Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  At 23.00 hrs. I reached my new command post, 1 mile south of Prudki.

  During the next few days the heavy Russian attacks went on with undiminished violence. Nevertheless there was a certain progress made on the right wing, while 18th Panzer Division and the first of the infantry divisions provided welcome reinforcement to the centre. But all attempts to advance towards Dorogobush were a complete failure.

  Intelligence reports during the last few days indicated that four new Russian armies were likely to appear eastward of the line Novgorod–Severski—west of Bryansk–Elnya–Rzhev–Ostashkov: the Russians were also believed to be fortifying this line.

  By July 25th the following points had been reached:

  1st Cavalry Division, the area south-east of Novye Bychov; 4th Panzer Division, Chernikov–Krichev; 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Chvikov; 3rd Panzer Division, Lobkovitchi.

  263rd Infantry Division, Machine-gun Battalion 5, Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, 18th Panzer Division and 292nd Infantry Division, the area south of Prudki and around the airfield of Shatalovka: this latter was now in use by our support planes, and must therefore be kept out of range of the enemy artillery.

  10th Panzer Division, Elnya; SS-Das Reich, north of Elnya.

  17th Panzer Division, Chenzovo and to the south; 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, south of Smolensk.

  137th Infantry Division, Smolensk.

  Enemy cavalry cut the railway line near Bobruisk.

  On July 26th the Russians continued to attack around Elnya. I requested that the 268th Infantry Division be sent up to strengthen the Elnya salient and to enable the panzer troops to be withdrawn; after all their marching and fighting they badly needed a period of rest and maintenance. At noon I went to 3rd Panzer Division to congratulate Model on a well-earned Knight’s Cross and to learn the position on his division’s front. Next I drove to 4th Panzer Division where I saw Generals Freiherr von Geyr and Freiherr von Langermann. Towards evening a message came in that the Russians had broken into our Smolensk bridgehead to the north of the Dnieper in the 137th Infantry Division’s sector.

  Wireless intelligence had informed us that there was a connection between the Russian 21st Army at Gomel, the 13th Army at Rodnia and the 4th Army to the south of Roslavl.

  On this day Hoth succeeded in closing the pocket east of Smolensk from the north. The remnants of ten Russian divisions were thus at the mercy of 3rd Panzer Group. In our rear strong Russian forces which had been holding out around Mogilev were finally destroyed.

  On returning to my headquarters I received a signal at 22.00 hrs. from Army Group, ordering me to be at Orsha airfield for a conference at 12.00 hrs. next day. Such a conference was necessary, since during the last few days divergences of opinion concerning the situation had appeared and these had to be cleared up. While Fourth Army had regarded the threat to the Smolensk area as very serious, we in the Panzer Group were of the opinion that our most dangerous enemy was now to the south of Roslavl and east of Elnya. As a result of units being retained on the Dnieper, west of Smolensk, crises and losses had occurred in the Roslavl area which could have been avoided. The relationship between the commander of the Fourth Army and myself had, in consequence, become strained to an undesirable degree.

  On July 27th, accompanied by my chief of staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Freiherr von Liebenstein, I flew over Orsha to Borissov, the headquarters of the Army Group, in order to receive my instructions for future operations and to report on the condition of the troops under my command. I expected to be told to push on towards Moscow or at least Bryansk; to my surprise I learned that Hitler had ordered that my 2nd Panzer Group was to go for Gomel in collaboration with Second Army. This meant that my Panzer Group would be swung round and would be advancing in a south-westerly direction, that is to say towards Germany; but Hitler was anxious to encircle the eight to ten Russian divisions in the Gomel area. We were informed that Hitler was convinced that large-scale envelopments were not justified: the theory on which they were based was a false one put out by the General Staff Corps, and he believed that events in France had proved his point. He preferred an alternative plan by which small enemy forces were to be encircled and destroyed piecemeal and the enemy thus bled to death. All the officers who took part in this conference were of the opinion that this was incorrect: that these manævres on our part simply gave the Russians time to set up new formations and to use their inexhaustible man-power for the creation of fresh defensive lines in the rear area: even more important, we were sure that this strategy would not result in the urgently necessary, rapid conclusion of the campaign.

  The OKH, too, had appreciated the situation quite differently a few days before. Proof of this lies in the following document, which reached me from a reliable Service source. Dated July 23rd, 1941, it runs as follows:

  ‘Decisions concerning future operations are based on the belief that once the first operational objectives, as laid down in the orders for the campaign, have been reached, the bulk of the Russian Army capable of operational employment will have been beaten. On the other hand it must be reckoned that, by reason of his strong reserves of man-power and by further ruthless expenditure of his forces, the enemy will be able to continue to offer stubborn resistance to the German advance. In this connection, the point of main effort of the enemy’s defence may be expected to be in the Ukraine, in front of Moscow and in front of Leningrad.

  The intention of the OKH is to defeat the existing or newly created enemy forces, and by a speedy capture of the most important industrial areas in the Ukraine west of the Volga, in the area Tula–Gorki–Rybinsk–Moscow, and around Leningrad to deprive the enemy of the possibility of material rearmament. With these ends in view the individual tasks for the Army Groups and the major necessary redistribution of force will be worked out in greater detail and forwarded in writing in due course.’

  Regardless of what decisions Hitler might now take, the immediate need of Panzer Group 2 was to dispose of the most dangerous enemy threat to its right flank. I therefore proposed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Group my plan for an attack on Roslavl; the capture of this important road centre would give us the mastery of the communications to the east, the south, and the south-west, and I asked that I be given the necessary additional forces to carry it out.

  My plan was accepted and Panzer Group 2 was allotted:

  (a) for the attack on Roslavl, VII Army Corps with the 7th, 23rd, 78th and 197th Infantry Divisions.

  (b) for the relief of the panzer divisions in the Elnya bulge which were in need of rest and maintenance, the XX Army Corps with the 15th and 268th Infantry Divisions.

  Meanwhile the 1st Cavalry Division was attached to Second Army.

  The Panzer Group was no longer subordinate to Fourth Army. It was also renamed Armeegruppe Guderian.1

  The attack for neutralising the threat to our flank from the Roslavl area was mounted as follows:

  XXIV Panzer Corps, with two divisions (the 10th Motorised Infantry Division and the 7th Infantry Division from VII Army Corps), was to take over the defence of the deep flank in the area Klimovitchi–Miloslavitchi. Meanwhile with the 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions it was to capture Roslavl and there make firm contact with the IX Army Corps which would be advancing from the north between the rivers Oster and Desna.

  VII Army Corps, with the 23rd and 197th Infantry Divisions, was to advance in conjunction with the 3rd Panzer Division to the line of the road Roslavl–Stodolishtche–Smolensk by way of Petrovitchi–Chislavitchi. The 78th Infantry Division was to move forward behind these two divisions as second wave.

  IX Army Corps was to advance southward with the 263rd Infantry Division between the highway and the River Oster and with the 292nd Infantry Division between the rivers Oster and Desna. Point of main effort was to be on the left flank, towards the Roslavl–Yekimovitchi–Moscow road. The 137th Infantry Division, brought down from Smolensk, was to be responsible for protecting the left flank. The corps was further streng
thened by elements of the XLVII Panzer Corps, notably by that corps’ artillery.

  The attack was to be started by XXIV Panzer Corps and VII Army Corps on August 1st. The IX Army Corps did not believe that it could be ready by that date and was therefore to attack on August 2nd.

  The next days were devoted to making the necessary preparations. In particular the newly subordinated infantry corps, which up to then had scarcely been in action against the Russians, had to be taught my methods of attacking. Since they had never worked in such close contact with tanks, problems arose which had to be cleared up. This was particularly the case with IX Army Corps, whose outstanding commander, General Geyer, was well known to me personally, since he had twice been my superior officer; first in the old days at the Truppenamt at the War Ministry and later when he was the commander of Army Area (Wehrkreis) V, in which Würzburg was located. General Geyer was famous for his ‘razor-sharp intelligence,’ on which Ludendorff had made a celebrated comment as far back as the First World War. Now of course he was quick to detect the weaknesses in my plan of attack and pointed them out at a corps commanders’ conference. I attempted to silence his criticism of my tactics by saying: ‘This attack is mathematical,’ by which I meant that its success was certain. General Geyer was by no means convinced that this was the case, and I had to put up a stubborn self-defence against the remarks of my old commander during that conference in the little Russian schoolroom. It was only on the field of battle that he recognised the correctness of the procedure that I had laid down; then he contributed greatly, by means of his outstanding personal courage, to the success of the enterprise.

  On July 29th Colonel Schmundt, Hitler’s chief adjutant, brought me the Oak Leaves to the Knight’s Cross and took the opportunity to discuss my intentions with me. He explained that Hitler had three objectives in view:

  1. The north-east, that is to say Leningrad. This city must be captured at all costs in order to free the Baltic for our shipping and to ensure the supply route from Sweden and the provisioning of Army Group North.

  2. Moscow, whose industries were important, and

  3. The south-east, that is the Ukraine.

  According to what Schmundt told me, Hitler had not yet made up his mind about an attack on the Ukraine. I therefore urged Schmundt with all the force of which I was capable to advise Hitler in favour of a direct push to capture Moscow, the heart of Russia, and against the undertaking of any operations that must involve us in losses without being decisive. Over and above that I begged him not to withhold the new tanks and our replacements, since without them this campaign could not be brought to a speedy and successful conclusion.

  On July 30th thirteen enemy attacks on Elnya were repulsed.

  On July 31st the OKH liaison officer, Major von Bredow, arrived back at my headquarters with the following information: ‘It is now considered that the original objectives for October 1st, the line Lake Onezhskoe–the Volga, cannot be reached by that date. On the other hand it is believed with certainty that the line Leningrad–Moscow and to the south can be reached. The OKH and the Chief of the General Staff are engaged in a thankless undertaking, since the conduct of all operations is being controlled from the very highest level. Final decisions have not yet been taken concerning the future course of events.’

  But everything now depended on what these final decisions concerning the next stage of the campaign were to be, even down to such details as to whether or not Elnya should be held; if there was to be no further advance on Moscow the Elnya salient offered us only the danger of continuous, heavy casualties. Ammunition supply for the positional warfare which had developed on this sector was insufficient. This was hardly surprising when it is realised that Elnya was 450 miles from the nearest adequate railhead. It is true that the railway track had already been relaid as far as Orsha to conform to the German gauge, but it was still only capable of carrying very limited traffic. The stretches of track which had not been relaid were useless since there were but few Russian locomotives available.

  All the same there was still hope that Hitler might change his mind and come to a decision other than that which had been outlined to us during the Army Group Centre conference at Borissov on July 27th.

  On August 1st XXIV Panzer and VII Army Corps began their attack on Roslavl. Early in the morning of that day I went to VII Army Corps, but could find neither the corps’ nor the 23rd Infantry Division’s headquarters along the road of advance. While hunting for them I found myself among the leading horse cavalry of the 23rd Infantry Division’s advance guard. Since there could be no headquarters ahead of them I stopped and let the cavalrymen give me their impressions of the enemy up to date. I then watched while the 67th Infantry Regiment marched past me; its commander was Lieutenant-Colonel Freiherr von Bissing, with whom I had for many years shared a house at Berlin-Schlachtensee. The comments of his soldiers, when they recognised me, betrayed pleasurable surprise. On my way to 3rd Panzer Division I became involved in a bombing attack by our own planes on the 23rd Infantry Division’s march route which resulted in heavy casualties. The first bomb burst 5½ yards from my car. Insufficient training and a lack of combat experience on the part of the young aviators were the cause of this unfortunate occurrence; and this despite clear recognition signals on the part of the troops on the ground and very plain orders to the fliers concerning the roads that we would be using. Apart from this the advance of the 23rd Infantry Division was completed without meeting serious opposition.

  I spent the afternoon with the leading units of the 3rd Panzer Division in the area immediately to the west of the Oster and south of Choronievo. General Model informed me that he had taken the bridges over the stream intact and had thus been able to capture an enemy battery. I expressed my thanks for the performance of their troops to a number of battalion commanders on the spot.

  In the evening I was at XXIV Panzer Corps headquarters in order to complete my picture of the day’s events. I returned to my group headquarters at 02.00 hrs., after having been away from it for twenty-two hours.

  Sketch Map 13

  Roslavl. Situation 30.7–3.8.41.

  The main objective of our attack, Roslavl, had been captured.

  In the morning of August 2nd I visited the IX Army Corps. From the command post of the 509th Infantry Regiment, of the 292nd Infantry Division, it was possible to watch the Russians as they withdrew. I then drove to Infantry Regiment 507, which was moving on Kosaki behind an advance guard. I finally visited the regiments and staff of the 137th Infantry Division and instructed them to continue their advance during the night so as to reach the highroad to Moscow as soon as possible. I arrived back at my headquarters at 22.30 hrs.

  The performance of IX Army Corps during August 2nd had not been very impressive. I therefore decided to spend the next day, the 3rd, once again with this corps in order to hasten its advance and to ensure the success of the attack. I drove first to the headquarters of the 292nd Infantry Division, near Kovali, and from there to the 507th Infantry Regiment. On the road I met the corps commander with whom I had a detailed conversation concerning the control of the battle. When I arrived at Infantry Regiment 507 I advanced on foot with the leading rifle company and thus ensured that there were no needless delays without having to waste many words to do so. Three kilometres before the great Moscow highroad was reached I recognised, through my glasses, tanks to the north-east of Roslavl. Everything immediately halted. I therefore told the assault gun, which was accompanying the infantry vanguard, to fire white signal shells, the agreed recognition signal for our troops: ‘Here I am!’ Immediately I received a similar signal in answer from the Moscow road. They were my panzer troops from Panzer Regiment 35 of the 4th Panzer Division.

  I now got into my car and drove over to the tanks. The last Russians threw away their guns and took to their heels. On the Moscow road where the bridge over the Ostrik was blown, the men of the 2nd Company of Panzer Regiment 35 scrambled over beams and planks to greet me. This was the comp
any which my elder son had until recently commanded. He had won the hearts of his men and their confidence and affection for him were extended to his father. Lieutenant Krause, who was now the company commander, described his experiences to me and I congratulated the whole company on their performance.

  The encirclement of the Russians around Roslavl was now complete. Between three and four divisions must be trapped. The task was now to hold them fast until they should surrender. Since a half-hour later General Geyer also appeared at this spot, I pointed out to him the great importance of holding the Moscow highway. The 292nd Infantry Division was to be responsible for containing the west side of the encirclement, the 137th Infantry Division the eastern side along the Desna.

  Back at my headquarters I learned that VII Army Corps had already taken 3,700 prisoners, 60 guns, 90 tanks and an armoured train.

  Meanwhile around Elnya heavy battles continued to rage, involving a great expenditure of ammunition. Our last reserve, the guard company of my Group headquarters, was sent to this sector.

  On August 3rd the following points were reached:

  7th Infantry Division and 3rd Panzer Division to the west of Klimovitchi; 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Chislavitchi ; 78th Infantry Division, Ponetovka; 23rd Infantry Division, Roslavl; 197th Infantry Division and Machine-gun Battalion 5 to the north of Roslavl.

  263rd Infantry Division to the south of Prudki; 292nd Infantry Division, Kosaki; 137th Infantry Division, the east flank on the Desna.

  10th Panzer Division, 268th Infantry Division, SS-Das Reich, Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland, the area about Elnya; 17th Panzer Division to the north of Elnya; 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division to the south of Smolensk; 18th Panzer Division, Prudki.

  XX Army Corps was in process of arriving.