The generals had a powerful ally in Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander in chief of the Combined Fleet, the operational arm of the Imperial Navy. Yamamoto, the man who had led the attack on Pearl Harbor, was concerned about the continued existence of the American aircraft carriers he had missed on December 7. He wanted to focus Japan’s efforts eastward, to Midway and Hawaii, hoping to capture both U.S. possessions in the near future and lure the American fleet into a final “decisive battle” that would destroy it.
Yamamoto’s opposition was important, for he controlled most of Japan’s warships. He refused to release any of his vessels for use in the South Pacific except for the capture of Port Moresby and Tulagi in the Solomons. He considered plans to invade New Caledonia, Samoa, and Fiji as “folly” because these islands would be too difficult to defend once occupied. In addition, their use for cutting supply lines with America would be limited since Yamamoto fully expected the U.S. Navy to find other routes to Australia. He was also adamantly opposed an attempt to invade Australia. The admiral considered such a venture a waste of manpower that would not contribute to ending the war before the industrial might of the United States began producing ships and planes that would rapidly outpace Japan’s manufacturing ability.9
The debate over invading Australia continued through February and March. At one conference an army officer, Colonel Takushiro Hattori, ridiculed Navy captain Tomioka’s planned use of five army divisions to invade the vast continent: the army simply did not have enough troops for such a task. Hattori claimed that the main body of the Combined Fleet plus a dozen army divisions would be required for any chance of success. When the naval officer pressed further, Colonel Hattori picked up a cup and said, “The tea in this cup represents our total strength.” He then spilled the tea on the floor. “You see it goes just so far. If your plan is approved, I will resign.”10
Of great importance, Prime Minister Hideki Tojo, also an army general, agreed with the army position concerning Australia.
Finally, on March 13, an Imperial Liaison Conference presented the emperor with a plan titled “Fundamental Outline of Recommendations for Future War Leadership.” Although the option of invading Australia still existed, it had been relegated to a far back burner. Serious consideration to such an invasion ended with the emperor’s approval of this document.11
While these discussions were taking place, the U.S. Navy and Army were preparing a joint operation that would shake the Japanese military, especially the Navy, to its very core. A carrier task force commanded by Admiral Halsey was sailing across the Pacific with a plan to attack the Japanese Home Islands. Aboard the carrier Hornet were sixteen Army B-25 Mitchell bombers. The crews for these land-based aircraft, led by Lieutenant Colonel James Doolittle, had spent three weeks at an Army Air Force base learning how to take their four-engine medium bombers off from runways just 450 feet long, instead of the usual 1,200 to 1,500 feet the aircraft required.
On April 1, cranes at the Naval Air Station Alameda in California loaded the sixteen bombers onto the Hornet’s deck, and the carrier left the following day to meet Halsey’s task force north of Hawaii. The task force included the carrier Enterprise, whose fighters and scout planes provided air cover for the operation since the Hornet’s aircraft were stored below to make room for the Army bombers. On April 17, the task force’s oilers refueled the two carriers and four cruisers and withdrew to the east, along with the task force destroyers. The carriers and cruisers dashed west into enemy waters at twenty knots, intending to get within 450 miles of Tokyo before launching the bombers.
Still eight hundred miles east of Tokyo, several Japanese patrol boats on picket duty sighted the American ships. Cruiser gunfire sank the patrol boats, but not before they sent warning broadcasts to Tokyo. Japanese officials decided they had time to react to this incursion, since the enemy ships were well beyond the range for carrier-based aircraft. They did not count on the longer-range Mitchells reaching their targets. At about noon on April 18, the raiders bombed military and industrial sites in Tokyo, Yokohama, and four other cities. The surprise was so complete that they faced only minor opposition from antiaircraft and enemy fighters. The bombers shot down six defending fighters.
Although the raid did not inflict extensive physical damage, it had a huge impact. In the United States, public and military morale received a much-needed lift. In Japan, officials bemoaned the Navy’s inability to protect the Home Islands from an attack that might have killed the emperor himself. Perhaps hardest hit by the raid was Yamamoto, who saw himself as the protector of the nation and the emperor. He was now more determined than ever to confront the American fleet in a final battle, expecting his forces to win. He insisted more than previously that the only way the Combined Fleet could protect Japan from future raids was by capturing the island of Midway and using it as a launching pad for the capture of the Hawaiian Islands. He intended to drive whatever was left of the U.S. fleet out of the central Pacific.
Both the naval staff and the army staff opposed Yamamoto’s plan for an attack on Midway. A primary objection of both was that the mission would take place without the support of land-based aircraft, something that had played a significant role in all operations other than the attack on Pearl Harbor. Both staffs finally gave in when Yamamoto threatened to resign. The navy agreed to support his assault on Midway, but only after the Port Moresby operation. Yamamoto acquiesced. The army agreed because Midway would require at most one regiment of army troops.12
The planned capture of Port Moresby, originally scheduled for late May, was now moved up several weeks. The advanced date would give the ships loaned to the Port Moresby operation by the Combined Fleet time to resupply and return to the fleet, making them available on the date set for Yamamoto’s “decisive battle” at Midway, June 5.
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Operation MO—the code name for the Port Moresby invasion—had three primary objectives. First was the invasion and occupation of Tulagi, an island in the southern Solomons across a narrow strait from Guadalcanal. Tulagi had a harbor ideally suited as a seaplane base, from which planes could help defend Rabaul from attack. Second was the establishment of seaplane bases at several of the tiny islands and reefs comprising the Deboyne Islands, off the east coast of New Guinea. Flying boats at these two locations would be responsible for patrolling deep into the Coral Sea, watching for enemy ships. Third was the invasion and capture of the primary target, Port Moresby.
Although Port Moresby had been bombed in February, the Allies first became aware of Japanese plans to capture the town on April 24. U.S. Navy code breakers reported that the Combined Fleet had ended its operations in the Indian Ocean, and was heading back to the Pacific. They learned that five large carriers would return to Japan for refitting, but two would be available for action in the South Pacific. At about the same time, a decoded message sent by the port director at Truk reported that four heavy cruisers only recently arrived at the base had departed, and were heading in a southerly direction.13
Meanwhile, British code breakers in Ceylon learned that two aircraft carriers from Vice Admiral Nagumo’s First Carrier Striking Force had been detached for participation in something the enemy was calling Operation MO. They were the carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku.14
A third carrier, not yet identified by the code breakers but assigned the name “Ryukaku,” soon joined the Fourth Fleet at Rabaul. The code breakers considered its transfer to the Fourth Fleet as “ominous.” Ryukaku was later identified as the converted light carrier Shoho. She had the capacity to be home to one-third the number of aircraft on the big attack carriers.
The Americans soon realized that the Japanese were planning something big in the southwest Pacific, but as yet did not know what. Then a breakthrough occurred when a code breaker named Finnegan uncovered a reference to what appeared to be a new organization, the “MO Covering Force.” The commander of Cruiser Division Six was in charge of this force. Digging further, Finn
egan discovered a reference to “MO Occupation Force.”15
Without realizing it, Allied air forces were giving additional urgency to Japanese plans for Port Moresby. Attacks against Rabaul and Lae from Port Moresby had increased, along with their destructive power. Following one raid on Rabaul by B-26 bombers that had probably refueled at Port Moresby, the commander of the 8th Base Force wrote in his diary: “Suffered a severe raid from four English [sic] aircraft in the morning. At Vunakanau, 30 casualties from the 7th and 8th Establishment Squads, with one dead at the airfield under a torrent of exploding torpedoes. Conspicuous signs of defeat in the air.”16
Allied reconnaissance flights soon began reporting an increase in both Japanese warships in the area of Rabaul and cargo ships capable of carrying army troops in Rabaul’s Simpson Harbor. Cruisers and destroyers from Truk steamed south, and it was clear to anyone reading reconnaissance reports that the Imperial Japanese Navy was planning a major operation. The obvious target was Port Moresby.
General MacArthur was fully aware that the enemy was likely planning to invade Port Moresby, and in late April he ordered antiaircraft reinforcements rushed to the town. Yet current aircraft facilities there were of limited value. Constant Japanese raids and inadequate facilities made it suitable for fighters, but the big bombers the Army was receiving required more than Port Moresby could offer. For more than a stopover for fuel, Allied bombers were based predominately at Townsville, some seven hundred miles to the south. For added protection, MacArthur ordered the expansion of the Townsville Airdrome and the construction of additional aircraft facilities farther up on Australia’s Cape York Peninsula, closer to New Guinea.17
Allied bombing attacks on Rabaul were also stepped up, as were raids on Lae and other Japanese positions. Commanders in Port Moresby and along the northeast Australian coast received orders to be on the alert for possible enemy landings. MacArthur loaned two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and two destroyers, under the command of Rear Admiral J. G. Crace of the Royal Navy, to the Pacific Fleet as it prepared for what many expected to be a major naval confrontation. Intelligence decrypts predicted the coming battle, but not exactly where it would occur. The Imperial Navy then took its first step toward invading Port Moresby. Operation MO was under way.
A powerful war fleet departed Truk and headed south toward the Coral Sea on May 1. This was the “MO Carrier Striking Force” under Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi. Its assignment was to provide long-range cover for the entire operation across the wide expanse of the Coral Sea. The force’s primary objective was to seek and destroy Allied warships that might attempt to interfere with the landings. It consisted of the two 29,800-ton fleet aircraft carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, each with a capacity of seventy-two aircraft, including eighteen “Zero” long-range fighters, twenty-seven “Val” dive-bombers, and twenty-seven “Kate” torpedo bombers. Accompanying these two powerful ships were two heavy cruisers, six destroyers, and an oiler for refueling.
The primary fleet in the overall operation was the “MO Invasion Force” commanded by Rear Admiral Katsuo Abe. It included six army and five navy transport ships carrying five thousand troops of General Horii’s South Seas Detachment and approximately five hundred troops from the Naval Landing Forces. Also included were one minelayer, six minesweepers, several oilers, and a repair vessel. Six destroyers and one light cruiser commanded by Rear Admiral Sadamichi Kajioka provided close-in support. Wider protection for the transports was assigned to Rear Admiral Aritomo Goto, who commanded the converted light carrier Shoho with eighteen aircraft on board, as well as four cruisers and one destroyer. Seven submarines under the control of Captain Noboru Ishizaki were to engage in wide-ranging patrols and report sightings of enemy ships.
Not heading directly toward Port Moresby were two additional groups of ships. These made up the Tulagi Invasion Group of Rear Admiral Kiyohide Shima and consisted of two minelayers, two destroyers, five minesweepers, two subchasers, and a transport carrying four hundred troops from the 3rd Kure Special Naval Landing Force, and a construction detachment. It sailed under the protection of Rear Admiral Kuninori Marumo’s Close Cover Force of two light cruisers and one seaplane tender with twelve aircraft. Army aircraft provided extra cover from Rabaul and Truk.
The overall commander of Operation MO was Vice Admiral Shigeyoshi Inoue, commander of the Fourth Fleet based at Rabaul. Inoue, whose flagship, the light cruiser Kashima, would remain anchored at Rabaul during the coming battle, was under the mistaken impression that a Japanese submarine had sunk the carrier USS Lexington in January. This was a widespread belief among high-ranking navy officers, although some were skeptical of the reported sinking. One of those critics was Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki, chief of staff of the Combined Fleet. The entry in his personal diary for January 15, 1942, reads, “The imperial headquarters announced last night that USS Lexington was considered sunk, with detailed descriptions of the situation under which submarine I-8 sighted and torpedoed her the other day. This morning’s papers took it up with banners.” Then a bit cynically, Ugaki added, “I hope this sunken ship never appears in the paper or on the sea in the future. The navy is not supposed to lie.”18
The admiral was correct: the navy was not supposed to lie, especially about such an important event as the alleged sinking of an American aircraft carrier. Yet it did not matter whether it was a lie or a mistaken report. The fact was the I-8 had fired several torpedoes at the U.S. carrier Saratoga, which managed to return to Pearl Harbor for repairs. This and so many other reports of Allied sinkings left unconfirmed but believed was the result of senshoubyou, a term tied closely to what Japanese officers would later call the “victory disease.” Victory in the war’s initial months had come so far ahead of schedule, and at such little cost, that faith in the “Japanese spirit” obscured their ability to judge events realistically.
Added to this was the belief by many high-ranking navy officers that the Doolittle raid had been supported by two or three carriers that had to return to Hawaii for restocking, leaving the South Pacific with possibly only one U.S. carrier, the Yorktown, thus giving their three MO Operation carriers air superiority over any enemy fleet.
Just as the German navy had failed to deal in any realistic manner with the possibility that Allied code breakers might be reading its messages, the Japanese refused to believe it was possible that their secret communications were understood by the enemy. Nevertheless, they were—at least enough so that messages were partially decoded when combined with the new practice of radio-traffic analysis, which tracked heavy radio relays to and from ships and identified their locations. This was how the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence was able to determine enemy intentions.19
What the Japanese certainly did not expect was to run head-on into three Allied Task Forces containing two fleet aircraft carriers. The main Allied group, which was already in the Coral Sea, was Task Force 17, under Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher. TF 17 was centered on the USS Yorktown and included five cruisers (Astoria, Chester, New Orleans, Minneapolis, and Portland) as well as five destroyers (Farragut, Dewey, Aylwin, Monaghan, and Phelps). A second force, Task Group 17.5, under Rear Admiral Aubrey Fitch, had rushed down from Pearl Harbor to join TF 17. It contained the carrier Lexington and four destroyers, Anderson, Hammann, Morris, and Russell. Coming from the south was Admiral Crace’s TF 44 with its three cruisers and two destroyers. Two oilers and two destroyers of the Refueling Group supported them. Search groups were composed of the seaplane tender Tangier with twelve aircraft, eleven submarines of the Eastern Australian Submarine Group, and several dozen U.S. Army land-based bombers from Australia and New Guinea.
As Admiral Takagi’s Carrier Striking Force made its way down the eastern side of the Solomon Islands, well beyond the range of MacArthur’s bombers from Australia and New Guinea, the two American carrier task forces met in the southern end of the Coral Sea for joint refueling operations shortly after six a.m. on May 1. The Yorktown ships complet
ed their refueling the following afternoon, and Fletcher decided to head north into the center of the Coral Sea and send planes out to search for enemy ships. Fitch was to follow him the next day, as were ships from Crace’s force that also arrived at the rendezvous.
The day before the Americans met, the Tulagi Invasion Group of Admiral Shima left Rabaul and sailed down the western side of the Solomons, heading toward Tulagi. Admiral Marumo’s Tulagi Covering Force joined it. An Australian Coastwatcher on the Solomon island of Bougainville provided the first news that the Japanese were in motion on May 2, reporting a large force of enemy ships sailing south toward Tulagi. A second, similar dispatch was made later the same day by another Coastwatcher on New Georgia. Both Coastwatchers transmitted their sightings to headquarters at Port Moresby, from where the information was relayed to what everyone assumed was the destination of the enemy ships: Tulagi, near the southern end of the Solomons. From Tulagi, seaplanes would be able to provide protection for the left flank of the Port Moresby invasion forces.20
Australian forces at Tulagi were unsurprised by the news. They realized the constant bombing by Japanese aircraft to which they had recently been subjected was to soften up their defenses. What the Japanese did not know was that those defenses were practically nonexistent. The twenty-four commandos of the 2/1st Independent Company, commanded by Captain A. L. Goode, and the twenty-five members of the RAAF 11 Squadron, commanded by Flight Officer R. B. Peagam, were armed with only three Vickers machine guns and one Bren light machine gun—this to fight off an invasion and protect their four Catalina maritime patrol aircraft. Most of nearby islands’ nonnative population, which consisted mostly of Australian and British planters and their families, had evacuated on February 8 aboard the Burns, Philp & Co. passenger cargo steamer S.S. Morinda.
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