Hitler's First Victims

by Timothy W. Ryback

  On the morning of Wednesday, April 12, just after eleven o’clock, as Hans Steinbrenner flogged Benario, Goldmann, and the two Kahns through their final hours, Papen sat in the gilded chambers of the Vatican with Pope Pius XI and Cardinal Pacelli. “His Holiness greeted my wife and me with much paternal kindness,” Papen recalled, “and he said how delighted he was to see a person like Hitler at the head of the German government, someone who was finally willing to declare an uncompromising battle against communism and nihilism.” The warm welcome extended to Hitler’s emissary by the pope and Pacelli was fueled not only by a common concern over communism but by a fear of the fragility of the Hitler government. The pope wanted to close the deal before Hindenburg threw his latest chancellor out of office.

  In those same weeks, Hitler sent the recently appointed Reichsbank president Hjalmar Schacht to Washington, D.C., to court President Franklin Roosevelt. Schacht was a respected, old-school banker, famous for his top hat and cigars, who was smooth and sophisticated, with an instinct for identifying common interests. “Roosevelt and Hitler both entered office nearly at the same time,” Schacht observed. “Both owed their election to the preceding economic depression. They both had the task of firing up the economy through state intervention.”

  Hitler also dispatched Alfred Rosenberg, his chief ideologue and editor of the Völkischer Beobachter, to London, as part of the Goebbels offensive. Rosenberg had aspired to the position of foreign minister in the Hitler cabinet, but Hindenburg had made it clear to Hitler that Konstantin von Neurath would continue to represent Germany in its foreign affairs. Neurath was an elegant and experienced diplomat with the personal credentials Hindenburg desired in representing the country abroad. “My grandfather, my great-grandfather, and my great-great-grandfather were ministers of justice and foreign affairs in Württemberg,” the baron told the Nuremberg tribunal. “On my mother’s side I come from a noble Swabian family whose ancestors were mostly officers in the Imperial Austrian Army.” The “pin-striped diplomats” at Wilhelmstrasse 7 represented a bastion of aristocratic lineage and privilege that proved resilient to Nazi intrusions. In March, Hindenburg signed a presidential decree, after some hesitation, that permitted the Nazi Party’s swastika banner to be flown alongside the traditional Reich flag as a sign of national unity, but the directive was ignored by German embassies on the grounds that it violated diplomatic protocol “requiring that abroad, flags can only be displayed that have been registered with the foreign governments.”

  Hitler, frustrated with the arrogance and obstructionist attitude at Wilhelmstrasse 7, established the Foreign Political Office (Aussenpolitisches Amt, or APA) within the Nazi Party, and installed Rosenberg as its head. “With the creation of the APA, the particular desires and the unique aspirations of National Socialism will find expression within the area of foreign policy,” Rosenberg told the Völkischer Beobachter on April 3, 1933. Rosenberg set London as his first diplomatic mission. He proved to be singularly unprepared.

  Unlike Papen and Schacht, who traveled as emissaries of the Reich chancellor, Rosenberg arrived in London as a representative of the Nazi Party. He spoke no English and received a notably cool reception. “We in this country,” the British foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, told Rosenberg, “do not care to see the press suppressed, persons deprived of their living on account of their race, and minorities, including elected representatives of the people, shut up in concentration camps because of their political opinions.” Simon said to Rosenberg that “in two months Germany had lost the sympathy which she had gained in this country in ten years, and especially in those quarters which had hitherto been sympathetic to her.”

  Rosenberg’s situation worsened when, without consulting the German embassy, he placed a wreath emblazoned with a swastika at the Cenotaph, Britain’s national war memorial, then offered a stiff-armed Nazi salute “in honor of the fallen British and in honor of Chancellor Hitler and the German people.” A British veteran removed the wreath and hurled it into the Thames. “I’ve removed it as a deliberate protest against desecration of the Cenotaph by Hitler’s hireling,” he told the police upon his arrest. “It is also a protest against the brutal barbarism which at present exists in Germany.”

  That afternoon, the British foreign secretary was summoned before the House of Commons to account for the Rosenberg visit. In what capacity had Rosenberg come to London? As a representative of the German government? As a representative of the Nazi Party? As a personal emissary of Adolf Hitler? The foreign secretary fumbled for an answer. He confessed that the status of the Rosenberg visit was not “exactly clear.” That evening, Rosenberg held a press conference at Claridge’s hotel, where he was staying, and sought to explain Hitler’s policies, in German, to a crowd of journalists. It did not help that the Nazis staged their first book burnings that same day.

  The next day, London “raged” at the Hitler aide. At Madame Tussauds wax museum, a protester dumped a bucket of red paint over a likeness of Hitler and hung a sign around his neck with the words “Mass Murderer.” During a lunch at Claridge’s a welldressed couple rose to their feet. The woman began distributing leaflets while the man railed against Rosenberg. “The government of this representative of Hitler is stained with the blood of German workers,” the protestor shouted as Rosenberg watched in silence. “It has suppressed trade unions, the Socialist and communist parties. Jewish people are being persecuted.” A melee ensued. Tables were overturned. The incidents made headlines around the world. “Rosenberg Has Another Sad Day,” the Chicago Daily Tribune reported in a headline story. Thirteen years later, during his trial at Nuremberg, Rosenberg offered a similar assessment. “A number of incidents occurred which showed that the sentiment was very repellent,” he recalled.

  The catastrophic state of Germany’s foreign relations was not lost on Hitler. Five days after the Rosenberg debacle, Hitler took matters into his own hands. On May 17, he addressed the Reichstag with a message intended for the world. He talked about the Bolshevik threat. He talked about his country’s desperate economic conditions. He talked about the need for revision of the Treaty of Versailles and Germany’s vulnerability to attack. He recalled Roosevelt’s proposal for American intervention in European affairs. “Germany would welcome the generous suggestion of the American president that the powerful United States of America would serve in Europe as a guarantor of peace and would provide a great comfort for all those who are truly interested in peace,” he said. Only America, he said, possessed the necessary capacities.

  The next day, Hitler addressed the American people in an exclusive interview with the American journalist Thomas Russell Ybarra for the popular American magazine Collier’s Weekly.*2 “In observing the American attitude toward Germany, some things have been beyond my understanding,” Hitler told Ybarra. “Certainly Americans are interested in the maintenance of peace in Europe, aren’t they? Certainly they don’t want to see Europe go up in flames. Certainly they have economic interests which they want to see consolidated.”

  Ybarra found Hitler courteous, measured, even statesmanlike. The Nazi leader wore a dark suit and tie. “His face was solemn—but it always is,” Ybarra observed. “And he didn’t smile—but he rarely does.” The two men sat across from each other in armchairs close enough that Hitler could drive home his points by tapping Ybarra’s knee. Hitler talked about unemployment, about the immigration of “Jews from eastern Europe,” about the “reign of terror” that was being touted in the international press.

  “Whatever violence there was is now past,” Hitler said. “Perfect calm reigns in Germany. Not a street has been destroyed, not a house. Where is this terror they talk about?” Hitler wanted Americans to know that he had not torched the Reichstag even if he thought it might have been a good idea. “The accusation was made that the Reichstag fire was set by members of my party,” he said. “Do Americans really believe I needed to do such a thing in my fight against Communists, even if I had wanted to?” The Nazi leader devoted much of
the interview to discussing the communist threat that he blamed on the country’s massive unemployment. “You have—let me see—how many unemployed? Eight million? Ten million?” Hitler queried Ybarra. “Well, suppose all these millions of American unemployed were Communists taking their orders from Russia.” That was exactly the situation Hitler said he was facing. “Germany has six million Communists,” he observed, “10 percent of our total population.”

  “Here is what I wish would happen,” Hitler said, making his point with a knee tap. “That Americans might understand these special German problems.” Hitler wanted Americans to understand the malaise and desperation that had gripped Germany during the Weimar Republic. He calculated there had been 224,000 suicides in the country since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles fourteen years earlier. That was forty per day. Here Hitler paused. He gazed into the distance. “Into his face came some of that mystical quality that has helped him to drive audiences to hysteria,” Ybarra noted. Hitler continued: “If only all Americans could come over here to Germany,” he said. “They would look about and ask themselves where is this revolution, where is this terror, where is all this destruction and chaos I’ve heard about?” With that, he rose from his chair and ended the interview.

  The impact of Hitler’s efforts was immediate and measurable. The German ambassador in Washington reported that he had spent an hour with Roosevelt the day after Hitler’s Reichstag appearance and that the American president “spoke warmly of the speech by the Reich chancellor.” Roosevelt pointed out that American public opinion of Hitler, which had reached a low point in recent months, had improved by 40 percent.

  A week later, Hitler assembled several key cabinet members, including Neurath and Goebbels, along with several other party colleagues, foremost among them Rosenberg, to discuss his strategy for securing the “foreign propaganda” gains he had just made and initiating a sustained and calculated campaign to repair the German image abroad. Hitler handed the floor to Goebbels. “The purpose of today’s meeting is to differentiate the areas of responsibility between the ministry of propaganda and the foreign office,” Goebbels explained. “The first priority of the Reich Ministry for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment must be influencing public opinion abroad.” But he wanted everyone to understand that such an initiative was going to cost money, a great deal of money. “For this purpose we will need a larger budget than the one necessary for internal propaganda,” Hitler said, noting the need for expert capacity in this sector. “The Reich ministry needs to be put in the position to be able to respond immediately to any threats from abroad. For this purpose, sending attachés to the key German representations abroad will be necessary. These attachés will have the same status as military attachés.”

  Neurath saw precisely where this was going. The Nazis had compromised the security services by introducing the SA and SS as “assistant police.” Here, they were not only infiltrating the foreign office by seeding embassies with “press attachés,” but also seeking to plunder its budget. Two weeks earlier, when this issue was raised at a meeting in the propaganda ministry, it had been recommended that the entire foreign office’s press section, along with its budget, be transferred to Goebbels. Now, in the presence of Hitler and ministers and advisers, Neurath drew a line. He was willing to represent Hitler’s muscular, even belligerent foreign policy, helping engineer German withdrawal from the League of Nations and the abrogation of foreign treaties and commitments, but he would not sacrifice a ministerial budget line.

  “The foreign office cannot get by without its own press office,” Neurath stated flatly. “If the press office is subsumed into the Reich Ministry for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, there will as a result be an urgent need for the foreign office to create a new office for these purposes.” He insisted that his diplomats required a regular service by which German foreign policy could be conveyed to the foreign press and, likewise, the foreign press could be analyzed when German foreign policy was being formulated.

  These were exactly the types of divisive confrontations Hitler had sought to avoid in his cabinet meetings. He had sat quietly listening to Goebbels and Neurath spar, but now he intervened. “From these deliberations it has been determined that in order to influence the public opinion abroad, a means will be necessary that is not yet available to us at the moment,” he said. “A new organization needs to be developed that will create its own method of working.” Having addressed the needs of Goebbels, one of his most effective ministers, he now sought to mollify Neurath. “Of course the foreign office cannot function without the instrument of the press office, because its work provides the foreign office with the foundations upon which political decisions are made.” But, Hitler said, the “advancement of our ideals” abroad, especially in developing a “defense mechanism against rumors of atrocity,” could only be achieved by the creation of a special capacity. “We need to find a way whereby the activity of the foreign office’s press department is not shut down,” he said, “but that still gives the Reich Ministry for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment sufficient influence.”

  Hitler underscored the necessity for his government to shape international public opinion “through the systematic application of a wide variety of propaganda techniques, especially in regard to the foreign press.” Neurath acquiesced. “The question of responsibility is relatively easy to solve,” he said. “The officials of the press department in the foreign office should give factual information, but not create any propaganda.” That would be left to Goebbels and his team. There followed a squabble over specific budgets and allocations that Hitler interrupted with brisk remarks: “For a well-functioning propaganda apparatus no cost is too high. The press department of the foreign office will in future restrict itself to its previous areas of activity. The Reich Ministry for Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, now establishing its own press department, will take over the responsibility of making active foreign propaganda.” Hitler closed the meeting by underscoring the vital and urgent necessity of responding to the increasingly negative foreign opinion and its impact on the national economy. “We find ourselves in a position of isolation from world politics that we will only be able to escape if we improve the sentiments toward us abroad.”

  Two days later, Hitler received heartening news when Schacht visited the Reich Chancellery to report on his meetings in Washington with Roosevelt and senior members of the State Department. Schacht had managed to have four personal meetings with Roosevelt in the course of a single week, during which the president appeared to be open and willing to listen. Schacht had explained to him the necessity of German suspension of credit payments, the need to suspend civil liberties, and the decision for Germany to begin rearming itself. Roosevelt was cautious but understanding. At their final meeting, the president asked Schacht to join him on the sofa and said with warm assurance, “You have made an excellent impression here because you have spoken openly and freely in every regard.”

  Schacht believed he had tipped American sentiments, he told Hitler, but it was now imperative “that our foreign propaganda must be made much more vigorously.” America was a democracy and its president was ultimately swayed by public opinion, which in turn was influenced by the press. It was vital that Berlin be able to respond immediately, effectively, and responsibly to accusations of atrocity and terror. “The Reich government needs to be in the position to denounce any information that is incorrect appearing in the newspapers, immediately,” Schacht told Hitler.

  * * *

  *1 Hindenburg applied a “25-48-53 formula” of constitutional articles empowering the president with near dictatorial power. He could invoke Article 53 to appoint and dismiss government at will; Article 48 to issue emergency decrees; and Article 25 to suspend the Reichstag, eliminating its capacity to rescind the Article 48 emergency decrees. In addition, Article 23 invested him as commander in chief, with the capacity to enforce that authority.

  *2 Thomas Russell Ybarra appears to have secured his Hitler
interview through a combination of professional credibility and personal connections. He had met Papen in 1932 and published a biography, Hindenburg: The Man with Three Lives, that same year. A note in the foreign ministry files says, “He is basically the rare type of respectable American journalist who makes an effort to write objectively and seriously.” (“Aufzeichnung des Oberregierungsrats Thomsen über eine Unterredung des Reichskanzlers mit dem Sonderkorrespondenten von Collier’s Weekly, Ybarra,” May 18, 1933, Akten zur deutschen auswärtigen Politik, 461.)

  14

  Death Sentence

  SHORTLY AFTER FIVE O’CLOCK in the late afternoon of May 24, as Adolf Hitler sat with Goebbels and Neurath, crafting their foreign propaganda offensive, Josef Hartinger received a report of yet another killing in Dachau. It was the first such call in nearly two weeks and came in an uneasy atmosphere. The rash of arrests and detentions of prominent and common folk alike had compelled the general public to grow increasingly cautious. A critical comment about Hitler or his new government would be answered with “Watch out or you will end up in Dachau.” The popular proverb that included “Silence is golden” was refitted to the changing times: “Silence is silver, speaking is Dachau.” A bedside prayer included the invocation, “Dear Lord, O make me dumb, / Lest to Dachau camp I come!”