Shadow over the Atlantic

by Robert Forsyth

  On past missions, the cramped arrangement of the navigation and radio space behind the 1st and 2nd pilot has been a noticeable disadvantage. Particularly at night and in bad weather, the annoyance to the pilot because of the radioman working behind him, as well as the navigator, is considerable. In the cramped space of the cockpit are located the two pilots, one mechanic, two radio-operators and one observer. For the further development, the following solution is held to be unavoidably necessary:

  Separation of the pilots’ space from the navigator’s space; place the navigator’s space forward on the starboard side instead of the current radio-operators’ space; the radio-operator’s space to go behind Frame 3 on the starboard side behind the B-1-Stand (arrangement as suggested by the E-Stelle Rechlin).

  Fischer was more upbeat on the standard of training and the quality of his crews:

  Operations have confirmed that the methods of training adopted prior to operations from July 1943 to November 1943 were correct. The tactical understanding of the long-range reconnaissance crews, who had not previously flown over water, have been so instructed in their training that their conduct in their new reconnaissance role region can, generally, be regarded as tactically correct.

  In particular, two points in training have been decisive factors:

  1. Making known the experiences of KG 40 by means of a very good training crew.

  2. Practice with the 27.U-boat Flotilla at Gotenhafen.

  The state of training of the pilots is good. To date, flights in the worst of weather conditions have been made. Sorties, in particular that with an aircraft weighing 41 t at take-off, in bad weather conditions, calls for the best pilots and personnel. Old, tried-and-trusted long-range reconnaissance pilots who are suitably talented have shown themselves to be successfully re-trained. The most advantageous are pilots of the Nachtaufklärungsstaffeln [night reconnaissance squadrons].

  The Kommandanten [pilots-in-command] are personally nominated by the Kommandeur and serve either as 1st pilot or observer. Decisive for this [purpose] is frontline flight experience and character.

  Operational enthusiasm and inspiration is high among all the crews. The loss of two crews has not had any effect. [There is] complete trust in the aircraft type.

  Fischer concluded his report with a detailed summary of the technical performance and related aspects of the Ju 290 based on experience:

  Technical experience:

  The flying and technical experiences of the Gruppe are gained from 1,482 flights and a total of 1,852 flying-hours on the Ju 290. All crews regard the flying characteristics of the Ju 290 as good; this holds true above all for heavyweight take-offs (at 41 t) and blind-flying. Flights in storms and areas of strong gusts (wind speeds of more than 100 km/h) have been carried out. In sorties conducted to date, only one aircraft has failed to return (shot down by a Mosquito). One aircraft crashed after take-off (a night take-off) and was destroyed by the ensuing fire on impact. The cause of the crash has not been fully determined. In one night landing, an aircraft rolling to a stop suffered an undercarriage leg breakage which caused 15 per cent damage. The reason for this is still being investigated.

  The experiences and defects in flying operations were in individual cases as follows:

  BMW 801 ML and G engines:

  In 30 sorties there were only minor defects/faults. Engine changes due to whatever causes did not have to be carried out. Cruising performance in the Gruppe is between 0.9 to 1.06 atm Ladedruck (boost pressure). With boost pressure below 0.95 and 1,800 rpm, in most of the aircraft, strong engine vibrations occur. These vibrations carry over to the airframe, and in particular to the cockpit.

  In shadowing missions and for the attainment of the longest flying time, flying with a boost pressure below 0.95 and 1,800 rpm is definitely necessary.

  Equipping with metal airscrews for this low rpm value, in the view of the Gruppe, will bring about a decisive advantage. It is recommended that the Gruppe be provided with one set of metal airscrews for testing purposes.

  Airframe:

  Damage to the skinning, sheet-metal rents, loosening/popping-out of rivets occurred mainly in the region of the landing-flap jet nozzle. In the 100-hour inspections, these were remedied. The Junkers detachment, with Ing. Glenck and nine specialists, are carrying out the strengthening requirements stipulated by Junkers. Following completion of these alterations, the defects should be remedied once and for all.

  On Wk-Nr 160 it was found in the 200-hour inspection on the wing upper side in the region of the end-box, a particularly noticeable loosening/popping-out of the rivets and sheet-metal plates. It has to be awaited to see whether this occurrence is a solitary case. Should, in later 200-hour inspections these same defects occur, a special report will follow. Also on the wing upper side, loosening/popping-out of rivets occurred, in the region of the fuel tank covers.

  It has been shown that, in terms of the airframe, in general, at 200 hours of operating time, a considerable amount of sheet metalwork is necessary. Together with the defects that occur subsequently on the empennage, the defects give rise to the need to partially overhaul the airframe at the 300-hour mark. Based on the defects/faults lists from the partial overhauls, a decision should be taken by the Amt as to whether the parts-overhaul can be raised to 400 hours.

  Due to it not being watertight in rain, the airframe suffers from a large number of damp-related and moisture faults. Measurement of the insulation values, which take place after every sortie, gives, on average, a value of 15–20,000 Ohms in cases of storms. In dry weather, 40–50,000 Ohms are regularly attained. The locations endangered by dampness are in particular the plug between the TZ and the wing; in the cockpit, the seeping-in of water behind the instrument panel into the instruments and the connecting plugs for the radio equipment. There is also the prospect of failure of the course-control and remote compass installation through damp and moisture.

  Failure [to function] of the oil tanks, despite a strengthening of the tank heads, is still a considerable problem. With the tanks, leakage appears in the welded joints. The Gruppe believes that this is down to manufacturing faults at the Raspe company. Within a short time, three fuel-draining tanks failed in such a way that the rubber seals loosened themselves from the canvas walls. Here too, the Gruppe surmises that this is due to manufacturing faults.

  The defects described above on all the oil and fuel-draining tanks were caused in the same way as already mentioned nine months ago by Hauptmann Braun of the Lufttransportstaffel Ju 290. Since then, nothing in the manufacturing of these tanks has brought about any improvement.

  Tank switching:

  The Gruppe demands, other than emptying from the main-tanks, the possibility of drawing fuel from Tz 2 and 3. Further, a fuel-transfer/pumping possibility into these tanks as well as a hand fuel-transfer possibility for all switches.

  The rest seats in the Ju 290 have shown themselves to be inefficient. The Gruppe intends to install folding seats with metal frames instead of the seats. Following their completion, photographs will be taken of this arrangement and will be forwarded via service channels. Folding seats conserve on material and still offer the crew the possibility of resting.

  For on-board catering on long-range sorties, the Gruppe has also built a kitchen cupboard with crockery and a heating plate in the aircraft. A sample has been forwarded to Junkers.

  Undercarriage:

  Tyre wear-and-tear is normal; in 156 take-offs and landings, four tyres suffered damage. On the undercarriage hydraulics system there was often chafing of the hydraulic pipes which lead through the firewall. The chafing spot is at the bulkhead.

  On Wk-Nr 164, despite the fact that the undercarriage switch was in the ‘off’ position, the undercarriage travelled past the end position on starting-up Engine No. 3. The reason: A short in the undercarriage electrics.

  Electrics:

  For safety reasons, it is urgently necessary to move the undercarriage double-pole electrics to another location. Likew
ise, for safety reasons, it is necessary to move the electrics for the double-pole trimming to another position.

  The connections described above on electrical installations were partly to blame for the fact that in nine out of 30 sorties, the Patin three-axis control or else the remote-control emergency compass went u/s. On such occasions the emergency compass situated in the right-hand pilot’s position proved to be very badly located. It would be preferable to install an OK 42 Draufsichtkompass (direct-view compass) at the 1st pilot’s location.

  Control system:

  On Wk-Nr 160, 161 and 162, in the tailplane connecting points, loose joints were discovered. Should this be the case in other aircraft, it would give cause to consider that with the current state of equipment condition, where the damping-tube is no longer adjustable, that the tailplane positioning is made more stable.

  The lifting jack for the rudder lever positioning on Frame 9f is too weak, so that on operating the rudder, Frame 9f is placed under considerable stress. The frame is, at the indicated position, too weak and must be strengthened. This fault was detected on several aircraft.

  Course-control (Patin three-axis control):

  As already mentioned above, in this control system instruments, distributors and plugs very much suffer from damp. Some of the instrument failures have been found to lead directly back to this cause. Furthermore, according to the firm’s representative, Herr Laude, the current damping-gyro does not meet the laid down requirements. Rarely do the gyros hold out for a flying time of 18 hours, and thereafter show a zero error or else run unevenly.

  Armament:

  In their functioning, the Seitenlafetten 131 were faultless. The HD 151/2 with electric ignition and loading shows great susceptibility to disturbances. It too is mainly dependent on connections and these [gun] mounts in turn, suffer from a lack of being watertight in rain. As an immediate remedy for these problems, the Gruppe has altered the mounts to mechanical operation. The RLM specialist, Oberinspektor Roloff, GL/C E-6 [the RLM department for munitions], visited the Gruppe and was fully in agreement with this temporary solution. At the Amt, he will advocate the following measures:

  Sealing of the canopy hood, installation of an emergency battery or a second ignition lead. These measures should largely take care of the faults. The Gruppe will then, with regard to the distributors of the electrical system, return to electrical ignition for the HD 151/2 mounts. With the HD 151/2, in ten sorties there were 12 failures in the electric loading function. In mechanical operation the stresses on electric loading should become less.

  Furthermore, Oberinspektor Roloff will investigate whether, with electric ignition, the possibility exists to enlarge the Schlussbereich (end-stop position). At the moment, the B-2 mount weapon fires with a blockage-area of 1.5 m around the tail unit. It is precisely the electic ignition that must allow firing to be accomplished closer to the tail unit. It would be advantageous to combat enemy aircraft flying behind the tail unit.

  Radio equipment:

  Equipping the aircraft with FuG 10 K2 devices (transceivers for both R/T and W/T communication) was not able to satisfy tactical requirements. It therefore became necessary on all sorties to provide an additional FuG 10 K transmitter and receiver which, in the close-range region up to the limit of 1000 km, and in particular at night, enables a secure connection. In operations with these devices, however, only the trailing-antenna was able to be used.

  Experiences with the current antenna installation, with respect to radio, shows good results. The moveable antenna masts, however, display faulty design, as they often break, and the in- and out- movement does not function well in operation. The poor accessibility to the trailing-antenna was shown to be a disadvantage on some flights. Relocating the installation position to an easily accessible place and its exchangeability during flight is deemed necessary.

  Hohentwiel:

  All tasks undertaken up to now were in regard to Funkmeßaufklärung (radar reconnaissance). In nine out of 11 instances, identification of convoys was by means of search equipment. In four instances, the task was abandoned due to failure of the search equipment. Initial difficulties in equipment maintenance was, following detailed instructions, remedied by specialists. Deliveries of spare parts, particularly tubes, at the present time, is especially problematic.

  Neptun-R

  The Neptun-R apparatus show a high failure rate as a result of the damp seeping in. Part of the cause was due to the poor laying of antennae lead cable and the accumulation of condensation in the couplings. Operation of the apparatus in the first four weeks had to be deferred, as no aircraft were synchronized. The currently installed vertical antennae enable a successful sortie, but however, only after reaching altitude of 1500 m. The installation of horizontal antennae with an effective scope at low flying attitudes is therefore urgently required. Nightfighters have also been observed at low altitudes.

  FuG 25 a [IFF radar]

  There are at the present time still no ground-based devices with corresponding auxiliary equipment in the operational area [and] experience has not been gathered.

  Supply and spare-parts:

  The supply of BMW 801 engines and spare-parts for the BMW 801 from Argenteuil [Paris depot] is good. Airframe spare parts have to come from series production at Junkers Dessau. Great difficulties are experienced in the supply of fuel and oil tanks. These also have to be supplied from Junkers Dessau series production.

  From the abovementioned reasons, it is urgent that the Gruppe receives spare parts from Dessau by means of a transport aircraft (Ju 352) so equipped.

  Supplies of weapons spare-parts for SD 131, MG 131, MG 151 and HD 151/1. For the HD 151/2 [there are] no spare parts being supplied. The parts will have to be procured direct from D.A.B. Berlin.

  Spare-parts difficulties are likewise for FuG 200 and 216.

  Signed:

  Hauptmann and Gruppenkommandeur

  Fischer11

  It was Hauptmann Fischer’s objective and hope that his report would reach, and be read at, the highest levels of the RLM and the OKL, as well as by the relevant departments at Junkers. He was successful in as much as that it did land on the desk of Generalfeldmarschall Milch, and he took immediate steps to hasten development of the Ju 390.12 But it remained to be seen just how much even the dynamic and influential Milch could achieve as the war entered its sixth difficult year.

  * * *

  *Since Vierling is a four-barrel arrangement, and Zwilling a two-barrel, Illing probably denotes a single-barrel, and is meant as an abbreviation for Einling or single arrangement.

  CHAPTER SEVEN

  A BURNING QUESTION

  Atlantic Operations, December 1943

  German air operations in the Atlantic have great prospects of success in spite of present inferiority.

  ‘The Operational Use of the Luftwaffe in the War at Sea 1939–1943’, Luftwaffe 8.Abteilung Historical Report, January 1944

  By 16 December 1943, conditions in the eastern Atlantic had become nothing short of appalling. One of the Coronel group U-boats, the Type VIIC U-284, had suffered considerable damage from the weather, and its commander, Oberleutnant zur See Günther Scholz, was compelled to abort operations and signal for help. By the 17th, U-284 had sustained bad sea damage to both of its electric motors. U-629, which had arrived from the Arctic, came to the vessel’s assistance on the 21st, taking all of its crew aboard before U-284 was scuttled.1

  After two fruitless weeks, BdU dissolved the Coronel group and repositioned it into three other patrol lines, Sylt, Amrum and Föhr.2

  On the morning of 17 December, a day when bad weather again curtailed any operations by FAGr 5, Kapitän Heinz Assmann, the naval operations officer on the OKW operations staff, delivered a personal teletype message from Dönitz to Adolf Hitler on the ‘burning question of long-range reconnaissance for submarine warfare.’ The Admiral was straight to the point:

  The superiority of the enemy air force due to the employment of the radar has forced
our U-boats in the Atlantic more and more below the surface. For the time being it has become necessary to renounce surface operations by day, and for U-boats to surface only by night, not only in the approach, but also in the main operational areas. Even if we succeed in reducing the possibility of locating submarines or in opposing enemy radar by our own active radar, there is on the whole little scope for change along this line of development …

  Surface tactics by U-boats are a thing of the past. In the future, operations will be carried out underwater … The finding of the enemy constituted the main problem even during the best times of submarine warfare, where operations were carried out on the surface only. In the present enforced mode of operations, the chances of finding the enemy are, as recent experience has shown, reduced by more than a half, since surface operations by day – and therewith the large reconnaissance area of the individual boat – have been discontinued.

  Even now, operations without air reconnaissance hold no promise of success. The past two months have, however, clearly confirmed that the extremely weak forces at the disposal of the Fliegerführer Atlantik cannot carry out the minimum reconnaissance requirements necessary for a U-boat operation, even when strained to the utmost. Nine out of fourteen joint operations already carried out were failures only because the reconnaissance forces were so weak that they could not detect the convoy sailing close by the U-boat patrol line. The long-term assembly of many U-boats will be an economic waste if the necessary number of reconnaissance forces are also not available.

  The last operation by Group ‘Coronel’ constitutes an example of this; for this operation in which 25 U-boats were engaged, the small number of only three aircraft was available on each of two days, and after one day’s interval, only three further machines could be made available. Owing to this weak reconnaissance, the convoy was not detected on two days, and on the third day it was too late and uncertain for the boats to operate.