Kill the Boer

by Ernst Roets

  Land reform is a political ploy, a policy that is rigged for failure and one that only serves to escalate the friction that already exists with regard to South Africa’s food producers. While the primary targets are white farmers, the primary victims might just as well be poor black people.

  EXPLOITING FARM WORKERS

  In 2012, violent unrests erupted in the agricultural community of De Doorns in the Western Cape. The riots were about the exploitation of farm workers and particularly with regard to the low wages that farmers paid their workers. The Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) representative Tony Ehrenreich warned that ‘the ill treatment and under-payment of workers by some farmers must stop or we will see a Marikana (massacre) in De Doorns,’21 adding that ‘the land war will be coming soon.’22 Three people were killed23 and more than 180 people were arrested for public violence.24 At least 30 hectares of vineyards were left in flames. 25

  However, Western Cape Premier Helen Zille believed that the riots were politicised,26 given that the Western Cape was the only province not governed by the ruling ANC, but by the opposing DA, and that the ANC and its alliance partners (including COSATU) had embarked on a campaign to make the Western Cape ‘ungovernable’.27 The notion that the riots were sparked in support of a political cause was strengthened when AfriForum sent representatives to De Doorns during the riots to investigate what the causes were, only to find that many of the rioters were not even farm workers or local residents.

  The then Minister of Labour Mildred Oliphant intervened, increasing the minimum wage from R69 ($5,52) per day to R105 ($8,40) per day. However, this major hike in the minimum wage (52%) forced farmers to look for less labour-intensive methods of farming, resulting in a slashing of the workforce. The 3,5% decline in employment was reported to be minimal,28 although there were farms where it had a major impact. One farm near Worcester went from 96 employees to only 25 in the season following the wage increase.29

  A call for the revival of the strike was made a year thereafter, only to be met with fierce opposition from many workers in the area.30

  However, the De Doorns unrests created a lasting impression that farmers were severely exploiting and even oppressing their workers.

  When thousands of people dressed in black to protest the scourge of farm murders in October 2017, the ANC’s military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), responded that they would rather march to highlight the plight of black farm workers.31 Early in 2018, COSATU alleged that white farmers were ‘on a rampage killing black vulnerable workers’.32 Exploitation of workers was said to occur in a variety of ways, including low wages, withheld benefits, poor housing, labour malpractices and violence committed against workers.

  It has been pointed out that many in the South African government argue that farm attacks are mostly a result of these factors, suggesting that farm attacks should not be prioritised and that it would stop if only farmers were to stop exploiting their workers.

  In the aftermath of the De Doorns riots, the International Labour Organization (ILO) embarked on an investigation into the realities of working conditions on South Africa’s farms. What the ILO found was that, with the exception of isolated cases, these claims were mostly unjustified.

  WAGES

  It was found that most farmers complied with minimum wage legislation, even before the De Doorns riots, and that these riots had to do with wages that were said to be too low, despite the fact that most farmers complied with the minimum wage.33 Wages of farm workers were found to be under-reported by the workers by between 1% and 14%.34 The ILO warned that, while wages reported by workers can be taken as an indicator, more caution had to be displayed when assessing whether workers were paid more or less than the minimum wage.35 Despite the fact that only about 37% of farm workers indicated that they knew their rights,36 there was also a fairly high compliance by farmers regarding the granting of key rights to their workers.37

  BENEFITS

  As far as benefits are concerned, the ILO found that a wide range of benefits was offered to farm workers in the Western Cape. Of the permanent farm workers, 100% had transport to work, 97% had transport to social events and 82% had transport to health services. Eighty-seven per cent of farm workers had free housing, 86% had free work clothes, 72% had vegetable gardens, 64% had access to a crèche, while 64% were on a funeral fund, 43% had subsidised electricity and 8% got electricity for free. Forty-three per cent had provident funds, 36% had access to on-farm medical facilities, 32% received contributions to medical costs, 22% received free food, 22% received food rations, 22% had access to grazing land and 8% had access to aftercare facilities.38

  Figure 18: Benefits to permanent farm workers in the Western Cape39

  HOUSING

  With regard to housing, it was found that the houses of workers who lived on Western Cape farms were considerably better than those of workers who resided elsewhere. Of the on-farm houses, 77% were built with bricks and mortar, as opposed to 11% elsewhere. Ninety-six per cent of the on-farm houses had a bath or shower in the house, which was available to only 44% of houses of farm workers who lived elsewhere. Eighty-eight per cent of on-farm houses had separate kitchens, compared to 72% of off-farm houses. Also, 24% of houses provided on farms were reported to have roof leaks, as opposed to 39% of houses elsewhere.40

  Figure 19: Comparing: on-farm houses and off-farm houses in the Western Cape41

  EVICTIONS

  It is also frequently stated that evictions of farm workers is a major problem. Of course evictions per se are not illegal, as long as the necessary procedures are followed. It turns out, however, that finding credible information on evictions proves to be extremely difficult, according to the ILO, mostly because government authorities (municipalities in particular) seldom have records of evictions readily available. ‘More often than not a special search … had to be done before statistics were made available,’ write researchers Margareet Visser and Stuart Ferrer. ‘The Land Claims Court is supposed to be the main source of information on legal evictions, but in spite of numerous requests to an officer of that court, no information on evictions was received by the researchers. Where statistics were made available by different levels of government, the information provided was often conflicting, making it very difficult to get a real sense of the problem. The Department of Rural Development and Land Reform (DRDLR) acknowledges that one of their biggest challenges is obtaining reliable statistics on eviction.’42

  LABOUR DISPUTES AND UNIONS

  It was also found that the majority of farm workers directly take up their issues with management, rather than to workers’ committees or unions.43 Seventy-one per cent of workers interviewed in the Western Cape felt that management had responded to their complaints.44 Only about 14% of permanent workers belonged to a union.45 The most common answer as to why workers were not part of a union was that they were not interested in joining a union.46 Reasons for lack of interest in joining a union were that they were happy on the farm; that they did not feel a union could add much to their lives; that they felt management could be approached about problems and complied with all labour legislation; and that they felt that unions soured labour relationships on the farm.47 Ninety-four per cent of respondents said that they had never been stopped or prevented from joining a union,48 and 18% of permanent workers indicated that they had participated in a strike in the past.49

  GOVERNMENT INTERVENTIONS

  The greatest irony is that, while farmers in general have put in a lot of effort to improve the working conditions of their workers, similar attempts by the government have failed dramatically. A national summit hosted by the Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF), entitled ‘Towards a better life for vulnerable workers in farms, forestry and fisheries’, concluded with 45 resolutions of what the government should do to ensure a better life for farm workers. Organising and hosting the national summit alone cost R14 million ($1,12 million). The Portfolio Committee on Rural Development and Land Reform remarked
two years later that nothing substantial had been achieved in the implementation of the summit resolutions. Researchers from the ILO inquired about the progress with the implementation of the resolutions, but were not allowed an interview to discuss the matter with the DAFF, nor was any information provided to them.50

  ‘They asked me if people were coming. I knew no one was coming, but I told them that people were coming at 07:00.’ Robert was burned on his feet, legs and stomach and stabbed in the shoulders, hands and neck. A plastic bag was then pulled over his head.

  CHAPTER 14

  Kill the Boer, kill the farmer

  On 5 June 2012, two attackers approached a smallholding in Mnandi, just outside Centurion in Gauteng. As Arina Muller (29) came home from the gym that evening, they presumably slipped onto the property as she entered. As she exited her vehicle, she saw the two men and immediately screamed. She was shot through the chest and left to die in her mother’s arms while the attackers fled the scene. Nothing was stolen.1 Muller’s murder had a big impact on me personally. Not only did it happen just a few kilometres from where I was living, but Muller was also the sister of a good friend of mine. I knew her too. Furthermore, she was murdered on the same day on which I became a father. After the birth of my son, I sent SMSs out to all my friends to inform them that I had just become a father and that our son was healthy. I received a reply from one of my friends: ‘Johannes’ sister was murdered today.’

  Earlier that day and just a few kilometres from the smallholding where Arina Muller was murdered, the African National Congress Youth League (ANCYL) had been hosting a conference on the issue of land reform. Ronald Lamola, President of the ANCYL at the time, addressed the media with the following words:

  I am just giving a warning to white South Africans: They must voluntarily bring back the land, and voluntarily bring back the mineral resources … there will be a moment when these service-delivery protestors will invade the land of Mr Van Tonder and Mr Van der Merwe and we can no longer be able to guarantee the continued safety of Mr Van der Merwe.2

  These words were uttered in the presence of a large variety of media and broadcasters and they were consequently also replayed on TV networks throughout the day. From what was said, it was clear that Lamola was calling for white people to voluntarily surrender their alleged wealth and interests in land and mineral resources. The reference to two prominent Afrikaner surnames, namely Van Tonder and Van der Merwe, created a reasonable impression that Afrikaners or Afrikaans-speaking white South Africans were particularly threatened by his statement. Afrikaners are purported to be the legitimate targets for the anger and aggression of protestors. It was also made clear that, should Afrikaners fail or be unwilling to surrender their wealth (and their land in particular), service-delivery protests would progress towards land invasions, that violence towards Afrikaners who own land is implied and that the ANCYL claims not to be able to guarantee their safety.3

  This is of course a vile threat.

  After it became known that AfriForum and Transvaal Agricultural Union of South Africa (TAU SA) had announced their intention to take legal action against Lamola, the ANCYL lashed back, stating that they stood behind their President. The ANCYL went even further:

  Such a precautionary note raising the hopeless plight of our people, blacks in general and Africans in particular, can only be construed as an incitement to violence … by those hell-bent to protect white minority privilege at the expense of the black majority.4

  The only way to achieve economic freedom, the League said, was through ‘urgent, unapologetic and radical land redistribution’.5 Once again violence was implied, since the mere owning of land by white people was said to be interpreted by black people (presumably only black people who supported the ANCYL) as an incitement for them to inflict violence upon white landowners.

  Shortly before this, Lamola said in Durban that ‘[w]e need an act as forceful as a war to bring it [the land] back to the Africans’,6 and shortly thereafter Magdalene Moonsamy, the then spokesperson of the ANCYL, warned the country to prepare for the ‘fight of their lives’.7

  In referring to the murder of Muller a few hours later and a few kilometres away from where Lamola uttered these words, it is not to say that Lamola’s threat was an essential condition to the murder of Muller, as there is no evidence of this. However, the point is that a culture of violence and a political climate in which violence towards white people – Afrikaners or white farmers in particular – is romanticised and in many cases even actively encouraged up to the highest levels of the ruling African National Congress (ANC), the South African government and certain opposition parties. Although a direct link between Lamola’s hate speech and the murder of Muller on a smallholding cannot be proven, it should be noted that, in the month following Lamola’s hate speech, seven farm murders took place. If you compare that to the average of 2012 (4,4 farm murders per month), it amounts to an upwards variance of 60%.8

  A study by AfriForum found that it is not uncommon for farm murders to increase in the months following on incidents of hate speech that received substantial coverage in the media.9 In the month that followed on former President Jacob Zuma’s singing of ‘Shoot the Boer’ (as discussed in Chapter 11), for example,16 farm attacks took place, during which six people were murdered.

  The effect of this was that farm attacks in the month that followed were 11% higher and farm murders were 36% higher than the average for 2012.10 Upon analysing five high-profile incidents of hate speech directed at white farmers, we discovered an average increase of 74,8% in farm murders in the months that followed on these incidents.11

  KILL THE BOER, KILL THE FARMER

  From the ANC’s legal entry into politics in 1990 until the inauguration of Nelson Mandela as President of South Africa, its youth wing (the ANCYL) was led by a militant man named Peter Mokaba. Mokaba was then sworn in as a Deputy Minister in Mandela’s Cabinet. Although described as ‘a man of considerable intelligence, charisma and courage,’12 Mokaba was always a deeply controversial figure.

  Mokaba was particularly known for popularising the song ‘Kill the Boer, kill the farmer’.13 (The word ‘song’ is used here, although this particular ‘song’ is actually a chant.)

  On 17 April 1993, Mokaba addressed a mass rally in Khayelitsha, just outside Cape Town in the Western Cape, where he led the crowd in chanting: ‘Kill the Boer, kill the farmer!’14 The slogan Bulula Amabhunu (English: Kill the Boers) was used.15 The song had been a popular song of the ANC and its military wing, Umkhonto we Sizwe (MK), in its armed struggle against the white minority government. Despite severe criticism, Mokaba persisted, going even further at a rally at Soshanguve Technikon near Pretoria, Gauteng on 21 April of that same year: ‘Let me make it clear. What I said was, “ Kill the farmer, kill the Boer. Shoot to kill.” This is our culture; this is our tradition. Those who disagree can go to hell.’16

  Mokaba then urged the students to ‘prepare for war’.17 He later rephrased, saying that he did not mean for these comments to be taken literally.18

  On 22 August 1992, Godfrey Frederick Lanz Heuer was murdered in front of his wife, Amy, on their farm near Vryheid in KwaZulu-Natal. The killer was a 28-year-old man named Ntuthuko Chuene. A Rossi Special firearm, ammunition and a suitcase containing about R1 000 ($80) in cash, a pocket calculator and books were also stolen from the scene. Chuene was convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment.

  He would later testify to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) that the only reason he had committed that murder was because he had been influenced by the ANC’s chanting of ‘Kill the Boer, kill the farmer’. He continued: ‘I could have killed any other white man I came across at that time. My frustrations were directed to white men because they had what we did not have.’19

  The song was sung at various public gatherings, including a public gathering of the ANCYL in Kimberley in the Northern Cape in June 2002, at the funeral of Chris Hani in 199320 and eventually also the funeral of Pe
ter Mokaba in 2002.21 In 2011, during the Shoot the Boer case (see Chapter 15), Julius Malema, the then President of the ANCYL, testified that he had sung the song with Mokaba when he was younger and that he had no problem with it.22

  The Freedom Front Plus (FF Plus) party had filed a complaint with the South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC), requesting that the song in question be declared hate speech. The SAHRC found that they could not find any reason to categorise the song under section 16(2) of the South African Constitution and therefore that it was not hate speech. In other words, what the Commission found was that the chanting of the words ‘Kill the Boer, kill the farmer’, combined with angry protestors imitating the sound of a machine gun, within the context of farm murders and Mokaba’s statement that he actually meant ‘shoot to kill’ did not amount to any of the following (as per section 16(2) of the Constitution):

  Propaganda for war;

  Incitement of imminent violence; or

  Advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that constitutes incitement to cause harm.23

  The finding was of course ridiculous. The result was a severe breach of minority communities’ faith in the objectivity of the SAHRC. The matter was taken on appeal and heard by a different panel.

  On appeal, the SAHRC found that calling for the killing of people because they belong to a particular community or race must amount to the advocacy of hatred, unless the context clearly indicates otherwise.24 With reference to the words ‘incitement to cause harm’ in section 16(2) of the Constitution, the Commission found that ‘harm’ must be defined broadly to include psychological, emotional and other harm, but the subsection mentioned then contains its potentially adverse impact by limiting its application to four categories, namely race, ethnicity, gender and religion.25 An important finding in this matter, which was also hotly debated in the Shoot the Boer case that followed, was the test as to whether expression amounts to hate speech for the purpose of section 16(2) of the Constitution. The Freedom of Expression Institute (FXI) had argued in this matter that the subjective intent of the inciter (eg. Mokaba) must be shown to have influenced the incitee (eg. an ANC supporter) to commit an offence. The Commission found that: