Plotting Hitler's Death

by Joachim C. Fest

  23 Müller, Heer, 349.

  24. Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, qtd. in Hoffmann, Widerstand, 125. There are still a number of gaps in the literature on the so-called September plot and especially on the Heinz task force.

  25. Gisevius, Ende, 332.

  26. Krausnick, “Vorgeschichte,” 345.

  27. Gisevius, Ende, 340.

  28. Friedrich Hossbach, Zwischen Wehrmacht und Hitler, 1934-1938 (Wolfenbüttel and Hannover, 1949), 136.

  29. Gisevius, Ende, 350.

  30. Ivone Kirkpatrick, Im innern Kreis: Erinnerungen eines Diplomaten (Berlin, 1964), 462; see also Paul Schmidt, Statist auf diplomatischer Bühne, 1923-1945 (Bonn, 1950), 409.

  31. Kordt, Akten, 262.

  32. William L. Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (New York, 1959), 399.

  33. Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers, 1938-1940 (Stuttgart, 1970), 35. Contrary to the widespread assumption, the brothers must have met not in mid-September but on the evening of September 27. In the middle of the month the actions of the task force had not yet been decided on in detail, if the dates we have are accurate. On the other hand, if we accept the later date, it is difficult to under­stand why Groscurth said that Hitler would be arrested “tonight,” since the deadline would not have been reached until the next day at 2:00 p.m. In either case there was probably a lapse of memory. The evening of September 27, however, seems the likeliest date.

  34. Gisevius, Ende, 360; see also Kordt, Akten, 270-71. Brauchitsch himself stated after the war that he never intended to issue orders for a coup and even denied that Halder, Witzleben, or anyone else ever approached him with plans to overthrow Hitler. See Hoffmann, Widerstand, 128, and the related note.

  35. Gisevius, Ende, 169.

  36. Qtd. in Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Offiziere gegen Hitler (Frankfurt and Hamburg, 1959), 169.

  37. Le Testament politique de Hitler, ed. Hugh R. Trevor-Roper (Paris, 1959), 118-19. For Schacht’s statement, see Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichishof Nurnberg, 14 November 1945-1. Oktober 1946 (Nuremberg 1949), vol. 13,4.

  38. Gisevius, Ende, 362.

  39. Hassell-Tagebücher, 71 (entry of Dec. 18, 1938). For Halder’s comment see Krausnick, “Vorgeschichte,” 370.

  40. Qtd. in Schlabrendorff, 168-69.

  41. Gisevius, Ende, 362; see also Rothfels, Opposition, 91.

  42. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 317-18 and 50 (for Romer).

  43. Hildegard von Kotze, ed., Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 1938-1943: Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel (Stuttgart, 1974), 39.

  4. From Munich to Zossen

  1. Speech on February 10, 1939, in the Kroll Opera House before the army group commanders. See Klaus-Jürgen Müller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime, 1933-1940 (Stuttgart, 1969), 379ff.

  2. Müller, Heer, 271. “Red pants” refers to the red stripe on the trousers of members of the general staff. For the quotation from Jodl that follows, see 382. In the interrogations conducted by the Gestapo after July 20, 1944, Fritz-Dietlof von der Schulenburg pointed to the Fritsch affair as the beginning of the division in the officer corps; see Archiv Peter, ed., Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte über das Attentat vom 20. Juli 1944 (Stuttgart, 1961), 273-74.

  3. For Keitel, see Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende (Zurich, 1954), 39-40. For Manstein and Guderian, see Fabian von Schlabrendorff, Offiziere gegen Hitler (Frankfurt and Hamburg, 1959), 99-100. Reichenau’s earlier disparagement of Beck is another example. Similarly, General Fritz Fromm, who played an inglorious role on July 20, 1944, recorded in his army diary Halder’s thoughts about a coup in the fall of 1939 (Harold C. Deutsch, Verschwörung gegen den Krieg: Der Widerstand in den Jahren 1939-1940 [Munich, 1969], 226-27).

  4. Helmut Krausnick, “Vorgeschichte und Beginn des militärischen Widerstandes gegen Hitler,” Die Vollmacht des Gewissens, vol. 1 (Berlin and Frankfurt, 1960), 373.

  5. Krausnick, “Vorgeschichte,” 373; see also Erich Raeder, Mein Leben (Tübingen, 1956-57), vol. 2, 133ff

  6. Christian Müller, Oberst i.G. Stauffenberg: Eine Biographie (Dusseldorf, 1970), 148; see also K.-J. Müller, Heer, 387.

  7. Galeazzo Ciano, Tagebücher, 1939-1943 (Bern, 1946), 225. For the confused feelings of the opposition, see the comments of Eduard Wagner in Müller, Heer, 389.

  8. This to the former Austrian minister Claise von Horstenau, qtd. in Ulrich von Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 1938-1944: Aufzeichnung vom anderen Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Hiller von Gaertingen, rev. and exp. ed. (Berlin, 1988), 59 (entry of Oct. 15, 1938).

  9. A total of six versions of this address have been preserved. Although differing in emphasis, they convey the same basic message. The version quoted here can be found in Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichishof Nürnberg, 14 November 1945-1. Oktober 1946 (Nuremberg, 1949), vol. 26, PS-798 (part 1) and PS-1014 (part 2) For the atmosphere of the meeting, see Halder’s remarks in Krausnick, “Vorgeschichte,” 381.

  10. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch: Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabs des Heeres, 1939-1942, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1962-64), vol. 1, 34. For Halder’s comments to Henderson, see Krausnick, “Vorgeschichte,” 377.

  11. Gisevius, Ende, 401ff. For Oster’s directions to the members of Heinz’s task force, see Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Op­position gegen Hitler, 3rd ed. (Munich, 1979), 142.

  12. Nikolaus von Vormann, Hitler’s OKH liaison officer, qtd. in Müller, Heer, 120.

  13. Qtd. in Müller, Heer, 419. I am also grateful to Müller for pointing out that this was just the situation the conspirators had been waiting for.

  14. Gisevius, Ende, 408.

  15. Müller, Heer, 425.

  16. Helmuth Groscurth, Tagebücher eines Abwehroffiziers, 1938-1940 (Stuttgart, 1070), 201 (entry of Sept. 8, 1939); see also Martin Broszat, Nationalsozialistische Polenpolitik, 1939-1945 (Stuttgart, 1961), 28.

  17. Note on the documents by Canaris on Sept. 14, 1939; qtd. in Müller, Heer, 128.

  18. See Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, 1939-1945: Der zweite Weltkrieg in Chronik und Dokumenten (Darmstadt, 1961), 607. See also Count Romedio Galeazzo von Thun-Hohenstein, Der Verschwörer: General Oster und die Militäropposition (Berlin, 1982), 143.

  19. See Hitler’s Secret Book (New York, 1962), with its continual criticism of the Prussian and bourgeois-nationalist policy toward Poland under the kaisers. The so-called Table Talk (London, 1953) also contains voluminous material on this topic.

  20. Manfred Messerschmidt, “Militärische Motive zur Durchführung des Umsturzes,” Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus: Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, ed. Jürgen Schmädecke and Peter Steinbach (Mu­nich, 1986), 1023.

  21. Prozess, vol. 26, PS-864, 381-82.

  22. Hildegard von Kotze, ed., Heeresadjutant bei Hitler, 1938-1943: Aufzeichnungen des Majors Engel (Stuttgart, 1974), 68 (entry of Nov. 18, 1939).

  23. This according to Colonel (later General) Eduard Wagner, who was already beginning to draft plans for martial law, and Quartermaster General Tippelskirch; see Groscurth, Tagebücher, 231 (entry of Nov. 14, 1939). For Blaskowitz’s report to Brauchitsch, see Groscurth, Tagebücher, 426.

  24. Jacobsen, 1939-1945, 606-07; also see Groscurth, Tagebücher, 426, n. 230.

  25. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, 160ff. (entry of Jan. 18, 1940).

  26. See Hassell, Hassell-Tagebücher, 152 (entry of Dec. 25, 1939). For Tresckow’s comment, see Bodo Scheurig, Henning von Tresckow: Eine Biographie (Frankfurt and Berlin, 1980), 76.

  27. Jodl reported Hitler’s reaction to Halder: “Distrust. Better that the soldiers don’t follow him.” See Halder, Kriegstagebuch, 97-98 (entry of Oct. 4, 1939).

  28. Halder, Kriegstagebuch 105 (entry of Oct. 14, 1939).

  29. Quoted in Thun-Hohenstein Verschwörer, 158.

  30. Groscurth, Tagebücher, 218 (entry of Oct. 16, 193
9): “Admiral visited Halder. Came back deeply shaken. Total nervous collapse. Brauchitsch also at wit’s end. Führer demands invasion. Closed to any factual objections. Just bloodthirsty.”

  31. Hassell, Hassell-Tagebücher, 133 (entry of Oct. 19, 1939).

  32. A thought of the former German ambassador in Paris, Count Johannes von Welczeck; see Hassell, Hassell-Tagebücher, 131 (entry of Oct. 16, 1939).

  33. Groscurth, Tagebücher, 498ff.

  34. Groscurth, Tagebücher, 223 (entry of Nov. 1, 1939). The description of the various, generally separate “centers of gravity” that came together only after Halder’s decision to take action is based on the presentation in Müller, Heer, 494ff.

  35. Hoffmann, Widerstand, 320-21.

  36. Gisevius, Ende, 418.

  37. Keitel’s account; see Müller, Heer, 521.

  38. See the statement that Army Adjutant and later General Gerhard Engel pro­vided to the Institut fur Zeitgeschichte, qtd. in Groscurth, Tagebücher, 225, n. 589.

  39. This is the version provided by Halder after the war to Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart, 1984), 504-05. For the rest, see Groscurth, Tagebücher, 225 (entry of Nov. 5, 1939), 246 (entry of Feb. 14, 1940). For Brauchitsch’s comment, see Gisevius, Ende, 420.

  40. See Deutsch, Verschwörung, 259; for V. Müller, see Müller, Heer, 534. The description in Gisevius, Ende, 423ff, is quite different.

  41. Leeb said this after the war in his statement for the Military History Research Bureau; see Müller, Heer, 543. For Halder’s comments, see Groscurth, Tagebücher, 236 (entry of Dec. 10, 1939), 233 (entry of Nov. 17, 1939).

  42. Together with Popitz and possibly also with Oster, Beck, and Schacht, Goerdeler had developed the plan of dropping off a few divisions in Berlin during their transfer and then having Witzleben appear and use them to disarm the SS. At the same time, Beck would drive to Zossen to “assume supreme command from the weak hands of Brauchitsch.” Hitler, according to the plan, would be “certified unfit to govern by a medical statement and kept in a safe place. Then an appeal to the people… .” Qtd. in Hassell, Hassell-Tagebücher, 153 (entry of Dec. 30, 1939).

  43. Groscurth, Tagebücher, 232 (entry of Nov. 16, 1939) and 233, nn.

  44. Erich Kordt, Nicht aus den Akten… Die Wilhelmstrasse in Frieden und Krieg: Erlebnisse, Begegnungen, und Eindrücke, 1928-1945 (Munich, 1949), 377. Hitler’s speech of November 23, 1939, was recorded and preserved by a number of different participants, who agree on its import. See Prozess, vol. 26, PS-789, 327ff; also Groscurth, Tagebücher, 414ff. (document 40).

  45. Qtd. in Paul Seabury, Die Wilhelmstrasse: Die Geschichte der deutschen Diplomatie 1930-1945 (Frankfurt, 1956), 149. (Rosenheim is a provincial city in the far south of Germany; Eydtkuhnen is in the north.)

  46. I am grateful to Jerzy W. Borejsza for this association; see “Der 25. Juli 1943 in Italien und der 20. Juli 1944 in Deutschland: Zur Technik des Staatsstreichs im totalitaren System,” Schmädecke and Steinbach, Widerstand, 1085.

  47. Gert Buchheit, Ludwig Beck, ein preussischer General (Munich, 1964), 228. See also Ritter, Goerdeler, 267.

  48. Hans Oster, qtd. in Deutsch, Verschwörung, 104.

  5. The New Generation

  1. S. Haffner, “The Day That Failed to End the War,” Contact (London, 1947), 42. Haffner’s bent for original points of view as well as the early date of this publica­tion explain many of his excesses; his interpretation does, however, shed some light on the sociology of the resistance, a controversial subject.

  2. Ulrich von Hassell, Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 1938-1944: Aufzeichnung vom anderen Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Hiller von Gaertingen, rev. and exp. ed. (Berlin, 1988), 289 (entry of Dec. 21, 1941). “The old-timers’ revolution” comes from a conversation between Stauffenberg and Leber; see Eberhard Zeller, Geist der Freiheit: Der zwanzigste Juli (Munich, 1963), 297.

  3. Harold C. Deutsch, Verschwörung gegen den Krieg. Der Widerstand in den fahren 1939-1940 (Munich, 1969), 104. For the “Oster problem,” see Kurt Sendtner, “Die deutsche Militäropposition im ersten Kriegsjahr,” Die Vollmacht des Gewissens, vol. 1 (Berlin and Frankfurt, 1960), 507ff.

  4. Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart, 1984), 271.

  5. Apparently the atrocities in Poland also played a part in Reichenau’s readiness to commit treason. H. C. Deutsch was the first to note this remarkable episode; see Verschwörung, 76ff.

  6. Deutsch, Verschwörung, 105.

  7. Hassell, Hassell-Tagebücher, 207 (entry of Aug. 10, 1940).

  8. Heinz Höhne, Canaris: Patriot im Zwielicht (Munich, 1976), 403.

  9. Klaus-Jürgen Muller, Das Heer und Hitler: Armee und nationalsozialistisches Regime, 1933-1940 (Stuttgart, 1969), 452-53.

  10. Ritter, Goerdeler, 274.

  11. Qtd. in Ritter, Goerdeler, 47-48. For the earlier characterizations of Goerdeler, see Margret Boveri, Fur und gegen die Nation, vol. 2 of Der Verrat in XX. Jahrhundert (Hamburg, 1956), 26.

  12. See Ritter, Goerdeler, 272ff.; Hans Rothfels, Opposition gegen Hitler: Eine Würdigung (Frankfurt, 1958), 104ff; and Hans Mommsen, “Gesellschaftsbild und Verfassungspläne des deutschen Widerstands,” Der deutsche Widerstand gegen Hitler, ed. Walter Schmitthenner and Hans Buchheim (Cologne and Berlin, 1966), 73ff. For Hassell’s contribution, see Gregor Schöllgen, Ulrich von Hassell, 1881-1944: Ein Konservativer in der Opposition (Munich, 1990), 136ff.

  13. Mommsen, “Gesellschaftsbild,” 83.

  14. See George K. Romoser, “The Politics of Uncertainty: The German Resis­tance Movement,” Social Research (1964), vol. 31, 73ff; Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, rev. and enl. ed. (New York, 1965), 97ff; and Ralf Dahrendorf, Gesellschaft und Demokratie in Deutschland (Munich, 1965), 441f.

  15. Mommsen points this out and mentions Wilhelm Leuschner as the sole exception, although he can only he viewed to a limited extent as a typical representative of the Weimar Republic (“Gesellschaftsbild,” 76).

  16. Qtd. in Mommsen, “Gesellschaftsbild,” 134-35.

  17. Hassell, Hassell-Tagebücher, 293-94 (entry of Jan. 24, 1942).

  18. For an overall assessment of these proposals, see Mommsen, “Gesellschaft­sbild,” 161ff.

  19. See Dorothee von Meding, Mit dem Mut des Herzens: Die Frauen des 20. Juli (Berlin, 1992), 135 (Freya von Moltke) and 198 (Marion Yorck von Wartenburg).

  20. Ger van Roon, Neuordnung und Widerstand: Der Kreisauer Kreis innerhalb der deutschen Widerstandsbewegung (Munich, 1967), 187.

  21. Freya von Moltke, qtd. in Meding, Mut, 135.

  22. Heinrich Stehkämper, Protest, Opposition, und Widerstand im Umkreis der (untergegangenen) Zentrumspartei: Ein Uberblick part 2, in Der Widerstand gegen den Nationalsozialismus: Die deutsche Gesellschaft und der Widerstand gegen Hitler, ed. Jürgen Schmädecke and Peter Steinbach (Munich, 1986), 895. See also Peter Hoffmann, Widerstand, Staatsstreich, Attentat: Der Kampf der Opposition gegen Hitler, 3rd ed. (Munich, 1979), 444. Moltke’s remark about “that Goerdeler mess” appears only in his next-to-last letter from prison, but it hints at the reservations that always existed.

  23. Marion von Yorck von Wartenburg, qtd. in Meding, Mut, 203.

  24. Qtd. in Christian Müller, Oberst i.G. Stauffenberg: Eine Biographie (Dussel­dorf, 1990), 368. For the letter to Lionel Curtis, see Klemens von Klemperer et al., Fur Deutschland: Die Manner des 20. Juli (Frankfurt and Berlin, 1994), 170-71.

  25. Qtd. in Hermann Graml’s groundbreaking study “Die aussenpolitische Vorstellungen des deutschen Widerstands,” Schmitthenner and Buchheim, Widerstand, 15 and 22.

  26. Graml, “Vorstellungen,” 40.

  27. Van Roon, Neuordnung, 271. See also Hassell, Hassell-Tagebücher, 335-36 (entry of Jan. 22, 1943). The comment about a “Kerensky solution” refers to Alexan­der F. Kerensky, the prime minister of Russia after the Russian Revolution of Febru­ary 1917, whose halfhearted policies seeking compromise solutions cleared the way for t
he Bolsheviks. Conceivably Moltke thought that Goerdeler would be a transi­tional figure who would clear the way for the Kreisauers.

  28. Rothfels, Opposition, 187.

  29. Hans Bernd Gisevius, Bis zum bittern Ende (Zurich, 1954), 455.

  30. Gisevius, Ende, 471.

  31. Deutsch, Verschwörung, 385-86; see also Oscar Reile, Geheime Westfront: Die Abwehr, 1935-1945 (Munich, 1962), 387.

  32. Höhne, Canaris, 291.

  6. The Army Groups

  1. Karl Klee, Das Unternehmen “Seelöwe” (Gottingen, 1985), 189-90.

  2. Franz Halder, Kriegstagebuch: Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabs des Heeres, 1939-1942, 3 vols. (Stuttgart, 1962-64), vol. 2, 121. For the conversation with Jodl, see vol. 1, 996 (Dec. 17, 1940); for the comment to Mussolini, see vol. 1, 275 (Jan. 20, 1941). That preparations for a war against the Soviet Union were quite open is evidenced in the fact that Hassell heard about them as early as the beginning of August (Die Hassell-Tagebücher, 1938-1944: Aufzeichnungen vom anderen Deutschland, ed. Friedrich Hiller von Gaertingen, rev. and exp. ed. [Berlin, 1988], 206 [entry of Aug. 10, 1940]).

  3. Halder, Kriegstagebuch, vol. 2, 335ff.

  4. Gerhard Ritter, Carl Goerdeler und die deutsche Widerstandsbewegung (Stuttgart, 1954), 323. For Jodl’s statement at Nuremberg, see Prozess gegen die Hauptkriegsverbrecher vor dem Internationalen Militärgerichishof Nurnberg, 14. November 1945-1. Oktober 1946 (Nuremberg, 1949), vol. 15, 339.

  5. The meeting, described by Ulrich Hassell, took place on April 8, Hassell-Tagebücher, 248 (entry of May 4, 1941). For the guidelines themselves, see Hans-Adolf Jacobsen, “Kommissarbefehl und Massenexekutionen sowjetischer Kreigsgefangener,” Anatomie des SS-Staates, by Hans Buchheim et al. (Olten and Freiburg, 1965), vol. 2, 223-24 and 225ff.

  6. Archiv Peter, ed., Spiegelbild einer Verschwörung: Die Kaltenbrunner-Berichte über das Attentat vom 20. Juli 1944 (Stuttgart, 1961), 368.