Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  The area for the attack was bounded on the front by the River Bug. Our first task was to secure crossings in the face of the enemy. This would be much easier if some degree of surprise could be obtained. I could not reckon on an immediate capture of the fortress of Brest-Litovsk, so my attacking armour would initially be split into two; I had therefore to ensure that my group did not suffer in consequence of this and also to secure the two open flanks of the Panzer Group. Once the Bug was crossed the right wing of the Group would be advancing along the edge of the Pripet Marshes, which are impassable to vehicles and very heavy going on foot: weak infantry forces of Fourth Army were to move through them. To the left of the Panzer Group there would be elements of Fourth Army attacking and, beyond them, the infantry of the Ninth Army. It was this left flank which was particularly threatened, since strong Soviet forces were known to be massing in the Bialystok area. It must be assumed that once these forces were aware of the danger to their rear from our panzer divisions, they would attempt to extricate themselves from encirclement along the line of the main road Volkovisk–Slonim.

  This double threat to the flanks was parried by two counter-measures:

  (a) through arranging our forces in depth, particularly on the more dangerously threatened left flank, and

  (b) by sending the Panzer Group’s 1st Cavalry Division through the marshes on our right which were wellnigh impassable to motorised formations.

  Further security was provided by the Fourth Army’s infantry divisions advancing behind the Panzer Group and by widespread air reconnaissance.

  In consequence of all this, the order of battle of the Panzer Group for the attack was as follows:

  Right Wing.

  XXIV Panzer Corps (General von Geyr), with:

  255th Infantry Division (under command only during the Bug crossing), from Vlodava to Maloryta,

  1st Cavalry Division, from Slavatycze through Maloryta to Pinsk,

  4th Panzer Division, from Koden to advance towards the Brest-Kobryn road,

  3rd Panzer Division, from north of Koden to advance towards the Brest-Kobryn road,

  10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, to advance behind as second wave of the assault.

  Centre.

  XII Army Corps (General Schroth), under command only during the initial phase, with:

  45th Infantry Division and

  31st Infantry Division, to advance between north of Koden and Neple, with objective the encirclement of Brest-Litovsk. All forces of the corps not needed for this purpose were to advance between the two roads Brest-Litovsk–Kobryn–Beresa Kartuska and Motykaly–Piliszcze–Pruzana, with the task of mopping up between XXIV Panzer Corps on their right and XLVII Panzer Corps on their left and of securing the internal flanks of the two panzer corps.

  Left Wing.

  XLVII Panzer Corps (General Lemelsen), with:

  18th Panzer Division and

  17th Panzer Division, between Legi and Pratulin, with the task of crossing the Rivers Bug and Lesna and advancing Vidomla–Pruzana–Slonim,

  29th (Motorised) Infantry Division advancing behind as second wave of the assault,

  167th Infantry Division (under command only during the Bug crossing), to the west of Pratulin.

  Panzer Group Reserve.

  XLVI Panzer Corps (General von Vietinghoff), with

  10th Panzer Division

  SS Division Das Reich, and

  Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, to be held back in the area Radzyn–Lukov–Deblin until XLVII Panzer Corps was clear of the Bug bridges, when it would move forward behind the left wing of the Panzer Group.

  On June 6th the Chief of the Army General Staff paid a visit to the Panzer Group. He expressed an opinion that in order to be in fit condition for performing their principal task of thrusting deep into the enemy’s defences, the panzer divisions should be kept back during the initial phase, while infantry divisions carried out the first assault. For the reasons I have already given I could not agree to this alteration to the plan.

  I received at my headquarters only bare indications of the Supreme Command’s intentions for the second phase of the operation after the first objectives (in the case of my corps the area Roslavl–Elnya–Smolensk) had been reached. These envisaged first of all the capture of Leningrad and the Baltic coast, so that contact might be established with the Finns and Army Group North safely supplied by sea. A proof that such plans were being seriously studied is supplied by the operational instructions which were issued; in these it was stated that Colonel-General Hoth’s 3rd Panzer Group and possibly also my Group were to halt in the Smolensk area and prepare to swing north in support of the operations of Army Group North. This operation would have had one great advantage; it would once and for all have secured the left wing of the German armies fighting in Russia. In my opinion this was the best plan that could have been devised in the circumstances, but unfortunately I never heard anything more about it.

  On June 14th Hitler assembled all the commanders of Army Groups, Armies and Panzer Groups in Berlin in order to explain his reasons for attacking Russia and to receive final reports on the preparations that had been made. He spoke on the following lines. He could not defeat England. Therefore in order to bring the war to a close he must win a complete victory on the Continent. Germany’s position on the mainland would only be unassailable when Russia had been defeated. His detailed exposition of the reasons that led him to fight a preventive war against the Russians was unconvincing. The tension that had arisen as a result of German penetration of the Balkans, the intervention of the Russians in Finland, the occupation of the Baltic states, such were the political reasons; these were as insufficient causes for taking a resolve of such drastic dimensions as were the ideological theories of National-Socialist dogma and certain reports of preparations for attack on the part of the Russians that had come in. So long as the war in the West was still undecided, any new undertaking must result in a war on two fronts; and Adolf Hitler’s Germany was even less capable of fighting such a war than had been the Germany of 1914. The assembled company listened to Hitler’s speech in silence and then, since there was to be no discussion, dispersed, still in silence and with heavy hearts.

  During the afternoon, at the military conference concerning the preparations that had been made, I was asked only one question. How long would it take me to reach Minsk? I replied: ‘Five to six days.’ The attack began on the 22nd of June and I arrived at Minsk on the 27th, while Hoth, advancing from Suvalki, had already occupied that city from the north on the 26th.

  Before I turn to describing the operations of my Panzer Group, I should like to outline the general situation of the German Army at the beginning of this decisive campaign in Russia.

  According to the information available to me, the German Army on the 22nd of June, 1941, consisted of 205 divisions as follows:

  38 divisions in the West,

  12 divisions in Norway,

  1 division in Denmark,

  7 divisions in the Balkans,

  2 divisions in Libya, and therefore

  145 divisions available for operations in the East.

  This dispersal of strength involved an unpleasant dissipation. The figure of 38 divisions in the West appeared particularly high. 12 divisions for Norway also formed an unnecessarily large garrison.

  A consequence of the Balkan campaign was that the Russian offensive could not be launched until late in the summer.

  Far more significant, however, than either of these facts was the underestimate of the Russian as an enemy. Our outstanding military attaché in Moscow, General Köstring, had reported on the military strength of that gigantic country: Hitler attached as little importance to these reports as he did to others concerning the production capacity of Russian industry or the stability of the Russian political system. On the contrary, he had succeeded in infecting his immediate military entourage with his own baseless optimism. The OKW and OKH were so serenely confident of victory before winter set in that w
inter clothing had only been prepared for every fifth man in the army.

  It was not until August 30th, 1941, that the OKH became seriously concerned with the problem of supplying major portions of the army with winter clothing. On this day an entry made in an OKH diary reads: “In view of recent developments which are likely to necessitate operations against limited objectives even during the winter, the Operations Department will draft a report on the winter clothing that will be required for this purpose. After approval by the Chief of the Army General Staff, this report will be passed to the Organisation Department for necessary action.”

  It is frequently maintained nowadays that Hitler and only Hitler was responsible for the lack of winter clothing in the army in 1941. I can in no way subscribe to this belief. Proof of this is that the Luftwaffe and the Waffen-SS were well and adequately equipped and had laid in the necessary stocks in plenty of time. But the supreme command was sunk in its dream of defeating the Russian Army in eight or ten weeks; this defeat would result, they thought, in the political collapse of the Soviets. So confident were they of this that in the autumn of 1941 a considerable portion of Germany’s industry was switched from war production to other purposes. It was even proposed to move 60 to 80 of the divisions in the east back to Germany at the beginning of winter: what remained would suffice to control Russia until spring came. Those remaining divisions were to occupy comfortable quarters in a well-prepared defensive line to be built during the autumn. It all seemed to be very well thought out and delightfully simple. A description of events as they occurred will show how far these ideas were divorced from the cruel reality.

  Finally, an allusion must be made to an event which was to leave a deep stain on Germany’s reputation.

  Shortly before the opening of hostilities the OKW sent an order direct to all corps and divisions concerning the treatment that was to be given to the civilian population and to prisoners of war in Russia. It specified that in the event of excesses being committed against civilians or prisoners, the responsible soldier was not automatically to be tried and punished according to military law; disciplinary action was only to be taken at the discretion of the man’s immediate unit commander. This order was obviously likely to have the most unfortunate effect on the preservation of discipline. The Commander-in-Chief of the Army had apparently realised this himself, for an appendix to the order, signed by Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, stated that the order would only be carried out if there was no danger of discipline suffering thereby. Since both I and my corps commanders were immediately convinced that discipline must suffer if the order were published, I forbade its forwarding to the divisions and ordered that it be returned to Berlin. This order, which was to play an important part in the post-war trials of German generals by our former enemies, was consequently never carried out in my Panzer Group. At the time I dutifully informed the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group that I was not publishing or obeying this order.

  The equally notorious, so-called ‘Commissar Order’ never even reached my Panzer Group. No doubt Army Group Centre had already decided not to forward it. Therefore the ‘Commissar Order’ was never carried out by my troops either.

  Looking back, one can only deeply regret that neither the OKW nor the OKH blocked these two orders in the first place. Many brave and innocent soldiers would have thus been saved bitter suffering, and the good name of Germany would have been spared a great shame. Regardless of whether the Russians had signed the Hague Agreement or not, whether or not they had approved the Geneva Convention, German soldiers must accept their international obligations and must behave according to the dictates of a Christian conscience. Even without harsh orders the effects of war on the population of an enemy country are cruel enough, and the Russian civilians were as innocent of causing this war as were our own.

  Opening Operations

  In describing the events which now took place I have in places given an exact description of how my time was spent. I have done this in order to show the spiritual and physical demands that were made on the commander of a Panzer Group during the Russian Campaign.

  After Hitler’s speech to the generals on June 14th 1 flew to Warsaw, on the 15th, where my staff was quartered. The days until the opening of the attack on June 22nd I spent visiting the troops and their jumping-off places and also the neighbouring units in order to ensure full co-operation. The march to the assembly areas and the final preparations for the attack passed smoothly enough. On June 17th I examined the course of the River Bug, which was our front line. On the 19th I visited General von Mackensen’s III Army Corps, which was immediately to the right of my Panzer Group. On the 20th and 21st I visited the forward units of my corps to make sure that all preparations for the attack were satisfactorily completed. Detailed study of the behaviour of the Russians convinced me that they knew nothing of our intentions. We had observation of the courtyard of Brest-Litovsk citadel and could see them drilling by platoons to the music of a military band. The strong points along their bank of the Bug were unoccupied. They had made scarcely any noticeable progress in strengthening their fortified positions during the past few weeks. So the prospects of our attack achieving surprise were good and the question therefore arose whether the one hour’s artillery preparation which had been planned was now necessary after all. I finally decided not to cancel it; this was simply a precaution lest unexpected Russian counter-measures cause us avoidable casualties.

  On the fateful day of June 22nd, 1941, I went at 02.10 hrs. to my Group command post which was located in an observation tower south of Bohukaly, 9 miles north-west of Brest-Litovsk. It was still dark when I arrived there at 03.10 hrs. At 03.15 hrs. our artillery opened up. At 03.40 hrs. the first dive-bomber attack went in. At 04.15 hrs. advance units of the 17th and 18th Panzer Divisions began to cross the Bug. At 04.45 hrs. the leading tanks of the 18th Panzer Division forded the river. For this they were equipped with the waterproofing that had been tested for Operation Sea-lion, which enabled them to move through 13 feet of water.

  At 06.50 hrs. I crossed the Bug in an assault boat in the neighbourhood of Kolodno. My command staff, consisting of two armoured wireless trucks, a number of cross-country vehicles and some motorcyclists, followed at 08.30 hrs. I began by following the tank tracks of 18th Panzer Division and soon reached the bridge over the Lesna, whose capture was important for the advance of XLVII Panzer Corps; there I found nobody except some Russian pickets. The Russians took to their heels when they saw my vehicles. Two of my orderly officers set off after them, against my wishes; unfortunately they both lost their lives as a result.

  At 10.25 hrs. the leading tank company reached the Lesna and crossed the bridge. Next to arrive was the divisional commander, General Nehring. I accompanied the 18th Panzer Division in their advance until mid-afternoon. At 16.30 hrs. I returned to the bridgehead at Kolodno and from there I went at 18.30 hrs. to my command post.

  We had managed to take the enemy by surprise along the entire Panzer Group front. To the south of Brest-Litovsk the XXIV Panzer Corps had captured the bridges over the Bug intact. To the north-west of the fortress our bridges were being built according to plan. The enemy, however, soon recovered from his initial surprise and put up a tough defence in his prepared positions. The important citadel of Brest-Litovsk held out with remarkable stubbornness for several days, thus depriving us of the use of the road and rail communications across the Bug and Muchaviec.

  In the evening the Panzer Group was fighting around Maloryta, Kobryn, Brest-Litovsk, and Pruzana. At the last-named place the 18th Panzer Division became involved in the first tank battle of the campaign.

  On June 23rd I left my headquarters at 04.10 hrs. and went first to XII Army Corps where General Schroth informed me about the fighting in and around Brest-Litovsk. I then drove to XLVII Panzer Corps at the village of Bildeiki, some 14 miles north-north-east of Brest-Litovsk. There I talked to General Lemelsen and also spoke on the telephone to my headquarters in order to receive the latest informat
ion about the general situation. I went on to 17th Panzer Division, where I arrived at 08.00 hrs.; the commander of the division’s rifle brigade, General Ritter von Weber, described to me what his men were doing. At 08.30 hrs. I met General Nehring of the 18th Panzer Division and then returned to see General Lemelsen once again. I next drove to Pruzana, where the headquarters of my Panzer Group was now to be located. The command portion of the staff arrived there at 19.00 hrs.

  On this day the XXIV Panzer Corps was fighting its way forward towards Sluzk along the Kobryn–Beresa–Kartuska road.

  I gained the impression that the XLVII Panzer Corps was likely soon to be heavily engaged with Russian forces moving south-east from the direction of Bialystok, and I therefore resolved to spend the next day once again with this corps.

  On June 24th I left my headquarters at 08.25 hrs. and drove towards Slonim. The 17th Panzer Division had meanwhile arrived at this town. Between Rozana and Slonim 1 ran into Russian infantry which was laying down fire on the main road. A battery of the 17th Panzer Division and dismounted motor-cyclists were returning the enemy fire without any particular success. I joined in this action and by firing the machine-gun in my armoured command vehicle succeeded in dislodging the enemy from his position; I was then able to drive on. At 11.30 hrs. I arrived at the headquarters of the 17th Panzer Division, at that time located in the western outskirts of Slonim, where I found not only the divisional commander, General von Arnim, but also the corps commander, General Lemelsen. While we were discussing the situation there was a sudden outburst of lively rifle and machine-gun fire in our rear; our view of the road from Bialystok was blocked by a burning lorry, so that we were in ignorance of what was going on until two Russian tanks appeared from out of the smoke. They were attempting to force their way into Slonim, with cannons and machine-guns blazing, and were pursued by German Panzer IV’s which were also firing heavily. The Russian tanks noticed the group of officers, of which I was one, and we were immediately subjected to a rain of shells, which, fired at such extremely close range, both deafened and blinded us for a few moments. Being old soldiers we had immediately thrown ourselves to the ground; only poor Lieutenant-Colonel Feller, who had come to us on a mission from the Commander of the Training Army, and who was unaccustomed to active service, was too slow and suffered a very painful wound in consequence. Also the commander of an anti-tank battalion, Lieutenant-Colonel Dallmer-Zerbe, received a severe wound from which, I regret to say, he died a few days later. The Russian tanks succeeded in forcing their way into the town where they were eventually put out of action.