by John France
2 FC, p. 131; Terraine, White Heal, p. 17.
3 AA, 374; RA, p. 50; GF, p. 30; FC, p. 94; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 149–52; RC, 647.
4 GF, p. 30; RA, p. 51; AA, 373; on horses see below pp. 281–2.
5 See below pp. 309–10.
6 GF, p. 32.
7 Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p. 43; Aleppo Chronicle, p. 579; on the capture of Rugia see GF, p. 26.
8 RA, pp. 51–52; AA, 373; Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p. 43.
9 GF, pp. 30–3; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 150, 158.
10 RA, pp. 51–2.
11 Runciman, 1. 221 offers this explanation; Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 171 offers no general comment, simply observing that, on the basis of these two sources, the crusaders had learned not to allow themselves to be surrounded.
12 AA, 373–4, 425; RA, p.53.
13 RA, p.56.
14 The tendency of later writers to present tidy and logical accounts of battles which are essentially chaotic affairs is thoroughly criticised by J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (London, 1976). It is worth noting that in Operation Battleaxe’ in the Western desert in 1941 twenty tanks of Seventh Armoured Brigade, one fifth of their strength, simply went missing and were not accounted for until two years later, and even that story was unconfirmed: B. Pitt, The Crucible of War: Western Desert 1941 (London, 1980) pp. 300–1.
15 GF, pp. 29–30.
16 GF, p. 33; RA, p. 53; AA, 375; on the battle see below pp. 246–52.
17 GF, pp. 33–4; AA, 378–9 FC, p. 95; Gesta Francorum Iherusalem expugnantium, RHC Oc. 3. 499;RA, pp. 54–5; on the attempted disciplinary action see J. A. Brundage, ‘Prostitution, miscegenation and sexual purity in the First Crusade’, in P. Edbury, ed., Crusade and Settlement in the Latin East, (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 58–9.
18 FC, p. 94; RA, pp. 53–4, who suggests that Bohemond was even then trying to gain Antioch; AA, 375.
19 See above pp. 209–10.
20 GF, p. 33.
21 AA, 375.
22 RA, pp. 54–5; on this see France, ‘Departure of Tatikios’, 145; J. Richard, ‘La confrérie de la première croisade: à propos d’un épisode de la première croisade’, in B. Jeannau, ed., Etudes de civilisation médiévale: mélanges offerts à E. R. Labande, (Poitiers, 1974), pp. 617–22.
23 RA, 50, 55–6; 62, GF, pp. 34–5.
24 GF, pp. 34–5; RA, pp. 54–5; AA, 366, 417.
25 RA, p. 55; France, ‘Depature of Tatikios’, 144–6; see also Richard, ‘La confrérie de la première croisade’, 617–22.
26 AA, 378–9.
27 AA, 378–9; HBS, p. 189.
28 RA, p. 62.
29 AA, 386.
30 GF, p. 35.
31 Aleppo Chronicle, p. 579.
32 Matthew, 33; HBS, 190.
33 RA, p. 49; Ibn Butlân, tr. and cited in Lestrange, Palestine under the Moslems, p. 370.
34 On the shortage of horses see below pp. 281–2; there is virtual unanimity on the figure of700; RA, p. 56, AA, 380, Stephen of Blois and Anselm in Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 151, 157. The only dissenter is RC, 647 who gives a figure of 200.
35 AA, 344 and see above pp. 75–7, 239–41; RA, pp. 53–54.
36 RA, p. 56; GF p. 35.
37 Aleppo Chronicle, p. 579.
38 AA, 380; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, 149–52, 157–60.
39 RA, pp. 56–8 GF, pp. 35–8.
40 Anonymi Gesta Francorum, ed. H. Hagenmeyer (Heidelberg, 1890), pp. 50–8 passages number 7 and 8 (2), and see also 6, 9, 10. My own work confirms this dependence.
41 RA, pp. 49, 52; Smail, Crusading Warfare, p. 171 follows this interpretation.
42 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 149–52; RC, 647–8.
43 RA, pp. 56, says that the leaders met on 8 February: ‘in the house of the bishop’ which strongly suggests that he was away, and later tells us that Count Raymond had been ill for much of the winter, p. 63; on Robert of Normandy see above pp. 215–19; RC, 647 lists Godfrey, Stephen of Blois and Bohemond as present, and to this list common sense would suggest we add Tancred and Hugh of Vermandois who seem to have spent much time with Stephen, but this list is a guess; PT, p. 43
44 AA, 380–2.
45 The Lake of Antioch has now all but vanished due to drainage schemes. Pre-war maps show it to have been three to four kilometres north of the Aleppo road, but, by then, drainage efforts had made an impact on its size. Moreover, Raymond of Aguiler’s statement that it was only two kilometres above the river refers to mid-winter when it would have been at its greatest. There are other mounds along this road (indeed, the Amouk is dotted with them) but the Tell Tayinat is the only one which can be described as being between the river and the lake. Set north of the Aleppo road it is aligned NE to SW. On its southern end, close to the road, is a Moslem cemetry, but the top of the hill is disfigured by an abandoned factory of 1950s vintage.
46 See below p. 256.
47 Aleppo Chronicle, p. 579.
48 On the sending of the embassy see above p. 211; GF, pp. 37, 43; RA, p. 58; AA, 379, 383, 463, 484–5; Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 149–52; Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge, pp. 64–5.
49 RA, pp. 109–10; Köhler, Allianzen und Verträge, p. 64. Köhler pp. 56–69, thinks that the Egyptians saw the crusade as a Byzantine force but their ambassadors were at Antioch for a month and had the chance to examine the crusader legates who returned with them for a year; even if there were also Byzantine emissaries there, they could hardly have failed to understand the differences. However, this does not alter the possibility that they were prepared to consider making arrangements reflecting earlier Byzantine dealings with the new force.
50 Köhler, Allianzen und Verträgen, p. 60, suggests that they were accompanied by a Greek embassy, but there is no evidence for this. Indeed, given that Tatikios had left the crusader camp by the time of their arrival, it is difficult to think who would have had the authority to create a Byzantine delegation. Lilie, Byzanz, pp. 51–2, thinks it is unlikely that the Byzantines would have wished to see contact between their allies and Egypt and is sceptical of Raymond of Aguilers’ report of the contacts between Egypt and the crusade, which he sees in the light of this writer’s known hostility to Byzantium. Köhler, Allianzen und Verträgen, pp. 66–8 argues strongly that Raymond was reliable in this context. Essentially, it seems unlikely that Raymond would have invented such controversial material.
51 On the sources and the numbers involved see above pp. 140–41; AA, 384–5; RA, p. 60
52 RA, pp. 62–3; PT, pp. 50–1; above, p. 229.
53 GF, p. 42; RA, p. 61–2. For the Moslem cemetry see Rey, Monuments, Pl. xvii. About 250metres to the right of the Bridge the excavations at Antioch revealed the remains of a late Roman cemetry: J. Lassus, ‘Cimitière au bord de l’Oronte’, in W. Elderkin, ed., Antioch on the Orontes: Excavations of 1932 (Princeton, 1934) pp. 85–92. On the west bank at the entry to the modern bridge there is a roundabout and the slope in question is now covered by a cinema and, across the road, the main Antioch post-office, both dating from French colonial days.
54 GF, p. 43; RA, pp. 63–4.
55 PT, p. 50
56 GF, pp. 29–32, 35–41.
57 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, p. 149; GF, p. 63; RA, p. 77.
58 Runciman, 1. 232, n. 1.
59 AA, 389–95.
60 AA, 395–6 and see above p. 167.
61 RC, pp. 649–50; PT, pp. 79–81.
62 Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 157–60.
63 Bouchier, Antioch, pp. 217–19, 226–7; Cahen, Turkey, p. 77.
64 AA, 400, says that Bohemond had made contact with Firuz seven months before; Alexiad, p. 344; Aleppo Chronicle, 581.
65 GF, pp. 44–8.
66 This Turk Bohemond was presumably identical with Bohemond the converted Turk, whom Raymond of Aguilers mentions in connection with the negotiations at Ascalon as having been the godchild of the Bohemond himself: RA, p. 159; RA, p. 64; FC, pp. 98–9;AA, 399–40
0; Bar-Hebraeus, p. 234.
67 RC, 651–2; Anna’s dating at this point is very erratic, for she evidently confuses the relief expeditions of Ridwan and Kerbogah, on which see France, ‘Departure of Tatikios’, 138–9; Alexiad, p. 342; Michael, p. 184; Matthew, 39.
68 Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p. 45; Aleppo Chronicle, 580; Ibn al-Athir, p. 192.
69 RC, 653.
70 As Hagenmeyer, Chronologie no. 265, comments, citing GF, p. 48 (and many derivatives);RA, p. 66; letters of Anselm of Ribemont, People of Lucca, and Princes to Urban II, Hagenmeyer, Kreuzzugsbriefe, pp. 157–60, 165–70.
71 AA, 398–400.
72 FC, p. 101; it must be said that the major Arab chronicles, of Aleppo and Damascus and Ibn al-Athir, do not mention the siege of Edessa, though the Aleppo Chronicle, 580, says that they attacked Tell-Mannas which was restored to Duqaq who took tribute and hostages.
73 AA, 397.
74 RA, p. 49.
75 AA, 396; Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p. 215 n. 35.
76 FC, ed. Hagenmeyer, p. 250, n. 12 lists the variants which appear to come from his first redaction; AA, 394; Aleppo Chronicle, 580; Ibn al-Athir 194.
77 Cahen, La Syrie du Nord, p. 215, n. 35 identifies the Boldagis of Fulcher and Buldagiso of AA with Bouldadji of Djahan, but AA 390, 392, 409 makes it clear that he was the son of Yaghisiyan.
78 AA, 356–7.
79 Matthew, 39, 42; Bar-Hebraeus, p. 235; Michael, p. 184; Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p. 45.
80 See above p. 260.
81 Aleppo Chronicle, 583; Bar-Hebraeus, p. 235.
82 AA, 398; the leaders, says Albert, tried to keep the news secret for fear of demoralising the army.
83 GF, p. 45.
84 AA, 398–400; RC, 657.
85 AA, 400–1; GF, p. 46.
86 On the location, see below p. 266.
87 GF, pp. 46–8.
88 AA, 401; RA, p. 64.
89 RA, p. 64; RC, 654; AA, 402–3.
90 AA, 404; RA, p. 65.
91 AA, 403; RM, 806–7.
92 GF, p. 46; AA, 400; RC, 652; WT, 212–13. In view of the Arab sources on the identity of the betrayer, it is interesting that William says the family were called the Beni Zerra, meaning ‘sons of the armourer.
93 RA, 64; RC, p. 654; Rey, Monuments, pp. 196–201. The weakness of the argument is that only WT, 229, refers to ten towers, but the point about the raising of Bohemond’s flag is a good one. On the postern Rey was writing at a time when the walls were more intact than they are now but he was a very careful observer. My own exploration of the remaining foritifications confirms his ideas.
94 AA, 405–6.
95 GF, pp. 47–8; RA, p. 66; AA, 406.
96 Aleppo Chronicle, 581; Bar-Hebraeus, p. 235; Ibn al-Athir, p. 193; Damascus Chronicle of the Crusades, p. 44.
97 RA, p. 65, tr. Krey, pp. 154–5; AA, 405–6, tells a rather similar tale of numbers of the enemy falling to their death after taking a wrong route in an effort to reach the citadel but he suggests there were 1,000 of them. The road up to the citadel from Antioch proper is so steep and dangerous that it is easy to envisage such an event.
98 RA, p. 65; AA, 407.
99 RA, p. 66; GF, p. 49; AA, 407; FC, 101.
CHAPTER 9
The siege of Antioch: victory
* * *
The second siege of Antioch was to be a desperate affair. From the outset it was clear that it would be very different from the first siege, for both sides must have recognised that it would be fairly short. The crusaders had broken into a city with food supplies depleted after a nine-month siege. Some effort was made to purchase food at St Symeon, but the speed of Kerbogah’s arrival meant that there was simply no time. Sitting out the siege was, therefore, not an option for the crusaders.1 In any case their military situation was quite different from that of the earlier defenders for the enemy controlled the citadel which was commanded by Kerbogah’s man Ahmad ibn-Marwan, and far outnumbered the crusaders even if seven to one is an exaggeration.2 It is unfortunate that there are no good estimates of the size of Kerbogah’s army but it was very large. The crusader army must have been very reduced and even before the fall of Antioch there were further desertions when news came of the approach of Kerbogah’s army, although they were in part compensated for by troops coming in from outlying places.3 Their numbers cannot have been as high as 30,000, including non-combatants, and were probably much lower so Kerbogah’s army could quite credibly have been twice or three times the size.
In these circumstances it is little wonder that the early reactions of the crusader army were dominated by fear. Fulcher says that Stephen of Blois left the siege on the day before Kerbogah’s arrival but gives no clear reason. Raymond of Aguilers says frankly that Stephen was frightened by rumour of the coming of Kerbogah and the Anonymous implies as much by saying that he pretended to be ill. Albert on the other hand actually says that he was ill and went to rest in Alexandretta where he remained in a state of indecision until other deserters joined him about 11 June; their reports impelled him to flee with 4,000 in his train. Fulcher seems to have been closely connected with Stephen, whose career he followed with interest, so his guardedly neutral tone suggests the worst.4 Stephen was a major leader, elected, as we have seen, to lead the army during the siege of Antioch. His departure had a considerable effect on the morale of the army.5 He was not alone, for after initial fighting in the city Bohemond’s brother-in-law William of Grandmesnil, his brother Aubré, Guy Trousseau Lord of Montlhéry, Lambert the Poor count of Clermont and William the Carpenter joined the ranks of the ‘rope-danglers’, so named from the method of their escape down the walls of Antioch. So general was the terror in the Christian army that the Anonymous says that Bohemond fired part of the city to drive out deserters.6 Such desertions weakened the army and sapped its morale. Rumours were rife; Albert says many believed that the princes would desert, perhaps the foundation of Matthew of Edessa’s reports that the leaders of the army had decided to surrender on terms when a vision revealing the Holy Lance changed their minds. It was against this background that when the priest Stephen had a vision promising divine aid, Adhémar took the opportunity of making all the leaders swear publicly not to abandon the siege.7
The vanguard of Kerbogah’s army arrived before Antioch on 4 June and sent thirty men ahead to trail their coats. Such Turkish tactics had not lost effectiveness through repetition for they were obligingly attacked by Roger of Barneville with fifteen knights who were in turn ambushed by a hidden force some 300 strong and Roger was killed in sight of the city walls; a lance was stuck in his back and he was decapitated. According to a variant story his horse stuck in a bog and, after defending himself well on foot, he was struck in the head by an Arab with a long lance and killed. He was North French, but evidently well known in the army for his death was widely noted. Albert reports the jubilation of the enemy and the shame of the Christians for no-one had dared to go out to his assistance, a circumstance which Albert attributes to the shortage of horses.8 A large element of Kerbogah’s force encamped near the Iron Bridge on 5 June; the crusaders had apparently attempted to defend it because its garrison was destroyed and its commander was found in chains after the great battle. On 6 June Kerbogah’s main army approached Antioch, apparently around the northern side of the Antioch Lake for they encamped, according to the Anonymous, ‘between the two rivers’.9 This could mean by the Wadi al Quivaisiya which entered the Orontes on the west bank just south of the Bridge of Boats. Much more likely, however, is at or near the junction of the Orontes and the Kara Su which drains from the Lake above the city and meets the Orontes about five kilometres above Antioch (see fig. 12).10 This is an odd position from which to conduct a siege, but it is confirmed by Raymond of Aguilers who says that Kerbogah camped some two miles (five kilometres in his usage) from Antioch because he believed that the crusaders would fight outside the city – this must be hindsight. Albert says that Kerbogah made camp ‘in the plain’ and that subs
equently he and a section of his army climbed into the mountains near to the citadel while another part of his force established itself outside the St Paul Gate; this implies that the original camp was to the north of the city.11 Since encampments are mentioned later much closer to the city we can perhaps assume that Kerbogah established his main base at the confluence of the two rivers, probably to prevent a sally from the three northern gates of the city against his forces, and that other encampments were set up according to need.12
After their experiences during the siege the crusaders were determined to hold sally-points protecting two of the gates of the city. On 5 and 6 June the Turks attacked the Mahommeries Tower and there was savage fighting as Robert of Flanders held it for the Christian army. On 8 June, however, it was abandoned as untenable.13 At a date unknown, but presumably about the same time, a similar redoubt outside the St Paul Gate was held by Godfrey whose troops were driven back into the city after heavy fighting with 200 casualties.14 But much of the fiercest fighting in the early part of the siege took place close to the citadel on the eastern wall of the city at the top of Mt Silpius.
Fig. 12 Kerbogah’s siege of Antioch, 4–29 June 1098
It is important to recollect that the city of Antioch covered only a small part of the area enclosed by the walls on the lower slopes of the mountain and on the flat area by the Orontes. The walled circuit protected access to this but for the most part the land within was as wild and precipitous as it was outside. When the city fell in 969 the attacking force was isolated for three days on the lonely part of the wall where they had entered through bribery.15 Both Kemal ad-Din and Ibn al-Athir implicitly blame Yaghisiyan for panicking instead of holding the citadel as his son did16 and with reason, for the citadel, though not a particularly powerful fortification, was very difficult to approach. At the time of the city’s fall Bohemond had placed his banner on a tower which stood on the high ground overlooking the citadel some 300–400 metres to the north. Between this tower and the citadel was a steep gully accommodating an ancient cistern, across the mouth of which ran the only access road to the citadel on a piece of flat land less than thirty metres wide along the edge of a precipitous drop (see fig. 13). Thus the crusaders controlled the only road by which the garrison could get into Antioch, for the land to the west and north is simply almost impossible to cross.17 Immediately after the fall of the city Bohemond seems to have advanced along the wall to the last tower on the opposite side of the gully below the citadel, but was ejected from it by the Turks and wounded by a Turkish arrow in the process. In the fighting here this tower seems to have been one of the key points in no-man’s-land.18 The Turks of the citadel could either advance along the line of the wall, from which the land drops sharply away to the cistern, towards Bohemond’s tower, assisted by forces on the outside, or attack along the road: two very narrow fronts. This set the scene for the savage fighting which erupted with the arrival of Kerbogah’s army on 6 June which the Anonymous emphasises so vividly. He fails to mention attacks on other areas which suggests that he was involved in this part of the city.