Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  Defence against the invasion would have proved far easier if Hitler and the OKW had approved the proposals of General Freiherr von Geyr and of the Inspector-General of Armoured Troops, by which all the panzer and panzer grenadierdivisions would have been concentrated ready in two groups, one north and the other south of Paris, while thorough preparations would have been made for moving these forces to the actual invasion front.

  But even the dispositions that were in fact made would have yielded better results if the High Command had been quite clear as to its intentions. On June 16th, that is to say nearly two weeks after the landing, the 116th Panzer Division was still on the coast between Abbéville and Dieppe, the 11th Panzer Division was in the Bordeaux area, the 9th Panzer Division was around Avignon, and the SS Panzer Division Das Reich was fighting guerrillas in Southern France, while the other panzer divisions, reinforced by the 9th and 10th SS brought across from the Eastern Front, were wasting their strength in heavy frontal battles in an area within range of the enemy’s naval guns. But apart from the panzer divisions, at this date there were still seven infantry divisions doing nothing in their coastal sectors north of the Seine, waiting for a landing that never materialised.

  The following details are worth mentioning:

  On June 7th General Freiherr von Geyr assumed command of the Caen sector, first of all under Seventh Army, then under Army Group B. The 12th SS and Panzer-Lehr Divisions were committed on the left of the 21st Panzer Division, which was already engaged. On the 10th of June General Freiherr von Geyr intended to launch his counter-attack, but a successful enemy bombing raid put the staff of his Panzer Group West out of action. I SS Panzer Corps took over command. After several days’ delay the SS Leibstandarte’ Adolf Hitler’ and the 2nd Panzer Division began to arrive and were committed piecemeal. On June 28th Panzer Group West having been reconstituted took over command of the I and II SS Panzer Corps and LXXXVI and XLVII Panzer Corps. General von Geyr’s proposal for a concentrated attack with all available strength was turned down by Rommel, who had lost his faith in the possibility of mounting a successful attack. Whether other, political considerations played a part in this overdue and piecemeal commitment of the reserves is an open question.1

  The commander of Seventh Army, General Dollmann, died on June 28th. Colonel-General Hausser was appointed in his stead.

  On June 29th a conference attended by the senior commanders from the Western Front took place at Hitler’s residence on the Obersalzberg. Field-Marshals von Rundstedt, Sperrle and Rommel were present. This was the last occasion on which I saw Rommel. I again received the impression that I had gained at his headquarters at La Roche Guyon the previous April: namely, that as a result of the enemy’s air supremacy Rommel no longer believed mobile defence to be possible. At this conference the principal matter under discussion was the strengthening of fighter formations. Goering promised to supply 800 fighter planes if Sperrle could provide the crews. This the latter could not do. He said, so far as I can recall, that he had only 500 crews available, thereby arousing Hitler’s anger. The evil result of this day was the dismissal, shortly afterwards, of Rundstedt, Geyr and Sperrle. Field-Marshal von Kluge succeeded Rundstedt; he had spent the last few weeks at Supreme Headquarters for the purpose of studying the general situation and of being available in any eventuality. Herr von Kluge was at that time persona gratissima with Hitler.

  The new High Command West that took over on July 6th did not succeed in altering the course of events. Field-Marshal von Kluge arrived in France still filled with the optimism that prevailed at Supreme Headquarters. In consequence he had an immediate disagreement with Rommel, but soon had to accept the latter’s more sensible appreciation of the situation.

  Herr von Kluge was a hard-working soldier, his knowledge of small-scale tactics was good, but he was totally ignorant concerning the employment of armoured formations in mobile operations. His influence on the command of armour was invariably, so far as I ever came across it, restrictive. He was an expert at breaking up units. It is therefore hardly surprising that the command in the West continued to try to cure each symptom that appeared instead of attacking the root of the disease, and going over to mobile warfare with what still remained of its armoured strength. What did remain was in fact squandered in further frontal attacks with limited objectives made under fire of the enemy’s naval guns.

  On July 11th Caen fell. On July 17th, while driving back from the front, Rommel’s car was attacked by an English fighter-bomber; the driver was severely wounded, the Field-Marshal being thrown from the car and suffering a cracked skull and other wounds which necessitated his going to hospital. With his departure, the strongest personality in the Western theatre was gone.

  Sketch Map 28

  The Destruction of Army Group Centre. Situation 22.6–1.8.44.

  On this day the invasion front ran from the mouth of the Orne, through the southern outskirts of Caen-Caumont–St. Lo—to Lessay on the coast.

  In Normandy the Western Allies were assembling their assaulting forces in order to break out of the bridgeheads that they had won, and the situation there could only be described as extremely tense. Meanwhile on the Eastern Front events had happened which threatened us with a gigantic catastrophe in the immediate future.

  On June 22nd the Russians, using 146 rifle and 43 tank formations, went over to the attack along the whole of the front of Army Group Centre, which was commanded by Field-Marshal Busch. This attack was completely successful. By July 3rd the Russians had reached the northern edge of the Pripet Marshes and a line Baranowicze-Molodeczno-Koziany. They continued to advance without pause, extending their attacks to the front of Army Group North, and by mid-July had reached a line running, approximately, Pinsk-Pruzana-Volkovisk-Grodno-Kovno-Dünaburg-Pleskau. At their points of main effort, which were directed towards the Vistula at Warsaw and towards Riga, they poured forwards and it seemed as. though nothing could ever stop them. Since July 13th they had also been attacking Army Group A and had won ground towards Przemysl—the San line—Pulavy on the Vistula. The result of this attack was the destruction of Army Group Centre. We suffered the total loss of some twenty-five divisions.

  In view of these shattering events Hitler moved his headquarters in mid-July from the Obersalzberg to East Prussia. All units that could be scraped together were rushed to the disintegrating front. In place of Field-Marshal Busch, Field-Marshal Model, who already commanded Army Group A, was also given command of Army Group Centre—or to be more precise of the gap where that army group had been. Since he could not perform both functions for any length of time, Colonel-General Harpe was appointed to command Army Group A. I knew Model well from the days when he commanded the 3rd Panzer Division in 1941. During my description of the 1941 Russian campaign I have portrayed his character enough; he was a bold, inexhaustible soldier, who knew the front well and who won the confidence of his men by his habitual disregard for his personal safety. He had no time for lazy or incompetent subordinates. He carried out his intentions in a most determined fashion. He was the best possible man to perform the fantastically difficult task of reconstructing a line in the centre of the Eastern Front. Harpe was a former panzer officer of Westphalian origin, calm, reliable, brave and determined. A man of cool understanding and with a clear brain. He too was the right man for the job he had now been given. The outstanding performance and leadership of these two generals were primarily responsible for the re-establishment of an Eastern Front. Of course this required a certain amount of time. Meanwhile an unexpected event occurred which threatened to make all attempts to defend the homeland illusory.

  10. JULY 20TH AND ITS SEQUEL

  There was a very real danger of the Russians breaking through into East Prussia as a result of their victory and of our absence of reserves. I therefore had ordered on July 17th, in my capacity as commander of the armoured force training schools, that the demonstration units at Wünsdorf and Krampnitz which were capable of fighting should be sent from Berlin to the
fortified area around Lötzen in East Prussia.

  During the afternoon of July 18th a Luftwaffe general whom I had known in the old days asked if he might come to see me. He informed me that the new Commander-in-Chief West, Field-Marshal von Kluge, intended to arrange an armistice with the Western Powers without Hitler’s knowledge, and that with this object in view was proposing shortly to establish contact with the enemy. I was utterly horrified by this piece of information. I saw what the immediate effect of Kluge’s act would be on our tottering Eastern Front and on the whole future of Germany. Our defences, both in the East and in the West, would collapse at once and the Russians would surge irresistibly forwards. Up to this moment I had never imagined that any German general, in command of troops actually in contact with the enemy, could possibly envisage taking such a step in direct opposition to the Head of the State. Since I could not believe the information he gave me, I asked the man with whom I was talking to tell me what his sources were. He proved reluctant to do so. Nor would he inform me why he had made this startling disclosure to me or what results he expected to achieve by so doing. When I asked whether this proposed action was to take place in the immediate future he replied that this was not the case. So I had time to think over what I should do about the extraordinary piece of information that I had received. At my headquarters, however, I was busied with a constant series of conferences and visits, which made it difficult to think such a matter out clearly; I therefore decided, on July 19th, to drive to Allenstein, Thorn and Hohensalza, ostensibly to inspect the troops in those places, but actually to work out during the drive what decisions I should take. If I were to inform Hitler of what I had heard without being able to state the source from which it came, I might be doing Field-Marshal von Kluge a grave injustice by arousing such very serious and unconfirmed suspicions against him. Should I keep the information to myself, and it turned out to be true, then I must share the guilt for the evil consequences that were bound to ensue. It was extremely difficult to decide what was the correct line of action for me to follow.

  On July 19th I visited the anti-tank troops at Allenstein. While there I was summoned to the telephone; my chief of staff, General Thomale, asked me to postpone for three days the transfer of the panzer demonstration units from Berlin to East Prussia already ordered. General Olbricht, the head of the General Army Office, had telephoned him and requested this postponement; on the next day, July 20th, 1944, there was to be an Exercise Valkyrie for reserve and demonstration units in the Berlin area which could not take place without the participation of the panzer demonstration troops. Exercise Valkyrie was the cover name for training exercises against the possibility of enemy air landings or of internal unrest. That, at least, is the meaning which I had always attached to it. When Thomale assured me that the situation in East Prussia was not for the moment critical and that the departure of the units in question might well be postponed for two or three days, I gave my reluctant approval that the troops take part in the exercise.

  On the afternoon of this day I inspected reserve units at Thorn and on the morning of July 20th I drove to Hohensalza to inspect the anti-tank troops stationed there. I spent the evening of that day at my home at Deipenhof. I went for a walk in the late afternoon from which I was summoned back by a motor-cycle despatch rider, who told me that a telephone call was expected from Supreme Headquarters. When I reached the house I was told of the announcement that had been made on the wireless concerning the attempt to assassinate Hitler. It was midnight before I spoke to General Thomale on the telephone; he described briefly the facts of the attempt on Hitler’s life, told me the name of the assassin, and informed me that Hitler had ordered that I report at Supreme Headquarters next day since he intended to'dismiss Zeitzler and to appoint me in his place. An aeroplane would be at Hohensalza at 08.00 hrs. on the 21st to take me back to East Prussia.

  All other stories about my activities on July 20th are pure invention. I knew nothing about the assassination attempt, I talked to nobody about it, and the only telephone conversation I had during that day was the one described above with General Thomale at midnight.

  The incidents that led up to my appointment as Chief of the Army General Staff were written down by General Thomale in a document composed under oath and now in my possession. They were as follows:

  At 18.00 hrs. on July 20th, 1944, General Thomale was in his office when he was telephoned by an officer of the General Staff Corps, Lieutenant-Colonel Weizenegger of Colonel-General Jodl’s Armed Forces Command Staff, who asked where I was. Thomale told him. He was then ordered to report at once in person to Hitler at Supreme Headquarters. He arrived there at about 19.00 hrs. Hitler, who was accompanied by his adjutant, Colonel von Below, received him. Hitler began by asking again where I was and whether I was in good health. Thomale answered this latter question in the affirmative. Hitler then stated that he had decided to appoint General Buhle Chief of the Army General Staff. But since Buhle had been wounded in the assassination attempt, and since it was not yet known how long it would take him to recover, he had decided that for the meantime Colonel-General Guderian would be entrusted with performing the duties of Chief of the Army General Staff. Thomale was ordered to arrange that I report to Hitler the following morning.

  From these facts it may be seen that Hitler did not originally intend to appoint me successor to Zeitzler, with whom he had been on bad terms for some time. He only picked me for this not very enviable post when the man for whom it was destined was incapacitated by the assassination attempt. All the conclusions that Hitler’s enemies have drawn since the war from my appointment as acting Chief of Staff are therefore invalid. They either belong in the realms of fantasy or are simply malicious slanders. Actually even the rumour-mongers must admit that voluntarily to tackle the situation on the Eastern Front in July 1944, was no very enticing proposition—and this was then the principal task of the man who filled that high-sounding, historic appointment.

  Needless to say I have been frequently asked why I agreed to accept the difficult position at all. It would be simple to reply: because I was ordered to do so. As a description of future events will show, the Eastern Front was tottering on the edge of an abyss from which it was necessary to save millions of German soldiers and civilians. I should have regarded myself as a shabby coward if I had refused to attempt to save the eastern armies and my homeland, eastern Germany. That my attempt to do so was ultimately a failure will remain, until the day I die, the distress and grief of my life. There can be scarcely anyone who feels more painfully than I do for the fate of our eastern territories and for their innocent, valiant, true and brave inhabitants. After all, I am myself a Prussian.

  On July 21st, 1944, I flew from Hohensalza to Lötzen. As soon as I arrived I had a short talk with Thomale, who told me of his conversation with Hitler and who described the attempted assassination. I next saw Field-Marshal Keitel, Colonel-General Jodl and General Burgdorf, who had succeeded Schmundt, severely wounded by the bomb, as Hitler’s chief adjutant and as head of the Army Personnel Office; they briefed me on the matters connected with the new appointment as Chief of the Army General Staff. The principal problem would be the almost complete replacement of all officers occupying General Staff Corps positions in the OKH. Of the officers previously with the OKH, some had been wounded in the assassination attempt, some were suspected of complicity in the plot and had already been arrested, while others were already known to me and their future collaboration undesired; others again had never seen the front and must for this reason be reassigned. Before this meeting I arranged that I would take over my new duties in the OKH building at 16.00 hrs.

  After this conversation with the officers of the OKH I reported to Hitler at about noon. He seemed to be in rather poor shape; one ear was bleeding; his right arm, which had been badly bruised and was almost unuseable, hung in a sling. But his manner was one of astonishing calm as he received me. He appointed me responsible for carrying out the duties of the chief of the Army Gene
ral Staff, and informed me that for some time he had been unable to agree with my predecessor, Zeitzler. Zeitzler had on five occasions offered to resign his appointment; such behaviour was wrong in wartime, and should be no more permissible to generals in authoritative positions than it was to soldiers in the field. The latter could not give notice or resign if something displeased them. He therefore forbade me most strictly ever to tender a resignation.

  The conversation then turned on individuals. My requests concerning the OKH appointments were approved. In this connection I remarked that the new Commander-in-Chief West did not have a lucky touch in commanding large armoured formations and I therefore proposed he be given another assignment. Hitler interrupted me with the words: ‘And furthermore he had foreknowledge of the assassination attempt.’ Keitel, Jodl and Burgdorf all three now stated that Field-Marshal von Kluge was the best horse in the stable and that he could not therefore he spared, despite his knowledge of the plot. Thus any attempt to remove Herr von Kluge quietly from the Western Front failed. Since Hitler was undoubtedly far better informed about Field-Marshal von Kluge’s attitude than I was, I decided to take no further steps in this matter.

  After our military discussions were over Hitler added one or two personal remarks. He informed me that my life was in danger and that he had therefore arranged that I be guarded by men of the Secret Field Police. These latter made a thorough search of my quarters and my vehicles, but found nothing suspicious. All the same I decided, for the first time since being a soldier, that I needed a bodyguard. I therefore appointed a number of reliable panzer troops to guard my quarters and my office building, and they did this faithfully until my dismissal. From time to time the men assigned to this duty were replaced by others.