On August 23rd I was ordered to attend a conference at Army Group headquarters, at which the Chief of the Army General Staff was present. The latter informed us that Hitler had now decided that neither the Leningrad nor the Moscow operations would be carried out, but that the immediate objective should be the capture of the Ukraine and the Crimea. The Chief of the General Staff, Colonel-General Halder, seemed deeply upset at this shattering of his hopes, which were based on a resumption of the Moscow offensive. We discussed at length what could still be done to alter Hitler’s ‘unalterable resolve.’ We were all agreed that this new plan to move on Kiev must result in a winter campaign: this in its turn would lead to all those difficulties which the OKH had very good reasons for wishing to avoid. I mentioned the road and supply problems which must arise if the tanks were to be sent south; I also expressed doubts as to the ability of our armoured equipment to perform these heavy new tasks as well as the subsequent winter advance on Moscow. I went on to draw attention to the condition of XXIV Panzer Corps, which had not had one single day for rest and maintenance since the opening of the Russian Campaign. These facts provided arguments which the Chief of Staff could bring to Hitler’s notice in still another attempt to make him change his mind. Field-Marshal von Bock was in agreement with me; after a great deal of chopping and changing he finally suggested that I accompany Colonel-General Halder to the Führer’s headquarters; as a general from the front I could lay the relevant facts immediately before Hitler and thus support a last attempt on the part of the OKH to make him agree their plan. The suggestion was approved. We set off later that afternoon and arrived at the Lötzen airfield, in East Prussia, just as it was getting dark.
I reported at once to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch, who greeted me with the following words: ‘I forbid you to mention the question of Moscow to the Führer. The operation to the south has been ordered. The problem now is simply how it is to be carried out. Discussion is pointless.’ I therefore asked permission to fly back to my Panzer Group, since in these circumstances any conversation I might have with Hitler would be simply a waste of time. But Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch would not agree to this. He ordered that I see Hitler and report to him on the state of my Panzer Group, ‘but without mentioning Moscow!’
I went in to see Hitler. There were a great many people present, including Keitel, Jodl, Schmundt and others, but neither Brauchitsch nor Halder nor, indeed, any representative of the OKH. I described the state of my Panzer Group, its present condition and that of the terrain. When I had finished Hitler asked: ‘In view of their past performance, do you consider that your troops are capable of making another great effort?’
I replied: ‘If the troops are given a major objective, the importance of which is apparent to every soldier, yes.’
Hitler then said: ‘You mean, of course, Moscow?’
I answered: ‘Yes. Since you have broached the subject, let me give you the reasons for my opinions.’
Hitler agreed and I therefore explained basically and in detail all the points that favoured a continuation of the advance on Moscow and that spoke against the Kiev operation. I maintained that, from a military point of view, the only question was that of finally defeating the enemy forces which had suffered so heavily in the recent battles. I described to him the geographical significance of Moscow, which was quite different from that of, say, Paris. Moscow was the great Russian road, rail and communications centre: it was the political solar plexus; it was an important industrial area; and its capture would not only have an enormous psychological effect on the Russian people but on the whole of the rest of the world as well. I dwelt on the attitude of the soldiers; they expected nothing but an advance on Moscow and had already made the necessary preparations for such an advance with the greatest enthusiasm. I tried to show how a victory in this decisive direction, and the consequent destruction of the enemy’s main forces, would make the capture of the Ukrainian industrial area an easier undertaking: once we had seized the communication hub of Moscow, the Russians would have extraordinary difficulty in moving troops from north to south.
I pointed out that the troops of Army Group Centre were now poised for an advance on Moscow; that before they could start on the alternative operation towards Kiev a great deal of time would be wasted in moving to the south-west; that such a move was towards Germany, i.e. in the wrong direction; and that for the subsequent attack on Moscow the troops would have to retrace their steps (from Lochvitsa to Roslavl, that is to say 275 miles), with consequent heavy wear to their strength and to their equipment. I described the condition of the roads over which my Group would have to move, giving as example the ones I knew as far as Unecha, and the unending supply problems which would become greater with every day’s march towards the Ukraine. Finally, I touched on the enormous difficulties which must arise if the proposed operation were not terminated as fast as was now planned and were to be protracted into the period of bad weather. It would then be too late to strike the final blow for Moscow this year. I ended with the plea that all other considerations, no matter how important they might seem, be subordinated to the one vital necessity—the primary achievement of a military decision. Once that was secured, everything else would be ours for the taking.
Hitler let me speak to the end without once interrupting me. He then began to talk and described in detail the considerations which had led him to make a different decision. He said that the raw materials and agriculture of the Ukraine were vitally necessary for the future prosecution of the war. He spoke once again of the need of neutralising the Crimea, ‘that Soviet aircraft carrier for attacking the Rumanian oilfields.’ For the first time I heard him use the phrase: ‘My generals know nothing about the economic aspects of war.’ Hitler’s words all led up to this: he had given strict orders that the attack on Kiev was to be the immediate strategic object and all actions were to be carried out with that in mind. I here saw for the first time a spectacle with which I was later to become very familiar: all those present nodded in agreement with every sentence that Hitler uttered, while I was left alone with my point of view. Undoubtedly he had already held forth many times on the subject of his reasons that had led him to take his strange decision. I was extremely sorry that neither Field-Marshal von Brauchitsch nor Colonel-General Haider had accompanied me to this conference, on the outcome of which, according to them, so very much depended, perhaps even the result of the war as a whole. In view of the OKW’s unanimous opposition to my remarks, I avoided all further arguments on that occasion; I did not then think it would be right to make an angry scene with the head of the German State when he was surrounded by his advisers.
Since the decision to attack the Ukraine had now been confirmed, I did my best at least to ensure that it be carried out as well as possible. I therefore begged Hitler not to split my Panzer Group, as was intended, but to commit the whole Group to the operation; thus a rapid victory might be won before the autumn rains came. Those rains would turn the trackless countryside into a morass and the movement of motorised formations would be paralysed. This request of mine was granted.
Sketch Map 16
Situation on 24.8.41 (Conference with Hitler).
It was long after midnight by the time I reached my quarters. On this same date, the 23rd of August, the OKH issued an order to Army Group Centre which contained the following: ‘The object is to destroy as much of the strength of the Russian Fifth Army as possible, and to open the Dnieper crossings for Army Group South with maximum speed. For this purpose a strong force, preferably commanded by Colonel-General Guderian, is to move forward, with its right wing directed on Chernigov.’ I was not informed of this order prior to my conversation with Hitler. Colonel-General Halder had not taken the opportunity to tell me about it during the course of the day. On the morning of the 24th I visited the Chief of the Army General Staff and told him of the failure of this last attempt to persuade Hitler to change his mind. I did not think that what I had to say wo
uld come as a surprise to Haider; yet to my amazement he suffered a complete nervous collapse, which led him to make accusations and imputations which were utterly unjustified. It is only the condition of Halder’s nerves which can explain the telephone conversations he had about me with Army Group Centre and the resultant, quite untrue, portrait of myself that certain subordinates of that headquarters have seen fit to paint in their post-war publications. He was particularly angered by my attempts to ensure that the operation which was now ordered should, from the very beginning, be carried out in adequate strength. He showed absolutely no understanding of my point of view and, indeed, later on did his best to hinder me. We parted without having reached agreement. I flew back to my Panzer Group with orders to start the move towards the Ukraine on August 25th.
On August 24th XXIV Panzer Corps captured Novosybkov and threw the enemy back in the area Unecha–Starodub.
The Battle of Kiev
The most important part of Hitler’s orders, dated August 21st, which laid the groundwork for the forthcoming operations, ran as follows:
I am not in agreement with the proposals submitted by the Army for the prosecution of the war in the East and dated August 18th.
I therefore order as follows:
1. Of primary importance before the outbreak of winter is not the capture of Moscow but rather the occupation of the Crimea, of the industrial and coalmining area of the Donetz basin, the cutting of the Russian supply routes from the Caucasian oilfields, and, in the north, the investment of Leningrad and the establishment of contact with the Finns.
2. An unusually favourable operational situation has arisen as a result of our troops reaching the line Gomel–Pochep; this must be immediately exploited through a concentric operation by the inner wings of Army Groups South and Centre. The objective must be not merely to drive the Russian Fifth Army back across the Dnieper by means of a solitary attack by Sixth Army, but to destroy that enemy before he manages to withdraw behind the line the Desna–Konotop–the Sula. This will give Army Group South the necessary security for crossing the central Dnieper and for continuing to advance with its centre and left wing in the direction Rostov–Kharkov.
3. Without consideration of future operations Army Group Centre is therefore to employ as much force as is necessary for the achievement of its objective, the destruction of the Russian Fifth Army, while occupying such positions on the centre of its own front as will enable minimum forces to ensure the defeat of enemy attacks in that area.
4. The capture of the Crimean peninsula is of extreme importance for safeguarding our oil supplies from Rumania.
This order, whose existence was unknown to me when I talked to Hitler on the 23rd, provided the foundation for the instructions that my Panzer Group now received from the OKH and from Army Group Centre. My most grievous disappointment was the removal of XLVI Panzer Corps from my Panzer Group. Despite Hitler’s promise to the contrary, Army Group withdrew this corps from my command and put it in reserve, behind Fourth Army, in the area Roslavl–Smolensk. I would thus have to embark on the new operations with only the XXIV and XLVII Panzer Corps, a force which had already been recognised and described as inadequate. My protests to Army Group fell on deaf ears.
I was given Konotop as my first objective. Further instructions for co-operation with Army Group South would be issued later.
The dispositions of my Panzer Group were now such that XXIV Panzer Corps in the area Unecha had not only to fight its way forward and break through the Russian forces once again, but also simultaneously to protect the Group’s right flank against the enemy attempting to escape eastwards from the Gomel area. The task of XLVII Panzer Corps was as follows: with its only immediately available division, the 17th Panzer, it was to launch an attack to cover the Panzer Group’s left flank against the considerable enemy forces on the east bank of the Sudost River to the south of Pochep. In this, the dry, season the Sudost did not provide a reliable obstacle.
Already the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division was protecting an area of 50 miles along the Desna and the upper Sudost. To the east of Starodub the enemy still held positions to the west of the Sudost, in the flank of XXIV Panzer Corps. Even when the 29th (Motorised) Infantry Division had been relieved by infantry units, our left flank from Pochep to our first objective, Konotop, would still be some 110 miles long, and it was only then that the major operations would begin and the chief danger arise. Intelligence of the enemy’s strength on our eastern flank was extremely fragmentary. In any case I had to reckon that the task of guarding that flank would necessitate the full employment there of XLVII Panzer Corps. The combat ability of our spearhead must further suffer from the fact that XXIV Panzer Corps was being committed to this new operation without having had any time for rest and maintenance; and this after a long and uninterrupted sequence of heavy battles and exhausting marches.
On August 25th the following advances were made:
XXIV Panzer Corps. 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division moved through Cholmy and Avdeievka; 3rd Panzer Division, through Kostobobr–Novgorod Severskie to the Desna; 4th Panzer Division, initially engaged in clearing the enemy from the west bank of the Sudost, was to be relieved by elements of XLVII Panzer Corps and then to advance behind 3rd Panzer Division.
XLVII Panzer Corps. 17th Panzer Division moved through Pochep to the southern bank of the Sudost and attacked towards Trubchevsk. Then, by crossing to the left bank of the Desna and pushing forward south-westward along the river, it was to facilitate XXIV Panzer Corps’ crossing of that wide stream. The remaining units of the corps were on the march from the Roslavl area.
Early on the morning of the 25th I went to the 17th Panzer Division in order to take part in the division’s attack across the Sudost and its tributary, the Rog, immediately to the south. I drove along a terrible sandy track, a very bad road, and a number of my vehicles broke down. As early as 12.30 hrs. I had to signal from Mglin for replacements of armoured command vehicles, personnel lorries, and motor-cycles. This was a grim omen for the future. At 14.30 hrs. I arrived at the headquarters of the 17th Panzer Division, 3 miles north of Pochep. It seemed to me that the calculation of the force necessary to carry out this difficult attack had been incorrect and that the force itself was therefore insufficient. As a result the advance was likely to be too slow in relationship to the speed of XXIV Panzer Corps. I informed the divisional commander, General Ritter von Thoma, and the corps commander, who arrived shortly afterwards, of my views in this matter of speed. In order to gain a personal impression of the enemy I went up to the front line, where Rifle Regiment 63 was attacking, and participated in a part of their attack on foot. I spent the night in Pochep.
Sketch Map 17
Situation 26.8.41. Developments to 31.8.41.
Early on the 26th of August I visited an advanced artillery O.P. on the northern bank of the Rog, accompanied by my adjutant, Major Büsing: I wanted to see the effect of our dive-bomber attacks on the Russians’ river defences. The bombs fell where they were supposed to, but their actual effect was negligible. On the other hand the psychological impact of the dive bombing on the Russians was considerable; they kept down in their fox-holes and as a result we crossed the river almost without casualties. Owing to careless behaviour on the part of an officer our presence in the O.P. became known to the Russians and we were subjected to well-aimed mortar fire. A shell landing very close to us wounded five officers, including Major Busing, who was sitting close beside me. It was a wonder that I remained unhurt.
Opposite us were the Russian 269th and 282nd Divisions. After observing the crossing of the Rog and the completion of a bridge, I drove in the afternoon through Mglin to Unecha, where my headquarters was now located. On my way there I received a surprising and most gratifying signal: by brilliant employment of his tanks Lieutenant Buchterkirch (of the 6th Panzer Regiment of 3rd Panzer Division) had managed to capture the 750-yard bridge over the Desna to the east of Novgorod Severskie intact. This stroke of good fortune should ma
ke our future operations considerably less difficult.
I did not reach my headquarters until nearly midnight. There I found General Paulus, who had arrived during the course of the afternoon in order to examine the situation: he was then Oberquartiermeister I at the OKH, or chief operational assistant to General Halder. He had not been empowered to make decisions. During my absence Paulus had discussed the position with Lieutenant-Colonel Freiherr von Liebenstein, and had subsequently been in communication with the OKH: he had suggested that a unified command be set up to control the Panzer Group and the left wing of Second Army and that the 1st Cavalry Division be committed on the Panzer Group’s left flank. He received the mystifying reply that there was no question for the time being of subordinating any elements of Second Army and that the movements of Second Army were ‘to be regarded as simply tactical.’ 1st Cavalry Division remained with Second Army, whose point of main effort was on its right. The Panzer Group was blamed for moving units in directions other than that laid down by the operational order. But the enemy along the Desna on our deep left flank was too strong to be ignored, as the OKH apparently wished us to do. He had to be defeated there before we could pursue our southward advance. The next morning I had another conversation with Paulus in order to explain my train of thought to him. He faithfully repeated my remarks to the Chief of the Army General Staff, but they made no impression in view of the general animosity towards myself that reigned in those quarters.
By the evening of August 26th the left wing of Second Army was immediately to the south of Novosybkov. My boundary with Second Army was Klinzy-Cholmy-Sosniza (on the Desna, north-east of Makoshino), and with Fourth Army Surash-Unecha-Pochep-Brassovo.
Of XXIV Panzer Corps, the 10th (Motorised) Infantry Division was at Cholmy and Avdeievka; the 3rd Panzer Division at the Desna bridge, south of Novgorod Severskie; the 4th Panzer Division in action with the enemy south-east of Starodub.
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