Victory in the East

Home > Other > Victory in the East > Page 37
Victory in the East Page 37

by John France


  Fig. 13 The fighting around the citadel of Antioch

  According to the Anonymous on the third day after his arrival, by which is meant 8 June, Kerbogah led a major force up the mountain towards the citadel. This began a serious assault, for the Turks established a camp on the mountain outside.19 Their purpose was obvious: to reinforce the citadel whose forces could then drive down into the city while further assaults on the outside of the wall held by Bohemond distracted the defenders. The crusaders sallied out of the city by a postern gate to attack them. Raymond of Aguilers says that after initial success the crusaders were driven back into the city with terrible losses; the visionary Peter Bartholemew was badly crushed in the scrum to get through the gate. The failure of this pre-emptive strike by the crusaders is confirmed by Anselm of Ribemont.20 The enemy was now in a position to take the fight to the crusaders and the Anonymous describes ferocious fighting over the next two days, both outside and inside the walls, which ended only with the exhaustion of the combatants, and this is confirmed by Raymond of Aguilers, by Anselm and by the letter sent to the pope by the Princes in September 1098 which says that the enemy were driven back into the citadel. The demoralising effect of all this was making itself felt on the army for on the night of 10 June many deserted the city and fled to St Symeon – amongst them William of Grandmesnil.21 On 11 June fighting was renewed and Peter Tudebode’s brother Arved was killed. Perhaps it was during this stage of the fighting that Bohemond was nearly killed and rescued only by the combined efforts of Robert of Flanders, Godfrey and Robert of Normandy who now reappears at Antioch. The Anonymous reports that the enemy got into a tower trapping three knights, including Hugh the Beserk who fought bravely after the others fled wounded. This is not unlike another episode in which Albert reports that the enemy got into a tower left unguarded by laxity, and were driven out by Henry of Esch, a relative of Godfrey. It may well be that this is the tower on the slope below the citadel in no-man’s-land which Bohemond had already tried to seize.22 Pressure from the citadel was so severe that the crusaders built a wall to counter attacks. Albert mentions it, as does Ralph of Caen, but Raymond of Aguilers implies that it was built just before the great battle on 28 June.23 The Anonymous twice refers to the building of this wall; on the first occasion after he tells us how the deserters fled to St Symeon, which would imply a date about 11–12 June 1098; the second was the day on which a meteor fell into the enemy camp, the night of 13–14 June. It seems likely, however, that the wall could be built because Kerbogah changed the emphasis of his attack.

  Anselm of Ribemont says ‘But they moved their camp and set siege to all the gates of the city’, while the letter sent by the Princes in September 1098 states:

  when they saw that they could do no harm on that side [by the citadel], they surrounded us all about, so that none of our men could go out or come to us. As a result of this we were all so destitute and afflicted that many of our men, dying of starvation and many other wants, killed and ate our famished horses and asses.

  The Anonymous says that after a meteor fell in the enemy camp on the night of 13–14 June 1098 the enemy fled down to the plain ‘to my lord Bohemond’s gate [the St Paul Gate besieged by Bohemond]’ which precisely dates the change of attack.24 It must surely be the case that the wall against the citadel was built during the lull as the enemy changed the emphasis of the attack from assault through the citadel to investment and blockade, almost certainly on and just after 14 June. It was probably little more than a barricade across the access road to the citadel and along the crest of the gully up to the wall, (see fig. 13) This does not mean that fighting stopped in the city altogether for even at the last, as the army prepared for the great battle, they left a considerable force under Count Raymond of Toulouse to blockade the citadel.25 Kerbogah probably withdrew because this line of attack was proving unprofitable. The crusader defence was stubborn and able to take advantage of the passive strength of Antioch’s defences and the extremely confined space outside the citadel which made it difficult for the Turks to bring their superiority in numbers to bear. The large Turkish force outside provided reinforcements for the citadel and attacked the wall but it must have been difficult to maintain a protracted effort in this wild and waterless terrain: Albert of Aachen says that the camp in the mountains was abandoned because the enemy found it difficult to supply it with food and fodder. Water must have been even more difficult to carry up the mountain side. Perhaps also it was expensive in manpower and Kerbogah was beginning to understand how desperate was the situation of the crusader army. He was also discovering the problems posed to an attacker by the sheer size of Antioch which threatened to disperse even his strong army. Kerbogah’s decision to switch the emphasis of his attack was a great relief to the crusaders on whom the fighting in the city had imposed great strains. On the night of 11 June the priest Stephen had his vision in the church of St Mary where he had retired in terror at the news that the enemy might get down into the city. The reduction in this pressure was undoubtedly a grave mistake.

  Conditions in the city, however, did not improve, for starvation now set in.26 The sources are eloquent, particularly the Anonymous with his account of poor food and high prices:

  many of us died of hunger, for a small loaf cost a bezant, and I cannot tell you the price of wine … men boiled and ate the leaves of figs, vines, thistles and all kinds of tree. Others stewed the dried skins of horses, camels, oxen or buffaloes.27

  Raymond of Aguilers tells much the same tale but he says that the rich could afford the high prices; even so the knights found things difficult and some were reduced to bleeding their horses for nourishment.28 Albert of Aachen has much the same story of awful things which had to be eaten, but adds the curious detail that they were made palatable by the addition of cumin, pepper and other spices; these were normally luxury goods, but presumably had been captured in Antioch. He says that many of the poorer people died and that some were in the habit of sneaking off to St Symeon to buy food until the enemy ambushed a group, burned the port and then drove away the ships. Later he reports that during the famine even substantial men were reduced to poverty. The noble Herman went to war on an ass and he and Henry of Esch were reduced to beggary and rescued by Godfrey.29

  This was the state of the army in Antioch within less than two weeks of siege – starvation, bitter fighting, panic, desertion, even, according to Raymond of Aguilers, treachery when some crusaders went over to the enemy.30 It was against this background that there occurred a remarkable series of visions. On the morning of 11 June a priest, Stephen of Valence, revealed that Christ had appeared to him and promised divine aid to the crusaders in a vision which he was commanded to reveal to the Legate Adhémar who accepted the tale and took the opportunity to make the crusader leaders swear not to abandon the army.31 And well he might, for this visionary was highly respectful of church order and in his account invoked the structure of the divine economy in his icon-like portrayal of the Virgin interceding for her people. Far different was the other revelation by a poor Provençal, Peter Bartholomew, who inveighed against Adhémar for not preaching to the people and promised not merely divine aid in return for penance, but a material token of God’s favour to His chosen people, the Holy Lance which was discovered in the church of St Peter on 14 June.32 It is undoubtedly true that these two visions, and others such as that of St Ambrose reported by Albert, expressed the deepest beliefs of the crusaders that God was on their side, a combatant in the great struggle who would give them aid according to their desserts.33 Nor is there much doubt of the impact upon the army as a whole. Raymond of Aguilers speaks of joy and exultation in the city when the Lance was discovered. He was a great partisan of the Lance in its later troubles, but the Anonymous was not and yet he is even clearer: ‘throughout the city there was boundless rejoicing’.34 In a letter written very shortly after the siege was over Anselm of Ribemont says of the Lance ‘So when this precious gem was found, all our spirits were revived’ and the crusading pri
nces in their letter of September 1098 to Urban II were absolutely explicit: ‘We were so comforted and strengthened by finding it, and by many other divine revelations that we, who before had been afflicted and timid, were then most boldly and eagerly urging one another to battle’.35 The visions are a deeply interesting topic in themselves, but what matters here is their military effect; they profoundly improved the depressed morale of the crusader army.36 However, the impression given by the Anonymous that spirits revived and the army was ready to proceed to battle once it had received the Lance is a mistaken product of the fractured nature of his narrative at this point.37 The Lance was discovered on 14 June, but it was not until 28 June that the army ventured out to battle, and Raymond of Aguilers makes it clear that there were another two visions and much suffering before the army was ready to march out.38 One of the most important events of this period was the selection of Bohemond to command the army on 20 June. Raymond says he was chosen because Count Raymond and Bishop Adhémar were both ill, but he had already admitted his high military reputation. Previously, he and Adhémar had abruptly closed the gates of the city to prevent the army melting away from desertion.39

  The appointment of a single commander showed that the leaders were now acting to prepare the army for the inevitable, an attempt to break out of the city and destroy Kerbogah’s force. It was a dangerous gamble, though not without precedent, for we have noted that when he was cornered by his father at Gerberoi Robert Curthose suddenly sallied forth, knocked his father from his horse and scattered the besiegers. The practical alternative for both Curthose and the crusaders was slow destruction and dissolution. In the end, as Albert says, they had little choice: ‘All, great and small, declared that they could no longer endure such suffering, and when they were asked said it would be better to die fighting than to succumb to the cruel famine and watch the miserable Christian people perish day by day’.40 What distinguished the crusader situation and made it especially perilous was that because the citadel of Antioch was in enemy hands, its garrison could see all preparations to sally out; on 28 June Albert reports that they duly raised a black flag as a sign of the coming break-out.41

  But before then the leaders sent an embassy to Kerbogah. In the version of the Anonymous this is made to appear purely as a morale-raising episode in which the ambassadors, Peter the Hermit and his translator Herluin, defied Kerbogah. Raymond of Aguilers gives much the same impression, and adds that at the time when the army sallied out Kerbogah announced that he was ready to take up their suggestion of five or ten from each side fighting a kind of trial by battle – but it was then too late. Albert presents the matter rather differently. According to him the leaders were still very uncertain because of the weakness of the army, and in particular the loss of horses; Peter first offered the city to Kerbogah if he would become a Christian. When this was refused he suggested a trial by battle with twenty on each side. When this was refused he left and reported back, being told by Godfrey not to talk about what he had seen in the enemy camp lest it demoralise the army.42 It is very hard to take this embassy as seriously as Albert suggests; perhaps his attitude reflects distrust of the princes amongst ordinary crusaders who were his informants. The embassy of Peter the Hermit was probably also the root of the story in Matthew of Edessa that the leaders were prepared to surrender on terms until the Lance was revealed.43 Now, strengthened by fasting and the rites and ceremonial of the church, almost certainly decreed by Adhémar, the army prepared to attack Kerbogah in a desperate sally.

  This battle was profoundly affected by one simple fact – the army had lost almost all its horses. Speaking of the skirmishing around Antioch, Raymond of Aguilers remarks:

  ‘And so it came about through assaults of this kind that they lost all their horses, because the Turks, not prepared to fight with lances or swords, but with arrows at a distance, were to be feared while they fled, as well as when they pursued.’

  The description is vividly endorsed by Ralph of Caen and reminds one of the careful instructions in Islamic manuals on how to fire to the rear.44 Quite apart from its effect on foraging, loss of horses was disastrous for the crusader army. The scale of the loss has not usually been appreciated by historians.45 Overall the chronicles give us more specific information about numbers of horses than they do about numbers of people; even allowing for the fact that numbers were much smaller, this shows an interesting perception of priorities. But it was a correct one, for without mobility the army would be gravely weakened. Anselm of Ribemont says that by late November 1097 after the construction of Malregard the army could muster only some 700 horses. Raymond of Aguilers, whose comment that the enemy killed many horses has been noted, remarks that for the expedition against Harem shortly before this Bohemond and Robert of Flanders could raise only 150 knights and that for the major foraging expedition of late December 1097 the army raised only 400. During the famine of early 1098 Raymond reports that horses were dying and that the Provençals were reduced to 100 horses when their count invented the compensation scheme for losses. While Bohemond and Robert of Flanders were foraging there was fighting around the city, in the midst of which the cavalry broke off the battle to pursue a riderless horse – an event which caused panic and heavy losses and indicates the value of a horse by this time. The Anonymous states that by late January or early February 1098 there were only about 1,000 horses in the army and this figure is supported by Albert of Aix. However, we have already noted that for the Lake Battle, for which the knights as a whole were mobilised, the sources agree that only 700 could be found – the only dissenter from this figure is Ralph of Caen who speaks of only 200, but he was surely exaggerating and we can suppose that some mounts were left in the camp, so between 700 and 1000 were available at this time. However, Albert says this figure included many on mules, asses and pack horses. Albert mentions horses dying in May 1098, and explains that nobody went to rescue Roger of Barneville because there were few horses; only 150 were left in the army at the time of the fall of Antioch when a further 400 were found in the city. Many of these must have died during the second siege because the Anonymous speaks of horse-flesh and hides being eaten during the famine, while Raymond of Aguilers stresses that many knights, expecting battle, lived on the blood of their horses but would not slaughter them. Albert records a sally against the Turks outside the city which broke down because of the exhausted state of the crusaders’ horses. By the time the army was ready to face Kerbogah he says that they had lost all the horses they had brought from France and that there were only 200 horses fit for war left in the army. At this time the German Count Hermann was reduced to riding an ass so small his feet dragged, and even Godfrey de Bouillon and Robert of Flanders had to beg horses from the Count of Toulouse.46 As usual with medieval numbers there is some doubt; could it be that the chroniclers were exaggerating weakness to maximise the sense of achievement? In this case the general impression of the sources all points in much the same direction – a dramatic reduction in numbers. It is hardly surprising. The crusade had endured a bitter journey across the arid Anatolian plateau in the summer of 1097 during which, the Anonymous says:

  we lost most of our horses, so that many of our knights had to go as foot-soldiers, and for lack of horses we had to use oxen as mounts, and our great need compelled us to use goats, sheep and dogs as beasts of burden.

  A little later the passage of the Taurus range took its toll of men and beasts, according to the same author.47 Many horses were lost, according to Raymond of Aguilers, in the fighting around Antioch and disease and starvation must have accounted for most. In sum, it would appear that by the time the army reached Antioch it had little more than a 1,000 horses and their numbers had dwindled to 700, including beasts of burden, by February 1098 and to 200 or so by the time they fought Kerbogah on 28 June 1098.

  The decision to break out of the city on the morning of 28 June 1098 was undoubtedly taken by all the leaders but we can safely attribute credit for the dispositions of the army to Bohemond.
The subsequent battle resulted in a remarkable crusader victory; to those who were eyewitnesses and others who later described it, it was no less than a miraculous delivery, the very climax of the crusade. So important was it that ‘The sources give more exact detail concerning this battle than of any other fought in Latin Syria during the twelfth century’.48 As a result scholars have felt able to reconstruct the battle in some detail. It is the account given by Raymond of Aguilers, supplemented by that of the Anonymous, which has been most credited by historians, partly because he is known to have been present as standard-bearer in the army of Adhémar of Le Puy, partly because it is a very clear description and partly because it reports a particular tactical formation in which foot-soldiers were thrown forward to protect the cavalry which was later much used in the crusading kingdom.49

 

‹ Prev