Panzer Leader

by Heinz Guderian

  As for the consequences of Himmler’s racial theories, I have, from personal observation and experience, nothing to say. Hitler and Himmler succeeded in keeping this part of their programme strictly secret.

  Himmler’s ‘methods of education,’ as practised in the concentration camps, have meanwhile become sufficiently well known. During his lifetime the general public knew only a little about this. The atrocities carried out in those camps were made known to most people, as to myself, only after the collapse. The way the concentration camp methods were kept secret can only be described as masterly.

  After 20th July Himmler became filled with military ambition: this led him to have himself appointed commander of the Training Army and even commander of an army group. In military matters Himmler proved an immediate and total failure. His appreciation of our enemies was positively childish. His decisions when in command of Army Group Vistula, in 1945, were dictated by fear. Despite this he retained Hitler’s confidence almost up to the end. All the same even this paladin bowed down before the dictator. I was in a position on several occasions to observe his lack of self-assurance and of civil courage in Hitler’s presence. The most spectacular example of this I have already described when dealing with the events of February 13th, 1945.1

  Himmler’s most notable creation was the SS. After the collapse this organisation was accused and condemned in root and branch. And that was unjust.

  The SS originated as Hitler’s bodyguard. A desire to supervise not only the uninitiated mass of the populace but also the Party organisation led to its increase in strength. After the concentration camps were set up Himmler made the SS responsible for their control. This marks the point at which the SS was subdivided into two main groups: the Waffen-SS, or Armed SS, a primarily military organisation, and the Allgemeine-SS, or General SS. The man entrusted with the task of training future leaders for the Waffen-SS was the former army general, Hausser, formerly chief of staff of my old division at Stettin. General Hausser was a first-class officer, a brave and clever soldier and a man of outstandingly upright and honourable character. The Waffen-SS had every reason to feel gratitude towards this remarkable man—not least of all for the fact that it was spared the general obloquy that at Nuremberg, after the collapse, was heaped on the SS as a whole.

  During the war, owing to Hitler’s insistence, the Waffen-SS was continually expanded. From 1942 on it no longer received sufficient volunteers to fill the ranks of its many formations so that from that period replacements were drafted to the SS in exactly the same way that they were conscripted into the Army. The Waffen-SS thus lost its political character of being a volunteer Party guard. However, Himmler continued to exert his influence in order to make sure that it received the highest standard of recruits and the best available equipment. But this favouritism was unimportant in comparison to the feeling of comradeship which existed on the battlefield between Waffen-SS and army formations. I fought with the SS-Leibstandarte ‘Adolf Hitler’ and with the SS Division Das Reich: later, as Inspector-General of Armoured Troops, I visited numerous SS divisions. I can therefore assert that to my knowledge the SS divisions were always remarkable for a high standard of discipline, of esprit de corps, and of conduct in the face of the enemy. They fought shoulder to shoulder with the panzer divisions of the Army, and the longer the war went on the less distinguishable they became from the Army.

  There can, of course, be no doubt that Himmler had quite other ends in view when he arranged for the expansion of the Waffen-SS. Both Hitler and he distrusted the Army, for their intentions were dark and there always existed the danger for them that if the Army recognised them in time it might resist. Therefore, despite the disadvantages involved, they increased the number of Waffen-SS divisions to thirty-five. A large number of units were formed consisting of foreign personnel, whose reliability was on occasion very good, on occasion doubtful. Finally, however, Hitler began to distrust even those allegedly most loyal of his adherents. The fact that in March 1945 he ordered them to surrender their armbands is indicative of the degree of estrangement that by then existed between Hitler and the Waffen-SS.

  A far different judgment must be passed on the Allgemeine-SS. Here, too, there were doubtless idealists to be found, who originally believed that they had joined an order with special responsibilities and therefore entitled to special privileges. There were also many men of good character and spirit, men drawn from the most varied professions and careers, who had simply been appointed members of the SS by Himmler without any questions being asked. But as time went on the picture changed; the SS took over numerous police functions of a most dubious sort. Then units of the Allgemeine-SS were also armed. The number of foreign formations was here also constantly on the increase; these were markedly worse than the units of the Waffen-SS, as, for example, was shown by the behaviour of the Kaminski and Dirlewanger Brigades in the crushing of the Warsaw uprising.1

  I never had anything to do with the SD and its Einsatzkommandos (Operational commandos) and am therefore not able to give any firsthand information concerning them.

  Himmler ended his life by committing suicide though he had previously consistently condemned such an action, which he claimed to regard as contemptible and which he had forbidden the SS. He therefore escaped his judges here below and left behind less responsible men to carry the burden of his great guilt.

  One of the cleverest men in Hitler’s close circle was Dr. Joseph Goebbels, the Gauleiter of Berlin and also Minister for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda. He was a skilled orator and in the struggle against the Communists for Berlin’s vote he had demonstrated great personal courage. But he was also a dangerous demagogue, quite unscrupulous in his agitations against the churches and the Jews, or against parents and school teachers; and he was largely responsible for the notorious pogrom, the so-called ‘Crystal Night,’ of November 1938.

  He was certainly in a position to recognise the errors and weaknesses of the National-Socialist system, but he lacked the courage necessary to lay his knowledge before Hitler. In Hitler’s presence he—like Goering and Himmler—was a little man. He both feared and idolised him. Hitler’s powers of suggestion were seldom so apparent as in his relationship with Goebbels. The highly skilled demagogue fell silent in Hitler’s presence. He did his best to unravel his master’s wishes, and in his propaganda—at which he might almost be called a genius—he seldom, if ever, displeased the dictator.

  I was particularly disappointed by his lack of courage in 1943, when he refused to grasp what he called ‘the thorny problem' of the supreme leadership of the armed forces and the State.1 As a result of this failure of will, he was forced to end his own life and those of his dependants in the frightful way that he even then already foresaw.

  Next to Himmler the most sinister member of Hitler’s entourage was Martin Bormann. He was a thick-set, heavy jowled, disagreeable, conceited and bad-mannered man. He hated the army, which he regarded as the eternal barrier to the limitless supremacy of the Party, and he attempted, with success, to do it harm whenever he could, to sow distrust, to prevent necessary measures being taken, to drive all decent persons away from Hitler’s entourage and from positions of authority and to replace them with his creatures.

  Bormann saw to it that Hitler was not kept informed of the real internal political situation. He prevented even the Gauleiters from seeing Hitler. Thus a grotesque state of affairs arose by which the Gauleiters—in particular Forster of West Prussia and Greiser of the Warthegau—came to me, the representative of the military they so distrusted, and asked for my help in arranging that they be allowed to see Hitler since Bormann consistently prevented them from obtaining interviews through normal Party channels.

  The sicker that Hitler grew and the worse the military situation became, the fewer were the number of people who could reach the dictator. Everything had to be done through this sinister guttersnipe, Bormann, and thus his methods became increasingly successful.

  I had repeated angry alterc
ations with him, because over and over again he would sabotage the taking of necessary military measures for the sake of the obscure political game that he was playing. He would also attempt to interfere in matters that purely concerned the Army, always with unfortunate results.

  Bormann was the èminence grise of the Third Reich.

  The National and District Controllers

  The National-Socialist Party was led by the National Controllers (Reichsleiter)and District Controllers (Gauleiter). Every side of German life was embraced by the Party’s system and controlled by the Party’s schematic organisation. The first step was the Hitler Youth and the League of German Maidens. After leaving the Hitler Youth the young males joined the National Labour Service whose leader was Hierl. This organisation, originally volunteer in nature, had a good influence thanks to the decency of its leader and his assistants, though nowadays it might be reproached for its rigidly military system and training methods.

  German workers were controlled by Dr. Ley in his capacity as Reichsorganisationsleiter (National Controller of Organisation). Arrangements were made for the holidays of the working class by the Kraft durch Freude (Strength through Joy) organisation, while the Winter Aid and National-Socialist Assistance groups took care of the unfortunate. Private and religious charities were looked on with disfavour and their activities curtailed.

  There was a National Health Controller, a National Peasant Controller and so on.

  The legal system was under Reichsleiter Frank and was to be developed according to National-Socialist ideals. But in this field National-Socialism showed a particular lack of creative ability.

  In foreign affairs Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg’s organisation paralleled that of the Foreign Minister. Rosenberg’s ideological enthusiasm led him frequently to act in opposition to the official policy with, of course, unfortunate results.

  Even sport was regimented. The National Sport Leader, von Tschammer and Osten, performed his duties well. On the occasion of the Olympic Games he was able to increase the esteem in which the Third Reich was held.

  A woman, the National Women’s Leaderess, completed the picture.

  The above list is by no means exhaustive; I give it simply in order to show what the principle was. There were many mutually antagonistic forces at work. Yet as a group all these individuals did jobs that were equivalent to those of the normal apparatus of the State and in consequence friction inevitably and frequently arose.

  This duplication and contradiction of effort becomes even more apparent when we turn to the next level of National-Socialist officials, the District Controllers, or Gauleiter.

  The National-Socialists wished to give the German Reich a new form and therefore replaced the old provincial administration with Gaue, or Districts. This reformatory intention was to be realised by means of the appointment of Gauleiters. After the Austrian anschluss, the establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia–Moravia and the seizure of Posen and West Prussia, so-called National Districts (Reichsgaue)were created for these territories, which, though considered to be outside the national frontiers, yet gave an indication of what the future organisation was intended to be. But this organisation remained a hybrid thing, like so many other plans that were initiated with the greatest enthusiasm but never completed.

  The Gauleiters were in fact Hitler’s deputies, and in the Reichsgaue they were actually called Reichsstatthalter.1 They were appointed on the basis of their services to the Party and not for any administrative talents or distinction of character. That is why, among other highly admirable men, there were to be found a number of disreputable persons who did no honour either to the name of Germany or to the reputation of the Nationalist-Socialist Party.

  Only occasionally were the offices of the Gauleiters combined with those of the highest local administrators, as for example in Mainfranken, where the Gauleiter was likewise President of the Council (Regierungs-president). In general the Gauleiters were additional and superior to the Regierungspresidenten, the Oberpresidenten of the Provinces and the Ministerpresidenten of the Länder or States.

  As a result the pyramidal state, the Führerstaat, which Hitler wished to create and which had formed part of his political programme, did not in fact exist. On the contrary, the condition of the national administration became ever more chaotic and even anarchic, and this tendency was increased by the appointment of numerous National Commissars, Generals Plenipotentiary, Special Commissioners and the rest. As time went by the whole system grew increasingly out of hand.

  It was the same story in many different fields. The huge building programme remained uncompleted, neither the national highroads nor the Party buildings being ever finished: the re-erection of Berlin, Münich and other great towns did not take place. Similarly the great national reforms bogged down at an early stage. The reform of the schools by the incompetent Minister of Education, Rust, came to nothing. The reorganisation of the Evangelical Church by the State Bishop, Müller, was a failure. It was the same story over and over again of grandiose plans and feeble execution, because both wisdom and moderation were lacking, because arrogance took its toll in these fields too, and finally because the outbreak of war put an end to all such endeavours.

  Hitler’s Intimate Circle

  A picture of the leading personalities of the Party contains more darkness than light. Hitler’s knowledge of mankind had proved defective when it came to choosing the leaders for his own Party. This makes it appear all the more curious that he should have kept a number of young men around him who were most carefully selected and who preserved their decency of character despite the temptations to which they were exposed. Both the military and the Party adjutants were upright men and, indeed, almost everyone employed in those positions was notable for politeness, good manners and discretion.

  Next to Bormann, Fegelein at the end made the most displeasing impression. He was an SS-Brigade Leader, Himmler’s permanent representative, and by his marriage to Eva Braun’s sister, became as it were Hitler’s brother-in-law, a position which he abused in a particularly tactless fashion. Other unpleasant individuals were his personal physician, Morell, who was guilty of questionable professional practices, and, I am sorry to say, General Burgdorf, who succeeded Schmundt as head of the Army Personnel Office after the latter’s death. These persons were a clique, constantly intriguing and forming a barrier between Hitler and the rest of the world which prevented him from learning the truth. They all drank far too heavily and thus—at the end, at least, when the collapse was imminent—offered a very sad example to others.

  The Government

  Beside the unique Party machine there stood the government of the country. The Cabinet, as originally nominated by Hindenburg, had consisted of a majority of bourgeois ministers and a minority of National-Socialists. Apart from Hitler the Party members to start with were the Minister of the Interior, Frick, and the Minister of Aviation, Goering. But very soon other Party members were appointed to the Cabinet, including the Minister for People’s Enlightenment and Propaganda, Dr. Goebbels; the Minister of Education, Rust; the Minister of Food, Darré; the Postmaster, Ohnesorge, and two Ministers without Portfolio, Hess and Roehm.

  Nevertheless von Papen continued to be Vice-Chancellor; Freiherr von Neurath, Foreign Minister; Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, Minister of Finance; Seldte, Minister of Labour; von Blomberg, Minister of War; Hugenberg, Minister of Economics—succeeded by Schmitt and, later, by Schacht—Gürtner, Minister of Justice; Baron Eltz von Rübenach and later Dorpmüller, Minister of Transport. They were all good, competent executives and, in some cases, outstanding men. Their influence on Hitler was slight.

  As the National-Socialist Party became more and more firmly established through the greater concentration of power in Hitler’s hands, the Ministers were increasingly pushed aside. After 1938 there were, for all intents and purposes, no more meetings of the Cabinet and each Minister simply administered his own department. From that time on they no longer exercised the slightest in
fluence in major political matters. In foreign affairs this change became evident when the Foreign Minister, Freiherr von Neurath, left and was replaced by Herr von Ribbentrop. On the same day Hitler personally assumed the dual role of Minister of War and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Papen was kicked out after June 30th, 1934. Later Funk replaced Schacht. In 1941 Hess flew to England.

  The men of this group whom I knew personally to a greater or lesser extent were the Finance Minister, Graf Schwerin von Krosigk, the Minister of Labour, Seldte, and the two Ministers for Armaments and War Production appointed successively during the war, Todt and Speer. I also knew the Minister of Food, Darré.

  Graf Schwerin von Krosigk is a typical outstanding high German official. He was partially educated in England, a remarkable and modest man.

  Seldte, who had at one time been head of the Stahlhelm, the ex-service men’s organisation, was a decent man, but possessed no power.

  Todt, an intelligent individual and a believer in moderation, did his best to exert a humanising influence.

  Speer preserved a sensitive heart through all the horrors of the closing years of the Third Reich. He was a good comrade, with an open character and an intelligent, natural manner. Originally an independent architect, he became Minister after Todt’s early death. He disliked bureaucratic methods and attempted to act according to a healthy understanding of human nature. We worked together without friction and always did our best to give one another such assistance as lay within our power, which is surely the obvious and sensible way to behave. But of how many prominent men in the Third Reich could it be said that they pursued this obvious and sensible course? Speer always retained his objectivity. I never saw him become exaggeratedly excited. He managed to calm down his occasionally highly temperamental colleagues, and when inter-departmental strife arose he always did his best to pacify both parties.