My Share of the Task

by General Stanley McChrystal

  challenge Al Qaeda’s leadership: Leah Farrall, “How Al Qaeda Works,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2011).

  voluntarily sharing it with others: This point is made in Lamb and Munsing’s article about TF 16 in Iraq: “SOF Task Force personnel were directed to set the example by being first to give more information. They were told to ‘share until it hurts.’ As one commander explained it, ‘If you are sharing information to the degree where you think, “Holy cow, I am going to go to jail,” then you are in the right area of sharing.’ The point was to build trust, and information-sharing was the icebreaker.” Christopher J. Lamb and Evan Munsing, “Secret Weapon: High-Value Target Teams as an Organizational Innovation,” Strategic Perspectives (March 2011), 46.

  “He would create the market”: Nicolson, Seize the Fire, 45.

  a brigade-size force: Interview with task force member.

  broadband Internet and cell towers: This point is explored by Peter Bergen in his book The Longest War (Free Press, 2011), 162–63.

  technically illegal under Saddam: “Iraq Awards Mobile Phone Licenses,” BBC, October 6, 2003.

  spread after the American invasion: The Department of Defense indicated (through graphics) that as of June 1, 2004, there were about 500,000 subscribers; 1.5 million by January 1, 2005; and more than 3.5 million by August 31, 2005 (U.S. Department of Defense, “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq,” October 13, 2005, 16). Further data on cell phone and Internet usage in Iraq can be found on the World Bank’s “Data” website, which can generate a variety of metrics on the country. In 2004, it lists 574,000 cellular phone subscriptions and, interestingly, only 300,000 Internet users (1 percent of the population).

  had not been convinced: Interviews with three task force members.

  140 Iraqis were wounded: The details of this event and the casualty toll come from Edmund Sanders, “35 Children Die in Baghdad Bombings,” Los Angeles Times, October 1, 2004.

  barracks for our operators: Interview with Lieutenant General (retired) John Sattler.

  enlisted Prime Minister Allawi: Ibid.

  first week of November: The operation was originally planned for November 5 but was then changed to November 7. Kenneth Estes, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations in Iraq, 2003–2006” (occasional paper), United States Marine Corps History Division, 55.

  real attack from the north: Interview with Lt. Gen. Sattler.

  fortified the terrain: “Three hundred and six well-constructed defensive positions were identified, many of which were interlaced with improvised explosive devices (IEDs)” (John F. Sattler and Daniel H. Wilson, “The Battle of Fallujah—Part II,” Marine Corps Gazette, July 2005.)

  daisy-chain IEDs: Interview with Lt. Gen. Sattler.

  cut the power: Estes, “U.S. Marine Corps Operations,” 58.

  Zarqawi pledged: The message was posted on October 17, 2004, the third day of Ramadan. Jeffrey Pool, “Zarqawi’s Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda,” Terrorism Monitor, December 16, 2004.

  “our most generous brothers”: Translated by Pool in “Zarqawi’s Pledge of Allegiance to Al-Qaeda.”

  websites a few days later: Ibid.

  next door, in Iraq: Al Qaeda’s leadership had sounded the alarm over the looming Iraq war in 2002, and bin Laden had spoken of Iraq as the “new crusade” since 2003. See, for example, Osama bin Laden, “Quagmires of the Tigris and Euphrates (October 19, 2003),” in Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden, ed. Bruce Lawrence (Verso, 2005), 207–211.

  Muslims to wage jihad there: In January 2004, bin Laden said, “Before concluding, I urge the Muslim youths to carry out jihad, particularly in Palestine and Iraq.” Osama bin Laden, “Resist the New Rome (January 4, 2004)” in Messages to the World, 231.

  “regret it afterwards”: Osama bin Laden, “Depose the Tyrants (December 16, 2004)” in Messages to the World, 272.

  maintain their good work: “Osama bin Laden to the Iraqi People” (Special Dispatch no. 837), Middle East Media Research Institute, December 30, 2004.

  bin Laden had tied his own fate: To determine when this shift in focus occurred, Thomas Hegghammer examined Islamist Web forums and estimated the jump in interest occurred between April and September 2004. From that point on, Iraq dominated the concerns of the global jihadist movement. (Thomas Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism After the Iraq War,” Middle East Journal (Winter 2006), 20–21.

  CHAPTER 11: OUT WEST

  by the sandwich bar: Elliott D. Woods, “A Few Unforeseen Things,” Virginia Quarterly Review, Fall 2008, 6–31.

  bowing forward in silence: “Lion in the Village” (transcript), Anderson Cooper 360, CNN, March 1, 2007.

  past noon, he ignited: Ibid.

  Saudi medical student: Friends of the twenty-year-old Saudi medical student reported that insurgents in Iraq had contacted the man’s father, informing him that his son, who had withdrawn his tuition money and left his studies in Sudan for the jihad, had martyred himself in Iraq. Associated Press, “Report: Mess-Hall Bomber Was Saudi Student,” MSNBC website, January 3, 2005. The New Republic, examining the 430 martyr biographies in the jihadist text The Martyrs of the Land of the Two Rivers, found a description of al-Ghamidi: “And Ahmad Said Ahmad Al Ghamidi, also of Saudi Arabia, was studying medicine at Khartoum University when he broke off his studies and used his tuition money to go to Iraq.” Husain Haqqani and Daniel Kimmage, “Suicidology,” New Republic, October 3, 2005, 14.

  “Caravan of Martyrs”: Thomas Hegghammer, “Saudi Militants in Iraq: Backgrounds and Recruitment Patterns,” Norwegian Defense Research Establishment, February 5, 2007, 8.

  restoring the caliphate there: “[T]he recruitment message relies not primarily on complex theological arguments, but on simple, visceral appeals to people’s sense of solidarity and altruism.” Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security (Winter 2010–11), 90.

  three dozen agencies: Interviews with JIATF members.

  between 12,000 and 20,000 men: John F. Burns, “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail,” New York Times, June 5, 2005.

  with that stated intention: This is based on what became known as the “Sinjar records,” which indicated that 56 percent of foreign fighters were recruited to be, or joined with the intention of becoming, suicide bombers, while 42 percent came or were tasked to be fighters. Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, Al-Qai’da’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar Records (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, January 2, 2007), 18. Interviews with a number of task force members indicated that some of the foreign fighters picked up had been recruited to fight but upon arrival to Iraq were assigned martyrdom missions (at times against their desire). But interviews also indicated that there was likely similar cross-assignment, where the more talented recruits who came with a desire to be suicide bombers were diverted to positions that would keep them alive.

  see a template emerge: The path of recruitment and of the “ratline” is based upon my memory, as well as interviews with task force members involved in both intelligence and operations.

  if not thousands, of dollars: Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, “Becoming a Foreign Fighter: A Second Look at the Sinjar Records,” in Bombers, Bank Accounts, and Bleedout: Al Qa’ida’s Road in and out of Iraq, ed. Brian Fishman (Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, July 2008), 53.

  they had been treated: Felter and Fishman, Al-Qai’da’s Foreign Fighters, 25.

  how strong their relationships were: Translated versions of the filled-out questionnaires were released as part of the Sinjar records, and an English version is available on the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point website.

  USS Cole overslept: He “slept through the page on his phone that would have notified him to set up the camera.” Wright, Looming Tower, 361.

  Christmas Eve that
year: This man survived the attack, and his account can be found in the first chapter of Ken Ballen’s Terrorists in Love: The Real Lives of Islamic Radicals (Free Press, 2011), 3–44.

  openly doubted our assessment: My recollection of these meetings is aided by interviews with other participants.

  more than fifty named insurgent groups: Mohammed M. Hafez, Suicide Bombers in Iraq: The Strategy and Ideology of Martyrdom (United States Institute for Peace Press, 2007), appendix 1, 243–49. Other reports indicate around forty insurgent groups during the summer of 2005.

  old Saddam apparatchiks: “Its [MNF-I JIATF’s] mission was abruptly changed in November 2004 to the identification of former Ba’athists who posed a threat to the occupation, at which point its name changed to JIATF–Former Regime Elements.” Lamb and Munsing, Secret Weapon, 15.

  calling democracy heresy: “Zarqawi and Other Islamists to the Iraqi People: Elections and Democracy Are Heresy” (Special Dispatch no. 856), Middle East Research Institute, February 1, 2005.

  mentored a younger Zarqawi: Jean-Charles Brisard with Damien Martinez, Zarqawi: The New Face of al-Qaeda (Other Press, 2005), 43–44.

  other hard-line insurgent groups: The three groups—Ansar al-Sunnah, Islamic Army of Iraq, and the Jihad Warriors Army—said, we “call upon all Muslims zealous for their religion not to participate in this act of heresy” (Middle East Media Research Institute, “Zarqawi and Other Islamists”).

  “The martyr’s wedding”: Ibid.

  overran no election sites: Kenneth Katzman, “Iraq: Elections, Constitution, and Government,” Congressional Research Service, February 27, 2007, 2.

  freeze them into a minority role: A number of Sunni parties had boycotted the election since December 15, 2004. Max Sicherman, “Iraqi Elections: What, How, and Who,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 24, 2005.

  2 percent of the population: Michael Knights and Eamon McCarthy, “Provincial Politics in Iraq: Fragmentation or New Awakening?” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 2008, 6.

  secured a mere 17: Katzman, “Iraq: Elections, Constitution, and Government.”

  independently of the Coalition’s control: Matt Sherman, interviewed in “Gangs of Iraq,” Frontline, PBS, October 4, 2006.

  uniforms on Badr militiamen: Ken Silverstein, “The Minister of Civil War: Bayan Jabr, Paul Bremer, and the Rise of the Iraqi Death Squads,” Harper’s, August 2006, 67–73.

  more than sixty suicide bombings: Burns, “Iraq’s Ho Chi Minh Trail.”

  mangers for their sheep: James Janega, “Too Much Border, Not Enough Patrol,” Chicago Tribune, April 19, 2005.

  “featureless, a muddy brown”: Viscount William Slim, quoted in The War: 1939–1945, ed. Desmond Flower and James Reeves (Cassell, 1960), 198.

  South Carolina–size: Al-Anbar Awakening, vol. I, 10.

  attempted to breach the gate: Steve Fainaru, “The Grim Reaper, Riding a Firetruck in Iraq,” Washington Post, April 19, 2005.

  Marine lance corporal: An account of the young Marine’s actions can be found in Elliot Blair Smith, “Pa. Native Thwarts Car-Bomb Attack,” USA Today, April 17, 2005.

  flown to Germany: Dates and information on soldiers Jerak, Diesing, Shea, and Kolath can be found on the U.S. Army Special Operations Command “Memorial Wall” website.

  “A lot of emotion attached”: E-mail to Annie, August 28, 2005, 9:22 A.M.

  “Governments saw men”: T. E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, 199.

  proportion of the car bombings: Craig S. Smith, “U.S. Contends Campaign Has Cut Suicide Attacks,” New York Times, August 5, 2005.

  10 incidents killed 97 people: These figures were calculated using data from the NCTC’s Worldwide Incidents Tracking System database.

  had fought with the insurgency: Kirk Semple, “U.S. Forces Rely on Local Informants in Ferreting Rebels in West Iraq,” New York Times, December 10, 2005.

  AQI and another tribe: Ibid.

  female body parts commingling: “Al-Qa’eda in Iraq Alienated by Cucumber Laws and Brutality,” Telegraph, August 11, 2008.

  executed nine members: Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, “Insurgents Assert Control over Town Near Syrian Border,” Washington Post, September 6, 2006.

  “Islamic Republic of Al Qaim”: Ibid.

  “I’ve been able to do”: E-mail to Annie August 28, 2005, 6:54 P.M. (edited for punctuation).

  CHAPTER 12: THE HUNT

  head of the conference table: Details of this meeting and the dialogue are based upon my recollection but aided and confirmed by interviews with two individuals present at the meeting.

  excluded these Iraq officials: Interviews with two senior members of National Security Council staff.

  “being done to get him”: A memorandum with the subject “Meeting with POTUS” was sent from Donald Rumsfeld to General Dick Myers and Steve Cambone on May 19, 2005. It is available from the Rumsfeld Papers website.

  self-stated main effort: In audio tapes, bin Laden “characterized the insurgency in Iraq as the central battle in a ‘Third World War, which the Crusader-Zionist coalition began against the Islamic nation.’” Christopher M. Blanchard, “Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology,” Congressional Research Service, February 4, 2005, 5.

  brothers and seven sisters: The most definitive list of Zarqawi’s nine siblings and their ages can be found in Brisard, Zarqawi, 10, note 13. However, it is worth noting that, like many aspects of Zarqawi’s early biography, contradictory information exists. For example, one otherwise very accurate Los Angeles Times article claims Zarqawi was the “second of five children.” Megan K. Stack, “Zarqawi Took Familiar Route into Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, July 2, 2004.

  cemetery near his apartment: Fouad Hussein, “Al Zarqawi . . . The Second Generation of Al-Qai’da, Part 1,” Al-Quds-al’ Arabi, trans. by the Federal Broadcast Information Service.

  dropped out at age seventeen: Stack, “Zarqawi Took Familiar Route.”

  sweeping Zarqa’s brown streets: Eli Lake, “Base Jump,” New Republic, November 28 and December 5, 2005, 19.

  reputation for his temper: Jeffrey Gettleman, “Zarqawi’s Journey: From Dropout to Prisoner to an Insurgent Leader in Iraq,” New York Times, July 13, 2004.

  tattoos gave his skin: Stack, “Zarqawi Took Familiar Route.”

  case of attempted rape: Brisard, having reviewed Jordanian records on the matter, is most reliable on this event (Brisard, Zarqawi, 13–14).

  knife in a fight: Ibid., 13.

  strict Salafist bent: Zarqawi’s mother “enrolled him . . . at a mosque in Amman known for its Salafist stance.” Hala Jaber, “A Twisted Love,” Sunday Times, July 31, 2005.

  worked as a correspondent: Stack, “Zarqawi Took Familiar Route.”

  their heroic exploits: Gettleman, “Zarqawi’s Journey.”

  for use against Israel: Brisard, Zarqawi, 37.

  1994: Zarqawi was arrested and sent to Suwaqah in 1994, but his trial did not finish with sentencing until November 1996 (ibid., 43).

  spent in Jordanian prisons: He was eventually moved to Al-Salt and then Jafar prisons (ibid., 49).

  using hydrochloric acid: Ibid., 50.

  keep people in line: “He would attack us with his fists,” attested fellow prisoner Yousef Rababa, quoted in Gettleman, “Zarqawi’s Journey.”

  homemade weights: “Cellmates remember his barbells, made from pieces of bed frame and olive oil tins filled with rocks” (ibid.). This fact is also cited in Brisard, Zarqawi, 49.

  respect of his followers: Brisard, Zarqawi, 48–49.

  “just by moving his eyes”: Gettleman, “Zarqawi’s Journey.”

  Released in March 1999: Brisard, Zarqawi, 58–59.

  Jordanian wife in tow: Alissa J. Rubin, “Jordanian’s Mother Denies He Has Ties
to Terrorism,” Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2003.

  in Herat in 2000: Herat, near Iran, might also have produced or deepened Zarqawi’s bile toward Shiites; Saif al-Adl, quoted in Fouad Hussein’s biography of Zarqawi, indicates that the Shiites in Herat worked with the “opposition” to rout the jihadists once the American invasion began. Hussein, “Al Zarqawi, part 8.”

  married a second wife: “Al-Jazeera TV Investigates Iraqi Militant Al-Zarqawi’s Al-Qa’idah Links,” BBC Monitoring International Reports, July 2, 2004.

  informal relationship with bin Laden: Reportedly, Al Qaeda’s insistence on making war with the United States was a barrier to Zarqawi’s pledging his full allegiance to bin Laden when invited to do so in 2000. It is also possible that bin Laden’s forbidding Zarqawi from teaching Maqdisi’s texts was a nonstarter. Vahid Brown, Cracks in the Foundation: Leadership Schisms in al-Qa’ida 1989–2006 (Combating Terrorism Center, January 2, 2007), 19–20.

  a set of broken ribs: Saif al-Adl in Hussein, “Al Zarqawi, part 8.”

  was on Zarqawi’s mind: Ibid.

  line to Zarqawi himself: Interviews with task force members implied that by being an Iraq-wide player in the insurgency, Abu Zar was more likely linked to AQI senior leadership.

  shrine on the other side: Robert F. Worth, “950 Die in Stampede on Baghdad Bridge,” New York Times, September 1, 2005.

  Some drowned: Dan Murphy, “Panic of Terror Sparks Human Tragedy in Iraq,” Christian Science Monitor (reprinted in USA Today), September 1, 2005.

  that many were injured: Casualty figures are from “Iraqis Bury Victims of Baghdad Stampede,” New York Times, September 1, 2005.

  of sectarian paranoia: A rumor spread that the pilgrims had been poisoned. As Robert Worth noted, “Shiite Muslims believe that Imam Kadhim was poisoned by agents of Harun al-Rashid, the Sunni caliph, in the late eighth century, and history often merges with the present among religious pilgrims here” (Worth, “950 Die in Stampede”).

  tragically entrenched: And yet even against Zarqawi’s encroaching dark dream for Iraq, a few defiant heroes stood out: A young Sunni man, nineteen years old, heard calls from a local mosque to help people drowning in the nearby Tigris, ran to the river, and ferried out Shia victims until he had exhausted himself, drowning in the water. “Sunni Rescuer Hailed as a Hero,” BBC, September 5, 2005.