When these bombers returned to Rabaul, however, they reported they had sunk a battleship, and seriously damaged another as well as a heavy cruiser, which they considered sunk.40
Admiral Crace, unable to communicate with the Task Force 17 commander because the latter was adamant about maintaining radio silence, decided to move his ships south toward Port Moresby. From there he would still be able to keep watch on the Jomard Passage but might also maneuver beyond the range of Rabaul’s bombers should they decide to return. From a nearby base, a Japanese floatplane that was shadowing the cruisers reported their movement south. The Carrier Striking Force heard the floatplane’s report at three p.m. and incorrectly assumed it was trailing the American aircraft carriers. Within fifteen minutes, Admiral Hara launched eight bombers to search an area two hundred nautical miles to his west to pinpoint the enemy’s position. When he had heard nothing of value by four fifteen, the impetuous admiral launched a second flight. This time he sent attack aircraft, including twelve dive-bombers and fifteen torpedo bombers, to join the search. Their instructions were to expand the search area by an additional eighty miles westward. The original eight planes returned and reported they had seen no enemy ships.
By coincidence, Admiral Fletcher’s two-carrier task force was just over two hundred miles west of the Japanese force. At 5:47, radar operators aboard Yorktown picked up the enemy planes of the second group, and launched eleven Wildcat fighters to intercept what appeared to be a flight of incoming enemy aircraft. The Japanese pilots still did not know the Americans were there waiting for them. Shocked by the sudden attack from an enemy they had not seen, the Japanese reacted poorly. Nine of their number were shot down and one was seriously damaged (it later crashed). The Americans lost three planes in the fight.
After scattering from the attacking Wildcats, the Japanese pilots lost track of their position and became disoriented. Deciding to break off contact with the Americans, they jettisoned their torpedoes and bombs for the return trip to their carriers. At seven p.m., as darkness closed in, six of them mistook Yorktown for their own carrier and attempted to land. Antiaircraft fire from the carrier escorts quickly turned them away. When the Wildcats finally did locate their own ships, eleven of them crashed attempting the night landing. It was a costly mistake for a carrier force that was losing pilots and aircraft daily.41
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During the night of May 7–8, the two enemy carrier forces steamed within one hundred miles of each other. Admirals Fletcher and Takagi considered attempting a night attack once they each knew the enemy’s location, but both men decided to wait until dawn.42
Pilots on all four carriers attended briefing sessions intended to prepare them for what everyone expected to be a climactic battle the following morning. Typical of these was one led aboard Yorktown by Lieutenant John James “Jo-Jo” Powers of Bombing Squadron 5. A native of Brooklyn, New York, and former boxing champion at the Naval Academy, with a broken nose to prove it, Powers told his fellow pilots, “Remember what they did to us at Pearl Harbor. The folks back home are counting on us. As for me, I’m going to get a hit on a Jap carrier tomorrow if I have to lay my bomb right on her flight deck.”43
As dawn broke over the Coral Sea, Shokaku and Zuikaku launched seven torpedo bombers to begin the search for the enemy task force. Three long-range flying boats from Tulagi and four bombers from Rabaul joined them. A short time later, Lexington, which had drawn search duty that day, launched eighteen dive-bombers to hunt for the Japanese carriers. The striking ability of both fleets was of almost equal size and strength: Takagi’s two carriers had 96 operational aircraft, while Fletcher’s two carriers mustered 117.
Flying through poor visibility caused by violent squalls and localized rain showers, Lieutenant (j.g.) Joseph G. Smith caught sight of the enemy carriers at about 8:20 and radioed his find back to his carrier. Both fleets found each other almost simultaneously. It became a matter of which side could get its attack aircraft launched first and make the first strike at the enemy. The Japanese won that race, but only barely.44
At 9:10, the Japanese carriers began launching their planes, sending toward the American carriers thirty-three dive-bombers and eighteen torpedo planes, along with eighteen fighters for protection. The Americans launched thirty-nine dive-bombers, twenty-one torpedo planes, and fifteen fighters. Yorktown launched first, followed by Lexington (the latter had a mishap on the flight deck that delayed the launch). Both sides held planes back to fly combat air patrol against enemy planes and antisubmarine patrols. Once all flights had been launched, the two sets of carriers turned toward each other and followed their aircraft toward the enemy to shorten the return flights of their planes.
About halfway between their own carriers and the enemy fleet, several Yorktown pilots made visual contact with the Japanese planes speeding in the opposite direction. With neither the fuel nor the instructions to engage enemy aircraft in flight, the Americans continued on their way, hoping their decks would be there when they returned.45
At 10:32, the dive-bombers from Yorktown arrived over the targets and circled out of sight of the Japanese, waiting for the slower torpedo bombers to catch up. The Zuikaku slipped from sight as it sailed into a squall with heavy cloud cover. Finally, at 10:57, both dive-bombers and torpedo bombers attacked Shokaku simultaneously, the dive-bombers from high altitude, the torpedo planes from closer to the surface. All the torpedoes were released too far from the target and missed her entirely. Two 1,000-pound bombs from the dive-bombers, including the one dropped by Jo-Jo Powers, smashed into the carrier, inflicting heavy damage to her flight and hangar decks. Antiaircraft fire from the cruisers and destroyers escorting the carriers blasted shock waves in the air, tossing planes around. In the ensuing dogfight, two American dive-bombers and two Zero fighters plunged into the sea.
Thirty minutes after the attack began, aircraft from the Lexington arrived. Facing increased resistance from enemy fighters and antiaircraft from the ships, they scored one hit on the disabled and burning carrier and headed back to the Lexington, chased most of the way by angry Zero pilots who brought down several of the retreating Americans.46
As the sky cleared of enemy planes, Admiral Takagi steered the Zuikaku out from under the cloud cover to survey the destruction. It was clear the Shokaku had suffered severe damage and would not be able to conduct further operations, even after her fires were extinguished. Luckily, she suffered no damage below the waterline, thanks to the poor performance of the American torpedo planes. She was capable of maintaining speed, but with the loss of 109 crew members and the wounding of an additional 114, she could serve no real purpose. Her aircraft were transferred to Zuikaku, and Takagi sent Shokaku back to Japan for repairs, escorted by several destroyers. Now the admiral waited for word from the aircraft he had sent to attack the American carriers.47
The fact that Japanese pilots were more experienced than their American counterparts at attacking enemy ships was demonstrated at the same time the Shokaku was under attack. A few minutes before eleven, radar aboard the American carriers reported a large number of inbound bogeys. Earlier, a Japanese flying boat had been shot down, but this force looked to be much more threatening. Soon, sixty-nine attack planes sent by Admiral Takagi were pushing their way through the outnumbered combat air patrol of Wildcat fighters and dive-bombers. Japanese torpedo planes attacked the Lexington from two directions, preventing her from turning away from one spread of underwater missiles without encountering a second from the opposite direction. At the same time, dive-bombers pounced. She began to experience serious damage almost immediately from hits on a ready ammunition box on her port bow and her smoke funnel.
The Yorktown was let in for a punishing attack when dive-bombers planted a 750-pound bomb on her flight deck near the base of her island. Several fires were quickly brought under control, and her ability to launch and receive aircraft was not impaired. Thanks to the alertness and fast reactions of her skipper
, Captain Elliott Buckmaster, the great ship zigged and zagged in every direction, avoiding incoming torpedoes and bombs. Her escorting ships had difficulty keeping up with her twists and turns, but all remained on station and maintained a lethal barrage of antiaircraft fire that brought down numerous enemy planes.48
Pilots returning to Zuikaku reported sinking two carriers, one of the Yorktown class and a second of the Saratoga class. Admiral Inoue, thinking his carrier force had won the battle despite having to send Shokaku back to Japan, ordered Takagi to take his ships to Truk for repairs. Because of the increasing intensity of attacks from U.S. Army bombers, Inoue decided to delay the invasion of Port Moresby pending the arrival of another carrier fleet. He did not want to proceed without carrier protection for his invasion force.49
Meanwhile, the American task force steamed away from the scene of the battle. Despite a seven-degree list, Lexington was moving under her own power, and several officers expected her to be able to reach Pearl Harbor without assistance. The fires were out, and although the damage was severe, it looked as if she had survived the attack. Then, at 12:47 p.m., a spark from a nearby generator ignited fumes from damaged fuel lines. The explosion blew the forward elevator over a foot above the flight deck. Attempts to control the resulting fire proved fruitless, and shortly after five o’clock the “abandon ship” order was given. After nearby ships rescued more than 2,700 men from the burning behemoth, a destroyer fired five torpedoes into the hulk as flames and black smoke climbed hundreds of feet into the sky. Finally, at 7:52 p.m., the aircraft carrier called “Lady Lex” by her crew rolled over and slipped away.50
Who won the Battle of the Coral Sea? Historians have been arguing over the answer ever since the battle took place. The sinking of Lexington was a greater loss to the Americans than the loss of Shoho to the Japanese. This was obvious. We can arrive at different answers by tallying lost aircraft and lost lives. However, perhaps the most important result of this historic battle was that it averted the invasion of Port Moresby, with all it portended for the safety of Australia and the future of the war. Never again would an enemy fleet attempt to invade that vital port city that would serve as the base of operations for Allied forces fighting on New Guinea.
In addition, one Japanese fleet carrier was out of action for repairs for several months, while the second suffered so many aircraft and pilot losses that she would not rejoin the war until mid-June. Both missed the Battle of Midway, where their presence might have altered the result of that decisive clash.
This was the first time in recorded history that major warships did battle without actually seeing each other. The fleet admirals could not walk out on the bridges of their flagships and see the result of their shelling on enemy ships. Instead, they had to rely on what we now know was the notoriously poor judgment of young aircraft pilots who habitually reported aircraft carriers where there were none; mistook cruisers for battleships, destroyers for cruisers, an oiler for an aircraft carrier; and regularly claimed to sink ships that did not exist or were not sunk. Despite the numerous reports from Japanese pilots of American battleships, not one sailed within several thousand miles of the Coral Sea.
Official U.S. Navy historian Samuel Eliot Morison said of the Battle of the Coral Sea, “It was a tactical victory for the Japanese, but a strategic victory for the United States.”51
That “strategic victory” completely altered the war for New Guinea. Lieutenant Colonel Shiro Hara, Eighth Area Army staff officer, Operations Section, later in retrospect described it this way: “The loss of the Battle of the Coral Sea affected our strategy in New Guinea to a great extent. After the loss, we realized that our offensive assault against Port Moresby by sea was blocked. This made it obvious that if we were to attack our objective it would have to be made overland via the Owen Stanleys.”52
As for the citizens of Japan, the Imperial Navy’s spokesman, Captain Hideo Hiraide, told them, “A powerful Anglo-American combined fleet was lured into the northern part of the Coral Sea by a feint of a small aircraft carrier of ours, and our naval force speedily entrapped the enemy fleet to finish it off in one fell swoop. This battle clearly shows the faulty nature of the strategy employed by enemy commanders.” He then predicted that Britain and the United States would fall “to the position of third-rate sea powers.” General MacArthur quickly issued a statement branding Hiraide’s claims as “entirely fictional.”53
Hiraide made another prediction, this one aimed at the people of Australia. “Of all the belligerents, Australia is to be most pitied. The Sixth Continent, considered by many as a paradise, rose against us by banking on the worthless aid of the United States and Britain. This erstwhile paradise is about to be turned into shambles.”54
Although his Army Air Forces played only a small role in the battle, General MacArthur was so pleased with the outcome that he wrote Admiral Nimitz: “I consider your forces in the recent action were handled with marked skill and fought with admirable courage and tenacity. I am most anxious to perfect air-naval cooperation. . . . Call upon me freely. You can count upon my most complete and active cooperation.”55
CHAPTER 6
Second Landings in New Guinea
On February 4, 1942, as General MacArthur had remained hunkered down on Corregidor, defying the Japanese invasion, the American submarine Seadragon slipped away from the island and headed to Australia. On board were eighteen members of the Navy’s code-breaking operation, headed by Lieutenant Rudolph J. Fabian. MacArthur would not leave his fortress for several more weeks, but these naval personnel were deemed so important that they had to be evacuated as quickly as possible. The remaining fifty-seven members of the unit were removed as submarines became available.
Relocated to Melbourne, Fabian’s people became the Fleet Radio Unit, Melbourne, or FRUMEL. Beginning in early May, at the general’s request, Fabian arrived at MacArthur’s office in Melbourne each day to give him an intelligence briefing on whatever they had learned from reading decrypted Japanese naval and diplomatic communications the previous day. MacArthur arranged for Fabian to be picked up at his office by a military car and driven to headquarters to arrive at precisely two p.m. and be shown directly to the general’s office without waiting. The only other person permitted in the room was MacArthur’s chief of staff, General Richard K. Sutherland.1
Lieutenant Fabian had scored big with the general just prior to the Battle of the Coral Sea. MacArthur, and many others at the time, believed the Japanese ships that engaged in the battle were heading to New Caledonia. When Fabian told him that his people had been reading enemy messages that indicated their true target was Port Moresby, a surprised MacArthur expressed skepticism. The code breaker explained in detail the process FRUMEL had followed when handling secret coded Japanese communications. According to Fabian, so convinced was MacArthur by what he learned that he immediately diverted an army transport ship headed to New Caledonia with troops and sent it instead to Port Moresby.2
“MacArthur was so exuberant about our warning him that the Japanese were really going to attack Port Moresby,” Fabian reports, that “I had to get my admiral to remind” him about the need for security so that he did not inadvertently reveal his source.3
On May 18, Fabian’s operation picked up a Japanese communication involving a preliminary discussion of an overland offensive against Port Moresby. The only way the Japanese could accomplish such a mission was by crossing the Owen Stanley Range. This was no easy task, as there were no roads across the mountains; the only available crossing was by way of narrow trails that could not accommodate vehicles and were filled with potentially fatal hazards. The day’s intelligence summary explained that translation problems made it difficult to ascertain whether the proposed route was for an invasion or simply to move supplies to Port Moresby after its occupation by Japanese troops. The summary claimed the enemy was definitely planning an overland route for what appeared to be some vital reason.4
On the
same day, the Pacific Fleet Intelligence Center in Hawaii predicted a Japanese overland offensive against Port Moresby would begin on or about June 15. The point of origin was expected to be the area around Lae and Salamaua.5
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Before the Japanese began their offensive against Port Moresby, Admiral Yamamoto got what he had been hoping for ever since he had learned that the American aircraft carriers were not at Pearl Harbor the previous December 7: a decisive battle with the U.S. Pacific Fleet. The admiral knew America and its people well, and he understood that a protracted war against such a large and powerful enemy with virtually unlimited resources spelled doom for the Japanese Empire. He needed to cripple the existing American carrier fleet before the United States began building new ships in large numbers.
From June 4 through 7, one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Imperial Japanese Navy clashed head-on with the U.S. Navy near the Midway Atoll, a tiny spot on the globe less than two and a half square miles in size. As its name implies, Midway is located roughly halfway between North America and Asia in the North Pacific Ocean, some thirteen hundred miles west of Pearl Harbor. This was the area that Yamamoto had selected to lure the Americans into a decisive battle through a surprise attack. Unfortunately for more than three thousand of his sailors and aviators, American code breakers had uncovered his plans. But although the U.S. Navy knew the IJN was planning an attack, it was not sure precisely where. All the code breakers knew was that the target had been code-named AF by the Japanese.
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