Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  2. In order to achieve these aims so far as organisation is concerned, I propose the following war establishments for 1943. (Diagram 1—unfortunately no longer available.)

  In this connection the following points apply to tank equipment:

  The mainstay of our tank equipment is at present the Panzer IV. In view of the current need of replacements for the African and Eastern theatres, as well as the need for training tanks, present production only permits the new establishment or full re-equipment of one tank battalion per month. Apart from this, we can reckon on equipping a limited number of battalions with Panthers and Tigers during 1943; but the Panther battalions at any rate will not be ready for action before July or August.

  In order, somehow, to re-equip the panzer divisions so that they may have complete combat efficiency, I therefore propose that use be made of the relatively large number of light assault guns that are now being produced.

  I believe that it is essential that each month one tank battalion be equipped with light assault guns and incorporated into the panzer divisions, and that this continue until such time as the factories are producing enough tanks to meet the full requirements of the panzer divisions.

  Further, the production of the Panzer IV must be increased during the year 1944–45, so far as this can be done without damaging the production of Panthers and Tigers.

  3. For 1944 I propose war establishments in accordance with Diagram 2 (unfortunately no longer available). So far as tanks are concerned it embodies the following major modification: the expansion of the tank regiment to a brigade of four battalions.

  4. The tank figures envisaged in this diagram are to be achieved by means of increased production of Panzer IV’s, Panthers and Tigers, and—until such time as this figure is reached—by appropriation of light assault guns built on a Panzer IV chassis and armed with a 75 mm. L48 cannon.

  Another essential for achieving these figures is that each tank must be given a longer life. For this, the following are necessary:

  (a) A thorough testing and perfecting of new models (Panther!).

  (b) Thorough training of the crews (participation in final assembly, individual and unit training).

  (c) Allotment of sufficient demonstration equipment to the training units. (See annex—no longer available.) General Hube’s letter concerning his experiences at the front. (No longer available.)

  (d) Continuity of training and the necessary time for training (no moving of new formations in training away from their stations and the nearby factories).

  5. The essential success on the battlefield can only be achieved by a drastic concentration of armoured strength at the decisive spot in suitable terrain; surprise both as to numbers and equipment is also indispensable.

  For this, the following are required:

  (a) Secondary war theatres must not be supplied with tanks of new design: armour for such theatres should be limited to captured tanks.

  (b) Concentration of all tank units (including Tigers, Panthers, Panzer IV’s, and for the time being a proportion of the light assault guns) in the panzer divisions and corps under commanders who are experts in the use of armour.

  (c) The state of the terrain must be taken into consideration before an attack is ordered.

  (d) New equipment must be held back (that is to say, for the time being, Tigers, Panthers, and heavy assault guns) until the new weapon is available in sufficient quantity to ensure a decisive surprise success.

  Premature commitment of new equipment simply invites the enemy to produce an effective defence against it by next year, which we shall not be able to cope with in the short time then available.

  (e) The avoidance of the setting up of new formations: the cadres of the old panzer and motorised divisions consist of trained men with a sound knowledge of their equipment and are an incalculable asset in re-forming their divisions. New formations can never be of equivalent value.

  The present system of committing panzer divisions for long periods of time in a purely defensive role is wasteful. It postpones the rehabilitation of those divisions and thus delays their being made ready for the attacking role.

  The problem, therefore, is the immediate withdrawal of numerous panzer division cadres from the front for rehabilitation.

  6. Anti-tank defence will devolve more and more on the assault guns, since all our other anti-tank weapons are becoming increasingly ineffective against the new enemy equipment or else are too expensive in terms of casualties sustained.

  All divisions on the main battle fronts, therefore, need to be supplied with a certain complement of these weapons; the secondary fronts will have to make do with a higher command reserve of assault guns, while the divisions are for the time being equipped with self-propelled anti-tank guns. In order to economise on personnel and material, a gradual amalgamation of the assault-gun battalions and the anti-tank battalions is necessary.

  The new heavy assault guns are only to be committed on the major battle fronts and for special tasks. They are primarily tank-destroyers.

  The value of the new 75 mm. L70 assault gun is as yet untried.

  7. The armoured reconnaissance battalions have become the step-child of the panzer divisions. Their value in Africa is easy to see, though on the Eastern front at the moment this is not the case. But we must not allow ourselves to be deceived by this fact. If, as we hope, we are once again to launch a great offensive in 1944 we shall need competent ground reconnaissance units.

  The following are required:

  (a) A sufficient number of light 1-ton armoured troop-carrying vehicles (at the moment in process of construction, and beginning to be available).1

  (b) An armoured reconnaissance car capable of great speed (35–45 m.p.h.) with adequate armour and armament.

  At the time being no such vehicle is being built. I request that I be authorised to go into this problem with Minister Speer and to make the necessary proposals.

  8. For the panzergrenadiers the main problem is the continued mass-production in sufficient volume of the 3-ton armoured troop-carrying vehicle without any further alteration to its design.

  The armoured engineers and the armoured signal troops will also have to make do with this vehicle.

  9. The artillery of the panzer and motorised divisions will from now on be receiving the adequate number of self-propelled gun-carriages which has been requested for the past 10 years. For organisation see annex. (No longer available.) Tanks of latest design must be supplied for artillery observers.

  10. As matters of basic importance I request:

  (a) Approval of the Inspector-General’s staff organisation with station Supreme Headquarters, and that of the Inspector of Troops, Home Territories, with station Berlin.

  (b) Approval of the war establishments.

  (c) Subordination of all assault artillery to the Inspector-General.

  (d) The abandonment of plans for the formation of new armoured or motorised divisions, both in the Army and in the Waffen-SS. The assimilation of these divisions, and of the Hermann Goering Division1 to the new war establishment.

  (e) Approval for the continued production of the Panzer IV in 1944–45.

  (f) The design of a new armoured reconnaissance vehicle, though this design will be based so far as possible on parts already available for production.

  (g) Further research into the need for building a light assault gun mounting a 75 mm. L70 cannon. The possibility of abandoning this model in favour of the light assault gun with a 75 mm. L48 cannon and armoured troop-carrying vehicles.

  Every one of the points in the above document gave rise to a lively discussion. Finally they were all agreed to, at least in theory, with the exception of my request that the assault artillery be placed under command of the Inspector-General. At this suggestion the whole conference became incensed. All those present, with the single exception of Speer, disapproved, in particular of course the gunners; Hitler’s chief adjutant also spoke up against me, remarking that the assault artiller
y was the only weapon which nowadays enabled gunners to win the Knight’s Cross. Hitler gazed at me with an expression of pity on his face, and finally said: ‘You see, they’re all against you. So I can’t approve either.’ The results of this decision were far-reaching: the assault artillery remained an independent weapon; the anti-tank battalions continued to be equipped with ineffective, tractor-drawn guns, and the infantry divisions remained without adequate anti-tank defence. It was nine months before Hitler was convinced that a mistake had been made, and even by the end of the war it had not proved feasible to supply all the divisions with the urgently needed defensive weapons. For the rest, even the proposals that had been approved were continually questioned and their execution impeded: this applied principally to my urgent and repeated requests for the withdrawal and timely rehabilitation of the panzer divisions, so that the Supreme Command might have a mobile reserve available. The fact that up to the bitter end our highest military leaders were themselves incapable of grasping the decisive need of possessing a mobile and powerful strategic reserve played an important part in our defeat. Hitler must share the blame for this with his military advisers, since these not only failed to support me, but actually hindered me in my attempts to create such a reserve.

  On March the 10th I flew back to Berlin and settled down to work. On March the 12th I visited the Tank School at Wünsdorf: on March 17th the Henschel works at Cassel which were producing our Tigers, a considerable proportion of our Panthers, and the 88 mm. anti-tank gun model 43: on March 18th Panzer Battalion 300 at Eisenach, which was responsible for experiments with remote-controlled tanks, and also the armoured force N.C.O. school at Eisenach: and on March 19th I was present in Rügenwalde for a demonstration before Hitler of the railway gun ‘Gustav,’ the ‘Ferdinand’ tank and of the Panzer IV equipped with the armoured ‘apron.’

  The Ferdinand tank was a Tiger of Professor Porsche’s design, electrically driven, with an 88 mm. L70 cannon in a fixed turret, as in an assault gun. Apart from this single, long-barrelled gun it possessed no other armament and so was valueless for fighting at close range. This was its great weakness, despite its thick armour-plating and its good gun. But since it had now been built, to the number of 90 units, I had to find some use for it, even though I could not, on tactical grounds, share Hitler’s enthusiasm for this product of his beloved Porsche. A panzer regiment of two battalions, each with 45 tanks, was set up with the 90 Ferdinand-Tigers.

  The ‘aprons’ were sheets of armour plating which were hung loose about the flanks and rear end of the Panzer III, the Panzer IV and the assault guns; they were intended to deflect or nullify the effect of the Russian infantry’s anti-tank weapons, which could otherwise penetrate the relatively thin, vertical body-armour of those types of vehicle. This innovation was to prove useful.

  The ‘Gustav' was a powerful 800 mm. railway gun which required a double-track line to move along. It had nothing to do with me and after the demonstration of loading and firing the weapon I was about to leave when Hitler suddenly called out to me: ‘Listen to this! Dr. Müller (of Krupp’s) has just told me that “Gustav” could also be fired at tanks. What do you think of that?’ For a moment I was dumbfounded as I envisaged the mass-production of ‘Gustavs,’ but I soon pulled myself together and replied: ‘It could be fired at them, I dare say, but it could certainly never hit one.’ Dr. Müller protested violently. But how would it be possible to fight tanks with a gun which required forty-five minutes to reload between shots? When I questioned Dr. Müller on the minimum practical range of his weapon even he had to admit that his statement was nonsense.

  On March 22nd I discussed with the commander of the Hermann Goering Parachute Division how his formation might best be reorganised; at that time this formation, which could produce only a single division for actual combat, was 34,000 men strong. The majority of this large number of men were leading a pleasant life in Holland. In view of our replacement problem this was intolerable, even in 1943.

  Finally, towards the end of March, the new organisation for our Panzergrenadiers was decided upon in accordance with our latest experience.

  Dr. Goerdeler’s Visits

  It was during this time, when I was so extremely busy with my work, that my old friend, General von Rabenau, brought Dr. Goerdeler to see me, as the latter was anxious to talk to me. Dr. Goerdeler explained to me that since Hitler was incapable of performing his duties as Chancellor of the Reich and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, it was desirable that his activities as such be curtailed. He described to me in detail his programme of government and of reform; this programme showed high idealism and the social adjustments envisaged would undoubtedly have been most desirable, although Dr. Goerdeler’s doctrinaire manner might not have facilitated the solution of the problems he posed. Dr. Goerdeler could not guarantee foreign support in the event of his plans succeeding. It was apparent that during his long-drawn-out attempts to establish contacts abroad he had been given a somewhat cold shoulder. Our enemies had refused to abandon the ‘unconditional surrender’ slogan, even in the event of Dr. Goerdeler being successful.

  I asked Dr. Goerdeler how he envisaged setting limitations to Hitler’s powers. He replied that Hitler would be retained as nominal head of the state but would actually be interned on the Obersalzberg or in some other safe place. When I asked how the leading National Socialists were to be removed—since without doing so the proposed change of system was doomed from the beginning—I was informed that this was a matter for the armed forces to decide. But Dr. Goerdeler had not succeeded in winning over to his way of thinking a single commander of troops on active service. He asked me, when visiting the front, to promote his ideas and to let him know whether, and which of, the commanding generals were inclined to join with him. To my question as to who was actually in control of this undertaking, he replied Colonel-General Beck. I was very surprised that a man like Beck, the hesitancy of whose character was well known to me, should be involved in such a business. A man of his type was the very last person suited to take part in a coup d’état, since he was incapable of taking a decision, and also had no popularity with the troops, to whom he was indeed more or less unknown; he was a philosopher but no revolutionary.

  The weaknesses and mistakes of the National-Socialist system and the personal errors that Hitler made were by then plain to see—even to me; attempts must therefore be made to remedy them. In view of Germany’s dangerous situation as a result of the Stalingrad catastrophe and of the demands made for unconditional surrender to all its enemies (including the Soviet Union) a way would have to be found that did not lead to a disaster for the country and the people. Hence the vast responsibility and the enormous difficulties that confronted anyone who tried to think quietly how he might best hope still to save Germany. I came to the conclusion that Dr. Goerdeler’s plan would be harmful to our general interest and was furthermore incapable of being put into practice; I therefore declined to take any part in it. Like the rest of the Army, I also felt myself bound by the oath of allegiance that I had taken. I therefore asked Dr. Goerdeler to give up his proposed plan.

  Disregarding my doubts, Dr. Goerdeler asked me, nevertheless, to procure him the information he had requested. This I agreed to do, since I hoped thereby to show Dr. Goerdeler that my attitude was not unique but that other generals thought as I did; by this means I trusted that I might persuade this undoubtedly idealistic man to abandon a course of action which I regarded as unsound. As a result I met Dr. Goerdeler again in April and was able to assure him that I had not found a single general who was prepared to join in his plan. The individuals I had sounded had all refused to take any part in the proposed action, not only on account of their oath of allegiance but also because of the grave situation at the front. I once again urged Dr. Goerdeler to give up the whole project.

  Dr. Goerdeler, who incidentally during our talks together expressly denied that there was any question of assassination, finally asked me not to speak of our conversations. I
kept my word until 1947, when I read a book by the barrister Fabian von Schlabrendorff, entitled, Offiziere gegen Hitler (‘Officers against Hitler’); this book made it plain that either Dr. Goerdeler or General von Rabenau had not kept his word to be silent about me. Incidentally, the assertions concerning myself in the above-mentioned book of Schlabrendorff’s are not true.

  I did not speak to Dr. Goerdeler again after April 1943, and I heard no more about his projects.

  But let us return to my military activities.

  “Operation Citadel”

  On March 29th I flew to the headquarters of Army Group South, at Zaporozhe, to see Field-Marshal von Manstein. Here a considerable victory had recently been won; by using armoured formations in the correct operational way Kharkov had been recaptured. The lessons to be learned from this, in particular concerning the way the Tiger battalions of the Gross-Deutschland and SS-Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler’ Divisions had been employed, provided the reason for my flight to see Manstein. At his headquarters I found my old friend Hoth, the commander of the Fourth Panzer Army, who also told me of his experiences. I once again realised what a pity it was that Hitler could not tolerate the presence of so capable and soldierly a person as Manstein in his environment. Their characters were too opposed: on the one hand Hitler, with his great will-power and his fertile imagination: on the other Manstein, a man of most distinguished military talents, a product of the German General Staff Corps, with a sensible, cool understanding, who was our finest operational brain. Later, when I was entrusted with the duties of Chief of the Army General Staff, I frequently proposed to Hitler that Manstein be appointed chief of the OKW in place of Keitel, but always in vain. It is true that Keitel made life easy for Hitler; he sought to anticipate and fulfil Hitler’s every wish before it had even been uttered. Manstein was not so comfortable a man to deal with; he formed his own opinions and spoke them aloud. Hitler finally answered my repeated proposal with the words: ‘Manstein is perhaps the best brain that the General Staff Corps has produced. But he can only operate with fresh, good divisions and not with the remnants of divisions which are all that is now available to us. Since I can’t find him any fresh, operationally capable formations, there’s no point in giving him the job.’ But the truth is that he did not wish to do so and was trying to justify his refusal by such circuitous excuses.