After receiving news of the approaching enemy ships from the Coastwatchers on May 2, Goode and Peagam ordered the destruction of all equipment they would have to leave behind at Tulagi and instituted their prearranged evacuation plan. Early the following morning, the Australian soldiers and aviators departed aboard two small vessels just ahead of the first Japanese landing parties, which landed unopposed.21
Meanwhile, with Admiral Fletcher’s task force over five hundred miles away, several of MacArthur’s bombers sighted the Japanese ships at Tulagi and reported them to Townsville. Word was sent to Fletcher, who immediately rushed his force north. Because Allied ships were operating in radio silence to avoid giving their presence away to the enemy, the remaining ships knew nothing of the Tulagi invasion or that Fletcher was rushing to attack the invasion force.22
Japanese construction crews immediately went to work building a seaplane base, joining the four hundred members of the Naval Landing Force who arrived aboard the transport Azumasan Maru. Machine guns and four antiaircraft guns were positioned around the port, although few Japanese expected their unopposed landing to be interrupted. Six seaplanes arrived and tied up in the harbor. Shortly before noon on May 3, with Tulagi secured, Admiral Goto’s Covering Group began to withdraw from the area to join the Port Moresby invasion forces.
Following a restful night, Tulagi echoed with the sounds of construction crews busily erecting facilities required by the seaplanes as well as barracks for the naval troops. The harbor was soon bathed in warm sunlight and filled with warships, under a clear sky, with only a few clouds floating by. One hundred miles to the southwest, the Yorktown was launching twelve torpedo planes and twenty-eight dive-bombers. Shortly before nine a.m., the sounds of the first group of thirteen American dive-bombers, led by Lieutenant Commander William O. Burch, shattered the peaceful morning. They raced down to strike the enemy ships, including two destroyers moored together and the minesweepers and minelayers, all at anchor.
As Burch’s flight headed back to the Yorktown, the twelve torpedo planes of Lieutenant Commander Joe Taylor attacked the destroyers and two of the minesweepers. Following them was a second wave of dive-bombers, led by Lieutenant W. C. Short, whose planes dropped fifteen 1,000-pound bombs.
Each flight returned to the Yorktown, refueled, rearmed, and headed back to Tulagi. In all, Yorktown launched three strikes against the Japanese forces at Tulagi on May 4. By the end of the day, the jubilant pilots were celebrating what for many had been their first combat missions. Because of their inexperience at ship identification, they erroneously reported sinking seven vessels (two destroyers, a freighter, and four gunboats). They also claimed the beaching of a light cruiser and causing damage to another destroyer, a freighter, and a seaplane tender.”23
The reality was, in the words of Admiral Nimitz, “certainly disappointing in terms of ammunition expended to results obtained.” At a cost of twenty-two torpedoes, seventy-six 1,000-pound bombs, and about 83,000 rounds of machine-gun bullets, the U.S. Navy had succeeded in sinking one destroyer, three minesweepers, four patrol boats, and five seaplanes. Several other ships were damaged, but all of these survived to fight another day. Japanese losses included eighty-seven dead and thirty-six seriously injured. The Americans lost three aircraft, but they recovered the even more valuable pilots.24 In response to the inadequate results, Nimitz called for “the necessity for target practice at every opportunity.”25
In spite of the moderate damage caused by the attacks on Tulagi, Japanese admirals were stunned by the sudden appearance of American carrier aircraft. One historian of the Imperial Navy reports, “The shock was felt throughout all of MO Operation’s units, but particularly by the Carrier Strike Force.”26
Admiral Takagi now understood that he was dealing with at least one, and possibly two American fleet carriers. Admiral Fletcher meanwhile would soon learn that he was facing two and possibly three Japanese carriers.
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With the last of her planes recovered from the Tulagi raids, Yorktown headed south to rendezvous with Lexington and Crace’s cruiser force. When Admiral Takagi, who had been refueling his ships about 350 miles north of Tulagi, learned of the attacks, he immediately stopped the process and rushed south. His search planes failed to find the enemy carriers.
The next two days were filled with erroneous reports and confusion on both sides. Task Force patrol planes spent May 6 searching for the enemy but failed to find anything; the Japanese Carrier Force was just beyond their range. Shortly before noon, Takagi received a report that a flying boat out of Tulagi had spotted the American fleet over three hundred miles south of his position, beyond the range of his own aircraft. Having recommenced his refueling, Takagi decided to take no immediate action other than sending his two carriers, along with several destroyers, south toward the enemy’s last known position. The remainder of his force would join them after completing the refueling.
Several times during that same day, MacArthur’s B-17s attacked the ships heading toward Port Moresby, including the covering group of Admiral Goto. When the Army flyers reported the presence of a carrier (the light carrier Shoho), Fletcher was convinced that the main Japanese attack force was protecting the invasion transports. He did not know that two fleet carriers were racing toward him at that very moment. At around eight p.m. the two carrier fleets came to within seventy miles of each other without either being aware of the other. Frustration ruled across the Coral Sea.
On May 7 Admiral Takagi, worried that the enemy carrier force he was expecting might slip behind him, sent two groups of planes south to search. At 7:22 a.m. a plane from the Shokaku reported sighting several enemy ships 160 miles south of the Japanese carriers. Takagi, along with Rear Admiral Chuichi Hara, the tactical commander of the carriers, waited impatiently for further details. Twenty minutes later the same aircraft signaled the presence of one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers. When a second plane, sent to confirm the report, agreed with the first, the Japanese admirals were ecstatic. They immediately ordered all available aircraft on both carriers into the air to attack what they convinced themselves was the enemy’s main carrier task force.27
Beginning at eight a.m., seventy-eight aircraft swept from the flight decks of the Shokaku and Zuikaku. They included twenty-four Type 97 Kate torpedo bombers, eighteen Zero fighters, and thirty-six Type 99 dive-bombers (known as “Vals” to the Allies). The massive armada headed south. The admirals waited for the report of the destruction of the American carrier fleet.
Meanwhile, a floatplane from one of Rear Admiral Goto’s heavy cruisers, the Furutaka, reported at 8:20 sighting an enemy fleet northwest of the Japanese carriers. The floatplane reported one battleship, one Saratoga-class carrier, two heavy cruisers, and seven destroyers eighty-two miles from Rossel Island, off the southern tip of New Guinea. When a second floatplane from the Kinugasa, another of Goto’s cruisers, confirmed the sighting at 8:30, it caused great confusion and consternation for the admirals. Could there be two American carrier fleets in the Coral Sea, or was one of the reports in error?28
Members of the headquarters staff of the Fourth Fleet at Rabaul were not confused. They had heard the reports of the two floatplanes that the enemy fleet was south of Rossel Island and determined that both planes had sighted the same ships moving west. They were optimistic when they learned the Shokaku and Zuikaku of the Carrier Striking Force had launched all available attack aircraft. What they did not know was that the aircraft from the two carriers were heading south instead of north. The staff was unaware of the earlier reports from the carrier search planes.29
Since their planes were already en route to the first sightings, Takagi and Hara decided to stick to their original plan. Yet the sightings were grossly mistaken. Instead of one carrier, one cruiser, and three destroyers, the two planes from the Shokaku had discovered one-half of the American Fueling Group code-named Task Group 17.6. Parked at what was considered a safe locat
ion and waiting to be called to refuel the ships of the task force were the fleet oiler Neosho and her escort, the destroyer Sims.
Five minutes after ten that morning, lookouts aboard the Neosho reported the approach of fifteen planes. Both American ships were at battle stations and on high alert after one of the two patrol bombers that earlier reported their presence had dropped a single bomb that splashed about one hundred yards off the starboard of the Sims. These new planes did not attack, but simply flew over the two ships, well out of range of their guns. Twenty-three minutes later a second flight of seven aircraft also passed overhead without attacking. When the planes seemed to be within range, both ships opened fire with their antiaircraft guns, with no success. Sailors aboard the oiler and destroyer were unaware that the Japanese pilots were not interested in them, but were searching for the aircraft carrier and cruiser they had been launched to sink. A third pass by bombers resulted in the release of three bombs. Neither ship, both maneuvering radically, was hit.30
At eleven fifteen, Lieutenant Commander Kakuichi Takahashi, commander of the Shokaku Air Group, realized the original sighting reports were incorrect. He instructed all aircraft, except for the thirty-six dive-bombers, to return to their carriers. In ten minutes, with the other planes out of the way, four dive-bombers attacked the Sims, which, despite radical maneuvering, received three direct hits by 551-pound bombs. Two exploded in the engine room and caused the ship to buckle. She began to sink almost immediately when a third internal explosion blew the vessel ten to fifteen feet out of the water. She crashed back into the sea and immediately plunged to the bottom. Only fifteen of her 192-member crew survived.
The fleet oiler endured special treatment from the dive-bomber pilots, who were probably angry and frustrated over not finding an aircraft carrier to target. They must have assumed that the wide-bodied ship, known to the sailors of the fleet she serviced as “the Fat Lady,” was the one mistaken for a carrier. Thirty-two dive-bombers attacked the Neosho from all directions nonstop for more than seventeen minutes. As the ship maneuvered to avoid the bombs, her gunners fired relentlessly at the attackers, bringing three down. Unfortunately, one of those crashed directly into Neosho’s gun enclosure number four, killing all members of the gun crew. By the time the planes departed, they had scored at least seven direct hits on the oiler. Adding to the damage and the suffering of the surviving crew, two boilers exploded. The Neosho listed to starboard by thirty degrees and was adrift, without power. Frantic efforts by crew members kept the remains of the vessel afloat for the next four days until a destroyer arrived to take off the survivors. Of the Neosho’s complement of 304 men, fewer than 120 survived. Gunfire from the rescuing destroyer sent the gallant ship to the bottom, with many of her crew entombed within.
Meanwhile, by the time the Japanese attackers had returned to the carriers, it was too late in the evening to respond to the second sighting to the north. The flight was short at least six planes, three shot down by Neosho, one brought down by Sims, and several that crashed when trying to land. It was a high cost to pay for sinking one oiler and one destroyer.
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The two Japanese admirals could not have made a worse decision when they continued their attacks southward on May 7. The ships sighted by the two floatplanes were actually Task Force 17.
As the Japanese aircraft had raced south to attack the Neosho and Sims, a Douglas Dauntless scout-bomber patrolling off the Yorktown reported sighting an enemy fleet between 175 and 200 miles northwest of TF 17. The coded message received by the Yorktown was that the fleet consisted of four heavy cruisers and two aircraft carriers. Although an error in decoding this message would later be corrected, Admiral Fletcher, believing his scout plane had found the main enemy fleet, immediately responded by ordering all available aircraft into action.
As ninety-three aircraft sped off the flights decks of Yorktown and Lexington—including twenty-two Douglas Devastator torpedo bombers, fifty-three Dauntless dive-bombers, and eighteen Grumman Wildcat fighters as escorts—Fletcher received another sighting report. This one arrived via MacArthur’s headquarters.31
Three Army B-17s had flown out of Port Moresby just after dawn on a search-and-bomb mission. Commanded by Captain Maurice C. Horgan, a Texan who would be awarded the Silver Star later in the year, the B-17s reported visual contact with an enemy fleet thirty miles south of the sighting by the scout-bomber. At this stage in the war, errors in ship recognition by pilots of all nations and services were common, as seen with the sightings of the Neosho and Sims. U.S. Army pilots had until this time very little training in identifying ships at sea, or in bombing these moving targets. Therefore, it is surprising that, of all the reports that day, the report from these three B-17s was among the most accurate. Horgan claimed to have seen a fleet of more than two dozen vessels, including an aircraft carrier, at least ten transports, and sixteen other warships only thirty miles from the original erroneous target.32 What Horgan saw was the MO Cover Group/Main Body Support Force of Rear Admiral Goto, which included the light carrier Shoho, and Rear Admiral Kajioka’s MO Invasion Group carrying the invasion troops.
Admiral Fletcher decided to turn his attacking aircraft toward the position where the Army pilots had reported seeing an aircraft carrier. This decision was prompted by the return of the Dauntless scout pilot who, after landing on Yorktown, was able to correct his original report that he had seen aircraft carriers. His actual report was that he had seen only “two heavy cruisers and two destroyers.” Even that corrected report was wrong, for he had actually seen Admiral Marumo’s Support Group, which was composed of two old light cruisers and two seaplane tenders as well as three small gunboats.33
In the meantime, Japanese floatplanes searching for the American fleet located the two-carrier task force 140 miles from Admiral Goto’s ships and reported its position to Rabaul. The position was soon broadcast to every Imperial Japanese Navy ship in the Coral and Solomon Seas. Even Fletcher became aware that the enemy had located him. With American carrier aircraft approaching, Goto ordered the Shoho to launch its nine torpedo bombers to attack the American carriers, then ordered a fighter combat air patrol above the carrier and her escorting ships. Around her were Goto’s four cruisers, arranged in a diamond pattern between three and five thousand yards off each corner of the carrier. Unlike American defense plans, Japanese policy was for the cruisers to be able to achieve independent maneuvering and provide information on incoming enemy aircraft to the carrier, not antiaircraft support.34
Only three Zeros were flying combat air patrol above the Shoho when the American planes arrived. Thirteen dive-bombers swept down on the target and released their ordnance. The captain of the little carrier managed to avoid them all and launch three more Zeros. One near miss blew five planes waiting to launch off the carrier’s deck into the water. Then, in what can only be described as gross overkill, a total of ninety-three dive-bombers and torpedo bombers pounded the ship from every direction, with the exception of two dive-bombers that went after the other Japanese ships. Shoho burst into flames when two 1,000-pound bombs smashed into her. Two torpedoes crippled her ability to maneuver. Twenty-one minutes after the attack had begun, the carrier’s crew received orders to abandon the burning mass. Five minutes later, she noisily slipped below the surface, taking 631 sailors, pilots, and flight crew members with her. No other Japanese ship received serious damage, and all steamed away under their own power.35
During the battle, fifteen of the Shoho’s twenty-one aircraft were lost. As for the American forces, all but three aircraft returned to their carriers.36
As the American planes were rearmed and refueled in preparation for a second attack, Admiral Fletcher learned that the aircraft carrier his pilots had sunk was a light carrier, not one of the two fleet carriers he sought. He decided to stop the second attack: the cruisers and destroyers were not his top priority, the fleet carriers were. He was concerned that his aircraft would be unavailable sho
uld one of his searchers find the big carriers. In addition, the weather was turning bad, and if it continued to worsen, the returning pilots might have trouble finding Yorktown and Lexington. He would wait until the next day.37
Learning of the sinking of the Shoho on May 7, Vice Admiral Inoue, overall commander of the entire MO Operation, ordered the transports to retreat north, out of potential danger. Perhaps stunned by the ferocity of the American attacks on his light carrier, Admiral Goto ordered his ships to flee north. He did not even bother to pick up survivors until several hours later, when he sent the destroyer Sazanami back to the scene. She was able to rescue some two hundred members of the Shoho crew, including her captain.38
Soon after, Inoue received a report from a floatplane that an enemy fleet that included one battleship, two heavy cruisers, and three destroyers was nearing the southern end of the Jomard Passage, which separates New Guinea from the Louisiade Archipelago. It would be the obvious route for Japanese ships sailing from the Solomon Sea into the Coral Sea heading to Port Moresby. As usual, the sighting report was in error. What the floatplane crew had seen was the Cruiser Support Group commanded by Rear Admiral John Crace of the Royal Navy. Crace, whose force included two Australian cruisers, one American cruiser, and three American destroyers, was tasked with guarding the exit of the passage and preventing enemy transports from getting through. With no air cover and within range of several land-based enemy airfields, including those at Rabaul and Lae, Crace was a bit apprehensive about this assignment.
The MO Invasion Force was near the northern entrance of the Jomard Passage, waiting for orders to proceed. Inoue, needing to clear the way if MO ships were to get to Port Moresby, quickly ordered bombers from Rabaul to attack the Allied ships. At two thirty that afternoon, May 7, twelve Japanese Mitsubishi Type 1 land-based torpedo bombers attacked Crace’s ships. The strike was expected, as the crews of all six vessels were aware that twin-engine Japanese bombers had been shadowing them for several hours. By skillfully maneuvering, all torpedoes were avoided. Gunfire from the destroyers Farragut and Wake brought down two of the enemy planes, and three more fell from the sky before the Japanese departed. A few minutes later, twenty high-altitude bombers dropped their loads on the American and Australian ships, but did no damage to any of them.39
War at the End of the World Page 11