Dieppe: Operation Jubilee - Channel Ports

by Tim Saunders

  The view inland from the cliffs to the east of Green Beach.

  A trench line still visible in the area of the Radar Station.

  Flight Sergeant Nissenthal was sheltering in a ditch with his escort; he described the situation that faced A Company:

  ‘I raised my head cautiously and scanned the hill to see how other SSRs were faring. Near the concrete roadblock, the road was dotted with bodies, some wearing khaki and some in field grey. None was moving. Around them lay the detritus of dead soldiers; a litter of rifles, steel helmets, smoke canisters; an abandoned two-inch mortar, a smashed radio set. I could hear shouts of orders and counter-orders, the rattle of machine guns, the crack of rifles and the hollow thump of mortars. Whether they were Canadian or German, it was impossible to know.’

  The concrete radar position was surrounded by a high blast-wall that was faced by an earth-and-sandbag bank. Around the radar casemate were trenches and machine-gun positions, and rolls of concertina wire piled twelve feet high surrounded the whole site.

  The area inland from Green Beach.

  Assembling such firepower as they had, A Company, reinforced by 10 and 12 Platoons from B Company, gave covering fire to the Special Platoon, who attempted to crawl forward across the broken ground towards the radar site. However, the Germans, too numerous to be suppressed by the Canadians’ fire, spotted them, and Jack Nissenthal and his escort were driven back in the face of growing German firepower. Some time later, after further vain attempts to get naval or artillery support, Sergeant Nissenthal decided to attempt to reach the radar on his own, covered by the fire of all the available Canadians.

  Under the noses of the German defenders, who could be seen manning the trenches, Nissenthal stealthily made his way around to an unguarded flank and into the radar site. With the German defender’s attention focused on keeping A Company away from the site, Nissenthal was able to cut the cables coming out of the Freyer casemate. By doing this, he provided valuable information.

  During the previous autumn, British radio-interception stations on the south coast, monitoring German radio communications, regularly picked up coded messages from Freya operators. British cryptographers broke these codes, and revealed that the messages were to command posts, giving details of approaching aircraft. From this data, British radar technicians were able to calculate the capabilities of the chain of German RDF stations. However, when the Germans connected the radar sites by telephone, this useful source of intelligence stopped. By cutting these telephone lines, Jack had forced the radar operators of Freyer Number 28, which was tracking the largest air engagement of the war over France to date, to resort to easily-intercepted radio to pass on details of incoming Allied air attacks.

  Radio-intercept stations along the South Coast recorded, decoded and analysed the German radio messages. From this text and from known movements of Allied Air Forces, the scientists were able to gage the extent of the developments to the Freyer system during the nine months since the regular coded messages had ceased. This information, though not as useful as a full internal examination of the system or the seizure of parts, was a significant factor in the technical war that was being fought by scientists.

  The German Reaction

  As with D Company, A Company had been unable to take its objectives on the Western Headland. 8 Kompanie was proving to be a determined enemy. It is interesting to speculate what might have resulted if tanks of the Calgary Regiment had been landed at Pourville, as had been envisaged in the early versions of the Rutter plan. Lacking sufficient combat power, the SSR’s attack on the high ground was broken off, and the companies concentrated on holding the ground already gained. This was easier said than done, as the well-exercised German defensive plan was producing a much swifter reaction than had been expected.

  The reserves of 571 Infanterie Regiment were awoken and placed on notice to move at 0530 hours. The leading elements of 1st Battalion relied on bicycles for mobility. In theory, this means of transport had worked well on exercise, but when, after an hour’s frenetic preparations, they set out with a full combat load of ammunition, the reality was rather different. The leading Kompanie on its eight mile march to Pourville was plagued with punctures, as under pressure of the heavily-laden infantrymen, the spokes became unseated. The march took a full three hours.

  Meanwhile, back in Pourville, Colonel Merritt was forced to move his Tactical Headquarters, as it was being unerringly engaged by mortar fire. One theme consistently mentioned in Canadian accounts of Green Beach is a theory that the Germans had used radio direction-finding equipment to locate their HQ positions accurately and to use this as targeting information. This may be true, as the Germans used such equipment to detect French Resistance radio operators. However, from positions overlooking Pourville, they could also have located the Canadians with the naked eye.

  A copy of the leaflet dropped by Allied aircraft as the raid began warning the French that this was only a raid.

  Casualties from mortar fire included Regimental Sergeant Major Strumm, a Great War veteran, who suffered a serious wound to his leg. Though already wounded, he narrowly avoided death but his polished-steel field-shaving mirror in his breast pocket prevented his heart from being pierced by a razor-sharp shell splinter. The RSM was evacuated, saying as he went, ‘They told me I was too old to get into action, but I fooled em.’

  The panoramic view from just below the RDF site, across the Scie Valley to the high ground where the Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders advanced inland.

  Despite leaflets warning the people of Pourville that this was not the invasion and that they should not compromise themselves, a number of French men and women actively supported the Canadians. Many accounts commented on the number of old gentlemen, no doubt veterans of the Great War, who stood calmly watching the exchange of small-arms fire, ignoring the detonation of shells. Most fondly remembered of all were the young French women who brought succour to the growing number of wounded at the Regimental Aid Post. Although they knew the risks of being seen cooperating with the Canadians, they insisted on helping, and help was sorely needed. They pressed water and wine to the lips of the wounded and passed around fruit to the men bringing in their wounded comrades. In general, however, it is worth noting that the French heeded the Allies’ warnings and remained at least neutral. The Germans acknowledged this by releasing French POWs from Dieppe captured in 1940 to their families.

  Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders

  The Camerons, travelling in twenty-five LCP(L)s from Newhaven, landed half an hour late at 0550 hours, as a result of a navigational error. With the enemy now fully alert, still manning untaken positions that covered the beach, Lieutenant Colonel Gostling and his men received the full effect of the enemy’s fire. With Piper Alex Graham playing ‘The Hundred Pipers’ standing on the bow of a landing craft, shells started bursting around the Camerons during their final run-in to the beach. The landings were made astride the mouth of the River Scie, which had considerable influence on subsequent events. According to Colonel Stacey:

  ‘LCP(L) 129, in Mr. O’Rourke’s phrase, “hit the objective in a rather awkward position,” at the east end of Green Beach, east of the outlet of the River Scie, and not far from a German pill-box which was still in action, the one beach position which the S Sask R had not succeeded in clearing. Lieutenant Colonel Gostling went ashore and began to direct the battalion’s advance through the wire obstacles.’

  The Commanding Officer was ‘directing wire cutting’ when he was shot down and killed by a burst of fire from a Spandau in a pillbox built into the headland. Major Law, the battalion’s Second-in-Command, stated that, ‘the parts of the unit that landed west of the river got across the sea wall with little difficulty and few casualties, which is in contrast to those who landed to the east [D and parts of B and C Companies], which the Saskatchewans had not been able to clear, and were held up for a time.’

  Once the Camerons were in the cover of Pourville, Major Law, as described in their
war diary, reviewed the situation:

  ‘It became evident, from the amount of mortar and shellfire coming on Pourville, that the enemy were aware that there were now two battalions in the town. A hasty appreciation of the situation and discussion with the SSR’s HQ revealed that the SSRs were held up by two pillboxes, which controlled the crossing of the River Scie. Parts of D Coy had worked their way around the right flank of the bridge and were in a good fire position. In view of this, it was decided to leave D Coy to support the SSRs and adopt our alternative route to the aerodrome, our objective i.e. via the west side of the River Scie.’

  The Camerons, with A Company in the lead, set off to their objective of the St Aubin airfield and the reported divisional headquarters location. Their first task was to seize a bridge at Bas - du-Hautot and reach their rendezvous with the tanks of the Calgary Regiment. However, ‘while proceeding south along the axis of the road Pourville – Bas-du-Hautot, we came under heavy mortar and MG fire from the area of les 4 Vents Farm on the east side of the river.’ Once in the cover of Bois d’Hautot, ‘we were not bothered by any mortar or machine-gun fire from this point onwards.’

  Once through the wood, the battalion deployed into an open formation and continued to move south across open ground. According to the report in the war diary:

  ‘A considerable amount of [enemy] activity along the road was seen, generally moving north on the west side of the river and moving south on the east side of the river. The time was now approximately 0845 hours and up to this time no information from Brigade had been received. The tanks, which by now should have been patrolling near us could not be seen . . . Time was getting short . . . therefore it was decided to abandon our original objectives. Strong enemy forces were coming up along the road. These were engaged by Bn HQ and the support platoon. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy and they eventually withdrew.’

  Three horse-drawn close-support infantry guns were seen attempting to cross a bridge, but the range was too great for effective rifle fire. As the Camerons had lost their mortar platoon during the landing, they had to rely on short bursts from Bren guns and 2-inch mortar ‘to keep them down.’ This artillery detachment seen moving towards Dieppe was, according to the German report, grouped with the reserve of 571 Infanterie Regiment consisting of ‘a cyclist platoon and patrols from the 1st Battalion.’ Meanwhile, A Company successfully located and destroyed an enemy mortar platoon, along with another horse-drawn mortar detachment that was moving forward to join the battle. But by around 0800 hours, the number of German reserves converging on Dieppe was growing significantly.

  With their original plan abandoned, the Camerons were planning to attack the Four Winds Farm from the rear when a radio message from Headquarters 6 Brigade was finally received at about 0900 hours. ‘Vanquish from Green Beach at 1030 hrs.’ ‘Vanquish’ was the code word for withdrawal, and it was to be via Pourville, rather than the main Dieppe beach as planned. What was going on in Dieppe? They all wondered.

  The Withdrawal from Green Beach

  The Cameron’s war diary reports:

  ‘The withdrawal commenced under heavy fire at 0930 hrs. The Pioneer Platoon and Support Platoon acted as a vanguard; flank protection was supplied by A Coy; C Coy fought the rear-guard action.

  ‘Enemy snipers harassed us but the main body was ably protected by the rear guard, whose casualties were heavy. We were soon under the protection of Bernouville Woods and a rapid withdrawal to Pourville was affected. Enemy machine-gun and mortar fire covering the road immediately south of Pourville inflicted further casualties upon us.’

  A photograph of the Coastal profile model as issued to the Saskatchewan.

  As they approached the defended perimeter, the Camerons were met by a platoon-sized patrol of Saskatchewans, who had been sent out to help them break clean and carry out a passage of lines into the Pourville beachhead. Arriving in the village at 0956 hours, they were informed that the LCAs ‘that were to take us off the beach would not be arriving until 1100 hrs’ rather than 1030 hours as previously advised. With this delay and the growing pressure from the German force that had followed them back to the beachhead, Major Orme decided to deploy A and B Companies to help the Saskatchewans stop the enemy advance onto the high ground west of Pourville.

  The net result of a delay in passing on information was that the Canadians abandoned the high ground to the west and withdrew prematurely because of time considerations based on faulty information. The Germans, despite belated attempts to check them, occupied positions overlooking Green Beach. This had a profound effect on the evacuation and caused the heavy casualties that the Saskatchewans and Camerons suffered during the withdrawal.

  The Saskatchewan’s withdrawal from below the RDF site and the slopes of the Four Winds Farm feature was potentially very difficult, and had to be carefully controlled if the men were not to break and run. War correspondent Wallace Reyburn was with Battalion Headquarters, and later wrote:

  ‘As we set off along the road to the promenade I heard Merritt’s voice, “Don’t run, men. Slope arms and march to the beach.” I saw the man in front of me shoulder his rifle and start marching. I’d been dashing forward in a crouching position, hoping that I’d be less of a target for the snipers but automatically I raised myself erect and marched with the other men around me.’

  Following behind Colonel Merritt’s men, the Germans occupied the Canadians’ abandoned positions and then pressed on downhill, but were halted by the SSR’s fire from the houses at the edge of Pourville. The two sides now engaged in a small-arms duel and, despite the Camerons’ earlier success in knocking out mortar positions, the volume of medium mortar bombs targeted at the town increased sharply.

  Colonel Stacey recorded that ‘At 1040 hrs Brigadier Mann informed Uxbridge that LCAs were “going to GREEN [Beach] PETER [Sector] for Cecil [SSRs] and Goose [Camerons]”. The first LCAs touched down on the beach at approximately1104 hours. Colonel Stacey continues:

  ‘The evidence of every witness is that as soon as the troops began to cross the beach, which due to the state of the tide was now 200 yards wide, a very heavy cross-fire... came down upon it. It appears that this fire included that of mortars, machine guns and small arms, and there is some evidence that there was shellfire also. Lieutenant Commander Prior [RN] had made very efficient preparations for evacuation, having the barbed wire cleared away and the casualties placed under cover ready to be removed. Some of the enemy prisoners, who were comparatively numerous in this area, were used as stretcher-bearers and did good work as such.’

  In spite of this, very few stretcher cases could be evacuated, and of the prisoners, only one was brought back to England. The Camerons reported that they suffered the majority of their casualties during the withdrawal phase. Bodies littered the beach as groups of men dashed across the fire-swept strand.

  The waiting landing craft, shrouded in protective smoke, broke cover and headed in to the beach. Ross Munro, who had earlier witnessed the disaster at Blue Beach, was with an LCA flotilla that was now dispatched to assist with the withdrawal from Green Beach.

  Pourville and the high ground to the west of Green Beach that was abandoned too soon.

  Canadian evacuees, mainly wounded, are transferred from an LCA to one of the destroyers.

  ‘The landing craft now were moving in on Pourville, scores of them circling slowly off shore and then turning in to the beach, many of them grounding before they got there. The S.S.R. and Camerons came across the beach through the machine-gun fire and raced for the boats. They brought all the casualties they could. They even brought some prisoners.

  ‘I was in an assault boat, which tried to go into Pourville; we got within three hundred yards of the beach when we were ordered along the coast to try to make the main beach and take off troops there. But I did get a glimpse of the Pourville evacuation.’

  On the beach, the Cameron’s Adjutant was attempting to control the re-embarkation of his battalion:

  ‘From this
moment on, the enemy machine guns and mortars ranged on the beach and brought down a murderous fire. One LCA, which was loaded, grounded on the beach, and the troops had to get out and push. It was shelled and one shell penetrated near the bow, making it unserviceable. The enemy machine guns took advantage and mowed down everybody in the vicinity. Another LCA was so badly damaged and was so overloaded that it capsized. This one unfortunately contained a number of casualties. Two LCAs managed to clear the beach successfully.

  ‘A few minutes later, one LCT and three more LCAs arrived. More troops were sent down, and again the enemy machine guns opened up, causing terrific casualties.’

  The view from seawards was no better. Ross Munro wrote:

  ‘It wasn’t any nice ordered sight. The boats were having trouble. Many of them were under direct machine-gun fire. Some were sinking, with troops leaping back into the water. Batches of Canadians were on the fringe of the town among some trees on the inside of the sea wall. Small groups of them hesitated there for a while; then they would leap over the sea wall to the beach and scatter for the run over the pebbles to the water and the boats. There was the hammering sound of German machine-guns, the occasional sharp whang of the mortars and the knock knock of the Brens. Smoke drifted over the beach in a long wispy trail as our craft turned for the main beach.’