Chickens' Lib
Page 36
I find myself thinking back to Angela, our hen with the mass of rotting eggs inside her body. Because the MAFF veterinary certificate we obtained described her as being ‘in a bright condition’ her suffering was dismissed in court (though the farmer was indicted on other charges). Surely, under the 2006 Act this should not happen, since the failure of the farmer to act to alleviate Angela’s suffering had been glaringly obvious.
Oddly perhaps, those ‘needs’ specified in the 2006 Act (2) are still based on the original ‘Five Freedoms’ (see my chapter Five Freedoms and a Convention), none of which can realistically be expected to be fulfilled within intensive systems. To take just one example: ‘For the purpose of this Act, an animals’ needs shall be taken to include its need to be able to exhibit normal behaviour patterns.’ (3). This may seem more of the usual meaningless language – but it is only meaningless if no action is taken when suffering is found.
The 2006 Act represents progress. Already the RSPCA is prosecuting far more cases of cruelty, especially to domestic pets, thanks to the wording of the new Act.
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In 2009 the Farm Animal Welfare Council (FAWC) issued a Report entitled Farm Animal Welfare in Great Britain: Past, Present and Future in which it revealed a philosophy aiming far higher than the expectation of a mere absence of suffering, whether present or potential. FAWC considers the need for such things as play and contentment, and asks whether the individual animal has a life worth living, from his or her own point of view.
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In March 22nd 2010 FAWC circulated its Strategic Plan for 2011-2015 to Council members, Ministers, veterinarians, advisory groups and stakeholders of all colours, seeking their comments. Those consulted were asked to rate general topics on farm animal welfare in order of perceived priority, and invited to say which specific issues should next be considered. Nearly two hundred bodies were listed, including Chickens’ Lib.
For me, two sentences leapt off the page: under ‘Farm animal legislation, regulation, enforcement and surveillance’ this question was posed: ‘How appropriate are current legislation and regulations, and are changes needed to ensure that each and every farm animal has a life worth living? How effective and efficient are current methods of enforcement and welfare surveillance?’ I read the passage several times. This was straightforward language, and it related to the very nub of our campaign.
‘Each and every farm animal’ – let’s take that first. Remember the editor of Poultry World’s fury over the case of the Surrey farmer fined for failing to inspect his flock?: ‘…So I am wondering’ he wrote ‘what [the farmer] did wrong in a mass management system that depends on catering for flocks, not individual birds. Quite rightly he was concerned about flock health and maintaining the best environment for the flock. When we fail to do that we deserve all the RSPCA can throw at us, but not for failing to look every bird in the eye every day.’ This was written some thirty years ago, but over the intervening decades we’ve detected no significant changes for the better. Rather, the trend has been for groups of livestock to get bigger, with no indication that the ratio of staff to animals has improved.
‘A life worth living’ – this delves even deeper. Consider broiler chickens – destined to five or six weeks of mere struggle for survival, often endured with pain, always terminated in terror, the parent stock living for a year or so in chronic and at times severe hunger. The list is long of farmed animals whose lives could not, at the wildest stretch of the imagination, be described as worth living.
In the next sentence came FAWC’s request for comments on the effectiveness and efficiency of current methods of enforcement of legislation and of welfare surveillance. It’s been a major purpose of my book to highlight the lack of enforcement of legislation and the dire lack of surveillance.
This latest communication from FAWC must have raised the spirits of many, while causing alarm bells to clang throughout the intensive farming industries. For at last the question has been asked from a government-appointed body: are changes needed to ensure that ‘each and every farm animal has a life worth living’?
FAWC’s communication, signed by its chairman Professor Christopher Wathes, gives real cause for optimism.
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On April 10th 2010 Professor Wathes contributed Veterinary Record’s ‘Viewpoint’ column. In it, he elaborated on the concept of celebrating the good things in an animal’s life, rather than merely stopping short at avoidance of the bad. He talks of enabling the fulfilment of animals’ ‘environmental choices and harmless wants’, and of the need to provide for an animal’s ‘comfort, pleasure, interest and confidence, and the highest standards of veterinary care’. So, the need is now seen for something infinitely better than a life merely devoid of downright suffering.
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A letter I received back in 1990 from Roy Moss, MAFF’s by then retired Chief Vet (he who had disposed of the putrid broiler feet) serves to emphasise today’s progress, contrasting as it does with Professor Wathes’ words. I’d sent Mr Moss a Chickens’ Lib fact sheet and booklet, which he was kind enough to comment on. Inter alia, he questioned whether it was possible to know what leads to pleasure or contentment in a hen (states of well-being we’d claimed on the hen’s behalf) and suggested that this passage might be better deleted.
Interestingly, Professor Wathes warns that moves to improve the lives of animals may be compromised by what he describes as ‘powerful economic and other forces’. Chickens’ Lib came up against those as long ago as the late 1960s, and it’s only rational to believe that they will always exist.
Professor Wathes Viewpoint suggested a sea change in attitudes and, as such, a potential forerunner of genuine progress.
Why ‘necessary’ suffering?
When Helen Steel and Dave Morris refused to be intimidated by McDonald’s, the suffering endured by millions of factory-farmed animals was condemned in London’s High Court.
For example, when summing up Mr Justice Bell had this to say on the subject of keeping chicken breeding stock desperately hungry: My conclusion is that the practice of rearing breeders for appetite, that is to feel especially hungry, and then restricting their feed with the effect of keeping them hungry, is cruel. It is a well-planned device for profit at the expense of the suffering of the birds.’
In areas related to poultry welfare the case represented a triumph for justice but failed to herald significant changes for the better, for the case was a civil action for defamation, and not based on criminal offences. The question remains: what hope is there that a broadly–based criminal charge might prove successful, that is to say one that will strike at the heart of intensive farming, in essence destroying the concept of ‘necessary suffering’?
Writing in the Journal of Animal Welfare Law in June 2007 Debbie Rook, Principal Lecturer in Northumbria University’s School of Law, drew attention to court action in April 1985. Then, in the case of Roberts v Ruggiero, the Court concluded that existing legislation could not be used to challenge the practice in question (in this case cruelly restrictive veal crates) (1).
By contrast, the author then described a case in which the outcome had been very different. Much earlier (in 1889) a case, Ford v Riley, had concerned the painful dehorning of cattle on a Norfolk farm. In that instance: ‘…the Court agreed to decide the broad question of whether the practice of dehorning was illegal rather than look at the narrower issue of the particular actions of the defendant…using this broad approach the Court held that the practice of dehorning was illegal.’ (2) The Court’s finding had been based on its decision that there were better, far less painful methods of achieving the desired results.
Of course things were different then. The multinationals had not yet imposed their iron grip upon world ‘food animal’ production. Maximum profits for the companies concerned and the interests of shareholders were not involved. But this difference should be no disincentive in the fight for justice for animals. Governments must be challenged, for it is they who have issued
legislation demanding comfort and well-being under systems that preclude both. And it is patently obvious that for every farming system that imposes predictable and often sustained suffering for the animals, there exists a substantially better one.
Debbie Rook went on to give reasons to be optimistic: ‘…the case of Roberts v Ruggiero seemed to close the door on any prospect of using the offence of cruelty to challenge the suffering of farm animals caused by intensive farming practices. It is submitted here that, relying on Ford v Riley, the courts are able to take alternative methods, which cause less suffering, into consideration when assessing proportionality. This…is a significant factor and should not be excluded outright. To ignore it would effectively give the farmers freedom to define what constitutes cruelty since only suffering above and beyond the farming practices they choose to use would be relevant. Such an approach would, in the words of Bell J, “hand the decision as to what is cruel to the food industry completely, moved as it must be by economic as well as animal welfare conditions.” ’ (3)
The author concluded her article thus: ‘Bell J found this unacceptable in a civil case [the McDonald’s libel case] and it is hoped that the criminal courts would find it equally unacceptable in any case of alleged cruelty to farm animals.’ (4)
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In January 2012 Peter Stevenson, an English lawyer who works for Compassion in World Farming, published an important document entitled European Union Legislation on the Welfare of Farm Animals. The document spells out the reasons for optimism that court action, challenging the legality of various intensive farming practices, would stand an excellent chance of succeeding.
The author points to the high level of importance attached to animal protection laid down in The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. (5) This Treaty not only recognises animals as sentient beings, but stresses that the EU and its Member States shall, when formulating and implementing their policies in certain key areas, pay ‘full regard to the welfare requirements of animals.’ (6)
Furthermore, the European Commission had this to say: ‘This [the above-mentioned Treaty] puts animal welfare on equal footing with other key principles mentioned in the same title, i.e. promotion of gender equality, guarantee of social protection, protection of human health, combating discrimination, promotion of sustainable development, ensuring consumer protection and the protection of personal data.’ (7)
Peter Stevenson addresses the contentious subject of ‘unnecessary suffering’ (a term that surely leaves room for some suffering to be deemed ‘necessary’) quoting from The General Farm Animals Directive of 1998 (8). Article 3 of this EU Directive states that EU member countries shall ‘make provision to ensure that the owners or keepers take all reasonable steps to ensure the welfare of animals under their care and to ensure that those animals are not caused any unnecessary pain, suffering or injury (9). He concludes that: ‘This provision could arguably be used to challenge the legality of industrial rearing systems. It should not be difficult to establish that such systems cause pain, suffering and/or injury. The challenge would principally turn around what is meant by “unnecessary”. It could be argued that the pain, suffering or injury involved in industrial animal production is not necessary as in each case viable non-industrial alternatives are available.’
Drawing attention to another provision in the same Directive, this one headed ‘Freedom of movement’, Peter Stevenson shows that the following wording gives further cause for optimism: ‘The freedom of movement of an animal, having regard to its species and in accordance with established experience and scientific knowledge, must not be restricted in such a way as to cause it unnecessary suffering or injury. Where an animal is continuously or regularly tethered or confined, it must be given space appropriate to its physiological and ethological needs in accordance with established experience and scientific knowledge.’ (10)
Surely a cursory glance at just one form of industrial farming – the confining of laying hens in ‘enriched’ cages – should raise well-founded doubts as to that system’s legality.
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Most intensive farming takes place behind closed doors, in windowless buildings, often behind high barbed wire fencing and well-protected by electronic security devices. But despite these measures much evidence continues to be obtained, often unofficially, to prove that suffering is widely caused to, and endured by, farmed animals.
So what can be done? Are we to meekly accept the fact that the legislation which should be protecting farmed animals from extreme suffering is failing utterly to do so? To look at the problem another way: should those living in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have viewed the shameful slave trade as acceptable because it was widespread and considered a good thing in economic terms? And is the task of exposing the true extent of the cruelty to ‘factory farmed’ animals to be left to those willing to take considerable personal risks while obtaining evidence, risks that all too often achieve no lasting positive impact?
Many of us already sign petitions, while others may join organisations and march with like-minded people. And these are excellent things to do. But there is more that we can all do, and to good effect, as long as we persevere.
Since the problem concerns the law of the land, our MPs are the appropriate people to approach. Not once, not twice, but until we feel that he or she understands the scale of the cruelty involved, and moreover is willing to put pressure on government. And since UK legislation covers intensive systems in place throughout the EU, we must also approach our MEPs, with the same persistence.
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Court action is essential. What is urgently needed is a successful case that would contradict the assumption that animals must continue to suffer because the suffering they endure is ‘necessary’. Mr Justice Bell considered the information before him and concluded that many areas of factory farming were inhumane and therefore unacceptable.
Now it is up to informed members of the public to insist on change. Given the evidence, the rational conclusion must be that the widespread suffering of intensively reared animals is not ‘necessary’ but merely convenient to trade and to sections of the farming industry.
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So who might promote a prosecution in a criminal court, taken against a company (or companies) involved in husbandry systems likely to cause ‘necessary suffering’? Surely the RSPCA is the body to take on the task. This highly-respected organisation has the necessary expertise, and doubtless their many thousands of members would be generous in their support of such a move.
Conclusion – to a journey without end
In 2010 we wrote to our supporters: ‘We feel the time has come to wind up Chickens’ Lib…and perhaps after 40 years that’s a good thing! Thank goodness many organisations are out there, all over the world, working incredibly hard, fighting the evils of animal abuse, in whatever form’. And so our campaign has ended.
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In the early days of Chickens’ Lib Violet and I were able to face the harrowing East End butchers’ shops, and later the battery sheds, because we needed first-hand knowledge – plus the hens. We tried not to dwell on their misery – constantly thinking about it could become destructive. I did develop a personal technique for bad moments, though. If I felt nervous, for example before giving a talk, I’d imagine myself inside a battery shed. That’s why I’m doing this, I’d tell myself. Think about the hens. Go for it.
But sometimes pictures come into my mind unbidden, unwanted even. A battery hen is waking up after yet another night spent crouching on the grid of the cage floor or, if in a so-called enriched cage, perched on a plastic rod. It’s about 3am in the shed, and the rows of dim, cobweb-festooned lights have just come on, to ensure that most eggs will be laid early, to fit in with the farmer’s schedule. Once again, she must face another seventeen-hour ‘day’ of boredom and frustration, pain and misery.
I find that image intolerably sad, the more so because the exclusion of the enriched cage from the 2012 barren battery cage ban ill
ustrates the grim fact that, despite all the campaigning by activists, the EU hasn’t moved on very far at all.
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We had a strawyard constructed to accommodate our little flock of rescued hens and turkeys. About the size of a small living room, its roof was covered, keeping the deep layer of straw on the earth floor perfectly dry. A traditional chicken hut, with nest box and a perch for roosting, stood between the strawyard and a small orchard. The birds sheltered in the hut at night, but had constant access to the fox-proof strawyard.
The strawyard was spacious and full of interest, with food and water available, but when I opened the door from the hut to the orchard each morning the hens would rush down the ladder, whatever the weather, eager for grass under their feet and the chance to peck around for insects in the earth. They’d even venture out when snow lay on the ground. Complicated scientific research wasn’t called for. Simple observation supplied more than enough material for conclusions to be drawn about their needs, their ‘harmless wants’.
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Within the European Union, and elsewhere too, legislation is in place to protect farmed animals. Now the pressing need is to ensure that those laws are enacted. But that step, though highly significant, should represent nothing more than a beginning
Unless radical changes are made in the way we think, the world’s escalating human population seems hell-bent on stumbling blindly down the road of industrial-style farming, recklessly feeding protein-rich crops to incarcerated animals. Superficially this system may appear to supply our needs, yet in reality it is not only immoral – furthering as it does cruelty to animals and starvation in an already hungry world – but it is doomed to failure. As illustrated earlier it can be argued, and increasingly it is argued, that our species must find a new agenda, a more compassionate and less wasteful way of feeding itself.