Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  In the late afternoon another heavy engagement with enemy tanks took place, this time to the north of Juniville. The French were advancing from the direction of Annelles towards Perthe with the intention of mounting a counter-attack, but we managed to beat them off.

  Meanwhile the 2nd Panzer Division was across the Aisne to the west of Château-Porcien and was advancing southward. By evening it had reached Houdilcourt–St. Etienne. Parts of Reinhardt’s corps, which had not yet been able to cross at the points allotted it, were sent over behind 1st Panzer Division. However, we reckoned that the capture of Juniville would soon bring the enemy resistance at Rethel to an end. Reinhardt’s corps would then have freedom of movement once again.

  Group headquarters was set up in the Bois de Sévigny, on the Aisne, south-east of Château-Porcien. I spent the night there. I was completely exhausted, and throwing myself down on a bundle of straw, without even taking my cap off, fell instantly asleep. Riebel, considerate as always, had a tent put up around me and posted guards so as to ensure that I had at least three hours’ undisturbed sleep.

  Early on June 11th I was at La Neuville for the attack by the 1st Panzer Division. The attack went forward as though this were a manæuvre: artillery preparation, advance by the tanks and riflemen, the encirclement of the village and break-through towards Béthéniville—this latter a village well known to me from the First World War. The enemy’s resistance was stiffer along the Suippes. He counter-attacked in vain, using some 50 tanks that probably belonged to the French 7th Light Division. The villages of Nauroy, Beine, and St. Hilaire-le-Petit were captured.

  The 2nd Panzer Division reached Époye, the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division the wood to the south-west of this village.

  Reinhardt’s XLI Army Corps, advancing to the east of the XXXIX Army Corps, had to beat off an attack on its flank by the French 3rd Mechanised and 3rd Armoured Divisions, which came in from the Argonnes. When these had been successfully repelled, it resumed its advance towards the south.

  In the afternoon I received a message that the Commander-in-Chief of the Army intended to visit the Panzer Group, and I therefore returned to my headquarters. I found Colonel-General von brauchitsch already there and I explained to him the position at the front and told him what we anticipated for the future. I received no new instructions. In the evening my headquarters moved to Juniville.

  The attack was resumed on the 12th June. XXXIX Army Corps was ordered to move on Châlons-sur-Marne with the 2nd Panzer Division, and on Vitry-le-François with the 1st Panzer Division and the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division. XLI Army Corps was to push its right wing through Somme–Py to Suippes.

  Our progress was made more difficult through confusion that arose from the impetuous advance of the infantry following behind us. The infantry units were now over the Aisne and in some cases they had by this time caught up with the panzer units which were fighting their way forwards. Divisional boundaries had not been drawn with sufficient clarity and units overlapped. A request was made to Army headquarters that this be sorted out, but in vain. At points along the Suippes there were a number of animated scenes. Both arms of the Service wanted to lead the advance. The gallant infantrymen had marched day and night, so keen were they to get at the enemy. On the morning of this day we passed the Heights of Champagne, well known to me from the autumn of 1917. I visited the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, commanded by General Freiherr von Langermann, which was now appearing at the front for the first time, near the northern edge of the camp of Mourmelon-le-Grand. He was engaged in giving orders for an attack on the camp by the reconnaissance battalion when I arrived. All his unit commanders were present, well forward. The orders were short and to the point. It all made a first-class impression. I could drive without anxiety to the 2nd Panzer Division at Châlons-sur-Marne.

  When I arrived there, Châlons had just been reached. Our foremost reconnaissance troops had captured the Marne bridge intact but had unfortunately failed to examine it at once for demolition charges, although they had received very explicit orders always to do this. As a result the bridge blew up while our troops were actually crossing it with consequent, quite unnecessary casualties.

  While I was discussing the further prosecution of his advance with General Veiel, I was summoned back to my Group headquarters, where the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group, Colonel-General von Rundstedt, was expected.

  By evening the 1st Panzer Division had reached Bussy-le-Château. They were ordered to move on Étrépy, on the Rhine–Marne Canal.

  During the course of this day Reinhardt’s Corps had fought a defensive battle against enemy troops attacking westwards from the Argonnes. I visited the divisions of that corps during the afternoon, in the neighbourhood of Machault, and was thus able, personally, to approve the measures that had been taken. We captured Souain, Tahure, and Manre. On my way back to my Group headquarters I came across renewed confusion caused by infantry units moving across our line of advance. Again I tried in vain to get Twelfth Army command to do something about this.

  From now on the Panzer Group received every day many mutually contradictory orders, some ordering a swing towards the east, others a continuation of the advance southward. First of all Verdun was to be taken by means of a surprise attack, then the southward advance was to go on, then we were to swing east on St. Mihiel, then again we were to move south once more. Reinhardt’s Corps was the one which suffered from all this vacillation; I kept Schmidt’s Corps on a steady course, southwards, so that at least half of my Panzer Group was assured of continuity of purpose.

  On the 13th of June I first visited the Reinhardt Corps and its 6th and 8th Panzer Division which were still engaged in battle with the enemy forces from Verdun and the Argonnes. Towards evening I set off to find the headquarters of the 1st Panzer Division, which had reached the Rhine–Marne Canal near Étrépy. XXXIX Army Corps had ordered the division not to cross this canal. I knew nothing of this order; nor would I have approved it if I had. Outside étrépy I found Balck, the inexhaustible commander of the leading elements of 1st Panzer Division, and asked him whether he had secured the bridge over the canal. He replied that he had. I asked him if he had also established a bridgehead on the far side. After a pause he answered that he had done that too. His reticence surprised me. Was it possible, I asked, to drive over to his bridgehead by car? Looking at me with deep distrust, he rather timidly said that it was. So over we went. In the bridgehead I found a capital engineer officer, Lieutenant Weber, who had risked his life to prevent the demolition of the bridge, and the commander of the rifle battalion which had formed the bridgehead, a Captain Eckinger. I was delighted to be able to decorate these two brave officers with the Iron Cross, First Class, on the spot. I then asked Balck why he had not pushed farther forward; it was only then I learned of XXXIX Army Corps’ order to stop. This was the explanation of Balck’s extraordinary reticence: he had already gone farther than he should and he expected me to reprimand him for doing so.

  Once again, as at Bouvellemont, our break-through was almost completed. Once again this was no time for hesitancy or delay. Balck gave me his impressions of the enemy: opposite his sector the canal was being defended by black troops with very little artillery support. He received my order to advance directly on St. Dizier. I promised, myself, to inform his divisional and corps commanders of this order. So Balck set to. I went back to divisional headquarters and ordered that the whole division be put in motion at once. I then informed General Schmidt of the orders I had given to the 1st Panzer Division.

  Finally, as dusk was falling, after driving through the area of the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, which had reached the canal at Brusson, I found Reconnaissance Battalion 5 of the 2nd Panzer Division just north of Vitry-le-François and learned from them the situation in this sector and what progress their division had made.

  At 09.00 hrs., on the 14th of June, German troops began to enter Paris.

  My 1st Panzer Division reached St. Dizier duri
ng the course of the night. French prisoners taken belonged to their 3rd Armoured Division, as well as to the 3rd North African Division and the 6th Colonial Infantry Division; they gave the impression of being utterly exhausted. Farther west the remainder of XXXIX Army Corps crossed the canal. East of Étrépy Reinhardt’s Corps reached the Rhine–Marne Canal near Revigny.

  At midday, after a conversation with the commander of the 1st Panzer Division, I entered St. Dizier. The first person I saw was my friend, Balck, seated on a chair in the market-place. He was looking forward to a few quiet hours after all the effort of the last few days and nights. I had to disappoint him in this. The faster we could now continue our advance, the greater must our victory be. Balck was ordered to set off at once and to head straight for Langres. The rest of the 1st Panzer Division was following behind. The advance was completed during the night, and early on the morning of the 15th of June the old fortress surrendered. Three thousand prisoners were taken.

  FIG.6. Boulogne: The assault on the town wall.

  FIG.7. The attack rolls on.

  The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division was sent through Wassy to Juzenencourt: the 2nd Panzer Division through Montierender–Soulaines to Bar-sur-Aube. Reinhardt’s Corps was ordered to keep on moving south.

  The intentions of the OKH that the Panzer Group should turn off towards Nancy by way of Joinville–Neufchâteau had already been issued as orders to the units: but there was still time for alternative orders to reach the troops.

  Early on the 15th June I set of for Langres, arriving at about noon. I told the 1st Panzer Division to head for Gray-sur-Saône and Besançon, the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division to advance towards the Saône, south-west of Gray, the 2nd Panzer Division to move on Til-Châtel, while the XLI Army Corps was to hold to its line of advance southwards, east of the Marne. On our right the XVI Army Corps of the Kleist Group was advancing towards Dijon. 1st Panzer Division moved off at 13.00 hrs. Then I sat down with my little combat staff in the French officers’ mess, whose garden commanded a fine view towards the east, and anxiously considered my left flank; it was very long by this time and very open, and now reports were coming in of French forces advancing against it from the east. In the course of the afternoon General Wiktorin’s 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division arrived at Langres; it moved off at once towards Vesoul, thus giving us protection on that section of our flank. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division was continuing to advance west of Langres. The situation was developing rapidly from hour to hour. By evening Bar-sur-Aube, Gray-sur-Saône and Bar-le-Duc had all been captured.

  The French commandant of Gray fell in the defence of that town.

  Group headquarters was moved in the evening to Langres. Since no orders had been received from the Army High Command concerning the future employment of the Panzer Group, I sent the OKH liaison officer attached to my staff back by plane to offer my suggestion that the advance be continued to the Swiss frontier.

  We billeted ourselves in friendly, middle-class houses in Langres; we enjoyed the comfort of our quarters after the really strenuous time that we had had during the past few days. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division reached Pontaillier-sur-Saône; on the 16th it was to go to Pontarlier and the 2nd Panzer Division to Auxonne-Dôle. XLI Army Corps was to continue to advance, with the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division moving ahead of the two panzer divisions.

  On the 16th of June the 1st Panzer Division managed to capture a bridge over the Saône intact, at Quitteur to the north of Gray. German planes bombed the bridge that was being built at Gray, for hours on end, and caused us considerable delay as a result. Since they apparently came from Army Group Leeb, there was no way we could get in touch with them to tell them of their mistake. Luckily they did not cause us any casualties.

  During the afternoon XXXIX Army Corps reached Besançon–Avanne; XLI Army Corps, with the 20th (Motorised) Infantry Division leading, moved through Port-sur-Saône, Vesoul, and Bourbonne. Thousands of prisoners were taken including, for the first time, Poles. Thirty tanks were captured at Besançon.

  On the 17th of June my most efficient chief of staff, Colonel Nehring, collected all the staff together on the little terrace between our quarters and the wall of the old fortress, to wish me a happy birthday. As a birthday present he was able to hand me a message which stated that the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division had reached the Swiss frontier. We were all delighted by this success, and I set off at once in order personally to congratulate the brave troops on the day of their great achievement. At about 12.00 hrs. I met General Freiherr von Langermann in Pontarlier, after a long drive during the course of which I passed most of his division advancing along my road. The men were in good spirits and waved cheerfully as I went by. We sent a message to supreme headquarters informing them that we had reached the Swiss border at Pontarlier, to which Hitler signalled back: ‘Your signal based on an error. Assume you mean Pontailler-sur-Saône.’ My reply, ‘No error. Am myself in Pontarlier on Swiss border,’ finally satisfied the distrustful OKW.

  I paid a short visit to the frontier and had a word with the leaders of the reconnaissance battalion. It was thanks to their tireless efforts that we had had such superb intelligence of the enemy. Among the best of those officers was Lieutenant von Bünau, who was later to lose his life in the service of Germany.

  From Pontarlier I sent a wireless signal, ordering XXXIX Army Corps immediately to change direction and to advance north-east. The 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division was to move along the border until it reached the frontier bend near Pruntrut and to clear the Jura of stragglers: 1st Panzer Division was to advance from Besançon through Montbéliard to Belfort: 2nd Panzer Division, advancing across what had been the line of march of those two divisions, was to go to Remiremont on the upper Moselle. At the same time the XLI Army Corps was to turn left towards épinal and Charme.

  Boundary between XXXIX and XLI Army Corps: the road fork south-west of Langres–Chalindrey–Pierrecourt–Membrey–Mailley–Vellefaux–Lure–Plancher (all inclusive to XLI Army Corps).

  Sketch Map 7

  Break through to the Swiss Border and into Upper Alsace. Situation 16.6–20.6.40.

  The purpose of this manœuvre was to establish contact with General Dollmann’s Seventh Army, which was advancing from Upper Alsace, and cut the communication of the French forces in Alsace-Lorraine with the rest of France. The difficult business of making a 90-degree turn was carried out with the same precision that my panzer divisions had shown in all their movements up to date. The crossed lines of advance which I had ordered did not result in any confusion. I had the satisfaction, that evening at my headquarters, of receiving a signal from Army Group Leeb in which I was informed that my Group was now subordinated to that Army Group and was to advance in the direction of Belfort–Épinal. I could reply that these orders were already being carried out.

  Six years later I was to share a cell in Nuremberg prison with Field-Marshal Ritter von Leeb. While sitting in that gloomy place we happened to discuss the events of 1940. Field-Marshal Ritter von Leeb told me that he had never understood how I managed to carry out his orders for the advance on Belfort–Épinal so quickly. I was able, belatedly enough, to give him the explanation. As a result of its operational role, the Panzer Group was able to see the situation from the same perspective as that of the Army Group and thus reach the same conclusions.

  We had taken up our quarters in Avanne, a beautiful place, with a lovely view over the River Doubs, near Besançon. At dinner there I had the pleasure of seeing my younger son, Kurt, once again. He had just been transferred from the 3rd Armoured Reconnaissance Battalion to Hitler’s bodyguard, the Führer Escort Battalion, and he took advantage of a courier mission to visit me here on my birthday.

  Towards midnight the operations officer of the 1st Panzer Division, Major Wenck, signalled that his division had just reached Montbéliard, which was the objective assigned to it by XXXIX Army Corps. The troops, however, still had plenty of fuel and there wa
s no reason why they should not go on. Since he could not reach his corps commander he wanted to know whether I would approve of the continuation of the division’s advance. They could reach Belfort during the night. Naturally I approved his request, particularly as I had never envisaged the division stopping in Montbéliard; XXXIX Army Corps, imagining that the division could not reach Belfort in one march as I had ordered, had given them Montbéliard as intermediary objective. At the critical moment the corps headquarters was on the move and could not, therefore, be reached by the division. It was the old story of giving armour the green light to the end of the road. The enemy was completely taken by surprise.