The Ether Zone: U.S. Army Special Forces Detachment B-52, Project Delta

by Morris Ray

  Project Delta 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion advisors, FOB Phu Bai, May 1968. Rear, L to R: CPT Thomas Humphus, 1LT William “Bill” Wentz, 1LT Anthony Ayers, SSG Paul Hill, MSG Virgil Murphy. Seated L to R: SSG David Ryder, (unknown, in front of Ryder), unknown, SSG Marvin Forbes, SFC Thomas Schultz and SFC Billy Bean. (Photo courtesy of Thomas O. Humphus)

  As Operation Delta Junction kicked into high gear, three companies were designated to set ambushes on suspected convoy routes. During Operation Samurai IV in March 1968, Delta teams reported locating an improved road and that they had heard trucks in the area. The Rangers’ job was to see that any supplies that might be in those vehicles didn’t reach the NVA offensive in Hue. Lieutenant Binh was the 5th Airborne Ranger Company Commander, LT Nguyen Hien commanded the 1st Platoon. The senior USSF advisor was LT Tom Humphus, his assistant was Australian Warrant Officer Cedric “Shorty” Turner and the NCOIC was SSG Phil Salzwedal. Specialist 5 Little Jackson was the medic attached from the Delta Medical Section.

  Slicks from the 281st AHC inserted 1st and 5th Ranger Companies at 1700 hours on an LZ near a curve in the targeted road. The 281st gunships were overhead to cover the insertion. Their luck held; no enemy on the LZ and no sign of the reported NVA. Just past the curve was an under-water bridge the enemy had built that was concealed from aerial observation. After securing the LZ, the Rangers quickly assembled and 1st Company led out away from the bridge toward their preplanned ambush positions west of the LZ. The 1st Platoon’s leader, LT Hien, later said he was surprised by the unit’s stealth and readiness as it proceeded toward the objective. He was excited, and from his men’s faces he knew their hearts were pounding just as hard as they moved into position along the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

  The 3rd Ranger Company was inserted into an LZ adjacent to the road, approximately five kilometers to the west of these two companies. Their mission was to block the road to keep NVA units from reinforcing the ambushed truck convoy and destroy any NVA that escaped the ambush.

  Upon reaching their objective, 1st Company moved off the road and up a ridgeline, forming a line along the ridge. They had a relatively clear view of the road across a small ravine. The 5th Company moved off the road and formed a line about thirty meters from the road, and parallel to it. Their ambush line was slightly downhill from the road, which gave any one on the road a tactical advantage over them. The two companies had effectively formed an “L” ambush, however, which would quickly overcome any such advantage.

  The USSF advisors situated themselves with the company headquarters element, about ten meters behind and centered on the ambush line. The company commander shielded himself behind a large banyan tree, with LT Humphus and WO Turner on either side, using the large roots as cover. Humphus couldn’t see Salzwedal and Jackson, but knew they were to the right in a shallow depression.

  About an hour before dark, the 5th Company left flank signaled enemy movement on the road from the west. The movement turned out to be an NVA squad. As they approached the center of 1st Company’s line, a shot rang out to Humphus’s left, and all hell broke loose as the first three NVA were hit numerous times and hammered to the ground. They died instantly, but in dying, the nearest one fell forward, squeezing off a burst from his AK-47. The errant burst tore through the rotting leaves to the right of LT Humphus, hitting Jackson in the chest and Salzwedal in the left arm.

  The remainder of the NVA squad went to ground against the north bank of the road, protected from 1st Company’s defilade position. Their location was such that when 1st Company attempted to fire at them, their rounds struck among 5th Company’s positions, and 5th Company’s rounds were striking them. The NVA could not move, but they were wisely causing the Rangers plenty of grief by firing at one company and then the other, causing the Rangers to return fire into friendly ranks. Humphus finally got the Rangers to cease fire.

  He contacted the 5th Company commander with a plan. “We have them pinned down and they can’t move. We should send a squad left to outflank them.”

  There was a slight rise in the road at that point and it would provide them perfect cover to fire upon the NVA’s position. The Rangers were good troops if properly led, but many times the appointed officers did not live up to their American advisor’s expectations.

  “No, no. VC too many, VC too many,” he kept repeating.

  The more Humphus encouraged him, the more he resisted, insisting that it should be 1st Company to make the move. To complicate matters, the NVA resumed firing and 1st Company opened up again, spraying the other Ranger company’s position.

  Frustrated, Humphus called the 281st gunships (Wolf Pack) and asked if they could see the road. They replied that they could. He asked for the “Hog,” a Huey gunship with an automatic 40mm chain gun, and they came back.

  “Can you paint a center line right down the middle of the road for us?”

  “Can do,” the Hog pilot said.

  “We’re ‘danger close’ to the road, but below it.”

  “No problem,” the Hog replied.

  Humphus told the CO to get everyone down, then told the Hog to bring it on. “Roger. We’re coming in hot.”

  The Hog’s 40mm rounds went precisely down the middle of the dirt road to the Ranger’s front, shrapnel zinging through the trees all around them. The Ranger CO’s face was a mask of sheer terror. As the Hog glided off, Humphus again tried to get the VN commander to send a squad down and check out the site. Again, “Too many VC,” was all he got. Humphus raised the handset and pushed the ‘push-to-talk’ button to call for the Hog to make another run. “Wolf Pack, Wolf Pack, this is Otter, over.”

  The VN CO started pleading, “No, no. We go now. We go.” He’d seen enough of the Hog.

  The CO ordered a squad down the road and found the rest of the NVA squad—all dead. The only Ranger casualties were minor wounds from 1st Company’s fire and splinters from the Hog’s 40mm.

  As darkness fell, the surrounding jungle turned an inky black. Humphus and Shorty Turner discussed their worries that the earlier firefight might bring a lot more NVA down on them. But as time dragged by, all remained quiet. Humphus saw someone light a cigarette near his side of the road. He could make out a shadow leaning against a tree. Shorty told him it was their Company XO, LT Lam. Suddenly, a figure in black pajamas strode along the road toward Lam. As he got closer, Lam asked who he was. The figure in black held a flashlight under his chin to illuminate his face, and told Lam his name. Then he asked Lam who he was.

  “I am Lieutenant Lam, 81st Ranger Battalion,” Lam said calmly. He shot the man through the head with his .45, killing him instantly. Humphus said Lam had retained the cigarette in his mouth throughout the episode.

  The .45 blast sounded much like a 105 howitzer in the still of the jungle night. Shorty said, “Aw damn. We’re in deep shit now.” Still, nothing happened. No attack came.

  Despite the effects of the jungle chill, Humphus noticed they were napping in shifts. The sound of a vehicle cut through the silence; everyone became alert. A vehicle approached, driving with its lights out. The driver stopped a short distance away and blew his horn, moved slightly forward, paused and blew it again. When it passed Humphus’s position, although too dark to identify its type, he was able to tell by its impressions that it was a three-quarter-ton U.S. Army truck. The Rangers held their fire as it proceeded to the underwater bridge, turned and came back. Obviously a scout vehicle, its horn telling the trailing convoy how far it had progressed.

  These trucks were first discovered by Delta Recon teams then ambushed near “Delta Junction” by the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion—Project Delta’s reaction force, March 1968. (Photo courtesy of Thomas O. Humphus)

  It was silent until daylight, when the drone of several trucks broke the morning calm. All Humphus could do now was hope the Ranger’s training kicked in. The plan called for a Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) to initiate the ambush by taking out the lead vehicle, thereby blocking the road and halting the others. But as plans often d
o once the first round is fired, this one changed immediately. The LAW misfired.

  If Humphus was concerned about the Ranger’s reaction, he needn’t have worried. When a young Ranger private noticed the LAW was a dud, he fired his M79 grenade launcher through the windshield of the lead truck, immobilizing it and blocking the trail. The ambush initiated, everyone began firing into the valley where the convoy had stopped. After a short but intense period, Humphus called for the 281st to come get them out—their mission was complete.

  Vietnamese soldiers from the 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion assigned to Project Delta as a Quick Reaction Force. (Photo courtesy of Len Boulas)

  Specialist 5 Little Jackson died sometime during the night. Wrapped in his poncho and liner, they carried him to the LZ for the ride back to FOB Phu Bai. Apparently the NVA had enough of Delta’s Rangers and the Wolf Pack, particularly the Hog, allowing them to leave without resistance. The NVA would welcome them back later, to the same LZ, and this time the Rangers would pay a stiff price to get in—and an even greater one to get out.

  It would not be the last Project Delta blood shed during Operation Delta Junction. Intelligence reports would later confirm Humphus’s bunch destroyed an NVA convoy of eight trucks laden with supplies and ammunition and caused heavy casualties to a mobile regiment of the NVA Yellow Star Division, yet escaped with a minimal number of wounded and dead. The 81st Airborne Ranger operation was considered a huge success, but this battle would be only one of many they would fight in the upcoming weeks as part of Operation Delta Junction in the enemy stronghold of A Shau Valley.

  Only one week later, they returned to support Operation Delta-36, only this time the four Airborne Ranger companies encountered an even larger NVA force on the LZ. Within minutes, five helicopters were shot down, their entire load of valiant Rangers lost. One USSF was KIA and several seriously wounded.

  * * * * * *

  In June 1968, when the Communists initiated grandiose plans to occupy Saigon, the ARVN Command knew they were in serious trouble and called for help from all quarters. In the midst of the ruin and rubble of that war-torn city, the 81st Rangers etched their name into Vietnam’s war history. The Rangers, trained exclusively to operate in jungle and mountainous terrain, chasing and fighting an elusive insurgency, were not trained to fight pitched battles on city streets. Hardly anyone surmised they’d make a difference in the nasty urban street fighting in Saigon’s Gia Dinh section. Although unaccustomed to urban warfare, the Rangers aggressively assaulted seasoned NVA soldiers who had the distinctive advantage of concealed fortifications. Staff Sergeant Tom Schultz advised one of the three Ranger companies going into Gia Dinh.

  Surveying the narrow streets where he was to engage the enemy, Schultz was visibly concerned about the operation’s urban combat aspect. Remembering the amphibious assault they were ordered to make at Vung Ro Bay, he knew his Rangers hadn’t been trained to fight in an urban warfare situation. He expressed apprehensions to the senior Special Forces advisor, MSG Murphy.

  “What the hell, Murph? We’re Special Forces. We fight in the jungle. What do we know about street fighting?”

  Murphy laughed. “You’ve watched that TV show, ‘Combat,’ haven’t you?”

  “Yeah.”

  “Well, shit. Don’t worry about it. Just do what they do.”

  Yeah.

  Until then, the Ranger Battalion had been armed with WWII vintage M-1 rifles, carbines and a few BARs. Outgunned by the NVA and VC’s highly effective AK-47 automatic rifles, the Rangers often came across as hesitant, less aggressive on the attack than American advisors would’ve preferred. After their first day in Saigon, it seemed to be a surprise when two duce-and-a-half truckloads of the new M-16 automatic rifles showed up. Whether the SF advisors had “borrowed” or had been issued them, was a topic often discussed among senior military officers, but never fully resolved.

  Making redistribution of the new weapons more difficult was the fact that the Rangers were heavily engaged with the enemy. Schultz and other Ranger advisors quickly devised a plan. One platoon at a time, they pulled them back off the line, issued the new weapons, showed the NCOs how to lock and load them, handed out ammo magazines and sent them back into the fray; the process repeated until all had the new weapons. The Ranger’s first M-16 test fire was a wet run in a built-up area against fortified enemy positions. Schultz related that once issued the new weapons, they turned into “tigers” with an astounding aggressiveness. The enemy, contemplating their options, often sought out other Vietnamese units instead of facing the ferocious Airborne Rangers with their little black rifles. While the battle for Gia Dinh raged substantially longer, the skirmish in the 81st Ranger’s section lasted only three days.

  “In just three days,” Schultz recalled, “our Rangers wiped out a battle-seasoned, hardcore, North Vietnamese Regiment from the Order of Battle Plan. They were that good.”

  During the battle for Gia Dinh, often NVA soldiers held out to surrender to the Vietnamese Marines; they claimed they would’ve surrendered sooner had it not been for fear of the Rangers. The speed and tenacity of the Ranger’s assault completely demoralized many NVA units. After a few days, some simply waited in their bunkers for someone to surrender to. Acclaim and civilian gratitude was expressed for this unit’s gallant actions and lofty accomplishments. After Gia Dinh, the unit was heralded as the “81st Special Forces Battalion.”

  During the battle for Gia Dinh, Project Delta medic, John Burdish, earned the Bronze Star for valor when, under heavy fire, he rescued three seriously wounded Rangers from certain death. Running through a hail of bullets, he first attempted to administer first aid, but soon discovered his position too exposed to enemy fire. He hoisted one of the men and ran through the devastating fire to safety. Burdish made two more trips through the rain of bullets to carry the wounded Rangers to safety. When all the wounded were in a covered position, he provided medical assistance until they could be evacuated to the rear, winning the admiration and respect of the entire 81st Airborne Ranger Battalion. This act, along with others during operations in 1969, would cost him his right to extend with Project Delta for another year. Turning his request down, SGM “Crash” Whelan told him, “I’m sending your ass home before you get yourself killed.”

  The Rangers didn’t stand-down as other ARVN units did, to relax and take it easy until their next mission. With procedures similar to those of the Delta Recon teams, they trained hard, continually running realistic combat exercises in the hills surrounding their Nha Trang base camp. The Ranger Battalion advisors during the action at Gia Dinh were CPT Edward M. Young, assisted by MSG Virgil Murphy, who remained throughout Saigon’s urban combat, and at the company level, SSG Tom Schultz. The 81st Rangers had won tremendous praise and deep respect for their efforts in the Saigon conflict and for their combat abilities during the Tet Offensive. It was one of the few Vietnamese units where members were awarded individual U.S. decorations for valor, including the Silver Star.

  * * * * * *

  While running recon support for CG III Corps, Dec 1968 to March 1969 during Operation ARES in Dong Xoai, Binh Long Province, SSG John P. Burdish and SP4 William R. Pomeroy were both awarded a Purple Heart for their wounds, while SFC Charles Hiner was awarded two. Staff Sergeant Sylvester Ray and SFC Walter Simpson both received the ACMV.

  TWENTY-FOUR

  Back Into the Valley

  IN APRIL 1969, OPERATION CASS PARK BEGAN, followed by Cass Park II, ending July 1969. Its namesake, LTC Alan H. Park, assumed command of Delta at the beginning of 1969 and remained through August 1969. Cass Park I, in support of the 101st Airborne Division’s recon effort in A Shau Valley, and Cass Park II, in Happy Valley, were extremely costly and bloody operations for Project Delta. Twenty-two awards for valor and eighteen Purple Hearts came out of these operations; twenty-one VNSF were lost, three American SF recon members were listed as MIA and one USSF soldier was killed in action. Colonel Alan Park, in recalling the loss of Recon Team 3, said the scars
of that operation still linger in his memory.

  Recon Team-3, comprised of SSG Charles V. Newton, SGT Charles F. Prevedel, SSG Douglas E. Dahill and three VNSF personnel, infiltrated into an area about forty kilometers southeast of A Shau on the evening of 21 April 1969. The entire area around A Shau had been saturated with enemy for months, and RT-3 made contact within hours of hitting the LZ. By daylight, they’d been in a running gunfight with a far superior enemy force for hours and suffered several casualties.Major Steven P. Solomon, Delta Operations officer, spoke with the team, reassuring them that help was on the way. Sergeant Prevedel told him they were cornered in a deep ravine between two rugged ridgelines unable to go on, had several wounded and were surrounded. Solomon advised Prevedel of LTC Park’s orders for a BDA Platoon to be sent as a reaction force, arriving within the hour. Around midday, all radio contact with the team was lost. Every time Park went to ask his communication NCO about any word from the team, the silent radio seemed to scream at him to do something. He’d done all he could. Somehow, it didn’t seem enough.