Siege of Khe Sanh

by Robert Pisor

  42 “the win phase”: Soldier, p. 142.

  43 “a Caucasian arrogance”: Halberstam, Brightest, p. 541.

  44 “firepower, mobility, and flexibility”: Soldier, p. 150.

  44 “the first team”: Halberstam, Brightest, p. 541.

  44 A thumbed copy of . . . Street Without Joy: Soldier, p. 277.

  44 France had been able: The account of Groupement Mobile 100’s dying comes from Fall, Street, pp. 185–250, and Fehrenbach, pp. 414–15, 475.

  47 “medical problems”: Report, pp. 269–70.

  49 “Are we fighting the Russians?”: Soldier, p. 23.

  49 “Good God, . . . our cause is lost!”: Samuel Eliot Morison, The Oxford History of the American People (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), p. 225.

  50 “I hoped . . . would extend the nation’s staying power”: Soldier, p. 295.

  50 “a bolt of ribbon wins many battles”: Soldier, p. 304.

  50 “mail from home . . . and hot meals”: Report, p. 147, and Soldier, p. 269.

  52 “Courvoisier, at $1.80 a fifth”: Herbert, p. 130.

  52 But firepower: Firepower statistics and technological advances come from Westmoreland’s Report and Soldier, and from the excellent Air War—Vietnam, by Frank Harvey. Lewallen, and Littauer, also provided helpful information.

  53 “expensive in dollars but cheap in life”: Graff, p. 82.

  53–60 Westmoreland seeded: Nearly all of the material in this section is drawn from the Department of the Army study, Cedar Falls-Junction City: A Turning Point, by Lieutenant General Bernard William Rogers, henceforth Cedar. Jonathan Schell wrote about this same operation in The Village of Ben Suc.

  55 “They were human moles”: Soldier, p. 55.

  55 “scorched earth”: Soldier, p. 40.

  56 “the people are strongly xenophobic”: Soldier, p. 53 and 152.

  56 “the village of Ben Suc no longer existed”: Cedar, p. 41.

  57 “even a crow . . . will have to carry lunch”: Cedar, p. 73.

  57 “What we need . . . is more bombs”: Ellsberg, p. 234.

  57 “Think big”: Cedar, p. 15 and 83.

  59 “[Your] commanders disgraced themselves”: Cedar, p. 135.

  60 “Viet Cong units have the recuperative powers of the phoenix”: Halberstam, Brightest, p. 464 (citing Pentagon Papers).

  60 “I never thought it would go on like this”: Brightest, p. 633.

  61 “the count . . . erred on the side of caution”: Soldier, p. 273.

  61 “Any American commander . . . would have been sacked”: Soldier, p. 25.

  61 “uncommonly adept at slithering away”: Soldier, p. 100.

  61 “vastly more desirable . . . fight in remote areas”: Report, p. 132.

  62 “Digging the guerrillas out”: U.S. Marines—1966, p. 8.

  62 “Rattling around the . . . border held nothing good for our side”: Marshall, West, p. ix.

  63 “If we avoided battle, we would never succeed”: Soldier, p. 150.

  63 “if considerably more American troops can be obtained”: Soldier, p. 227–28.

  66 decoy: Marshall offers several extraordinary examples of North Vietnamese soldiers sacrificing themselves to set up Americans for the kill; the Khe Sanh battle would provide more.

  67 “A sense of despair”: Pearson, p. 94.

  67 “We are very definitely winning”: “End of the Vietnam War in Sight?” U.S. News and World Report, August 12, 1967 and September 11, 1967.

  67 “never-ending searches”: Soldier, p. 207.

  67 Con Thien: The story of Con Thien is from Pearson, and from Soldier.

  68 “It was Dienbienphu in reverse”: Soldier, p. 204.

  68 “We killed some . . . as they came over the top”: Interview at Loc Ninh.

  69 lost . . . at A Shau: The driest account of the fall of A Shau appears in Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, pp. 92–95.

  69 Loc Ninh: The story of Loc Ninh comes from newspaper accounts of the period; Hay, Tactical Innovations, pp. 42–56; Kelly, Special Forces, pp. 127–33; and my own reporting.

  71 “you made it look too easy”: Hay, p. 56.

  71 “I have doubts he can hang on”: “In a Military Sense, the War is Just About Won,” Washington Star, Nov. 7, 1967.

  71 Sgt. Vu Hong: Albright, Seven, p. 87.

  71 camp at Dak To: The story of Dak To comes from newspaper accounts of the period, the author’s reporting, and Hay, pp. 78–96.

  71 “You can ring a bell”: Chaisson, Oral History, p. 127.

  72 “It looked like Charlie had . . . nuclear weapons”: Bernard Weinraub, “Tense Dak To G.I.s Hunt Elusive Foe,” New York Times, November 17, 1967, p. 1.

  73 “a classic example of allied superiority”: Hay, p. 78.

  73 “Is it a victory?”: Chaisson, p. 121.

  73 “The NVA is sucking . . . American forces away”: quoted in Peter R. Kann, “Value and Price in Battle of Dak To,” Wall Street Journal, Nov. 28, 1967, p. 1.

  73 “entice the Americans close to the . . . border and bleed them without mercy”: Warner, Certain Victory, p. 134.

  74 “A unit might be ‘lured’ ”: Soldier, p. 147 and 194.

  74 “A boxer faces problems”: Report, p. 133.

  74 “The war was going well”: Soldier, p. 315; Report, p. 135.

  75 “delusion”: Soldier, p. 235.

  75 President Johnson had received: The uncertain, changing mood of the people in the United States is captured best in Oberdorfer, Tet!, pp. 77–114.

  76 “I was confident”: Soldier, p. 22.

  77 “the advantage of nearby sanctuaries”: Report, p. 138.

  77 “there was no way Giap could win”: Soldier, p. 405.

  77 “we are definitely winning this war”: Stewart Alsop. “Will Westmoreland Elect Johnson?” Saturday Evening Post, Jan. 13, 1968.

  77 “many frustrations”: Soldier, p. 261.

  78 “the instrument of his army’s downfall”: Soldier, p. 261.

  78 “I had no illusions”: Soldier, p. 339.

  3. IN THE TIME BEFORE THE WAR

  For details about civilian life in Khe Sanh, I am especially indebted to Carolyn Miller who worked with her husband for six years at Khe Sanh to create a written Bru language so the Montagnards could read the New Testament. The Millers spent nearly fourteen years in Vietnam learning the spoken vocabulary of the Bru, writing down the words, training literacy teachers, helping the mountain people learn to read and write—and all the while, translating the New Testament into Bru. War drove them from Khe Sanh, but they continued their work for seven more years in Banmethuot, a city hundreds of miles to the south. The Millers and their five-year-old daughter were captured in the final North Vietnamese offensive of 1975, and they spent a difficult eight months in captivity. Mrs. Miller wrote about the ordeal in Captured! (Christian Herald Books, Chappaqua, N.Y., 1977). The Millers now live near Kota Kinabalu, in East Sabah, Malaysia, where they have undertaken another language project.

  Some information about the early years at Khe Sanh was also gleaned from a tale told by Francois Pelou, a French news correspondent in Vietnam, as recorded by Oriana Fallaci in Nothing, and So Be It, pp. 224–28.

  PAGE

  89 “If I were General Giap”: Shaplen, Road from War, p. 94.

  89 “not a shot . . . fired in anger”: U.S. Marines—1966, pp. 82–83, and Shaplen, Road from War, pp. 93–100.

  90 “it would be too isolated”: Chaisson, Oral History, pp. 371–74.

  90 “you . . . haven’t lost a damn thing”: U.S. Marines—1966, p. 109.

  90 “with a shoe in your tail”: U.S. Marines—1966, p. 109.

  91 “someone will be hurt”: Miller letters.

  92 “setting out honey to attract flies”: Fallaci, Nothing, p. 226. Hill Fights: Marine Corps Operations—1967, p. 124.

  92 “The NVA are excellent troops”: Stubbe, p. 131.

  93 the Lang Vei . . . camp: Albright, Seven, pp. 109–110, and Stubbe, pp. 122–23.
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  93 Jeane Dixon: Stubbe, p. 169.

  93 airfield had been badly damaged: Nalty, Air Power, p. 8.

  94 “one horrendous ambush”: Tompkins, Oral History, p. 17.

  94 a strike into Laos: Nalty, p. 104.

  94 “most magnificent bunker you ever laid eyes on”: Tompkins, Oral History, pp. 26–27.

  95 “something mysterious about those wretches”: Tompkins, p. 34. (Army and Marine officers were stunned by the opulence of Green Beret team houses—which often featured excellent furnishings, a wet bar, refrigerators, movie projectors, and whole libraries of paperback books and pornographic movies. The Green Berets figured that since they lived closest to death, they might as well live highest on the hog.)

  96 “Khe Sanh . . . remembered in American history”: Stubbe, p. 589.

  96 “We don’t have our eyes!”: Stubbe, p. 634.

  97 “I’m getting worried”: Tompkins, Oral History, p. 16, see also Simmons, Marine Corps Operations—1968, p. 295.

  97 “We’re going to Laos”: Stubbe, p. 684.

  98 “[We] had to play this thing very delicately”: Charleton, p. 143.

  98 “Things are picking up”: Stubbe, p. 800.

  98 Khe Sanh Village: The picture of Khe Sanh Village on the eve comes from Stubbe, and from Miller letters.

  99 “a spy for them”: Miller letter.

  99 “very tempting for the Viet Cong”: Fallaci, Nothing, p. 225.

  101 “If I ever had to pay protection money”: Miller letter.

  102 six men appeared: the killing of the NVA officers: In Comments, Marine Major Harper L. Bohr Jr. asserts that a regimental commander was not among the dead, but he still believes one of the bodies was Chinese—“too big and too non-VC looking.”

  103 “hostile units . . . materializing . . . south of the DMZ”: Nalty, p. 14; Major Jerry E. Hudson in Comments; and Pearson, p. 29.

  103 “an undeniable opportunity”: Pearson, p. 30. (Chaisson, Oral History, p. 374, says: “We didn’t think they’d have the Guts to mass a couple of divisions—to take a chance on what we could do them, even through cloud cover, with bombing.”)

  104 “very hazardous business”: Electronic Battlefield, p. 89.

  104 “They’re going to attack”: Stubbe, p. 734.

  105 “It was essential that the hills . . . remain in the hands of the Marines”: Shore, p. 31.

  105 Captain Daloney: preparations at Khe Sanh: Shore, pp. 32–33; Stubbe, Tompkins, Nalty and Pearson.

  107 truck traffic inside . . . Laos: Pearson, p. 30.

  108 the agonized scream of someone hurt: Electronic Battlefield, p. 34.

  109 the movie schedule: Stubbe, p. 753.

  4. “HERE THEY COME!”

  PAGE

  110 First Lieutenant La Than Tonc: The extraordinary gift of Lieutenant La Than Tonc emerges from military writings as one of the most spectacular intelligence coups of the Vietnam war. The story, with new details in every telling, appears in Westmoreland’s autobiography, in General Tompkins’ interviews with the Marines’ oral history researchers, in Shore (pp. 39–45), and even years later in testimony before Congress (Electronic Battlefield). Once again the Reverend Ray Stubbe was writing everything down in his diary; he even talked with the two sergeants who interrogated the defector.

  The North Vietnamese defector would have been instantly shredded by flechette rounds if he had sneezed as he walked toward the jittery Marines; he lived to tell a story that influenced U.S. military movements and thinking for months.

  110 he seemed so eager: Comments (Lt. Col. James Wilkinson).

  111 “We had nothing to lose”: Stubbe, pp. 771–72.

  111 “a detailed description of the coming offensive”: Shore, p. 39.

  113 “He . . . gave a wealth of information”: Swearengen, “Siege,” p. 24.

  114 “the enemy will soon seek victories”: Soldier, p. 319.

  114 “reminiscent of Dienbienphu”: Kelly, “U.S. Watches,” Washington Star, January 21, 1968.

  115 pounded Hill 861: Shore, pp. 39–41; Swearengen; Comments; and Stubbe, pp. 780–81.

  117 In a colossal explosion: Most Marines who served at the combat base measured time from “when the ammo dump went.” The story is vividly told in nearly every source.

  118 “extreme combat fatigue”: Comments (Major Kenneth W. Pipes, who was commander of Bravo Company).

  119 they could not find the enemy guns: Shore, pp. 43–44.

  120 “We were never able to silence the [enemy guns]”: Electronic Battlefield, p. 83.

  121 lost ninety-eight percent of his ammunition: Nalty, p. 25.

  121 “critical, to say the least”: Comments.

  5. “I DON’T WANT ANY DAMN DINBINFOO”

  President Johnson’s declaration to the Joint Chiefs of Staff about “Dinbinfoo” was captured in Texan phonetics by Michael Herr, in Dispatches, p. 105.

  The influence of the 1954 battle on American military planning, thinking and deployment throughout the 1960s is evident in the sources cited below. The fixation of the President and Westmoreland on Khe Sanh comes from Johnson’s The Vantage Point, Doris Kearns’ Lyndon Johnson and the American Dream, and Westmoreland’s Report and Soldier. For military details in this chapter and in others, I relied in part on two publications of the armed services: The War in the Northern Provinces, 1966–1968, by Lieutenant General Willard Pearson, and Air Power and the Fight for Khe Sanh, by Bernard C. Nalty.

  PAGE

  123 Captain Larry Budge: Furgurson, p. 14.

  124 Everyone . . . thought about Dienbienphu: Herr, Dispatches, pp.99–100.

  124 “Your rifles had better be clean”: Ellsberg, p. 288.

  125 “we don’t want any Dienbienphus, not one”: Marshall, Monsoon, p. 233.

  126 The President . . . had become insecure, fearful: Kearns, p. 256.

  126 “the Communists are preparing for a maximum military effort”: Johnson, p. 371.

  127 “intend to reenact a new Dienbienphu”: Schandler, p. 86.

  127 “Kamikaze tactics”: Johnson, p. 379.

  128 sand table thoughtful guesses . . . : “How the Battle for Khe Sanh Was Won,” Time, April 17, 1968.

  128 too costly . . . helicopters: Nalty, p. 56.

  128 the Laotians were gone: Bits of the Laotians’ sad story can be found in Shore, Comments; and Albright, Seven.

  129 “casualties [would be] too numerous” Nalty, p. 25.

  129 “a guaranteed one thousand casualties—fast”: This was the consensus of Marine officers at Khe Sanh, determined by Associated Press correspondent John Wheeler, who spent much of the siege at Khe Sanh. Interview, August 1978.

  129 Dabney . . . lost twenty more: records of Third Battalion, 26th Marines.

  129 “create another Dienbienphu”: Westmoreland letter to Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, Comments.

  130 “unalterably opposed”: Nalty, pp. 68–70.

  130 “There is no doubt”: the emphases are in the original Chaisson, Oral History, p. 134.

  131 Sharp suggesting he withdraw: Nalty, p. 68.

  131 “knew the terrain intimately”: Tompkins, Oral History, pp. 19–20.

  131 One Nine: Shore, p. 48.

  132 “We’re surrounded”: Stubbe, pp. 803–4.

  133 “show of strength”: Westmoreland cable to Sharp, January 22, 1968.

  135 “Give me some . . . stouthearted men”: Dabney interview.

  135 head count: Stubbe, p. 815.

  137 A surprise landing: Schandler, p. 89, and Oberdorfer, p. 173.

  137 war with North Korea: The compounding tension of these days in early 1968 may have been captured best in the Chronology of Tet!, pp. 337–51. Don Oberdorfer’s daily, sometimes hourly, catalogue of events gives the pell-mell pace of the times.

  138 “I couldn’t stand it any more”: Kearns, p. 271.

  139 “We’ll just go on bleeding them”: Westmoreland speech to editors of the Associated Press, cited, in Simmons, U.S. Marines—1967, p. 123
.

  139 “Khe Sanh commands the approaches”: Report, p. 162.

  140 “I believed we could do all these things”: Report, p. 163.

  140 “the only logical thing to do”: U.S. Marines—1968, p. 296.

  140 It was the only time: Others say that President Johnson called Westmoreland, and even Lownds, by direct telephone, but Westmoreland asserts this was the only time he ever talked to the President from Saigon.

  141 The President asked tougher questions: Max Frankel caught Mr. Johnson’s hands-on approach to the Khe Sanh battle in “White House: Ultimate Command Post,” New York Times, February 10, 1968, p. 1.

  141 Every day, Westmoreland: Oberdorfer, p. 172, and Nalty, p. 17.

  141 Westmoreland . . . could no longer trust the Marines: Soldier, p. 342, and Pearson, p. 66, and especially Chaisson, pp. 229–30.

  141 “The most unpardonable thing . . . ever”: Tompkins, p. 82.

  141 Pegasus Operation: Pearson, p. 34, and Nalty, p. 107.

  141 “various bits of . . . disturbing intelligence”: Soldier, p. 318.

  142 ARVN Ranger 37th Battalion: Shore, p. 51. Tran Van Don asserts in Our Endless War that slights such as this had enormous impact on ARVN morale.

  142 “I don’t want any damned Dienbienphu”: The President’s declaration was first reported by Time in the first week of February 1968.

  143 Maxwell Taylor . . . came back worried: Schandler, p. 88, and Nalty, p. 17. It was a widely held military opinion. Gen. Matthew B. Ridgeway, for example, believed that defeat was “the almost invariable fate of troops invested in an isolated fortress.” (cited in Asprey, p. 805.)

  143 similarities between Dienbienphu and Khe Sanh: O’Neill, Strategy, p. 14.

  143 “None of us was blind”: Soldier, p. 337.

  144 The French, he decided: Soldier, p. 337.

  145 “I knew Khe Sanh was different.” Soldier, p. 338.

  145 “Why would the enemy give away his major advantage?”: Soldier, pp. 320–21.

  145 “[We] might be able to do . . . what the French [couldn’t]”: Nalty, p. 22.

  145 “ ‘sending a message’ to Hanoi . . . tactical nuclear weapons”: Soldier, p. 338.

  146 Pegusus was underway: Pearson, pp. 13–14.

  147 the largest air strike of the war: Nalty, p. 82.