Six Days of War

by Michael B. Oren

  It is quite clear that the current success of the Israeli military effort has had the fundamental and lasting effect of convincing Israelis of all walks of life that this is the opportunity for them to move from the restricted status of semi and temporary acceptance which has characterized the first 19 years of Israel’s existence to a condition of complete and entire nationhood enjoying all the attributes of other independent states…They will insist on moving from a cease-fire direction to the conclusion of final peace treaties with their neighbors.

  Ambassador Barbour wrote glowingly of the IDF’s “stunning military success” and the “brave new world” it opened for both the U.S. and Israel.

  By the evening of June 7, however, the first cracks in the presumed U.S.-Israel consensus had emerged. Israeli officials were no longer eschewing all claims on their new acquisitions, but suggesting the need for some permanent IDF presence in Gaza and Sharm al-Sheikh, and for broadening the country’s narrow waist opposite Jordan. Dayan was already floating the idea of an autonomous Palestinian state in the West Bank, federally linked to Israel. Most contentiously, Israeli rulers appeared united in declaring the “liberation” of Jerusalem irreversible. “As a Jew and as a citizen of Israel, it is clear to me that Jerusalem belongs entirely to Israel,” stated Israel’s ambassador to Rome, Ehud Avriel, to Cardinal Dellacava of the Holy See, “that fact was determined a thousand years before Christianity and 2000 before Islam, and the Vatican had better find a way of reconciling itself to it.” The Bank of Israel moved to establish a $50 million fund for West Bank development, and raised the idea of purchasing the Sinai Peninsula, much as the United States had purchased Alaska and Louisiana.20

  Intimations of these changes invariably reached the White House, where they aroused the concern of Dean Rusk. “If we do not make ourselves attorneys for Israel, we cannot recoup our losses in the Arab world,” he told a meeting of the NSC. Specifically, he was willing to represent Israel’s demands for full peace treaties with the Arab states, as well as American ideas for arms controls agreements and a solution to the refugee problem. But in return for such advocacy, the secretary insisted on Israeli agreement to withdraw from all the occupied Arab territories. He informed his ambassadors that “we wish to convey the conviction that the territorial integrity and political independence of the Arab states are just as important to all of us as the security of Israel.”

  The potential for friction between the U.S. and Israel was still far from the president’s focus, however. More immediate was the need to counter the Big Lie—disseminating reports on Egypt’s use of poison gas in Yemen was one method considered—and to take precautions against any Arab oil boycott. Johnson was also eager to exploit his support for Israel’s war aims to convince American Jews (“Doves for War,” one aide called them) to support his own in Vietnam. Most pressing, though, was the need to watch the Soviets’ reactions and not be lulled into passiveness. “I can’t believe the USSR is just going to walk away from this,” the commander in chief admitted to the NSC. “I’m not sure we’re out of our troubles.”21

  While American policy makers planned for a new world of peace in the Middle East, the old world concluded its third day of war. At dusk, Israeli troops entered Bethlehem after hardly firing a shot. In Manger Square, they were greeted by cheering and shopkeepers rushing to sell them souvenirs. “We broke into the police station and prepared to get some sleep,” Rafi Benvenisti, the Jerusalem Brigade officer, reminisced. “Suddenly, an old man was brought in and tole me, ‘the elders and notables of the city are waiting to receive the conqueror of Bethlehem.” Benvenisti was taken to the Church of Nativity—one of the few buildings damaged, four shells having hit its roof—and into a candle lit chamber where churchmen and family heads waited. “I assured them that they had nothing to fear, that we had come in peace. They were in shock and so was I. Then everybody simply went home.”

  A less hospitable reception awaited Uri Ram’s men as they entered Nablus, a city of 80,000—the biblical capital of the Samaritans. Ram recalled how “thousands of people stood applauding and waving white handkerchiefs, and we, in all innocence, responded to them with smiles …There was perfect order in the city; no signs of panic at all.” That is until one of the Israeli soldiers tried to disarm a member of the local National Guard. Only then did the onlookers realize that the troops were not Iraqi, as they had originally thought, but Israelis. “In an instant the streets were empty and the sniping began.”

  From the Nablus area, forces of the Peled Ugdah turned east and then south to meet up with elements of the Harel Brigade, heading north. By midnight, all four bridges across the Jordan River had been occupied. Dayan ordered that they be demolished, demonstrating that the West Bank had been physically severed from the East.22

  The battles in the West Bank were winding to a close, but those in Sinai were just reaching their climax. The task force under Yisrael Granit, proceeding virtually unopposed from al-’Arish, reached Romani, the Egyptian village closest to the Canal. Other elements of Tal’s Ugdah meanwhile raced for the passes, which the Egyptians, in contrast to their abandonment of the coastal road, had resolved to defend with the returning 4th Division. Near midnight, advanced elements of the 4th—sixty T-55’s—collided with thirty of Tal’s AMX tanks west of Bir Gafgafa. Three of the far lighter AMX’s burst instantly into flames along with eight half-tracks, one of which was laden with ammunition. Twenty Israelis were killed, including a company commander, Maj. Shamai Kaplan, before the rest of the column retired.

  Yet, even as the Egyptians made a bold stand against Tal, Yoffe’s tanks were approaching the entrance to the Mitla Pass. A detachment of nine Centurions, perilously low on fuel—four had to be towed by the others—and their crews exhausted, reached the entrance to the pass before sunset. There they arranged wrecks of Egyptian vehicles in such a way as to channel the retreating army directly into their guns.23 Though vastly outnumbered, this tiny force controlled the single escape route through which three Egyptian divisions—300 tanks and over 30,000 men—were soon to stumble.

  THE WAR: DAY FOUR, JUNE 8

  Israeli coups de gràce.

  A fatal accident.

  Nasser capitulates and the Syrians wait.

  The fourth day of the third Arab-Israeli war began with a series of explosions in the Jordan Valley. Packing them with captured Jordanian mortar shells—explosives were in short supply—the Israelis destroyed the bridges over the Jordan River. Providing cover for the IDF engineers, elements of the Harel Brigade crossed to the East Bank and set off a new burst of panic in Amman. “For God’s sake, get them to stop!” Hussein implored Findley Burns. Thirty Israeli tanks were tearing through the northern part of the country, the king claimed; they were already shelling Ramtha.

  A similar plea was made to the British but, disgusted by Hussein’s continuing support for the Big Lie, neither they nor the Americans were eager to rush to his aid. The king was forced to fall back on his own resources, meager as these had become. Of the eleven brigades fielded at the beginning of the war, only four were still functional. The remnants of Jordan’s army—elements of the Yarmuk and al-Husseini Brigades, the Royal Guard, and the five surviving tanks of the 60th Brigade—joined with Iraqi units to protect the western approaches of Amman and the Golan’s southern slopes. There seemed little chance of their success, though, or even their survival, if the Israeli juggernaut advanced.1

  But there was no Israeli attack, no armored thrust, even feinted, toward Amman. On the contrary, IDF forces along the Jordan had deployed in a defensive alignment in anticipation of a Jordanian counteroffensive. “And so at the end of four days’ fighting,” Uzi Narkiss, at a postwar briefing, concluded, “Central Command fulfilled its natural aspirations and established Israel’s border on the Jordan.” The sense of accomplishment was tempered by an appreciation of the price: 200 Israelis killed, 144 of them paratroopers. If unimpressed with the inability of Jordanian commanders to adapt to changing circumstances, Israelis re
tained their respect for the Jordanians. An internal IDF report concluded that the enemy “demonstrated courage and determination, especially in Jerusalem, where he fought to the last in isolated bunkers.” The marker placed by Israel over the grave of those Jordanians killed at Ammunition Hill extolled their singular bravery.

  The consolidation of Israel’s position on the West Bank—rather than its expansion into the East—soon became evident to the Jordanians as well. While Amman remained unscathed, Israeli troops invested Hebron, site of the biblical Cave of the Patriarchs. The Arab residents, fearful the Israelis would exact revenge for the 1929 massacre of the city’s Jewish community, were quick to hang white sheets from their windows and to voluntarily surrender their weapons. The war on the West Bank was over. Writing from the Jordanian perspective, historian Samir Mutawi defined the moment: “By midday on 8 June, Jordan was once again the Transjordan of [King] Abdullah, while Israel completed the total occupation of historical Palestine.”2

  The question of not only when the war would stop but where had also become predominant on the southern front. Fighting had reached full intensity by dawn as thousands of Egyptians rushed toward the Mitla and Giddi Passes in the hope of reaching the Suez Canal. “Thirty-six enemy planes have attacked us in succession,” Maj. Gen.al-Ghul, the 4th Division commander, reported to ‘Amer. “Our tanks, artillery, and anti-aircraft guns are burnt. Communications with the rear headquarters have been cut, and those with armored brigade as well. We’re under attack right now!” Murtagi also called in: “I believe that we must destroy the passes at once, after our forces have crossed the Canal.”‘Amer asked both Fawzi and Land Forces Commander Lt. Gen. Muhsin where to draw the final defense line, west or east of the Canal. Both agreed with Murtagi. ‘Amer issued the order, one of his last of the war: “All forces to defend the Canal from the west. The passes leading to the Canal are to be demolished, though not the Canal itself, pending further instructions. The air force will cover our forces’ retreat during the night of June 8-9.”

  Neither task, destroying the passes or fording the Canal, would prove easy, however. Aided by an unremitting IAF, a few Israeli tanks continued to block the entrances to the canyons, turning them into deadly culs-de-sac. “All tanks, trucks, guns and equipment east of the passes were demolished, and 10,000 men lost their lives on that day alone,” wrote Mahmoud Riad. “Many others died of hunger and thirst.” Forward Israeli spotters worked feverishly to pick out enemy from friendly forces, so completely were the two intermixed. The slaughter continued until mid-morning, when Israeli pilots were ordered to cease destroying Egyptian vehicles so that they might be captured undamaged.

  At least 100 Egyptian tanks had been destroyed at the passes, and another 60 east of Nakhl, along with 400 guns and innumerable vehicles. An entire SAM-2 missile battery was taken, intact. No longer able to provide for prisoners, however, the Israelis directed capitulating Egyptians toward the Canal. “There were crowds of Egyptians with weapons running about wildly,” Col. Jackie Even, a tank commander, later testified. “I told myself, ‘hold on, there’s going to be a massacre here, with both sides shooting. So I ordered everyone, ‘no killing soldiers. Try to catch them and then let them go so that they’ll spread the word that the Israelis won’t kill them, just send them home.” Only officers were taken into custody, to be traded for Israeli pilots shot down behind enemy lines. Among the hundreds of high-ranking commanders captured was Maj. Gen. Salah Yaqut, chief of Egyptian artillery, who surrendered to a disabled Israeli tank.

  Such scenes repeated themselves far to the east, in the wastes between Nakhl and al-Thamad, where Col. Mendler’s column drove elements of the Shazli Force and the Egyptian 6th Division straight into an ambush laid by Arik Sharon.

  “We’re on their heels,” Aharon Yariv, the IDF intelligence chief, reported to Harry McPherson, adding that Egypt had lost as much as 70 percent of its armored force. But with the destruction of the Egyptian army now irrefutable the issue arose of just how far the IDF would pursue its remnants. Rabin informed the cabinet that the IDF “had no problem reaching the Canal,” and merely needed the approval of the defense minister. But while the defense minister was eager to complete Nasser’s downfall—he proposed bombing Cairo airport as a further means of hastening it—he was just as anxious to keep clear of Suez. “I will personally court-martial any Israeli commander who touches the banks of the Canal,” he threatened. Yet the pace of battle would soon outstrip even those who ostensibly controlled it, including Moshe Dayan.3

  Yoffe’s tanks, having effectively blocked the passes, were now chasing those Egyptian forces that had managed to slip through. To the north, Col. Gonen and the 7th Brigade overwhelmed al-Ghul’s advance guard of T-55 tanks, destroying forty of them. Having lost over 50 percent of its equipment, the Egyptian 4th Division was again retreating toward the Firdan Bridge, with Gonen’s men in close pursuit. Also racing for the bridge was Col. Granit’s column, which had turned inland from the coast on the road to Qantara.

  Israeli forces were closing in on the Canal, in spite of standing orders to remain at least twelve miles distant from it. Ostensibly, the reason was pursuit—the need to complete the destruction of Egypt’s army and to prevent it from regrouping—but another, more visceral, motivation was involved. Spectacular though they were, the battles in Sinai had been overshadowed by the millennial liberation of Jerusalem. “The Temple Mount is in our hands,” Gen. Gavish purportedly bemoaned to his officers, “We’ve lost the glory.” Some of that glory could now be regained, however, along the banks of the Suez Canal.

  Whether in the West Bank or in Sinai, Israeli offensives had been determined less by design than by expediency. The old army adage “When in the field, improvise,” had been applied in the extreme, luring IDF forces farther than either military planners or civilian officials foresaw. “The Israeli government never set specific goals for the war,” recalled Rehavam Ze’evi, the deputy operations chief. “The objectives rose from the bottom up, from the military to the political echelon. Only after the war did the government draw circles around our accomplishments and declare that these were its original goals.”4 Ze’evi’s observation may have held for the fighting on the southern and eastern fronts, but in one theater the government was determined to exercise control. The Cabinet, not the army, would decide when, and whether, to strike Syria.

  The Golan Looms

  “[The] Syrian shelling of kibbutzim and settlements in Israel has been continuous and incessant,” Barbour cabled the National Security Council on the morning of June 8. “Some kibbutzim have been completely leveled above ground.” He stressed the Syrians’ ongoing preparations for war—“[They] have made no, repeat no, reply to call for a cease-fire”—and predicted that the IDF would once again act preemptively, penetrating Syria to a depth of twelve miles. “In the circumstances, I would not—repeat not—be surprised if the reported Israeli attack does take place or has already done so.”

  Barbour’s assessment was only partially correct, however. Syrian guns were maintaining their bombardment of Galilee farms—forty-eight of them were hit—and Damascus Radio continued to proclaim far-reaching victories in the north, including the liberation of Acre and Nazareth. The Syrians had condemned the abandonment of the West Bank, blaming it on “Jordanian reactionaries,” and were pressuring Lebanese President Charles Helou and Prime Minister Rashid Karame to actively enter the war. But while Lebanese generals successfully resisted this pressure, the Syrian army itself remained hunkered down in its bases. Its official record read: “The Ground Forces Headquarters could not take any decision regarding a general or local offensive because of the complicated situation at the front and because of the unwillingness of the reserve brigades to fight. Therefore, it decided to keep low on the ground, and concentrate its artillery fire, to use anti-aircraft fire to the maximum and watch closely the enemy’s movements.” Incessantly bombarded, intimidated by rumors of Israeli invasions, Suweidani and other senior officers retired to Damasc
us. Yasser Arafat, leading a guerrilla group to the Golan front, found the roads entirely empty. Syria, he later concluded, had signed a secret pact with Israel.5

  The Syrians had no intention of invading but neither, officially, did Israel. Though public opinion strongly supported a Golan offensive—“The time has come to settle accounts with those who started it all,” the daily Ha’aretz clamored, “to finish the job”—the government still resisted it. The decisive victories on the Egyptian and Jordanian fronts seemed only to harden that opposition as the Ministerial Defense Committee again met on Israel’s northern question.

  “It [attacking Syria] will bring down the whole world on our heads,” contended Zalman Aran. “I’m against accepting the cease-fire just to violate it later.” Supporting him were the National Religious representatives, Haim Moshe Shapira and Zorach Warhaftig, while Yigal Allon was, as usual, opposed. Arguing that capturing the Heights was the only way of eliminating the Syrian threat, Allon suggested that Israel need not occupy the area, but could give it to the local Druze as an independent state. The army weighed in with Allon, as Bar-Lev later attested, “If the Syrians got away unscathed, the general staff believed, they would continue their policies and would not be deterred by our victories in the south and the east.”

  Between those in favor and those opposed to attacking Syria, the prime minister tread a middle path. No less eager to acquire the Banias and to silence the Syrian guns, Eshkol was also aware of the dangers. “I’m sorry that Syria received so little, but I know that this issue could entangle us with Russia.” The deciding vote fell once again to Dayan.