I was ordered to Army Group headquarters early on the morning of August 4th in order to report to Hitler for the first time since the opening of the Russian Campaign. We had reached a decisive turning-point of the war.
Moscow or Kiev?
The conference with Hitler took place in Novy Borissov, at the headquarters of Army Group Centre. Those present were Hitler and Schmundt, Field-Marshal von Bock, Hoth and myself, as well as a representative of the OHK, Colonel Heusinger, the Chief of the Operations Department. We were each given the opportunity to express our views and we did this alone so that no man knew what his predecessor might have said. But Field-Marshal von Bock, Hoth and I shared the opinion that a continuation of the offensive towards Moscow was of vital importance. Hoth reported that the earliest date by which his Panzer Group could resume its advance was August 20th; the date I gave for my Group was the 15th. Then Hitler assembled the whole company together and began himself to speak. He designated the industrial area about Leningrad as his primary objective. He had not yet decided whether Moscow or the Ukraine would come next. He seemed to incline towards the latter target for a number of reasons: first, Army Group South seemed to be laying the groundwork for a victory in that area: secondly, he believed that the raw materials and agricultural produce of the Ukraine were necessary to Germany for the further prosecution of the war: and finally he thought it essential that the Crimea, ‘that Soviet aircraft carrier operating against the Rumanian oilfields,’ be neutralised. He hoped to be in possession of Moscow and Kharkov by the time winter began. No decisions were reached on this day concerning those problems of strategy which we regarded as most important.
The conference then began to discuss more detailed questions. The important point for my Panzer Group was a decision not to evacuate the Elnya salient, since it was not yet known whether this salient might not still be needed as a jumping-off point for an attack towards Moscow. I stressed the fact that our tank engines had become very worn as a result of the appalling dust; in consequence they must be replaced with all urgency if any more large-scale tank operations were to be carried out during the current year. It was also essential that replacements be provided for our tank casualties from current production. After a certain amount of humming and hawing Hitler promised to supply 300 new tank engines for the whole Eastern Front, a figure which I described as totally inadequate. As for new tanks, we were not to get any, since Hitler intended to retain them all at home for the equipping of newly set-up formations. In the ensuing argument I stated that we could only cope with the Russians’ great numerical superiority in tanks if our tank losses were rapidly made good again. Hitler then said: ‘If I had known that the figures for Russian tank strength which you gave in your book were in fact the true ones, I would not—I believe—ever have started this war.’ He was referring to my book Achtung! Panzer!, published in 1937, in which I had estimated Russian tank strength at that time as 10,000; both the Chief of the Army General Staff, Beck, and the censor had disagreed with this statement. It had cost me a lot of trouble to get that figure printed; but I had been able to show that intelligence reports at the time spoke of 17,000 Russian tanks and that my estimate was therefore, if anything, a very conservative one. To imitate the ostrich in political matters has never been a satisfactory method of avoiding danger; yet this is what Hitler, as well as his more important political, economic and even military advisers, chose to do over and over again. The consequences of this deliberate blindness in the face of hard facts were devastating; and it was we who now had to bear them.
While flying back I decided in any case to make the necessary preparations for an attack towards Moscow.
Back at my headquarters I learned that IX Army Corps, worried about a Russian break-through in the Yermolino area on the southeastern edge of the encirclement, had withdrawn from the Moscow highway; in consequence the danger had arisen that the Russians encircled on August 3rd might now break out. Early on the 5th I therefore hurried to VII Army Corps and drove along the Moscow highway in order to plug any gaps in the southern flank of our encirclement. On my way I came across elements of the 15th Infantry Division, destined for Elnya, and was able to brief the divisional commander on conditions in that sector. I then went on to the 197th Infantry Division, whose commander, General Meier-Rabingen, informed me that the encirclement was no longer complete and that the Russians controlled the Moscow highway, at least by fire. At 4th Panzer Division I learned that the tanks of Panzer Regiment 35 had been relieved. I immediately got into wireless communication with XXIV Panzer Corps, which I made responsible for the security of the Moscow highway, and then drove back to VII Army Corps. This corps had already instructed the Reconnaissance Battalion of the 23rd Infantry Division to prevent any break-out by the Russians inside our encirclement. The measures so far taken seemed to me insufficient and 1 therefore set off, together with the chief of staff of the corps, Colonel Krebs, for Roslavl. (Krebs, an old friend from the days of the Goslar Jaeger Battalion, was to succeed me as Chief of Staff of the Army in the spring of 1945.) There I came upon Lieutenant Krause’s company, the 2nd Company of Panzer Regiment 35, withdrawing to its rest area; the company commander was still engaged with the enemy. Until that morning the company had been beating off enemy attempts to break out, had destroyed a number of Russian guns and had taken several hundred prisoners. It had then withdrawn according to orders. I immediately turned the trusty company right about and told them to reoccupy their old positions in the line. I next sent off II Battalion of Infantry Regiment 332 to the Ostrik bridge, finally alerted such anti-aircraft troops as were available in Roslavl, and then set off for the front myself. I arrived at the Ostrik bridge exactly as a group of a hundred Russians appeared, moving towards it from the north. They were driven off. The bridge had been repaired in the course of the past few days and our tanks, driving across it, frustrated the enemy’s attempts to break out. After the tanks had established contact with the 137th Infantry Division, I went once again to the headquarters of VII Army Corps; there I instructed General Martinek, a tried and true Austrian, who commanded VII Army Corp’s artillery, to be responsible for keeping a careful watch on the danger spots along the Moscow highway. I then flew to my headquarters, where I signalled IX Army Corps to establish contact with Battle Group Martinek.
Sketch Map 14
Krichev—Miloslavitchi. Situation 9.8.41.
I now told my staff to prepare for an advance on Moscow, as follows: the Panzer Corps were to be committed on the right, along the Moscow highway, while the infantry corps were to be brought forward in the centre and on the left wing. I intended my point of main effort to be on my right: by attacking the relatively weak Russian front on either side of the Moscow highway, and then rolling up that front from Spas Demiansk to Viasma, I hoped to facilitate Hoth’s advance and bring our forward movement towards Moscow into the open. As a result of these ideas of mine I refused an OKH request, dated August 6th, that panzer divisions be detached from my command for an attack on Rogachev on the Dnieper, which lay far behind my front. My intelligence established that on this day there were hardly any enemy forces for a considerable distance around Roslavl. Towards Bryansk and the south there was no enemy for some 25 miles. This was confirmed on the following day.
FIG.10. Dawn, June 22, 1941
FIG.11. Russia: The road forward
FIG.12. Bridge building over the Dnieper near Kopys.
FIG.13. The Battle of Shklov.
By August 8th the battle of Roslavl was more or less over. We had captured 38,000 prisoners, 200 tanks and an equal number of guns. It was a considerable and highly satisfactory victory.
But before the attack on Moscow could be launched, or any other major operations undertaken, one condition must be fulfilled: our deep right flank in the Krichev area had to be secured. The clearing of this flank was also essential before Second Army would be in a position to attack Rogachev. Army Group (Bock) shared my opinion that the detachment of tank strength from my Panzer G
roup to Second Army would be a mistake in view of the long march involved (Roslavl–Rogachev 125 miles: there and back 250 miles) and the consequent inevitable wear and tear to the armoured equipment. Both staffs regarded the resumption of the advance on Moscow as the primary objective. Despite this clear recognition of the true facts, I continued to receive demands from Army Group—no doubt under pressure from the OKH—that I ‘send a few tanks off to Propoisk.’ A stop was finally put to this business by reason of a decision of General Freiherr von Geyr’s: this involved the elimination of the constant threat to his right flank by attacking the enemy in the Miloslavitchi area to the south of Krichev. I approved this plan and persuaded Army Group to do likewise, so no more was heard about sending tanks to Propoisk.
On August 8th I visited the corps and divisions in and around Roslavl and to the south. On August 9th I joined the 4th Panzer Division for XXIV Panzer Corps’ attack. The attack by Panzer Regiment 35 and Rifle Regiment 12 went in as though it were a model attack on the training-ground: Colonel Schneider’s artillery gave valuable support.
A significant indication of the attitude of the civilian population is provided by the fact that women came out from their villages on to the very battlefield bringing wooden platters of bread and butter and eggs and, in my case at least, refused to let me move on before I had eaten. Unfortunately this friendly attitude towards the Germans lasted only so long as the more benevolent military administration was in control. The so-called ‘Reich commissars’ soon managed to alienate all sympathy from the Germans and thus to prepare the ground for all the horrors of partisan warfare.
For some reason unknown to me the 2nd Panzer Division, which had been kept in OKH reserve, was sent off to the West—that is to say to France—on August 10th.
The advance of Second Army on Gomel during these few days was made more difficult by the fact that the roads had no foundations; this was a strong argument against attempting to follow the infantry through that area.
By August 10th the following points had been reached:
7th Infantry Division area south of Chotovitchi; 3rd and 4th Panzer Division attacking south-west of Miloslavitchi; 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Miloslavitchi; 78th Infantry Division, Sloboda with advance units Buchan; 197th Infantry Division, Ostrovaia with advance units Aleshnia.
29th (Motorised) Infantry Division, Roslavl; 23rd Infantry Division resting north of Roslavl; 137th and 263rd Infantry Divisions along the Desna.
10th Panzer Division west of Elnya; 17th Panzer Division north-west of Elnya; 18th Panzer Division east of Prudki; SS-Das Reich and Infantry Regiment Gross-Deutschland in rest areas north-west of Elnya.
Up to this point all the steps taken by the Panzer Group had been based on the belief that both the Army Group and the OKH regarded the operations towards Moscow as the decisive move. Despite the Novy Borissov conference of August 4th, I had not given up hope that Hitler would agree with this point of view which—to me at least—seemed the natural and obvious one. On August 11th I was disillusioned on this score. My plan of attack, with point of main effort through Roslavl towards Viasma, was turned down by the OKH and described as ‘unsatisfactory.’ The OKH. however, did not produce a better plan but contented themselves with deluging us during the next few days with a positive stream of varying instructions; this made it quite impossible for subordinate headquarters to work out any consistent plan at all. Army Group had apparently agreed to the cancellation of my plan, though they had unambiguously approved it as recently as August 4th. Unfortunately I did not learn at the time that a few days later Hitler was to change his mind and share my views on the Moscow attack—though insisting that certain preliminary conditions be fulfilled before it was launched. In any event, the OKH did not know how to make use of the few moments of Hitler’s approval. A few days later the whole picture was changed once again.
On August 13th I visited the Desna front, to the east of Roslavl, on either side of the Moscow highway. With a heavy heart I saw how my soldiers, confident that they would soon be advancing straight towards the Russian capital, had put up many signposts marked ‘TO MOSCOW.’ The soldiers of the 137th Infantry Division, with whom I spoke at the front, would talk only of a rapid resumption of the move to the east.
On August 14th XXIV Panzer Corps’ battle in the Krichev area was brought to a successful conclusion. Three Russian divisions were smashed, 16,000 prisoners and a great many guns captured. Kostiukovitchi was taken.
When my plan of attack was turned down, I proposed that the Elnya salient, which now had no purpose and was a continual source of casualties, be abandoned. This proposal, too, was not acceptable either to Army Group or the OKH. With the feeble comment ‘it is far more disadvantageous to the enemy than it is to us,’ the whole point of my suggestion, that human lives be spared, was brushed aside.
On August 15th I was busy trying to persuade my superiors not to exploit the success of XXIV Panzer Corps by making them push on to Gomel. As I saw it such a march to the south-west would constitute a step backwards. Army Group attempted then to withdraw one panzer division from my command for this operation, being apparently uninterested in the fact that a single division cannot operate through the enemy’s lines. The only possible course was to use the whole XXIV Panzer Corps, while covering its left flank with fresh forces. Since the beginning of the campaign on June 22nd XXIV Panzer Corps had, moreover, not passed a single day out of action and was urgently in need of a rest period for tank maintenance. When at last I had persuaded Army Group to give up this plan I received, half an hour later, an order from the OKH that one panzer division be sent to Gomel. XXIV Panzer Corps was therefore now ordered to advance, with 3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions leading and with the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division moving behind, in a southerly direction towards Novosybkov and Starodub; when it had effected a break-through the right-hand division was to swing towards Gomel.
On August 16th the 3rd Panzer Division captured the road centre Mglin. Army Group Centre (Bock) had to surrender the XXXIX Panzer Corps, with the 12th Panzer Division and the 18th and 20th (Motorised) Infantry Divisions, to Army Group North (Leeb).
I shall pass over the fluctuations of opinion at Army Group Centre as expressed during the telephone conversations of the next few days. On August 17th the right wing of XXIV Panzer Corps was held up by strong enemy opposition, while the two left-hand divisions, the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division and the 3rd Panzer Division, after capturing the rail centre of Unecha, were making good progress. The Gomel–Bryansk railway was cut and a deep penetration made. How could it best be exploited? It was to be assumed that Second Army’s strong left wing, supported as it was by my right wing, would now launch an attack on Gomel. But curiously enough nothing of the sort happened. Instead, strong formations of Second Army marked off from that army’s left flank in a north-easterly direction, passing far behind XXIV Panzer Corp’s front, while leaving the Panzer Corps heavily engaged in the area Starodub–Unecha. I turned to Army Group and requested that units of Second Army be ordered finally to attack the enemy on my right flank. My request was granted, but when I inquired of Second Army whether they had received the relevant orders I was informed that on the contrary it was Army Group itself which had ordered the move of formations to the north-east. And this was at a time when a resolute plan of action was all the more desirable, since as early as August 17th there were indications that the enemy was evacuating Gomel. Indeed on that day XXIV Panzer Corps received orders to block the enemy’s eastward escape route in the area of Unecha and Starodub.
On August 19th Panzer Group 1, fighting with Army Group South, captured a small bridgehead over the Dnieper near Zaporozhe. Second Army entered Gomel. My Panzer Group was ordered to advance through Klinzy–Starodub to Novosybkov, while XLVII Panzer Corps was entrusted with the task of covering XXIV Panzer Corps’ eastern flank. The former corps ran into heavy enemy opposition at Pochep.
An appreciation on the future course of the war on the Eastern Fron
t, dated August 18th, was submitted to Hitler by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
On August 20th the XXIV Panzer Corps repulsed enemy attacks along the line Surash–Klinzy–Starodub. Elements of the Russian forces succeeded in breaking through to the east in the area south of Unecha. Attacks on Elnya were beaten off.
On August 20th Field-Marshal von Bock ordered by telephone that attempts by the left wing of Panzer Group 2 to press on southwards towards Pochep were to be discontinued. He wanted the whole of the Panzer Group withdrawn to rest in the Roslavl area, so that he would have fresh troops at his disposal when the advance on Moscow for which he was hoping was resumed. He had no idea why Second Army had not made better time in its advance; he had been continually urging it to hurry.
Sketch Map 15
Situation on 17.8.41.
On August 21st XXIV Panzer Corps took Kostobobr, and XLVII Panzer Corps Pochep.
On August 22nd I handed over command of XX, IX and VII Army Corps to Fourth Army. The Panzer Group’s headquarters was moved to Shumiatchi, to the west of Roslavl, in order to be nearer to the mass of the divisions. On this day, at 19.00 hrs., a query came in from Army Group: would it be possible to move armoured units capable of fighting to the area Klinzy-Pochep for operations on the left flank of Second Army? These operations were to be in a southerly direction for the purpose of co-operation with Sixth Army of Army Group South. It transpired that an order had arrived from the OKH or the OKW which stated that a mobile formation was to participate in Second Army’s attack. I told Army Group that I regarded the employment of the Panzer Group in this direction as a basically false idea: as for splitting up the Panzer Group that, I said, would be criminal folly.
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