One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War

by M. Dobbs

  The mass media had always: Tad Szulc, Fidel: A Critical Portrait (New York: William Morrow, 1986), 465. I have relied on Szulc for most of Castro's early biographical details.

  "Fatigued by talking": "The Fidel Castro I know," Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Cuba News, August 2, 2006.

  The streets of Havana: Prensa Latina dispatch by Sergio Pineda, October 24, 1962.

  "They were geared": Maurice Halperin, Rise and Decline of Fidel Castro (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), 191.

  "We have won the war": Szulc, 30.

  "a much bigger": Ibid., 51. Castro later claimed that he wrote this letter at a time of great emotion and that it did not reflect his true feelings toward America. His argument is unconvincing, and seems geared to an international audience. Copies of the letter to Sanchez are prominently displayed in Cuban museums for the domestic audience.

  "We are going ahead": Hugh Thomas, Cuba: The Pursuit of Freedom (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), 445.

  "an illiterate and ignorant": Halperin, 81.

  The sugar harvest: Ibid., 124-5, 160.

  "sectarianism": See, e.g., report of Hungarian ambassador Janos Beck, December 1, 1962, Havana 2002, vol. 2.

  When Khrushchev first broached: See, e.g., Alekseev quoted in Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 179.

  "many mobile ramps": Mary McAuliffe, CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 1992), 105. The pilot's name was Claudio Morinas. The report was disseminated within the CIA on September 20, 1962.

  "missiles on Cuban territory": Henry Brandon, Special Relationships (New York: Atheneum, 1988), 172.

  "the pass at Thermopylae": Szulc, 445.

  Carved out of the soft limestone: Author's visit to Cueva de los Portales, March 2006. The caves have been turned into a museum and shrine to Che.

  "an extraordinary man": Jorge Castaneda, Companero: The Life and Death of Che Guevara (New York: Knopf, 1997), 83.

  "our old, much lamented": Ibid., 62.

  "too much freedom": Ibid., 71.

  Castro had reserved half: Blight and Welch, On the Brink, 398.

  Timur Gaidar: The father of Yegor Gaidar, Russia's first post-Communist prime minister. Decades later, Yevtushenko gleefully told the story of how, as a small boy living with his father in Havana, the father of Russian capitalism "pissed on my beautiful white suit" ― author's interview, June 2006. See also Yevtushenko, article in Novaya Gazeta, July 11, 2005.

  "Has Moscow called?": Timur Gaidar, Grozi na Yuge (Moscow: Voennoe Izdatelstvo, 1984), 159.

  CHAPTER FOUR: "EYEBALL TO EYEBALL"

  The previous evening, he and other: NYT, October 24, 1962; Foy Kohler cable to State Department 1065, October 24, 1962, SDX.

  "Why, that's Karl": Knox notes on meeting, JFKL.

  "If I point a pistol": Beschloss, 496.

  "disappear the first day": Roger Hilsman memo to secretary of state, October 26, 1962, OSD.

  "Saying Grace": Reeves, 410.

  "He opened and closed": RFK, 69–70.

  "probably the most memorable day": Dobrynin, 83.

  "massive uncertainty": NYT, October 28, 1962.

  "sat around wondering": Clinton Heylin, Bob Dylan: Behind the Shades Revisited (New York: HarperCollins, 2001), 102-3; see also Dylan interview with Studs Turkel, May 1, 1963.

  "We're eyeball": Rusk, 237.

  "The meeting droned on": RFK, 72.

  "SECRET. FROM HIGHEST": CINCLANTFLT message 241523Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC. The order was also passed on by single sideband radio from Navy Plot ― Vice Adm. Griffin notes, October 24, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  The Kimovsk was nearly: The Kimovsk's position at 0930, October 24, was 27deg18'N, 55deg42'W, according to CINCLANTFLT message 241950Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC. The Essex's position at 0900 on October 24 was 23deg20'N, 67deg20'W, according to ship logs now at NARA. Erroneous accounts of Soviet ship positions are given in Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision, 2nd ed. (New York: Longman, 1999), 233, 348-9, and Fursenko and Naftali, Khrushchev's Cold War, 477, 615. The U.S. Navy concluded on October 25 that the Soviet ships had turned around at 0700 Zulu time on October 23, 3:00 a.m. in Washington, 10:00 a.m. in Moscow ― CNO Office logs, October 25, USNHC. According to Soviet records, the turnaround orders began going out at 6:00 a.m. on October 23 ― see notes in chapter two.

  "turned around when confronted": McAuliffe, 297. McCone's information was incorrect. JFK noted at the ExComm meeting that an intercept attempt would be made between 10:30 and 11:00.

  only "a few miles" apart: RFK, 68–72; see also Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, 537, which draws on RFK's account.

  "en route to the Baltic": CIA report, October 25, 1962, CREST.

  The naval staff suspected: Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 391. Some of the reported positions for Soviet ships, including the Aleksandrovsk and the Poltava, were clearly false. For accuracy of direction fixes, see JFK3, 238.

  He had visited Flag Plot: CNO, Report on the Naval Quarantine of Cuba, USNHC.

  Communications circuits were overloaded: CNO Office logs, October 24, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  That afternoon, NSA received: Message from director, NSA, October 24, 1962, NSA Cryptotologic Museum, Fort Meade, MD.

  "in a position to reach": JFK3, 41.

  "surprise attacks": Anderson message 230003Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "I give you my word": Kohler cable to State Department, 979, October 16, 1962, SDX.

  "the appearance of": CINCLANT (Dennison) message to JCS 312250Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "Initial class probable sub": U.S. Navy messages 241610Z and 250533Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC, also available through "The Submarines of October," Electronic Briefing Book 75, NSAW. The submarine was located at 25deg25'N, 63deg40'W. It was dubbed "C-18" by the Navy.

  What had started off: See Gary E. Weir and Walter J. Boyne, Rising Tide: The Untold Story of the Russian Submarines That Fought the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 2003), 79–98, for an account of the B-130 journey, based on interviews with Capt. Nikolai Shumkov.

  "special camps are being prepared": Savranskaya, "New Sources on the Role of Soviet Submarines in the Cuban Missile Crisis," Journal of Strategic Studies (April 2005).

  Shumkov understood the power: Weir and Boyne, 79–80; Aleksandr Mozgovoi, Kubinskaya Samba Kvarteta Fokstrotov (Moscow: Voenni bibliography Entryd, 2002), 69.

  "If they slap you": Savranskaya, "New Sources." See this article also for conflicting evidence over whether Soviet submarine captains had the authority to use nuclear torpedoes if attacked.

  The information on the overhead screens: SAC historians jotted down the daily totals and recorded them in Strategic Air Command Operations in the Cuban Crisis of 1962, SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, NSA. Photographs of the SAC control room are in Vol. 2, FOIA.

  By the time SAC reached: SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, 58.

  "high priority Task 1 targets": William Kaufmann memo, Cuba and the Strategic Threat, October 25, 1962, OSD.

  At 11:10 a.m.: Cuba crisis records, 389th Strategic Missile Wing, FOIA.

  "This is General Power speaking": SAC Historical Study No. 90, Vol. 1, vii.

  It was received loud and clear: G. M. Kornienko, Kholodnaya Voina (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnesheniya, 1994), 96. It is unclear whether the Soviets intercepted the DEFCON-2 order, in addition to Power's message. The DEF CON-2 order was classified top secret; Power's address was unclassified. See Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 62.

  tried as "a war criminal": Quoted in Richard Rhodes, Dark Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1995), 21.

  "SAC bases and SAC targets": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 262-5.

  "They're smart": Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1983), 265.

  "mean," "cruel": Gen. Horace M. Wade OH, AFHRA.

  "The whole idea": Kaplan, 246.

  Using maps and charts: Kaufmann memo, Cuba and the Str
ategic Threat, OSD.

  Just to move the 1st Armored Division: USCONARC Participation in the Cuban Crisis 1962, NSAW, 79–88, 119-21. USCONARC briefing to House Appropriations Committee, January 21, 1963.

  "Soon military police": Dino Brugioni, "The Invasion of Cuba," in Robert Cowley, ed., The Cold War (New York: Random House, 2006), 214-15.

  The British consul in Miami: British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962 (London: Archival Publications, 2001), 278; "Air Force Response to the Cuban Crisis," 6–9, NSAW; NYT, WP, and LAT reports from Key West, October 1962.

  Military shipments did not always: USCONARC, 117.

  Fidel Castro had spent the night: Author's interview with Rafael Del Pino, former Cuban air force aide to Castro, September 2005. Unpublished MS by Del Pino.

  "Our greatest problem": Notes on meeting between Castro and Cuban military chiefs, October 24, 1962, released by the Cuban government, Documentos de los Archivos Cubanos, Havana 2002.

  This stretch of coastline: Szulc, 474-6.

  A thirty-minute drive: Author's visit to Tarara beach and SAM site, March 2006. Both the SAM site and the antimissile site are still visible on Google Earth at 23deg09' 28.08''N, 82deg13' 38.87''W.

  As he drove back to Havana: Acosta, 165. For Castro's thoughts, see Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 211. Photographs of Castro's visit to the AA unit are available on Cuban Web sites.

  "Fidel gets his kicks": Franqui, 189.

  A few months earlier: Estimate by Soviet defense minister Malinovsky; Blight and Welch, On the Brink, 327.

  The Marine regiment selected: Marine Corps records, October 1962, JFKARC.

  "Where are we gonna go?": Author's interview with Maj. Gregory J. Cizek, operations officer, 2nd Marine Regiment, April 2005.

  who "spent his time": Author's interview with Don Fulham, assistant operations officer, 2nd Marine Regiment, May 2005.

  Whatever happened, casualties: CINCLANT message, November 2, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "diversionary replies": CNO Office logs, October 24, 1962, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  "purposeful and completely unruffled": Gribkov and Smith, Operation ANADYR, 69.

  He quickly agreed: Statsenko report.

  "A force that remains": Szulc, 179.

  "You don't want to celebrate": Beschloss, 501.

  "You'll be interested": Ibid., 502.

  Had Kennedy known: Yesin interviews, July 2004 and May 2006. See also Yesin et al., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 154.

  The targeting cards: Author's interview with Maj. Nikolai Oblizin, deputy head ballistic division, July 2004.

  Launching the missiles successfully: For description of the sequence of firing an R-12 missile, I am indebted to Col. Gen. Yesin, former chief of staff of the Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces, who served with Sidorov's regiment as a lieutenant engineer.

  The regiment of Colonel Nikolai Bandilovsky: The sites in western Cuba were designated San Cristobal 1, 2, 3, and 4 by the CIA, from west to east. The first two sites (Bandilovsky) were actually sixteen and thirteen miles west of San Cristobal. The other two (Solovyev) were about six miles west and seven miles northeast.

  He ordered Sidorov and Bandilovsky: Statsenko report.

  CHAPTER FIVE: "TILL HELL FREEZES OVER"

  "The Americans have": Presidium protocol No. 61. Fursenko, Prezidium Ts. K. KPSS, 620-2.

  Nikita "shit in his pants": Attributed to Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Kuznetsov, in Kornienko, 96.

  "That's it": Semichastny, 279.

  "You don't have to worry": Testimony of Emilio Aragones in Blight et al., Cuba on the Brink, 351.

  The two men sent by the CIA: Vera interview.

  The lack of power would also: CIA report, August 29, 1962, Mongoose memo, JFKARC.

  A dispatch from Ambassador Dobrynin: CWIHP, 8–9 (Winter 1996-97), 287.

  a proximity fuse: Alexander Feklisov, The Man Behind the Rosenbergs (New York: Enigma Books, 2001), 127.

  "what we would call": NK1, 372.

  "He sure as hell": Warren Rogers interview in Tulanian (Spring 1998).

  "to finish with Castro": Author's interview with embassy counselor Georgi Kornienko, July 2004; KGB report to Moscow, SVR; Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 261.

  It was the tip: Dobrynin telegram, October 25, 1962, LCV; Fursenko and Naftali, One Hell of a Gamble, 259-62.

  "Stop the conveyor": Article in Hoy Dominical [Havana], November 18, 1962; CIA report, August 29, 1962, Mongoose memo, JFKARC.

  Coffee could see rows and rows: Author's interview with Lt. Gerald Coffee, December 2005; his mission number was Blue Moon 5012.

  "alertness in a rapidly": Undated letter to Coffee from Marine Corps Cdr. David Shoup.

  The overflight of the Crusader: Gribkov et al., U KrayaYadernoi Bezdni, 253-60.

  Kovalenko controlled two Luna launchers: Malinovsky memorandum, September 6, 1962, LCV, trans. in CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 259. Together with the launchers, each regiment controlled four nuclear Luna missiles and eight conventional missiles.

  His most recent report: Author's interview with Carlos Pasqual, January 2006. CIA Operation Mongoose memo from Richard Helms, December 7, 1962, JFKARC.

  As they sorted through: Richard Lehman, "CIA Handling of Soviet Build-up in Cuba," November 14, 1962, CREST.

  had "come to view": Ibid.

  "the establishment on Cuban soil": NIE 85-3-62, "The Military Buildup in Cuba," September 19, 1962, CREST.

  "large intercontinental rockets": CIA inspector general report on handling of Cuban intelligence information, November 22, 1962, 19, 31, available through CREST. The report was disseminated by CIA on October 2, with the dismissive headquarters comment. The Poltava docked in Mariel on September 16 with eight R-12 missiles on board, according to RSVN documents inspected by Karlov.

  "giant missiles": Marchant dispatch, November 10, 1962, NSAW Cuba; also published in British Archives on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962.

  a "wide, unpaved": Report by M. B. Collins, November 3, 1962, British Archives on Cuba, Cuba Under Castro, Vol. 5: 1962 (London: Archival Publications, 2003), 155.

  The vaults were hot and humid: Reminiscences of Rafael Zakirov, former FKR nuclear control officer, V. I. Yesin, ed., Strategicheskaya Operatsiya Anadyr', 1st ed. (1999), 179-85. See also Zakirov, October 2007 article.

  The Soviet trailer-launched missiles: Malinovsky memo, May 24, 1962, LCV, trans. in CWIHP, 11 (Winter 1998), 254.

  "to deliver a blow": Malinovsky order to Pliyev, September 8, 1962, LCV, in ibid., 260.

  a "liberated zone": Author's visit to Mayari Arriba, March 2006.

  Raul understood immediately: Yazov, 157; see also Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 119.

  The Soviet officer responsible: Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 90, 302-3.

  Soon after arriving in Oriente: Cuba under Castro, Vol. 5, 152.

  Everything was in place: Svetlana Chervonnaya interview with Sgt. Vitaly Roshva, May 2006; Gribkov et al., U Kraya Yadernoi Bezdni, 87-8.

  Raul received regular intelligence: Blight and Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 102.

  They took elaborate precautions: Zakirov, October 2007 article.

  Known to the Marines: "Guantanamo Bay Compared to Attack-Ready Suburbia," Washington Evening Star, November 14, 1962.

  By nightfall, 2,810 dependents: CINCLANT history, chap. VII. Evacuation details from Cuba Fact Sheet, October 27, 1962, NSAW.

  But nearly half the 2,400: Gitmo situation report No. 15 250100Z, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  a series of yellow, green, and red: AP report from Guantanamo in Chicago Tribune, November 13, 1962.

  At first, Adlai Stevenson: George Plimpton OH, JFKL.

  Stevenson was humiliated: Porter McKeever, Adlai Stevenson: His Life and Legacy (New York: William Morrow, 1989), 488.

  "What year is this?": Arkady Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985), 114.

  "Missile," he wrote: Presidential doodles file, JFK
L.

  "Terrific": O'Donnell and Powers, 334.

  The nightwatchman: Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 99; NORAD Combat Operations Center logs, October 26, 1962, Sagan Collection, NSA.

  Nobody knew what to make of: E-mail message to the author from Jim Artman, former F-106 pilot, Duluth.

  "discretion was": ADC Historical Study No. 16, 212-14.

  At Williams Air Force: Ibid., 121, 129.

  The order to flush: Historical Resume of 1st Fighter Wing Operations During Cuban Crisis, December 13, 1962, AFHRA; e-mail correspondence with Dan Barry, former F-106 pilot, Selfridge AFB.

  They eventually concluded: NORAD log, NSA.

  CHAPTER SIX: INTEL

  "brainwash" the press: Handwritten note from Maj. Gen. Chester Clifton, October 22, 1962, JFKL.

  it would be "nice": The suggestion was made by Vice Adm. Wallace Beakley, deputy commander of the Atlantic Fleet ― Diary of Vice Adm. Alfred Ward, commander Task Force 136, USNHC. See also deck logs for Pierce and Kennedy, NARA.

  "friendly gestures": Message 251800Z from COMSECONDFLT, CNO Cuba, USNHC.

  labeled "scientific instruments": Personal notes of Lt. Cdr. Reynolds, Battleship Cove Naval Museum. The Kennedy is now on permanent display in Fall River, MA.

  The streets around: Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 190-2.

  The overnight intelligence haul: Photo Interpretation Report, NPIC/R-1047/62, October 25, 1962, CREST.

  were "fully operational": Supplement 6, Joint Evaluation of Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba, October 26, 1962, CREST; Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 436-7. For information provided by Penkovsky, see Jerrold L. Schecter and Peter S. Deriabin, The Spy Who Saved the World (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1992), 334-46. The Penkovsky materials were labeled IRONBARK and CHICK ADEE, and mentioned in the October 19, 1962, Joint Evaluation, CREST.

  "a fear or stampede": Brugioni, Eyeball to Eyeball, 437.

  He liked to boast: Arthur Lundahl OH, July 1, 1981, Columbia University Oral History Research Office.