Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  In September 1943, Reichsmarschall Göring had directed that Fliegerführer Atlantik was to direct and control long-range maritime reconnaissance, undertake defensive sorties in the Bay of Biscay, mount attacks against enemy convoys and single ships in the Atlantic based on the interpretation of aerial photography and reconnaissance reports, and to undertake reconnaissance of enemy submarines. Göring was of the opinion that German ‘submarines and aircraft were pursuing the same aim and Fliegerführer Atlantik should therefore cooperate closely with BdU. Although limited forces are available at present, considerable success could still be achieved.’15

  To comply with Göring’s orders, in mid-November 1943, in addition to the arrival of FAGr 5, Kessler drew on the following principal units:

  II./KG 40 With c.30 serviceable He 177 bombers at Bordeaux-Mérignac, in location for only around a month, under Major Rudolf Mons and intended for anti-shipping operations.16

  III./KG 40 With c.45 Fw 200 Condors at Bordeaux-Mérignac under Hauptmann Robert Kowalewski and intended for anti-shipping operations and maritime reconnaissance.17

  1.(F)/SAGr 129 With two Bv 222 (V2 and V4) and two Bv 138C-1 at Biscarosse since June 1943, intended for long-range reconnaissance.18

  I./ZG and 7./ZG 1 1. and 2./ZG 1 at Lorient and 3./ZG 1 at Bordeaux-Mérignac with c.40 Ju 88C and Ju 88R-2 under Hauptmann Horst Grahl. 7./ZG 1 was also at Lorient with Ju 88C under Hauptmann Hans Morr.19

  3.(F)/Aufkl.Gr.123 Based at Rennes with c.6 Ju 88 (mixed variants) for reconnaissance.20

  1.(F)/SAGr 128 Based at Brest-Hourtin with elements at Brest-Poulmic and Bayonne with 12 Ar 196A-3 and 5 Fw 190A-3/A-5/G-2/G-3 for reconnaissance and fighter operations.21

  As a reflection of the actual strength of this force, on 11 November, Fliegerführer Atlantik reported as follows:22

  1 Bv 222

  19 Fw 200 (of which 4 were operationally ready)

  61 Ju 88C-6 (of which 37 were operationally ready)

  6 Ju 290 (just arrived)

  24 He 177

  In an official German document of late 1943, the modus operandi for the Fliegerführer Atlantik was outlined. The command’s ‘general principles’ were described as follows:

  1)Concentration of all appropriate forces in the right place at the right time in accordance with the operational demands of the BdU and the requirements of Fliegerführer Atlantik’s own operations.

  2)Most economical operational use of reconnaissance forces until the commencement of operations by BdU or Fliegerführer Atlantik. For this purpose full advantage to be taken of technical and weather conditions.

  3)Flights into areas where controlled enemy day or nightfighters are operating are to be avoided. Wherever possible, operations of Fliegerführer Atlantik are to be confined to areas where there is no enemy twin-engined fighter defence.

  When it came to reconnaissance, the rationale was as follows:

  1)Reconnaissance to be carried out mainly with ship-locating radar. Reconnaissance by sectors at 1000 m altitude. Operations not to be dependent on visibility.

  2)The situation in the Atlantic will dictate the areas in which aircraft with strong defensive armament are to be used. Area of operations to be widened by exploitation of weather conditions.

  3)Navigational accuracy of aircraft position up to distances of 2000 km with a margin of error of +/- 10 to 20 km.

  4)Convoy reconnaissance. In areas requested by BdU or laid down by Fliegerführer Atlantik. Generally reconnaissance of area to be covered should start in the morning. On the days when operations are planned by BdU or Fliegerführer Atlantik, reconnaissance should be repeated in late afternoon with a view to shadowing – in the case of U-boats, reconnaissance to continue into the night.

  The basic navigation method employed by FAGr 5 was to use a track plot, with air plotting used only when a dead reckoning position was doubtful or when an aircraft was being chased by enemy fighters. Distance was reckoned in kilometres. No standard navigation drill was formulated in the Gruppe, however, and observers were free to take drifts, find winds or obtain fixes in their own time. On returning from sorties, the observers’ logbooks would be analyzed, although not marked in any way.23

  Shadowing missions with ship-locating radar on behalf of BdU were to commence at dusk, using D/F signals as well as flares for marking the location of a convoy. The shadower was to keep as close to the convoy as possible, and shadowing was to continue as far into the night as possible.24

  However, by 13 November, despite some sightings by German air reconnaissance, as a result of evasive routing and land-based air support, three convoys had avoided or sailed through the U-boat patrol lines. Just one merchantman had been lost for the cost of two U-boats sunk.25 But that day, U-boats operating in the Atlantic were signalled the encouraging news that ‘the Ju 290, a four-engined, long-range, reconnaissance aircraft with penetration depth of 2250 km, is now available for operations. It is hoped that its use will remedy recent failures by U-boats, which are largely ascribed to unsuccessful air reconnaissance.’26 BdU further signalled its U-boat commanders:

  U-boat operations of recent weeks have miscarried through failure to find the convoys. We have good reason to suppose that enemy air reconnaissance picks up our disposition-lines by methods of location which in part we are still not able to get on to, and that the enemy has gone round us.

  The difficulty of finding convoys must be removed through far-reaching air reconnaissance on our part with location gear. From today, the first Ju 290 four-engined long-distance reconnaissance aircraft, with penetration-depth of 1,400 miles, are ready for operational use. Their number and penetration-depth will be raised. In addition to these, we have Bv 222s and Fw 200s, and also, from today, the He 177 as a bomber.27

  Each Ju 290 would carry a crew of between nine and 11 men; two pilots, one navigator, two radio-operators, one flight engineer and up to five gunners, the latter frequently carrying out dual functions as radio-operator or flight engineer.28

  As Oskar Schmidt recorded: ‘Now it was serious! All functions of the Gruppe had to be coordinated (technical sections, transport sections, the signals group, the photographic section). If everything was coordinated from the start, things should run like clockwork.’29

  The baptism of fire for FAGr 5 came on 15 November when the Kommandeur, Hauptmann Fischer, led the unit’s first shadowing operation into the Atlantic in Ju 290 WK-Nr 0164 9V+GK, piloted by Hauptmann Heinz Braun. The mission was called as a result of intelligence emanating on 13 November from ‘agents’ in the Strait of Gibraltar area on the passage of convoy MKS.30 en route from ports in North Africa via Gibraltar, which it had departed on the 13th.30 Dönitz moved quickly, ordering 26 U-boats of the Schill wolfpack to attack the convoy. This group of U-boats, which had been formed partly to attempt a one-night attack on a Mediterranean convoy using boats in the Atlantic and some sailing from the Biscay bases, had failed in its initial operation against MKS.28 and MKS.29, primarily because of the boats’ dependence on air reconnaissance. Unfortunately, the Fw 200s involved had suffered from engine problems and radar defects. Only one ship was sunk. Hessler notes: ‘These experiences confirmed our conclusions of 1941, namely, that air cooperation could only be successful if sufficient long-range aircraft were available for prolonged and concentrated reconnaissance, together with adequate reserves of aircraft and equipment.’31

  Meanwhile, Fischer’s and Braun’s course took them across the French coast at 14° West 2421, out into the Bay of Biscay, then south, to the west of Portugal and then to the west of Casablanca. During the afternoon, 400 km south-west of Cape St Vincent (Cabo de São Vicente), they spotted a large enemy convoy with escort vessels. This was convoy SL.139, heading north-west and returning to the UK from the collection point at Freetown in Sierra Leone, from where it sailed on 2 November. It had subsequently rendezvoused with MKS.30 from Gibraltar, 100 miles south of Cape St Vincent the day before. This major combined convoy was sailing in 14 columns, its escort formed of the 40th Esc
ort Group.32

  At 1733 hrs, Fischer reported to the Fliegerführer Atlantik observing, at 23°W 3661, a total of 67 merchant vessels, four escort vessels and three destroyers on course 290° and moving at eight knots, but further reporting was frustrated by low fuel levels, forcing a return, and a landing at Bordeaux-Mérignac in the early hours of the 16th after flying for 16 hr 15 min.33 A Bv 222 of 1./SAGr 129 had also located the convoy and relayed its position.34

  At some point, however, German wireless traffic advising of the convoy’s location, possibly emanating from Fischer’s Ju 290, had been detected by British listening stations. Placed on alert, the Admiralty took immediate steps to increase surface escort for SL.139/MKS.30, while air support was strengthened by drawing on squadrons in England, Gibraltar and the Azores, and it soon arrived in the form of Hudsons, Fortresses and Catalinas.35 As for the appearance of a Ju 290, the British quite correctly noted: ‘This was the first occasion on which a Ju 290 is known to have operated on sea reconnaissance in any area … Callsigns and frequency suggest a new unit, and it must be supposed that the Ju 290 is working separately from those units already known to be operating in the Bay.’36

  Early on the 16th, in order to maintain its observation of SL.139/MKS.30, FAGr 5 despatched a second aircraft, Ju 290 Wk-Nr 0167 9V+HK of 2.Staffel, which was scheduled to take off from Mont de Marsan at 0315 hrs, crossing the coast at 14° West 2415. This aircraft was piloted by Hauptmann Bergen, marking the operational debut of 2./FAGr 5. At 1000 hrs, the Ju 290 spotted the convoy at 23° West 5625, moving at seven knots, but at exactly the same time the convoy reported a shadower. Bergen’s crew observed that the convoy was protected by a ‘battleship’; in fact SL.139/MKS.30 had been further reinforced by the seven ships of the 5th Escort Group as well as two destroyers, making a total of 19 escort vessels providing a double screen and over which there was continuous air cover. An hour later, at 23° West 6749 the crew aboard 9V+HK located another convoy, this time OS.58/KMS.32, en route for Freetown and Gibraltar respectively. They reported 44 merchant vessels altogether, with eight escorts, course 135°, at a speed of seven knots. In fact they had undercounted the merchantmen by two. At 1231 hrs, the Junkers located and reported what was probably the French battleship Richelieu, accompanied by a pair of destroyers, course 320°, moving at 15 knots at 23° West 4942.

  Unfortunately, during the course of their mission, west of the Portuguese coast, Bergen’s plane was attacked by aircraft from a British carrier, probably HMS Biter. One of the crew, gunner Feldwebel Walter Bauer, was wounded in the attack when a bullet struck his leg. Bergen was forced to abandon his reconnaissance and make for home.37 The Ju 290 landed at 1900 hrs after a flight of 15 hr 45 min.38

  Using the information gleaned from FAGr 5’s flights, Generalleutnant Kessler and the BdU deployed all available forces against the convoy. To shadow the convoy, the Luftwaffe additionally deployed the Bv 222s of 1./SAGr 129 and the Fw 200s of III./KG 40.

  In accordance with Fischer’s new tactical directives, FAGr 5 embarked on a continuous shadowing of the SL.139/MKS.30 convoy, and at 0400 hrs in the early morning darkness of the 17th, Ju 290A-2 Wk-Nr 0159 (originally SB+QI), coded 9V+CK of 2.Staffel, took off, crossing the French coast directly west of Mont de Marsan and out into the Bay of Biscay. This aircraft may have been flown by Hauptmann Heinz Braun of 2.Staffel who had joined FAGr 5 from LTS 290. The crew reported spotting the convoy in a signal sent to Fliegerführer Atlantik at 1313 hrs, advising that it consisted of 63 motor vessels steaming at eight knots, course 320°, position 23° West 8881. In fact, observers in the convoy had spotted the lone Ju 290 one minute earlier at 37° 15´ North, 18° 01´ West. Braun’s aircraft was also attacked by Allied aircraft and suffered a wounded crew member, before it too was forced to head back to France. In France, Generalleutnant Kessler seems to have been concerned over the certainty of the convoy’s position, probably because of growing demand for information from the BdU, and at 1640 hrs, he signalled the Junkers for an update. The aircraft merely repeated its original information.39

  So it was that, from early evening on the 17th and based on FAGr 5’s reports, Dönitz ordered eight boats of the Schill 1 wolfpack eastwards in submerged patrol disposition to intercept the convoy between 39° 03´ North, 21° 02´ West and 39° 36´ North, 19° 02´ West by 1800 hrs on the 18th.40 Kessler ordered another Ju 290 patrol in the early morning of the 18th to ‘make early contact with the convoy with a view to improving the disposition of the U-boats submerged on patrol.’ One Ju 290, possibly 9V+HK, took off at 0345 hrs on the 18th with a second, identified as aircraft ‘9V+IK’, following around 15 minutes later.* This aircraft reported contact with the convoy at 0945 hrs in 24° West 9075. The convoy reported the shadow 16 minutes later at 1001 hrs in 39° 27´ North, 19° 42´ West.

  At 1100 hrs on 18 November, Kapitänleutnant Peter-Erich Cremer’s U-333, in position close to the convoy, was attacked by the frigate HMS Exe, from which Commander G.V. Legassick commanded the 40th Escort Group. Having spotted the periscope of U-333, Exe dropped depth charges: ‘A pattern of ten depth charges exploded with a deafening roar round the boat,’ Cremer recalled. ‘The effect was terrible ... damage very great.’41 Exe then rammed the U-boat with its keel. The U-boat was subjected to another eight hours of depth-charging, but it managed to return to base despite having part of the frigate’s propeller embedded in its hull.42

  At 1125 hrs, the Ju 290 identified as aircraft ‘I’ expanded its report, having counted the convoy as comprising ‘64 motor vessels in close formation, three ships and four ships, seven knots.’ Based on FAGr 5’s report, at about midday on 18 November, Dönitz moved the other boats of the Schill 1 wolfpack eastwards to intercept the convoy.43

  Three weather reports for the convoy’s area followed from the Ju 290 ‘I’, along with two further position reports at 1400 hrs (24° West 9032, 7 knots) and 1500 hrs (24° West 9018, 7 knots). Meanwhile, the Allied ships signalled that the shadower was still lurking in the skies over the convoy at 1331 hrs. This was potentially a fatal signal for the convoy, for it was intercepted and decyphered by the B-Dienst (Beobachtungsdienst – Observation Service). Based on this information, the eight U-boats of Schill 1 were ordered to steer a submerged course 030° at three knots from 1200 hrs.44 The ten boats of the Schill 2 pack, lying farther to the north, six of which were returning from the North Atlantic, were also moved closer in readiness for an attack.45 During the afternoon, U-515, commanded by Kapitänleutnant Werner Henke, fired an acoustic torpedo at the 1,350-ton escort sloop, HMS Chanticleer, which blew its stern off. The vessel was towed to the Azores.46 However, at around 2300 hrs, U-515 reported being overrun by the convoy at 1300 hrs.

  Immediately after its last signal on the position of the convoy at 1500 hrs, the Ju 290 ‘I’ broke off and returned to France, and at 2015 hrs signalled that its ETA at Mont de Marsan was 2110 hrs.47

  As darkness fell over the eastern Atlantic, SL.139/MKS.30 welcomed additional protection in the form of the 7th Escort Group, while Leigh Light Wellingtons flew in to replace the daylight air escorts. One Ju 290 pilot who encountered such aircraft was Oberleutnant Heinz Bretnütz of 2./FAGr 5 who may have been piloting ‘I’. On a return flight from the Atlantic during operations over the convoy, Bretnütz was pursued by an enemy ‘nightfighter’ which apparently resorted to using a ‘searchlight’ in an attempt to locate the German shadower in the growing darkness as it headed back towards the French coast. In reality, this would probably have been a Wellington bomber of Coastal Command fitted with the powerful 24-in Leigh Light searchlight housed in a retractable ventral ‘dustbin’ under the fuselage of the aircraft and capable of producing a beam of between 20 and 50 million candles. Intended for deployment in night attacks against U-boats on the surface, so equipped, the Wellington was considered a very manoueuvrable aircraft, offering a good view for the pilot.48 Indeed, Leigh Light Wellingtons of the Azores-based No. 179 Squadron had already proved themselves successful against the U-boats in the Atlantic.49
Fortunately, for Bretnütz and his crew, they managed to return to France safely.

  Both during day and night, the Allied air cover blanketed the convoy, and together with the surface escort were more than a match for Schill 1.

  Shortly after midnight on the 18th/19th, the boats of Schill 2 were ordered to move 100 km north in order to be in position to attack by 1800 hrs on the evening of the 19th. At the same time, all U-boats were advised that the Luftwaffe would provide air reconnaissance during the morning and afternoon, the latter being provided by a Ju 290 of FAGr 5, which would send beacon signals from 1830 hrs until well after dark. The U-boats were to watch for these signals and report bearings.

  The morning patrol was to be undertaken by four Fw 200s of III./KG 40, but one of the Condors developed fuel tank problems, began to lose fuel and was forced to return to Bordeaux. The first Focke-Wulf to reach the convoy did so at 1015 hrs, placing it at 24° West 9032. Fifteen minutes later, HMS Exe reported an Fw 200 shadowing the convoy. The Condors returned during the late afternoon, unharmed, one aircraft at least having apparently fed the Fliegerführer Atlantik with what was inaccurate reporting. According to British radio intercepts, ‘Aircraft proceeded to give details of the convoy’s composition, describing it as “40” and “60” motor vessels, with two escort vessels and three aircraft. This intelligence evidently puzzled the Fliegerführer, who enquired persistently for the correct number of merchant vessels sighted. It was not till 1515 that he was told that it was 70.’

  Taking over from the Fw 200s was the Ju 290 9V+GK from 2./FAGr 5. This time the aircraft successfully sent its homing signals which were picked up by six U-boats, cross D/F bearings giving them an accurate fix 32 km south of the centre of the patrol line.50

  Far away to the east at the Führer’s Wolfsschanze headquarters in East Prussia, Kapitän Heinz Assmann, the naval operations officer on the OKW operations staff, was present at the midday situation conference on the 19th and advised that the ‘new Aufklärungsgruppe 290 [sic] – they didn’t expect German aircraft to appear – managed to get as close as 300 m to the convoy.’51 There was also radio traffic evidence to suggest that this aircraft also dropped flare buoys. 9V+GK returned to Mont de Marsan shortly after 0215 hrs on the morning of the 20th.52