several of Germany’s multi-engined aeroplanes of World War II, the concept of the Junkers Ju 290 lay in the design of a commercial transport aircraft intended for the German state airline, Deutsche Lufthansa.

  During the second half of the 1930s, Nazi Germany became very ‘air minded’, creating and developing an ever-expanding infrastructure of state-sponsored flying schools and aero-clubs, as well as encouraging aircraft and aircraft engine manufacturers and aero-industry companies to increase production on an unprecedented scale. The Nazis also attached considerable importance to the development of commercial aviation. The previous decade, despite the restrictions of the Treaty of Versailles and with limited resources, Germany’s civilian air fleet grew to a size comparable to French and British operators. Simultaneously, there was a rigorous expansion in airline traffic from 7,733 passengers and 35.57 tons of freight in 1922 to 120,000 passengers and 607 tons in 1925.

  By February 1923 various amalgamations of small German airlines left just two major operators – Junkers-Luftverkehr and Deutscher Aero Lloyd, which operated airline services around Continental Europe, with further routes to Scandinavia, London, Budapest, Switzerland and Italy. Junkers-Luftverkehr was part of a multi-faceted business based at Dessau on the River Elbe, north of Leipzig, originally established by Professor Hugo Junkers in 1895. An ill-fated venture with the Soviet government during the early 1920s, however, had almost resulted in complete financial disaster for the firm. Suffering from the military restrictions enforced by Versailles and fearful of the severe economic consequences of war repatriation payments sought by Britain and France, Germany was eager to cooperate in any bi-lateral ventures with the Soviet Union in order to allow continued, if not covert, development of its aircraft industry. By signing the Treaty of Rapello, the Soviet Union had declared itself willing to place airfields, aircraft manufacturing facilities and labour at Germany’s disposal in return for German technical knowledge and training.

  The potential for large-scale manufacturing of aircraft in the Soviet Union free of Allied intervention was irresistible. In November 1922, encouraged and supported by the German government to the tune of 100 million Reichsmarks, Junkers signed a contract with the Soviet government to build airframes and engines designed by his company for use by the Soviet Air Force at the former Russo-Baltic factory at Fili, near Moscow. Professor Junkers was well aware that a lucrative market still existed for military aircraft as well as civil, and that, wherever possible, every commercial type should be built with potential military conversion in mind.

  By 1923, Junkers was producing significant numbers of its trademark, all-metal aircraft, some of which had performed long-range flights as far afield as China, as well as making record-breaking endurance flights. By late 1925, the three-engined Junkers G 24 monoplane was operated by most of the leading central European airlines, and it offered their passengers increased comfort in the form of leather armchairs, overhead luggage nets, a toilet, a complimentary route map and a cabin boy attendant. For the business traveller, typewriters and radio telephones were available on request. Meanwhile, Junkers engine works manufactured petrol aero engines.

  However, key figures in the Reichsverkehrsministerium (RVM – the State Transport Ministry) wanted to emulate the British example of Imperial Airways, a single, leading, domestic and international ‘flag carrier’. Despite objections from Professor Junkers, the owner of Junkers-Luftverkehr, the men from the ministry were determined and conspired to achieve their ambitions by nefarious means and heavy-handedness: Junkers was threatened with the withdrawal of government subsidies and attempts were made to lean on the banks to end lines of credit to Junkers’ businesses unless they accepted a merger between the two airlines. Under heavy pressure, Junkers conceded.

  A cornerstone of German civil aviation – indeed, very much a ‘beacon to the world’ – Deutsche Lufthansa Aktiengesellschaft (DLH) was formed in Berlin in January 1926 as a result of the merger. Over the following years, through a process of strong, even ruthless management and innovation, DLH expanded its fleet and network. Its senior executives, especially its operations director, Erhard Milch, understood that the customer was king. As early as 1928, stewards were introduced to serve drinks and snacks on some flights, and reclining seats were added to at least one of its biplane types. Strangely, however, as the airline achieved greater efficiency, the superior levels of passenger comfort it provided sometimes worked against it and there were complaints from customers if their aircraft arrived early at their destination.

  In 1932, DLH commenced using what would become the ubiquitous and highly successful Junkers Ju 52/3m tri-motor, all-metal airliner on its key international routes. Ironically, however, within three years of its introduction, Hugo Junkers would be dead, hounded to his grave by a highly orchestrated process of investigation – spearheaded largely by Milch – into apparent financial misconduct and irregularities within his various businesses. On 3 April 1935, the Junkers companies were nationalized and effectively placed under control of the RLM under the direction of Heinrich Koppenberg, who had been appointed by Milch.

  From Berlin, where the vast Tempelhof airport with its extended runways and passenger halls, restaurant, administration, hangar and servicing areas – known as the Luftkreuz Europas (Europe’s air crossroads) – represented the state of the art in air travel and design, DLH’s aircraft flew progressively across an expanding domestic route network that included Königsberg, Leipzig-Halle, Rhein-Main, München, Hamburg, Köln, Dresden, Stuttgart, Düsseldorf and Essen, while the aircraft of many other nations gave Tempelhof a distinctly international atmosphere. The carriage of airmail, for example, increased dramatically from 748 tons in 1934 to 1,408 tons in 1935. At Leipzig-Halle, passenger numbers grew from 65,230 in the financial year 1933, to 75,000 in 1935, to 266,378 in 1936. In 1936 Rhein-Main airport handled 58,010 passengers and 796 tons of mail along with 801 tons of freight on 5,270 flights, while the following year, these volumes increased to 70,910 passengers and 7,090 flights respectively, along with 1,452 tons of mail and 966 tons of freight.

  Deutsche Lufthansa had also expanded its overseas operations, forging global links with operators as far afield as Brazil and China. The airlines of other nations witnessed the growth of DLH with considerable envy.

  But such volumes and expansion demanded new aircraft, capable of carrying greater numbers of passengers and heavier payloads for longer distances. Thus it was that during the mid-1930s, the senior management of DLH turned to the still fledgling Luftwaffe, monitoring the development of military aircraft designs that could be adapted into the commercial transport role. Once again, inspiration came from Junkers.

  The all-metal, twin-engined Junkers Ju 86 was powered by a range of engines including the Junkers Jumo 205 Diesel, which unfortunately proved terribly unreliable – the aircraft became known to its crews by the unhappy moniker of ‘The Flying Coffee Grinder’. In April 1937, no fewer than 18 Ju 86s were lost in crashes, mainly due to lubrication problems resulting in overheated engines, seized pistons and bearings, as well as broken gear wheels and connecting rods. One Luftwaffe bomber commander recalled:

  We operated the Ju 86 A-1 as a medium bomber with Junkers diesel engines and, later, BMW radial engines, with a crew of four – pilot, navigator, radio-operator/bomb-aimer and gunner. The Jumo Diesels gave us a lot of headaches and we suffered frequently from broken pistons, poor manufacture and high levels of repair and unserviceability. In reality, we always saw
the Ju 86 as a stopgap for the Heinkel He 111.1

  Phased out as a bomber in favour of aircraft such as the He 111, the Ju 86 soldiered on as a reconnaissance aircraft in limited numbers until mid-1944. But in the 1930s many, if not most, senior officers in the Luftwaffe remained convinced that the way to win a war in the air was by the use of heavy/four-engined bombers, capable of delivering heavy offensive loads at long range. They believed that Germany’s main enemy in the future would be the Soviet Union. Therefore, any war would involve industrial targets deep within the Soviet Union, perhaps even east of the Ural Mountains; hence the concept of an ultra-long-range bomber, or ‘Ural Bomber’, was born. Encouraged by Oberstleutnant Wilhelm Wimmer, then head of the Technisches Amt of the RLM, who was considered to have ‘the best technical mind in the Luftwaffe’, Generalmajor Walther Wever, the first Chief of Staff of the Luftwaffe, had ordered a specification to be issued to Junkers and Dornier for an aircraft of this type. It was a specification that was well in advance of the plans of most of the world’s air forces and it would stretch the resources of the still very young post-war German aircraft industry to its limits – demanding the carrying of a heavy bombload over a great distance with the benefit of speed and good defensive armament. This was despite the fact that German engine technology was still some years away from producing equipment that could give such aircraft the necessary range and reliability at an affordable cost.