by John France
Raymond of Aguilers tells us that the Provençal army formed up inside the Bridge Gate under the command of Adhémar. Raymond of Toulouse their natural commander, was ill and therefore stayed behind to protect the city against the garrison of the citadel. According to Raymond of Aguilers this army divided into two squadrons each of two lines with the foot thrown forward of the cavalry and this formation was replicated in the other divisions of the army each of which comprised broadly national groups organized around the great leaders. There were four of these when they marched out, the first led by Hugh of Vermandois, Robert of Flanders and Robert of Normandy, the second by Godfrey, the third by Adhémar and the fourth by Bohemond. As they emerged Kerbogah was playing chess with one of his followers, Mirdalin, and their dialogue suggests that he was frightened by the Franks, but nonetheless formed his army although he allowed the Franks to exit from Antioch unopposed. Raymond says that in order to evade encirclement (a theme we have noted in Raymond before) Adhémar’s force marched towards the mountains some two miles (five kilometres) away, disregarding Kerbogah’s offer to undergo a trial by battle as Peter the Hermit had suggested. Some of the Turks did move to the left of the crusader line to take them in the rear and a crusader infantry detachment fought them off well until the enemy set fire to the grass and drove them back. Adhémar’s force, though encircled, fought its way towards the mountain, then the army in eight divisions (augmented by five more, by a miracle and their horses wonderfully refreshed by light rain) charged the enemy who fled. The Anonymous makes it clear that Bohemond’s force was in reserve and that the North French led by Godfrey, Robert of Flanders and Hugh were on the Christian right by the river and they engaged the main enemy force.50 The general outline of the plan and its outcome has been summarised neatly thus:
The Franks were marshalled in four divisions, each of two squadrons, in which were both horse and foot-soldiers. The infantry were arrayed in front of the knights … Bohemond was again commander … he led the fourth and last division which was to be in reserve … As soon as the first division had passed through the gate and crossed the Orontes bridge, it was to turn into line, and to march upstream with its right flank on the bank of the river. The second division marched across the rear of its predecessor and turned to face the enemy in line when it was in a position to advance in line with and on the left of the first division. The third did likewise and came into line on the left of the second. The plan ensured that each division as it left the city changed its formation from column into line at the earliest possible moment, so that it faced the enemy ready to attack, and covered the deployment of the succeeding column… The flanks were covered by natural obstacles … Some two miles ahead of the Franks as they left the city was high ground. The head of the third division was ordered to reach this before it turned into line; after it had done so the left flank of the Franks was protected just as its right was covered by the river … The battle developed almost in accordance with Bohemond’s plan. The Turks resisted the attempts of the third division … and were able to send a detachment across the head of the Latin column … a body of crusaders was detailed to meet its attack and in the resulting encounter the pedites showed they were well able to defend themselves … the three leading divisions … were able to attack in echelon. The Turks … fled with little resistance to the Latin charge.51
Now something like this must have happened, but the neatness of the event as described must, on a priori grounds, raise some suspicions. Deployment from column into line is a notoriously complicated manoeuvre and undertaken after crossing the rear of a force under attack, in the close presence of the enemy, is a military nightmare. Raymond asks us to believe that the crusader force was seeking to block the plain as it executed a right turn, yet the plain in question is four to five kilometres wide as he says. Moreover, his account suffers from some internal contradictions. He tells us that the army was divided into four divisions but does not explain whence came the infantry unit which dealt with the enemy to the rear. Adhémar’s division was opposed and encircled yet no arrows were shot against it and nobody killed – but Raymond himself tells us that he replaced Heraclius of Polignac who was wounded in the face by an arrow as the standard-bearer of the bishop. Finally he refers to a total victory and pursuit to the setting of the sun, but remarks that few of the enemy’s mounted men were killed, though many foot. When we look at other accounts we can see some indication of the difficulties simply from the variant numbers of divisions in the crusader army which they record. The Anonymous, who was certainly present, gives six and Ralph agrees on the number and the make-up but suggests a different order. Anselm, who was a participant and wrote his second letter very shortly after the battle, mentions only five divisions and omits the name of Godfrey de Bouillon who was most certainly present and in charge of a major division. Albert of Aachen says there were no fewer than twelve divisions which he carefully enumerates specifying who the leaders were.52 Anselm’s slip of memory should remind us that this was an exciting and emotional occasion. The importing of camp gossip by Raymond and his concern with enemy encirclement point to his efforts to explain events post facto. The Anonymous does much the same – he refers to Kerbogah at the start of the battle ordering that grass-firing be used to signal retreat and records its use against the crusader infantry deployed against the enemy in the rear as signalling the end of the battle – but nobody else does this. Presumably he connected the appearance of a grass-fire with the enemy flight, though there is clear reason to believe that it signified nothing of the sort.53 There is always a tendency to tidy up a battle in retrospect, to give it a shape which will inevitably reflect the deductions and predilections of the writer as much as events, and that is what we are dealing with here in what was a remarkable event and a deeply felt experience for all who lived through it. If we bear all this in mind it seems to me that the crusaders had a much simpler battle plan than has been suggested and that the reasons for their victory are fairly clear.
The most remarkable thing about the battle against Kerbogah was that it was a victory of a largely infantry army over a much larger force with infantry and cavalry. For the crusaders must have been overwhelmingly dismounted. Albert of Aachen says that there were only 150–200 horses in the army fit for battle. This would suggest that there were barely more than thirty knights on average in each if there were six crusader divisions. It is possible that the Provençal force was stronger in horses than others, for Godfrey and Robert of Flanders had begged horses from Count Raymond, but if that was the case then other divisions would have been weaker in mounted men.54 Albert makes his comments about the shortage of horses in the context of explaining that its consequence was that there was little pursuit of the enemy after the battle. The other sources seem to point in the same direction. Raymond of Aguilers, who does not comment directly at this point on the number of horses, says that few of the enemy’s horsemen were killed, but many of their footmen. Ralph of Caen says exactly the same thing – only Tancred and his small force really pursued the enemy beyond his camp as far as ‘Artāh. This is confirmed by Kemal ad-Din who says that there was no pursuit and no prominent men were lost although many volunteers became casualties. Matthew of Edessa stresses that it was the Islamic infantry which bore the weight of the crusader attack.55 We need not suppose that Albert was exactly right, and he does qualify his number by saying that the 200 were those fit for battle. However Fulcher, without giving figures, says much the same thing: ‘They [the enemy] knew that our knights had been reduced to weak and helpless footmen’.56 The crusader army was overwhelmingly an army on foot and the few horsemen in its divisions must have been precious nuclei round which the others could rally. We can assume that in this desperate situation every fit man was pressed into service, for after the capture of the city they would have had ample supplies of arms for even the poorest. Amongst these were the Tafurs, a hard-core of poor men organised under their own leaders, whose name may be derived from the big light wooden shield which
many of them carried, the talevart or talevas. Their ferocity and in particular their cannibalism would later repel friend and foe alike, although their supposed ‘king’ may well have been a later invention grafted on like the nobility of Robin Hood. These desperados seem to have been pre-eminently North French and Fleming in origin and to have represented a quasi-autonomous force within the army.57 Such troops as these would have been well-stiffened by large numbers of dismounted knights, so that a formidable infantry existed, and would continue to exist for the rest of the crusade. The use of infantry thrown forward of the knights was not so much a skilful tactical invention – rather a necessity, for the shortage of horsemen meant that the foot would have to carry the battle to the enemy. In the event the battle proved their value in spectacular fashion.
Here we come to the whole point of the crusader deployment. They needed to get to close quarters with the enemy as quickly as possible and in the most favourable circumstances. They could not afford to fight at a distance for that would be to the enemy’s advantage. This was why they chose to break out of the Bridge Gate. The main enemy camp was situated up the valley of the Orontes some five kilometres above Antioch, as we have noted (see fig. 12). It seems to have remained there for all the sources indicate that after the battle the enemy were pursued up the valley and their camp sacked.58 To have attacked through the three north-facing gates would have sent the army into the narrow funnel of the Orontes valley, close to where the enemy main force lurked in its camp at the confluence of the Orontes and the Kara Su. It is clear that his main force was there, for the crusader sources speak of Kerbogah being in the camp at the time of their sally and being separated from the main focus of the fighting.59 To have attacked south through the St George Gate would have been folly, for the enemy would have been massed behind an army which would inevitably have fled to the sea. Rather, a key factor in the defeat of Kerbogah was the decision of the crusaders to attack against the force in the plain above the Bridge Gate and the speed with which this was achieved. It is easy to forget the sheer size of Antioch. This had troubled the crusaders who for six months could only sustain outposts on the west bank. Kerbogah made the fatal mistake of dispersing his forces, something the crusaders had been at pains to avoid during their siege. He held much of his army to the north but this separated him from the force by the Bridge Gate, much of which was mainly on foot to judge by comments in the sources that the infantry suffered the bulk of the losses. If all the gates of the city were invested as the crusader sources say we can envisage much of his huge army rallying to the battle which developed to the north of the Bridge Gate and being committed to action piecemeal (see fig. 14). Presumably some of those who attacked the crusaders in the rear came from the force outside the St George Gate. As the crusaders marched out, all these groups would have had to concentrate and either await the coming of their commander or rush into a developing battle without any direction.60 The formation adopted by the crusaders was designed to strike at the enemy in the plain and to seize them in close combat; this was the job of the first divisions to emerge. The long march of the Provençals across the plain was to protect their own flanks and this was especially useful as Kerbogah and his main force approached, while the reserve under Bohemond was there to give support as needed. Bohemond probably counted on the distance between Kerbogah and the forces in the plain to aid his plan; Kerbogah was suffering from dispersal of his forces, which the crusader leaders had been at such pains to avoid. In the event, the crusaders were able to achieve success because of hesitations in the enemy camp and the speed of their own action.
When the garrison of the citadel flew the black flag to warn Kerbogah that a break-out was imminent the news seems to have triggered not action but a debate in the enemy camp. Some crusader sources report a dialogue between Mirdalin and his commander which shows Kerbogah as fearful. This follows the poetic tradition of imaginary exchanges amongst the enemy, in this case designed to explain an extraordinary fact, the slowness of the enemy army to react to the attack.61 According to Kemal ad-Din, the Arab leader Wassab ibn-Mahmud and some emirs urged Kerbogah to fall on the Franks as they appeared at the gate but the majority of the commanders wanted to let the enemy out to attack them in the plain. Ibn al-Athir says there was in any case considerable friction between many of the emirs and Kerbogah, and that some favoured an immediate attack but Kerbogah favoured letting the enemy out.62 Kerbogah’s view seems to have prevailed, but that is not to say that no effort was made to attack the Franks as they left the Bridge Gate. According to Albert of Aachen a force of 2,000 mounted bowmen rode up to the Bridge Gate as it opened. However, the crusaders had concentrated a force of bowmen with Hugh of Vermandois at the very head of their column and they advanced with shields held up against the enemy arrows and drove back the enemy until they got his horses in range, at which point the Turks took flight; they may well be the Turkomen to whom Kemal ad-Din refers as causing disorder in the ranks of Kerbogah’s army. Anselm of Ribemont then led his forces into the retreating enemy, followed by Hugh of Vermandois and the whole group of the North French as they turned right across the Bridge Gate – Robert of Flanders, Robert of Normandy, Baldwin of Hainault and Eustace of Boulogne.63 It was here on the Christian right by the Orontes that the main engagement was fought largely by the North French and against a largely infantry force (see fig. 14). The Anonymous says they were led by Godfrey, Robert of Flanders and Hugh of Vermandois, and it is these people that Albert mentions in his vivid, though often confusing description of events. As we have noted, the other accounts give much the same list of divisions in the army and Albert identifies some of these major groupings – those of Hugh of Vermandois, Robert of Flanders, Robert of Normandy, Adhémar who he says marched across the plain, Godfrey, Tancred and Bohemond whose force he describes as the biggest of all in knights and foot, committed to supporting the others according to need. Since his description of the main course of the battle accords with that of other sources, we can assume that the long list of divisions given earlier were the units in which men actually fought, and which they recalled being amongst and told Albert about later.64 Each of these groups, as they crossed the Bridge, turned right and attacked the enemy to the left of its predecessor, fanning out like the fingers of a hand. It is unlikely that there was a deployment into tidy formations in line and far more likely that each charged in column pell-mell against the enemy. But the general battle plan was followed. Raymond of Aguilers describes how the army of the bishop struck across the plain, surrounded by the enemy who swarmed about it like flies, but never came to close quarters. It is quite likely that enemy cavalry forces, coming up piecemeal from their siege deployments, were attracted into attacking Adhémar’s force, leaving their infantry isolated. An important action was caused by a large group of the enemy led, so Albert says, by Soliman and Rossilion, who moved to the left of the bishop’s force with the obvious intention of taking the Christians in the rear. The Anonymous says that to counter this the leaders improvised a force from the armies of Godfrey and Robert of Normandy under Count Renaud of Toul. Albert says that this enemy force of 15,000 fell by chance into conflict with the corps led by Renaud III of Toul and others who are all associated with Godfrey. Raymond of Aguilers remarks that a group of the enemy moved to their rear and were attacked by crusader infantry who fought well, and Ralph of Caen says that an enemy force of 100,000 passed across the Frankish column to take them in the rear precipitating a two-faced battle. Raymond of Aguilers simply records that this infantry force fought well, but the Anonymous says that it had heavy casualties. Albert says that it was wiped out, save for the knights and, like the Anonymous, says that the enemy set fire to the grass in order to defeat them. Ralph never mentions Renaud and his men, but says that Bohemond fought the two-faced battle.65 It is at least possible that after the infantry was wiped out Bohemond’s force lent support. The improvisation of such a force in an emergency suggests that the leaders had established very tight control over their forces
which had become disciplined and trained through hard and long contact with the enemy. This was a grim and costly engagement fought out in the rear of the main crusader force, but their sacrifice bought time for the main army. The only writer to give any detail about the fighting near the Bridge Gate is Albert of Aachen whose account is confusing and, in at least one minor respect, demonstrably erroneous. His account tends to exalt the role of Godfrey and very much to play down that of Bohemond who he never suggests to have been in command. According to Albert, while the fight in the rear was going on, Bohemond was attacked by a force led by Qaradja of Harrân, Duqaq of Damascus and Ridwan of Aleppo. It is quite definitely known that Ridwan was not present. Godfrey was, at this time, engaged in attacking a force led by, amongst others, Balduk of Samosata and, as he defeated them, received a call for help from Bohemond. Godfrey rallied to Bohemond’s aid with Hugh of Vermandois, and it is interesting that they changed position slowly so that horse and foot could stay together. The enemy then fled, crossing a stream which flowed into the Orontes, probably the Wadi al Quivaisiya, which must mean that they fled north, and dismounted on a hilltop to resist, but were driven off. This could well represent confused memories of what the Anonymous records in tidier form; he says that at the moment that the Saracens to the rear were setting fire to the grass around the beleaguered force led by Renaud of Toul, Godfrey and the North French began to press forwards on the right by the river, Bohemond committed his own force to the charge and the enemy fell into disorder and retreat.66 Albert is reporting recollections of confused close-quarter fighting which was witnessed from a distance by the Anonymous who was caught up in it just at the moment that the enemy broke. But such fighting was confined to this part of the battlefield and to the gallant stand of Renaud of Toul’s men. Raymond reports being attacked with arrows but:‘the enemy turned in flight without giving us a chance to engage in battle’, by which he probably means they never got to close quarters.67 In the meantime it would appear that Kerbogah’s main body had reached the battlefield on the Christian left where, Albert says, it stood still unable to come to the aid of the retreating Turks by the river. This was not divine intervention as Albert suggests, but because of the presence of Adhémar’s force in the valley which would threaten his right wing should he undertake such a difficult manoeuvre as to gallop to the rescue of an already broken force. Albert says that at this point Kerbogah was informed that the crusaders were in the camp, which presumably means the camp in the plain immediately above the Bridge Gate, and he retreated, barely pursued because of the lack of horses. This general picture of really hard fighting in only a limited area of the battlefield is confirmed by Ibn al-Athir who says that only one division of the Islamic army stood, fought and was wiped out.68