Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  I now drove through the woods to 10th Panzer Division, which had crossed the Semois in the sector Cugnon–Herbeumont. When I reached their road of advance I witnessed an attack by the Reconnaissance Battalion on the frontier defences; the riflemen advanced immediately behind the reconnaissance unit, with the brave brigade commander, Colonel Fischer, at their head, followed closely by the divisional commander, General Schaal. The steady way the division moved forward under the command of its officers was an impressive sight. The defensive positions in the woods were soon captured; the advance through La Chapelle towards Bazeilles-Balan continued. I could return without anxiety to my corps headquarters at Bouillon.

  Colonel Nehring, my Chief of Staff, had meanwhile established himself in the Hôtel Panorama, from whose windows there was a splendid view over the valley of the Semois. In the office that we shared my desk was in an alcove much decorated with trophies of the chase.

  We went to work. Suddenly there was a series of explosions in rapid succession; another air attack. As though that were not enough, an engineer supply column, carrying fuses, explosives, mines and hand grenades, caught fire and there was one detonation after the other. A boar’s head, attached to the wall immediately above my desk, broke loose and missed me by a hair’s breadth; the other trophies came tumbling down and the fine window in front of which I was seated was smashed to smithereens and splinters of glass whistled about my ears. It had in fact become very unpleasant where we were and we decided to move elsewhere. We chose a small hotel to the north of Bouillon which had served as regimental headquarters for the 1st Panzer Regiment. When we went to look at it the commander of our air support, General von Stutterheim, who happened to be present, warned me that it was very exposed. Even while we were talking a squadron of Belgian planes appeared and bombed the bivouacs of the tank regiment. Our casualties were negligible, but we were now prepared to listen to Stutterheim’s advice; we moved farther north, to the next village, Bellevaux-Noirefontaine.

  Before this second move could be carried out a Fieseler–Storch aeroplane appeared to fetch me to General von Kleist’s headquarters for orders. The order I received was to attack across the Meuse on the next day, the 13th of May, at 16.00 hrs. My 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions should be in position by that time, but the 2nd Panzer Division, which had run into difficulties along the Semois, would certainly not be. I reported this fact, which was of importance in view of the weakness of our attacking force. General von Kleist would not modify his orders, however, and I felt obliged to admit that there were probably advantages in thrusting forwards immediately without waiting for all our troops to be ready. A further order was far less pleasant. Unaware of the arrangements I had come to with Lörzer, General von Kleist and the air force General Sperrle had decided on a mass bombing attack, to be co-ordinated with the beginning of the artillery preparation. My whole attack plan was thus placed in jeopardy, since if such an attack were carried out the long-drawn-out neutralisation of the enemy batteries could no longer be achieved. I argued strongly against this and asked that my original plan, on which the whole attack was founded, be followed. General von Kleist refused this request too, and I flew back in the Fieseler–Storch, with a new pilot, to my corps headquarters. The young man maintained he knew exactly where the landing strip from which I had set off was located, but he could not find it in the fading light and the next thing I knew we were on the other side of the Meuse, flying in a slow and unarmed plane over the French positions. An unpleasant moment. I gave my pilot emphatic orders to turn north and find my landing strip; we just made it.

  Back at corps headquarters I settled down at once to drawing up orders. In view of the very short time at our disposal, we were forced to take the orders used in the war games at Koblenz from our files and, after changing the dates and times, issue these as the orders for the attack. They were perfectly fitted to the reality of the situation. The only change that had to be made was that at Koblenz we had imagined the attack going in at 10.00 instead of 16.00 hrs. 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions copied this procedure and so the issuing of orders was an agreeably quick and simple business. (See Appendix V.)

  By the evening of May 12th the 1st and 10th Panzer Divisions had occupied the northern bank of the Meuse and had captured the historic city and fortress of Sedan. The night was spent in making final preparations for the assault and in moving the Corps and Panzer Group artillery into position. The point of main effort lay in the sector of the 1st Panzer Division, which was reinforced by the Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’, the corps artillery and the heavy artillery battalions of the two flanking divisions. When judging the achievements of the two flanking divisions on the following day, this weakening of their artillery strength must be borne in mind.

  The transfer of corps headquarters to La Chapelle was ordered for the 13th of May. (See Appendix VI.)

  In the morning I first visited the headquarters of the 1st Panzer Division to see how far advanced their preparations were; then, driving across partially mined ground, which my staff drivers cleared, and under artillery fire put down by the French defence from the far bank, I went on to the 2nd Panzer Division at Sugny. The head of the division had reached the French frontier. At midday I returned to my corps headquarters, by now installed at La Chapelle.

  At 15.30 hrs. I went through French shell fire to an advanced artillery O.P. of 10th Panzer Division in order personally to observe the effects of my artillery and of the Luftwaffe’s contribution. At 16.00 hrs. the battle began with a display of artillery fire which, to us at least, seemed magnificent. Tensely I waited for the air force. It arrived punctually but my astonishment was great to see only a few squadrons of bombers and dive-bombers, under fighter cover; they adopted the tactics which Lörzer and I had agreed on during our war games. Had General von Kleist changed his mind, or had the new orders for the attack not got through to the squadrons in time? In any event the flyers were doing exactly what I believed to be most advantageous for our attack and I sighed with relief.

  I was now anxious to take part in the assault across the Meuse by the riflemen. The actual ferrying must be nearly over by now, so I went to St. Menges and from there to Floing, which was the proposed crossing-place of 1st Panzer Division. I went over in the first assault boat. On the far bank I found the efficient and brave commander of the 1st Rifle Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Balck, together with his staff. He greeted me cheerfully with the cry: ‘Joy riding in canoes on the Meuse is forbidden!’ I had in fact used those words myself in one of the exercises that we had had in preparation for this operation, since the attitude of some of the younger officers had struck me as rather too light-hearted. I now realised that they had judged the situation correctly.

  The attack by the 1st Rifle Regiment and by Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ was developing as though it were being carried out on manœuvres. The French artillery was almost paralysed by the unceasing threat of attack by Stukas and bombers. The concrete emplacements along the Meuse had been put out of action by our anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery, and the enemy machine-gunners were forced to keep down by the fire of our heavy weapons and artillery. Despite the completely open nature of the ground, our casualties remained light. By the time night fell a considerable penetration of the enemy’s defences had been made. The troops had been ordered to keep up the attack without pause throughout the night, and I could rely on this important order being obeyed. By 23.00 hrs. they had captured Cheveuges and part of the Bois de la Marfée and west of Wadelincourt had reached the French main line of defence. Pleased and proud of what I had seen, I returned to my corps headquarters in the Bois de la Garenne, arriving at La Chapelle just in time for another air attack, and settled down to study the reports from the flanks.

  Sketch Map 4

  Battle for the Meuse Crossings. Situation 13.5–15.5.40.

  Only the advance elements of the 2nd Panzer Division, the Reconnaissance Battalion and the Motor-cycle Battalion together with the heavy artillery, had been in action. With
such few troops they had not succeeded in forcing a crossing. The whole of 1st Panzer Division’s Rifle Brigade was over on the left bank of the Meuse by now: the division’s tanks and artillery were ready to follow just as soon as a bridge could be thrown across. The 10th Panzer Division had crossed the river and established a small bridgehead on the far side; owing to lack of artillery support this division had had a hard day. Flanking fire from the Maginot Line south of Douzy-Carignan had been particularly worrying. The next morning, however, should bring relief both to them and to the 2nd Panzer Division. The corps heavy anti-aircraft was to be brought up to the near bank of the river during the night, since from the 14th no more support could be expected from the Luftwaffe, which was to be employed elsewhere.

  During the night I telephoned Lörzer to inquire what the reason was for the change in the plan of air support and also to thank him for the splendid nature of that support which had contributed so markedly to our success. I learned that Sperrle’s order had in fact arrived too late to be passed on to the squadrons and that Lörzer had therefore quite correctly made no modifications to the existing plan. I then sent a signal to Busch, who during the Hitler conference in Berlin had questioned my ability to cross the Meuse, informing him of my troops’ success; he sent me a very cordial reply. Finally, I thanked my colleagues on my staff for their devoted help. (See Appendix VII.)

  Early on the 14th of May the brave 1st Panzer Division signalled that they had managed to increase their penetration considerably during the night and were now through Chéméry. So off to Chéméry I went. On the banks of the Meuse were thousands of prisoners. At Chéméry the commander of the 1st Panzer Division was giving orders to his subordinate commanders and I listened while he did so. There was a report of strong French armoured forces moving up, and he sent the tanks of 1st Panzer Division into the attack towards Stonne to head them off; then I returned to the Meuse bridge, where I had arranged for my command staff to await me, and ordered that 2nd Panzer Brigade move across the river immediately behind the 1st, so that there would be sufficient armour available on the far side to meet the French attack when it came in. This attack was stopped at Bulson with the destruction of 20 tanks, and at Chéméry with the destruction of 50 more. Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ took Bulson and advanced from there on Villers-Maisoncelle. Unfortunately shortly after my departure German dive bombers attacked our troop concentration in Chéméry, causing us heavy casualties.

  Meanwhile the 2nd Panzer Division had crossed the Meuse near Donchéry and was engaged in fighting its way up the southern bank. I drove there to see how they were getting on and found the responsible commanders, Colonels von Vaerst and von Prittwitz, at the head of their troops, so I was able to return to the Meuse. There was now a most violent air attack by the enemy. The extremely brave French and English pilots did not succeed in knocking out the bridges, despite the heavy casualties that they suffered. Our anti-aircraft gunners proved themselves on this day, and shot superbly. By evening they calculated that they had accounted for 150 enemy aeroplanes. The regimental commander, Colonel von Hippel, later received the Knight’s Cross for this.

  Meanwhile the 2nd Panzer Brigade continued to cross the river in uninterrupted flow. Towards midday, to our general delight, the Army Group commander, Colonel-General von Rundstedt, arrived to have a look at the situation for himself. I reported our position to him in the very middle of the bridge, while an air-raid was actually in progress. He asked drily: ‘Is it always like this here?’ I could reply with a clear conscience that it was. He then spoke a few deeply felt words in appreciation of the achievements of our gallant soldiers.

  Once again to the 1st Panzer Division, where I found the divisional commander accompanied by his first general staff officer, Major Wenck; I asked him whether his whole division could be turned westwards or whether a flank guard should be left facing south on the east bank of the Ardennes Canal. Wenck saw fit to interject a somewhat slangy expression of mine ‘Klotzen, nicht Kleckern’ (the sense of it being to strike concentrated, not dispersed—it might be translated roughly as ‘Boot Ľem, don’t spatter Ľem’), and that really answered my question. 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions received orders immediately to change direction with all their forces, to cross the Ardennes Canal, and to head west with the objective of breaking clear through the French defences. That I might co-ordinate the movements of the two divisions I next went to the command post of the 2nd Panzer Division, which was in the Château Rocan, on the heights above Donchéry. From that vantage-point a good view could be obtained over the ground across which 2nd Panzer Division had advanced and attacked on the 13th and 14th of May. I was surprised that the French long-range artillery in the Maginot Line and its westerly extension had not laid down heavier fire and caused us more trouble during our advance. At this moment, as I looked at the ground we had come over, the success of our attack struck me as almost a miracle.

  In the afternoon I returned to my headquarters to arrange for the co-ordination of my divisions for the 15th of May. Immediately north of my corps was XLI Army Corps (Reinhardt), which had originally been following behind me and which, since the 12th, had been committed on the right of XIX Army Corps in the direction of MézièresCharleville. On the 13th this corps had forced a crossing of the Meuse (at Monthermé) and was making a fighting advance westwards. General von Wietersheim’s XIV Army Corps was now in my immediate rear and must soon reach the Meuse.

  By evening the 1st Panzer Division had strong elements across the Ardennes Canal and had taken Singly and Vendresse despite strenuous enemy resistance. The tanks of the 10th Panzer Division had crossed the line Maisoncelle-Raucourt-et-Flabas, while the bulk of the division had reached the high ground south of Bulson-Thélonne, where they had captured more than forty guns.

  The principal task of XIX Army Corps had been to secure the dominating heights around Stonne, thus depriving the enemy of any chance of breaking into our bridgehead, and assuring the formations that were moving up behind us a safe river crossing. The attack on the heights had involved the Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ and the 10th Panzer Division in heavy fighting on the 14th. The village of Stonne had changed hands several times. On the 15th these attacks were to be carried through to a successful conclusion. (See Appendix VIII.)

  At 04.00 hrs. on the 15th of May I met General von Wietersheim at my corps headquarters to discuss with him the relief by his troops of my units now in the Meuse bridgehead south of Sedan. After briefly summarising the situation we set off together for the headquarters of the 10th Panzer Division near Bulson. General Schaal was forward with his troops. The first general staff officer of the division, the excellent Lieutenant-Colonel Freiherr von Liebenstein, explained the difficulties of the situation and answered patiently the many detailed questions of the general who was to take over from us. Finally we agreed that, for the duration of the relief, 10th Panzer Division and the Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ would be placed under command of XIV Army Corps until such time as units of that corps could take over from them. So I found my command limited, for the next few days, to the 1st and 2nd Panzer Divisions.

  The 10th Panzer Division, with the Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ under command, was ordered to cover the southern flank of XIX Army Corps along the line Ardennes Canal—the high ground by Stonne—the bend in the Meuse south of Villemontry. In the course of the 15th of May it was already being strengthened by the advance units of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division.

  From the headquarters of the 10th Panzer Division I drove to the headquarters of the Infantry Regiment ‘G.D.’ in Stonne. A French attack was actually in progress when I arrived and I could not find anyone. A certain nervous tension was noticeable, but finally the positions were held. I then went to my new corps headquarters, which was in a small wood near Sapogne on the southern bank of the Meuse.

  Contrary to expectations the night was one of confusion, not owing to the activity of the enemy but on account of command difficulties with our superiors. Panzer Group von K
leist ordered a halt to all further advance and to any extension of the bridgehead. I neither would nor could agree to these orders, which involved the sacrifice of the element of surprise we had gained and of the whole initial success that we had achieved. I therefore got in touch, personally, first with the Chief of Staff of the Panzer Group, Colonel Zeitzler, and since this was not enough with General von Kleist himself, and requested that the order to stop be cancelled. The conversation became very heated and we repeated our various arguments several times. Finally, General von Kleist approved of the advance being continued for another twenty-four hours so that sufficient space be acquired for the infantry corps that were following. I had finally had to mention the Hentzsch Mission and thus remind him of the ‘Miracle of the Marne,’ a reminder that was no doubt not very well received by the Panzer Group.

  I was pleased to have retained my freedom of movement when, early on the 16th of May, I went to the headquarters of the 1st Panzer Division. I drove through Vendresse to Omont. The situation at the front was not yet clear. All that was known was that there had been heavy fighting during the night in the neighbourhood of Bouvellemont. So on to Bouvellemont. In the main street of the burning village I found the regimental commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Balck, and let him describe the events of the previous night to me. The troops were over-tired, having had no real rest since the 9th of May. Ammunition was running low. The men in the front line were falling asleep in their slit trenches. Balck himself, in wind jacket and with a knotty stick in his hand, told me that the capture of the village had only succeeded because, when his officers complained against the continuation of the attack, he had replied: ‘In that case I’ll take the place on my own!’ and had moved off. His men had thereupon followed him. His dirty face and his red-rimmed eyes showed that he had spent a hard day and a sleepless night. For his doings on that day he was to receive the Knight’s Cross. His opponents—a good Norman infantry division and a brigade of Spahis—had fought bravely. The enemy’s machine-guns were still firing into the village street, but for some time now there had been no artillery fire and Balck shared my opinion that resistance was almost over.