Hanoi's Road to the Vietnam War, 1954-1965

by Asselin, Pierre

  38. Balazs Szalontai, Kim Il Sung in the Khrushchev Era: Soviet–DPRK Relations and the Roots of North Korean Despotism, 1953–1964 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005), 203.

  39. Ilya V. Gaiduk, Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1954–1963 (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003), 204.

  40. Moscow to Ottawa, 14 February 1964, 20-VIET N-1-3, Vol. 8892 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1.

  41. French Embassy, Washington, to MFA, 17 February 1964, #313, AO: VC, ADF, 1; Mari Olsen, Soviet–Vietnam Relations and the Role of China, 1949–64: Changing Alliances (New York: Routledge, 2006), 131. For a detailed account of the meeting, see Ilya V. Gaiduk, The Soviet Union and the Vietnam War (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 6–10.

  42. Olsen, Soviet–Vietnam Relations, 127; Kurt L. London, “Vietnam: A Sino-Soviet Dilemma,” Russian Review 26, no. 1 (January 1967): 29. “The interest of the Soviet Union, both as a nation state and as a bastion of world communism,” London noted, required “a long period of peace during which the much heralded ‘transition to communism’ can be effected.”

  43. French Embassy, Moscow, to MFA, 15 February 1964, #36, AO: VN, ADF, 2.

  44. Moscow to Ottawa, 20 February 1964, 20-VIET N-1-3, Vol. 8892 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 2.

  45. Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War, 1964–1969,” China Quarterly, no. 142 (June 1995): 384. Unlike Soviet aid during this period, Chinese aid was “less oriented toward key projects and was more multi-dimensional and flexible,” which no doubt facilitated Vietnamese endeavors in the South following the adoption of military struggle. See Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 170–71.

  46. Chen Jian, “China’s Involvement in the Vietnam War,” 383.

  47. Womack, China and Vietnam, 173.

  48. Joachim Glaubitz, “Relations between Communist China and North Vietnam,” in Robert Rupen and Robert Farrell, eds., Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet Dispute (New York: Praeger, 1967), 66.

  49. London, “Vietnam,” 30.

  50. Quoted in “China and North Viet-Nam,” undated, FO 371/175487, NAUK, 1.

  51. William J. Duiker, Ho Chi Minh: A Life (New York: Theia, 2000), 537.

  52. The delegate’s comments are reported in Saigon to Ottawa, 22 June 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1.

  53. La vérité sur les relations vietnamo-chinoises durant les trente dernières années [The Truth about Sino-Vietnamese Relations in the Past Thirty Years] (Hanoi: Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 1979), 47–48; Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam: A Long History (Hanoi: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1987), 327.

  54. “‘Bao cao tinh hinh the gio va cong tac ngoai giao’ doc truoc ky hop thu ba cua Quoc hoi khoa hai (ngay 24 thang 10.1961)—Bo Truong Bo Ngoai giao Ung Van Khiem” [“Report on the World Situation and Diplomatic Tasks” Read before the Third Meeting of the Second Session the National Assembly (24 October 1961—Foreign Minister Ung Van Khiem)], 24 October 1961, Ho so 728: Ho so ky hop thu ba cua QH khoa II tu ngay 23–27.10.1961. Tap 2: Phien hop ngay 24.10.1961: Bao cao, to trinh cua UBTVQH, Bo Ngoai giao, Uy ban Thong nhat, Bo Tai chinh, Phu Thu tuong ve cong tac cua UBTVQH, tinh hinh the gio va cong tac ngoai giao, mien Nam ve thong nhat nuoc nha, Phong Quoc hoi, VNAC3, 2; Qiang Zhai, “An Uneasy Relationship: China and the DRV during the Vietnam War,” in Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives on Vietnam (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000), 137.

  55. Adam Fforde and Suzanne Paine, The Limits of National Liberation: Problems of Economic Management in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (London: Croom Helm, 1987), 29.

  56. Olsen, Soviet–Vietnam Relations, 133–34. According to Ilya Gaiduk, “The Soviet Union followed a cautious policy of offering propaganda support and various, but modest, forms of economic and military assistance.” See Ilya V. Gaiduk, “Soviet Policy toward US Participation in the Vietnam War,” History 81, no. 261 (January 1996): 43–44.

  57. The estimates are quoted in Washington to Ottawa, 23 June 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 4.

  58. P. J. Honey, “The Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi Minh,” China Quarterly, no. 9 (January–March 1962): 25.

  59. Minutes on “Outlook for North Vietnam: Chinese Support for North Vietnam,” 22 April 1964, FO 371/175487, NAUK, 2.

  60. The estimate is referenced in ibid.

  61. British Consulate General, Hanoi [hereafter BCGH], to BES, 9 December 1963, FO 371/170099, NAUK, 1.

  62. Olsen, Soviet–Vietnam Relations, 115. On the extent and limits of Soviet power and influence in Indochina and elsewhere during this period, see Roger E. Kanet, “The Soviet Union and the Third World from Khrushchev to Gorbachev: The Place of the Third World in Evolving Soviet Global Strategy,” in Roger E. Kanet, ed., The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe and the Third World (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 4–9. Under Khrushchev, Kanet writes, the Soviet Union “was unable to provide the type of effective support that would permit it to stabilize throughout the Third World regimes which it viewed as friendly and generally supportive of Soviet interests” (ibid., 6).

  63. BCGH to Southeast Asia Department, London [hereafter SEAD], 19 November 1963, FO 371/170099, NAUK, 2.

  64. Reported in Saigon to Ottawa, 22 June 1964, 1–2.

  65. Honey, “Position of the DRV Leadership and the Succession to Ho Chi Minh,” 25, 35.

  66. “Le Duan, First Secretary of the Lao Dong Central Committee,” 11 March 1973, 20-VIET N-6, Vol. 9167 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1.

  67. Ang Cheng Guan, “Vietnam War, 1962–64,” 615; Nguyen Khac Vien, Vietnam, 310; Womack, China and Vietnam, 172.

  68. Le Duc Tho, “Let Us Strengthen the Ideological Struggle to Consolidate the Party,” Tuyen huan (April 1964). Reproduced and translated in Folder 03, Box 25, DPC: Unit 06—Democratic Republic of Vietnam, VATTU, 18.

  69. Hoang Van Hoan, A Drop in the Ocean: Hoang Van Hoan’s Revolutionary Reminiscences (Beijing: Foreing Languages Press, 1988), 317.

  70. “Bao cao cua Chinh Phu do Thu tuong Pham Van Dong trinh bay” [Government Report by Prime Minister Pham Van Dong], June 1964, Ho so 1158: Ho so ky hop thu nhat QH khoa III tu ngay 26.6.—03.07.1964. Tap 3: Phien hop ngay 27.6.1964: Bao cao cua UBTVQH, CP ve tinh hinh bau cu DBQH, phong trao thi dua yeu nuoc, tinh hinh mien Nam, Phong Quoc hoi, VNAC3, 25. According to Melvin Gurtov, the VWP aimed to avoid “a full-fledged ideological or political commitment to either power” by keeping both powers “at bay with piecemeal gestures of approbation.” See Melvin Gurtov, Hanoi on War and Peace (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1967), 181.

  71. “North Vietnam Today,” November 1965, 20-VIET-N-1-4, Vol. 9001, RG 25, LAC, 2–3.

  72. “North Viet-Nam: Annual Review for 1964,” 4.

  73. BCGH to SEAD, 22 February 1964, FO 371/175487, NAUK, 1; French Embassy, Delhi, to MFA, 19 February 1964, #313, AO: VC, ADF, 1.

  74. Ilya Gaiduk, “Containing the Warriors: Soviet Policy toward the Indochina Conflict, 1960–65,” in Gardner and Gittinger, eds., International Perspectives, 72–73.

  75. Olsen, Soviet–Vietnam Relations, 125.

  76. BCGH to SEAD, 22 February 1964, 1–2.

  77. See the remarks of Chinese leaders quoted in William E. Griffith, “The November 1960 Moscow Meeting: A Preliminary Reconstruction,” China Quarterly, no. 11 (July–September 1962): 38–57.

  78. Tran Quoc Tu, “Peace and Revolution, 15–18.

  79. The editorial is summarized and discussed in FGDH to MFA, 20 June 1964, #17, AO: VN, ADF; and FGDH to MFA, 1 July 1964, #76, AO: VN, ADF, B2.

  80. FGDH to MFA, 1 July 1964, B2.

  81. FGDH to MFA, 20 October 1964, #36, AO: VN, ADF, 3.

  82. FGDH to MFA, 5 October 1964, #76, AO: VN, ADF, B3.

  83. French Embassy, Washington, to MFA, 17 February 1964, 1.

  84. See Porter, “Hanoi’s Strategic Perspective,” 16–17. />
  85. According to the British Consulate, Hanoi favored China “chiefly because the Chinese are more ready to support ‘national wars of liberation,’ i.e., in this case the reunification of Vietnam under the North Vietnamese Government”; it was at odds with Moscow, whose “main interest” in Asia was “containing China and avoiding trouble in South East Asia.” See BCGH to SEAD, 26 August 1964, FO 371/175486, NAUK, 1.

  86. BCGH to SEAD, 9 September 1964, FO 371/175481, NAUK, 4.

  87. Gaiduk, “Soviet Policy toward US Participation,” 46. “North Vietnamese leaders were very independent in their policy towards the war,” Gaiduk added, “and often presented their Soviet and Chinese counterparts with faits accomplis” (ibid., 42).

  88. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 74-CT/TW, ngay 27 thang 1 nam 1964: Ve viec to chuc hoc tap Nghi quyet Hoi nghi lan thu chin cua Trung uong ve van de quoc te” [Politburo Instruction, no. 74-CT/TW, 27 January 1964: On the Effort to Organize the Study of the Resolution on International Problems of the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee], in VKD: 1964, 43–44, 58.

  89. Le Duc Tho, “Let Us Strengthen the Ideological Struggle to Consolidate the Party,” 22.

  90. FGDH to MFA, 7 January 1964, #75, AO: VN, ADF, A5; FGDH to MFA, 7 April 1964, #76, AO: VN, ADF, A4.

  91. FGDH to MFA, 7 January 1964, A5. In addition to forty-eight hours of work each week, each cadre and party member was expected to attend thirty hours of “study sessions” each month and four monthly meetings of indefinite duration (ibid., A6).

  92. Quoted in “Hanoi Conference Urges More Work, Ignores Ideology,” 14 April 1964. This U.S. State Department document is located in 20-VIET N-1-3 [Part 1], Vol. 8892, RG 25, LAC, 1.

  93. Thomas Latimer, “Hanoi’s Leaders and the Policies of War,” Folder 18, Box 01, John Donnell Collection, VATTU, 21.

  94. “Hanoi Conference Urges More Work, Ignores Ideology,” 1.

  95. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 128.

  96. The text of the report by Ho Chi Minh is reproduced as “Bao cao Chu tich Ho Chi Minh tai Hoi nghi chinh tri dac biet, ngay 27–28 thang 3 nam 1964” [Report by President Ho Chi Minh at the Special Political Conference, 27–28 March 1964], in VKD: 1964, 90–108. See also Ho Chi Minh, Toan tap, Tap 11 [Collected Works, Vol. 11] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 2000), 220–35.

  97. “Hanoi Conference Urges More Work, Ignores Ideology,” 3, 5.

  98. “Record of Conversation: Visit of Messrs Sullivan and Cooper to the Department,” 3 June 1964, 3.

  99. “Hanoi Conference Urges More Work, Ignores Ideology,” 4.

  100. The final resolution is quoted in “Nghi quyet ve ket qua cau Hoi nghi chinh tri dac biet,” 4.4.1964 [Resolution on the Result of the Special Political Conference, 4 April 1964], Ho so 760: Ho so ky hop thu tam cua QH khoa II tu ngay 29.3–04.4.1964. Tap 5: Phien hop ngay 04.04.1964: Tham luan cua DBQH ve thuc hien ke hoach nam nam, ve cuoc dau tranh cua dong bao mien Nam, ve ket qua Hoi nghi Chinh tri dac biet, ve phat trien cong nghiep dia phuong, dao tao can bo KHKT, Phong Quoc hoi, VNAC3, 2; Bo Quoc phong—Vien Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Tap 11: Cuoc khang chien chong My, cuu nuoc, 1954–1975 [Military History of Vietnam, Volume 11: The Anti-American Resistance for National Salvation] (Hanoi: Nha xuat ban Chinh tri quoc gia, 2005), 154.

  101. “Tham luan ve phong trao dau tranh cua nhan dan mien Nam cua Tran-huu-Tuoc, dai bieu Thanh-hoa [Address on the Struggle Movement of the Southern People by Tran Huu Tuoc, Representative of Thanh Hoa], 4 April 1964, Ho so 760: Ho so ky hop thu tam cua QH khoa II tu ngay 29.3–04.4.1964. Tap 5: Phien hop ngay 04.04.1964: Tham luan cua DBQH ve thuc hien ke hoach nam nam, ve cuoc dau tranh cua dong bao mien Nam, ve ket qua Hoi nghi Chinh tri dac biet, ve phat trien cong nghiep dia phuong, dao tao can bo KHKT, Phong Quoc hoi, VNAC3, 1.

  102. “Nghi quyet va ket qua cua Hoi nghi chinh tri dac biet, 4.4.1964,” 2.

  103. Quoted in “Tham luan thang loi Hoi ngi chinh tri dac biet cua Tran-van-De, dai bieu Ha-tinh” [Address on the Victory of the Special Political Conference by Tran Van De, Representative of Ha Tinh], 4 April 1964, Ho so 760: Ho so ky hop thu tam cua QH khoa II tu ngay 29.3–04.4.1964. Tap 5: Phien hop ngay 04.04.1964: Tham luan cua DBQH ve thuc hien ke hoach nam nam, ve cuoc dau tranh cua dong bao mien Nam, ve ket qua Hoi nghi Chinh tri dac biet, ve phat trien cong nghiep dia phuong, dao tao can bo KHKT, Phong Quoc hoi, VNAC3, 3.

  104. Hoang Van Thai, “The Lesson of Dien Bien Phu,” Hoc tap, no. 5 (May 1964). Reproduced and translated in Folder 03, Box 05, DPC: Unit 08—Biography, VATTU, 14–22.

  105. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 81-CT/TW, ngay 7 thang 8 nam 1964,” 189.

  106. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 74-CT/TW, ngay 27 thang 1 nam 1964,” 59.

  107. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 81-CT/TW, ngay 7 thang 8 nam 1964,” 187.

  108. “Dang Lao dong Viet Nam—BCHTW—Bao cao tong ket tinh hinh dich va cong tac danh dich trong 2 nam 1962–1963 va phuong huong day manh cong tac dau tranh chong phan cach mang trong thoi gian toi (Tong ket viec thuc hien nghi quyet 39 cua BCT ve viec tang cuong dau tranh chong phan cach mang), 26.6.1964” [Vietnam Workers’ Party—Central Committee—Summary of Enemy’s Situation and the Effort to Fight the Enemy in 1962–1963 and the Direction of the Effort to Step Up the Struggle against Counterrevolutionaries in that Period (Summary of the Implementation of Central Committee Resolution 39 on the Effort to Intensify the Struggle against Counterrevolution), 26 June 1964], Ho so 262: Bao cao cua BCH TW Dang tong ket tinh hinh va cong tac danh dich trong 2 nam 1962–1963 va phuong huong day manh cong tac dau tranh chong phan cach mang trong thoi gian toi, Phong Uy ban Thong nhat Chinh phu, VNAC3, 7–8.

  109. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, so 73-CT/TW, ngay 24 thang 1 nam 1964: Ve tang cuong lanh dao cong tac tuyen giao doi voi cac dan toc thieu so o mien nui” [Secretariat Instruction, no. 73-CT/TW, 24 January 1964: On Increasing the Leadership in the Effort to Educate Minority Peoples in the Highlands], in VKD: 1964, 30.

  110. The full text of the instruction is reproduced as “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, so 77-CT/TW, ngay 18 thang 4 nam 1964: Ve viec phat dong cao trao thi dua ‘Moi nguoi lam viec bang hai, ra suc xay dung va bao ve mien Bac, tich cuc ung ho cach mang giai phong mien Nam’” [Secretariat Instruction, no. 77-CT/TW, 18 April 1964: On the Mobilization for the Emulation Movement “Each Person Works Like Two, Building and Protecting the North, Supporting the Southern Liberation Revolution”], in VKD: 1964, 116–26. The VWP elaborated on the meaning of the instruction in articles it published in Nhan dan on 9 and 11 April 1964 (see ibid., 117).

  111. “Report on the Activities of the International Commission in Vietnam for the Month of May, 1964,” 1.

  112. Nhan dan, 21 April 1964; 12 années d’intervention et d’agression des imperialistes américains au Laos [12 Years of American Intervention and Aggression in Laos] (n.p.: Éditions du Neo Lao Haksat, 1966), 52, 54. See also D. Gareth Porter, “After Geneva: Subverting Laotian Neutrality,” in Nina S. Adams and Alfred W. McCoy, eds., Laos: War and Revolution (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), 179–212; Sandra C. Taylor, “Laos: The Escalation of a Secret War,” in Jane Errington and B. J. C. McKercher, eds., The Vietnam War as History (New York: Praeger, 1990), 73–90.

  113. Wallace J. Thies, When Governments Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the Vietnam Conflict, 1964–1968 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), 43.

  114. Ton That Thien, The Foreign Policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam: A Study of Communist Tactics (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 143–44.

  115. Bo Quoc phong—Vien Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Lich su quan su Viet Nam, Tap 11, 172.

  116. On these operations, see Richard H. Shultz, Jr., The Secret War against Hanoi: Kennedy’s and Johnson’s Use of Spies, Saboteurs, and Covert Warriors in North Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1999).

  117. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, so 73-CT/TW, ngay 24 thang 1 nam 1964,” 31.

  118. “Chi thi cua Ban Bi thu, so 75-CT/TW, ngay 3 thang 3 nam 1
964: Ve cong tac phong khong nhan dan” [Secretariat Instruction, no. 75-CT/TW, 3 March 1964: On the People’s Air Defense], in VKD: 1964, 71.

  119. Military Institute of Vietnam, Victory in Vietnam, 131.

  120. FGDH to MFA, 1 July 1964, C1.

  121. “Chi thi cua Bo Chinh tri, so 81-CT/TW, ngay 7 thang 8 nam 1964,” 185, 188.

  122. Mark L. Haas, The Ideological Origins of Great Power Politics, 1789–1989 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005), 150.

  123. Zhou’s comments are quoted in Qiang Zhai, “An Uneasy Relationship,” 110.

  124. “Outline of Subjects for Mr. Seaborn,” undated [May 1964], 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1, 3–4.

  125. “Record of Conversation: Visit of Messrs Sullivan and Cooper to the Department,” 3 June 1964, 2.

  126. Saigon (from Hanoi) to Ottawa, 20 June 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 2, 6.

  127. Andrew Preston, “Mission Impossible: Canadian Secret Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace in Vietnam,” in Lloyd C. Gardner and Ted Gittinger, eds., The Search for Peace in Vietnam, 1964–1968 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2004), 125.

  128. Saigon (from Hanoi) to Ottawa, 22 June 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 3.

  129. Saigon (from Hanoi) to Ottawa, 15 August 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1, 3.

  130. Saigon (from Hanoi) to Ottawa, 17 August 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 3.

  131. Saigon (from Hanoi) to Ottawa, 18 December 1964, 29-39-1-2-A, Vol. 3092 [Part 1], RG 25, LAC, 1.

  132. “Tham luan ve dau tranh thong nhat cua Bo-xuan-Tuan (?), dai bieu Hung-yen” [Address on the Reunification Struggle by Bo Xuan Tuan (?), Representative of Hung Yen], 3 July 1964, Ho so 1162: Ho so ky hop thu nhat QH khoa III tu ngay 25.06–03.07.1964. Tap 7: Phien hop ngay 03.07.1964 ve tham luan cua DBQH ve dau tranh thong nhat dat nuoc, phong trao thi dua, tang cuong luc luong quoc phong, Phong Quoc hoi, VNAC3, 3.

  133. Gareth Porter, “Coercive Diplomacy in Vietnam: The Tonkin Gulf Crisis Reconsidered,” in Jayne Werner and David Hunt, eds., The American War in Vietnam (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1993), 13–14. In fact, that matched their behavior precisely once talks actually began in 1968, before secret negotiations with the Nixon administration began. On this, see Pierre Journoud, “Des artisans de paix dans le secret de la diplomacie: Vers un règlement pacifique de la guerre au Vietnam, 1967–1973” [Peace Artisans in the Secret of Diplomacy: Toward a Peaceful Settlement of the War in Vietnam, 1967–1973], unpublished paper in author’s possession. See note 29 in particular.