George F. Kennan : an American life

by John Lewis Gaddis

  What was required, therefore, was coordination across each of the categories of available power: “We must work out a general plan of what the United States wants in this world and we must go after that with all the measures at our disposal, depending on what is indicated by the circumstances.” The nation needed in peacetime a “grand strategy no less concrete and no less consistent than that which governs our actions in war.” If applied wisely, then “these measures short of war will be all the ones that we will ever have to use to secure the prosperous and safe future of the people in this country.”

  Kennan finished with that but got a tough first question: was it possible for the United States to have a grand strategy? “[W]e don’t aspire to anything particularly except what we have; [so] what, mainly can our grand strategy consist of ?” The point was well taken, Kennan acknowledged. “What has the United States got really to offer to other people?” Thinking quickly, he improvised an answer that raised a larger question:

  [W]e have freedom of elections, freedom of speech, freedom to live out your life politically; but a great many people in this world would say that is not enough; we are tired; we are hungry; we are bewildered; to hell with freedom to elect somebody; to hell with freedom of speech; what we want is to be shown the way; we want to be guided. [You] don’t believe in abstract freedom but only in freedom from something or freedom to something; and what is it you are showing us the freedom to?

  Kennan would not attempt a reply. “I am going to let you try to think it out for yourself. I am still trying to think it out.” But he did offer a place to start: “Perhaps it is better that we don’t come to people with pat answers but say, instead, ‘You will have to solve your own problems, we are only trying to give you the breaks.’ ”33

  It’s unlikely that anyone dozed, therefore, through Kennan’s opening National War College lecture. It redefined international relations in an ideological age, it assessed totalitarian strengths and weaknesses, it sketched out democratic responses, it stressed the multiple forms that power can assume, it called for diplomacy to become grand strategy, and it concluded with Kennan’s imaginative leap into the minds of those for whose allegiance the United States and the Soviet Union would be competing. It was a satisfactory start, not least because of the work it left for his students—and for Kennan himself—still to do.

  VI.

  Kennan had long liked the idea of becoming a teacher. He had regularly raised it with Jeanette as an alternative to the Foreign Service, and his Bad Nauheim lectures had revealed unexpected pedagogical skills. That was hardly the ideal environment, though: the war college came closer. “I am enjoying the work very much,” George wrote Kent early in October. “It is the first time in years that I have been relatively free from administrative duties and able to give a good portion of my time to purely intellectual pursuits.” He was supervising four civilian professors—one was Brodie, on leave from Yale—while giving occasional lectures and listening to many more. He was consulting on foreign policy in Washington and speaking to audiences elsewhere, as Acheson had encouraged him to do. He was getting, from all of this, a stimulus, as well as a degree of appreciation, “which I haven’t experienced anywhere else. In consequence, I feel quite bucked up.” Dorothy Hessman, who had followed Kennan from Moscow, thought the situation ideal for him: “There was no ambassador or Secretary to say ‘he can’t say that.’ ”34

  By his count, Kennan composed seventeen lectures or articles, each about the length of the “long telegram,” between September 1946 and May 1947: the list did not include occasions on which he spoke extemporaneously or from rough notes. He gave most of the lectures at the National War College but also spoke at the Naval and Air War Colleges, at Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania (where the Army War College would soon relocate), at Yale, Princeton, Virginia, Williams, at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association, and—as it turned out, famously—at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. The indefatigable Hessman kept up, typing as many as three drafts for some of the lectures while managing a proliferating correspondence. This “veritable outpouring of literary and forensic effort” was meant to educate audiences on the nature of the postwar world and what the American response to it should be; but like all good teachers, Kennan was also educating himself along the way.35

  His chief concern, in the fall of 1946, was still that too few Americans saw anything between diplomacy and war: if the first failed, the second must follow. Henry A. Wallace, Roosevelt’s former vice president, now Truman’s secretary of commerce and a leading Democratic Party liberal, dramatized the polarity in a New York speech on September 12, warning that “ ‘[g]etting tough’ never bought anything—whether for schoolyard bullies or businessmen or world powers. The tougher we get, the tougher the Russians will get.” The president, he insisted, had read his speech and agreed with it. A confused week followed, at the end of which Truman made it clear that he did not agree and demanded Wallace’s resignation. Everywhere he went, Kennan complained while the controversy was still raging, “I find people with their faces buried in their hands and an air of tragedy about them saying collaboration with Russia has proved to be impossible and, therefore, all is lost.” When would the war start?36

  Kennan used his first appearance before a university audience—an off-the-record lecture at Yale’s Institute of International Studies on October 1—to take on Wallace. The result was an evisceration, arguably unnecessary since the target by then had largely eviscerated himself. The talk was a response, though, not just to Wallace but to a succession of Kennan’s superiors—Bullitt, Davies, Harriman, Byrnes, and Roosevelt himself—all of whom had assumed, at one time or another, that if offered friendship the Soviet Union would reciprocate. If Wallace believed, like “many vain people” before him, “that the golden touch of his particular personality and the warmth of his sympathy for the cause of Russian Communism would modify in some important degree the actions of the Soviet Government,” then he was not only ignoring the way states worked, but he was also “flying in the face of some of the most basic and unshakeable of Russian realities.”

  Stalin and his associates would not thank Wallace for implying that “they, the guardians of the Revolution, are a group of neurotic, wistful intellectuals, to be swept off their feet and won over from their holiest articles of faith by an engaging smile, [and] a few kind words.” They had committed acts that, in the absence of an ideology to justify them, would have to be considered among “the most stupendous crimes in the history of mankind.” They had built a regime in the image of that ideology. They had corrupted a generation:

  The official who wields the disciplinary power of the Communist Party; the worker of the secret police who has sacrificed his family relationships to the grim dictates of his profession; the army officer whose wife has become accustomed to the new fur coat, the larger apartment and the war-booty Mercedes; the economic administrator whose one talent is to force the pace of armaments developments; all these, and many others besides, have sold their souls to the theory that the outside world is threatening and hostile.

  They resembled the village misfits Dostoyevsky had described in The Demons, “already caught up in the toils of the revolution,” unable “to escape from its relentless demands.” But now they controlled a nation.

  It was clear, then, that the fears and suspicions so prevalent in Moscow related not to the Truman administration’s policies but “to the character of the Soviet regime itself.” They would not be dispelled by “fatuous gestures of appeasement,” which could only lead “to the capitulation of the United States as a great power in the world and as the guardian of its own security.” There was, however, no reason to despair: Americans should see the situation instead “as a narrow and stony defile through which we must pass before we can emerge into more promising vistas.”

  That promise resided in the Russian national character, more deeply rooted even than the Stalinist state or the ideology that animated it, ye
t visible in Russian literature. Kennan cited, as an example, the provincial governor in Gogol’s Dead Souls who one day acknowledged, in “a typically Russian burst of honesty,” that “perhaps I have, by my excessive suspiciousness, repelled those who sincerely wished to be useful to me.” He also recalled the Chekhov heroine who had tried to befriend peasants, got nowhere with them, walked away sadly, but was followed by a sympathetic blacksmith:

  “Don’t be offended, Mistress,” said Rodion. . . . “Wait a couple of years and you can have the school, and you can have the roads, but not all at once.... [I]f you want to sow grain on that hill, first you have to clear it and then you have to take all the stones off and then you have to plow it up and then you have to keep after it and keep after it . . . and it is just the same with the people. You have to keep after them and keep after them until you win them over.”

  People, Kennan was suggesting, could indeed shape governments, but this would take time. And circumstances, not sentimentality, would shape people. Therein lay the key to what American strategy should be.

  The United States could alter the circumstances in which the Soviet government operated “only by a long term policy of firmness, patience, and understanding, designed to keep the Russians confronted with superior strength at every juncture where they might otherwise be inclined to encroach upon the vital interests of a stable and peaceful world, but to do this in so friendly and unprovocative a manner that its basic purposes will not be subject to misrepresentation.” The objective would be Clausewitzian: to shift the psychology of an adversary. The manner, however, would be Chekhovian.37

  Was there reason to think that this might work? Kennan’s Naval War College lecture, delivered on the same day he spoke at Yale, addressed this issue. The Russians, he pointed out, were “the most un-naval of peoples,” but they understood naval strategy. Lacking easily defended borders, unable to count on domestic loyalty, Kremlin leaders would not willingly engage an adversary stronger than themselves. “They cannot afford to get into trouble.” They respected, therefore, one of “the great truths of naval warfare,” which was “that a force sufficiently superior to that of the enemy will probably never have to be used. Its mere existence does the trick.”

  That was where the United States, with superior force, had the advantage. It ought to be possible “for us to contain the Russians indefinitely” and perhaps eventually “to maneuver them back into the limits within which we would like them to stay.” This would not “solve” the Soviet problem. “You never really solve problems like that; you only learn to live with them after a fashion and to avoid major catastrophe.” But if the United States followed such a strategy consistently enough over a long enough period of time, then “I believe that the logic of it would enter into the Soviet system as a whole and bring about changes there which would be beneficial to everyone.”

  As currently configured, the American government was not equipped to do this. Its policies proceeded along separate tracks; there was no common concept. But it should be possible to secure such coordination. It would involve setting up “some formal organization for decision and action at the Cabinet level.” It would demand closer liaison with Congress. It would require educating the public on the “powers and prerogatives of government in the field of foreign affairs” and on the need for its own “restraint and self-discipline.” And there would have to be “more sheer courage” in defending policies from domestic critics.

  The Soviet challenge, therefore, was really to “the quality of our own society, . . . [to] how good democracy is in the world of today.” If it could “force us to pull ourselves together,” then “perhaps we may call our Russian friends a blessing rather than a plague.” Shakespeare’s Henry V had anticipated that possibility long ago:

  There is some soul of goodness in things evil,

  Would men observingly distil it out;

  For our bad neighbor makes us early stirrers,

  Which is both healthful and good husbandry;

  Besides, they are our outward consciences

  And preachers to us all: admonishing

  That we should dress us fairly for our end.38

  With these two lectures, given on the same day, Kennan found his voice as a teacher. He connected current events with his years of experience in the Soviet Union, his summer crash course on grand strategy and the atomic bomb, the impressions derived from his speaking tour, Admiral Hill’s mandate to rethink the requirements of national security, and his own sense that literature could inspire statecraft.39 He did all of this with an eloquence that existed nowhere else in the government: he understood—as his friend Bohlen did not—that rhetoric persuades, and that style instructs. It’s no wonder that he attracted students, some of them highly placed.

  The State Department sent Kennan to Ottawa in December to present the new American policy, on a top-secret basis, to Canadian officials worried about defense of the Arctic. It was “virtually certain,” he assured them, that Stalin planned no surprise attack, there or anywhere else. Miscalculation, however, might lead to unplanned hostilities, so the United States and its allies must leave no doubt, in his mind, of their resolve. They would have to be as firm as they were patient: the goal should be “to ‘contain’ Russian expansionism for so long a time that it would have to modify itself.” And how long might that take? Kennan guessed “10 or 15 years.”40

  VII.

  “I seem to have hit the jackpot as a ‘Russian expert,’ ” George wrote Jeanette on Christmas Day 1946. “You’d be amazed, what seems to be coming my way.” Harvard, Princeton, and Yale had all asked him to join their faculties. “As far as I can see, I can write my own ticket.” The State Department was willing to keep him on the payroll while “loaning me out” for research: he would soon be promoted to the rank of “minister” with a salary rumored to be $15,000. It was “almost too good to be true, and I really doubt that it will materialize; but it all goes to show that nothing succeeds like success.”41

  The Kennans had been living, since September, in a graceful three-story brick house on “General’s Row” at Fort McNair, courtesy of the U.S. Army. Facing the parade ground with a view of the Potomac out the back, it was large, well staffed, and came with full commissary privileges, which George noted “considerably reduce the cost of living.” There were tennis courts, a golf club, a swimming pool, an officers’ club, and it was all within reach of the East Berlin farm on weekends.

  Saturdays flew by in veritable orgies of labor on various “projects.” The energies of guests were employed no less enthusiastically and no less inefficiently than our own. Then, on Sunday mornings, there would be the sad cleaning up . . . , followed by the long trek back amid Sunday-afternoon traffic; and finally—the sudden confrontation with the . . . fat stacks of the waiting Sunday paper and the insistent phone calls of people who had been trying to reach us ever since Friday noon.

  The farm, George believed, kept him healthy: “When, for one reason or another, I omitted these weekend expeditions to the country, I fell ill.” And his Pennsylvania neighbors provided not only practical advice but “a shrewd, reassuring common sense ... that gave new, and sometimes healing, perspective to the trials, excitements, and disappointments of a hectic official existence.”42

  The disappointments, that fall and winter, were remarkably few. The children loved living in their Army house and, to their parents’ relief, liked their Washington schools, to which a bus delivered them every day. Grace, now fourteen, had been to several local dances; Joan, however, missed ballet classes in Moscow. Hearing The Nutcracker Suite, her father noticed, caused her to go “through all the dances as she remembered them.... She certainly has it in her blood.” George, for his part, was coming to see in his children something that he and his siblings had missed. “I hope you will get married,” he wrote Kent, “if only because you—like the rest of us—did not have a normal family life in childhood; and the re-living of it in one’s own family helps to overcome the effects of that.�
� The war college allowed as “normal” an existence as the Kennans had yet managed.43

  George was “terribly happy” at the National War College, Annelise remembered. “You must think me a little dotty,” he would come home and say, but “this was said, and this was discussed, and this is wonderful.” There had been eighty-five lectures that fall, he explained to Kent, probably the best series on international affairs that had ever been given. The contacts were “like manna to me after many years of the philistinism of American foreign colony life.” He was not sure now that he would want to return to diplomacy: “I have found such generous appreciation . . . among the academicians for what little I know about Russia and have had such tempting offers to continue working with them that I am sorely tried.” That knowledge now was “a chance aggregate of odds and ends, gathered without system and in large part without purpose.” If he could spend a year or two in systematic study, “I might really be able to do something more worthwhile in scholarship than in diplomacy.”