Zumwalt

by Larry Berman

  Admiral Tom Moorer, now slotted to chair the Joint Chiefs of Staff, opposed Bud’s selection. When learning that Chafee was leaning toward Zumwalt, a shocked Moorer instructed his aide, a future admiral, Captain Harry Train, to “get Jerry King up here.” Jerome King was Moorer’s protégé, one of the earliest Navy ROTC graduates to achieve the rank of three-star admiral.6 Moorer took King by the arm into Chafee’s office. “You want somebody young. He’s somebody young.”7 In a desperate attempt to prevent the nomination, Moorer wrote to Chafee on April 10, 1970, under the heading SENSITIVE—HOLD CLOSE. Moorer was “gravely concerned and have been thinking about this matter almost continuously for the past three months. Our sole objective should be to do what is best for our Navy.” Moorer recommended another protégé and confidant, Admiral Chick Clarey, as his first choice. Clarey had been Moorer’s deputy when he commanded the Pacific Fleet and then served as Moorer’s vice chief of naval operations. “I think it would be detrimental to the Navy as well as to Vice Admiral Zumwalt to bring him into this position as this time. He requires more experience—he would be forced to retire at a very early age—and, in my view, he simply is not ready for this assignment.”8 By “not ready,” Moorer meant that Bud lacked command experience at sea and should be given command of either a numbered fleet or the U.S. Pacific Fleet. Moorer believed that senior officers would be especially troubled by the appointment.9 Chafee ignored this advice from the incoming chairman of the JCS. Chick Clarey was assigned as commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet.10 When he learned of Chafee’s final decision, Moorer kicked the wastebasket across the room.

  Bud Zumwalt was a black-shoe navy man, a nonaviator, the first since Arleigh Burke to serve as CNO. He had also been deep-selected; seven admirals and twenty-six vice admirals had been passed over. He hoped that the Old Guard would give him a chance but was prepared for rough sailing. Melvin Laird recalled how impressed he was with Zumwalt’s briefing during his first trip to South Vietnam. Bud’s overview of navy strategy in the delta and his vision for accelerated turnover were precursors for Laird’s concept of Vietnamization. More important, Laird was committed to leading the Defense Department into the equal-opportunity era, most especially in rooting out racist practices and other injustices. At the time, there were only three black captains with sea commands in the entire navy. One of Laird’s top priorities was to have selection boards allow him to appoint the first black admiral and Laird sensed he had the right person to make it happen.11

  Laird’s private life reflected his public commitment. Laird had joined the Kenwood Golf and Country Club as a young congressman because it was within walking distance of his home and it had a swimming pool for his children. In 1968 waiters at the club refused to serve his guest, the mayor of Washington, D.C., Walter Washington, a black man. Laird demanded that they serve him. Afterward, the president of the club told Laird that this had been a onetime exception and that no blacks would be served again. Laird decided to fight the policy, joining with Senator Frank Church to lead a petition drive. By the time the case reached the courts in 1970, two prominent Republican members of the administration had already resigned from the club in protest of discriminatory practices, Laird and Secretary of State William Rogers.12

  Secretary of the Navy John Chafee had backed Nelson Rockefeller against Richard Nixon for the 1968 Republican presidential nomination, and John Warner, who was then serving on the Nixon transition team, had been lobbying for Chafee’s position. Warner’s father-in-law, billionaire Republican contributor Paul Mellon, was advocating on behalf of his son-in-law, but Laird had already made up his mind on Chafee. Laird needed Chafee as much as they now both needed Bud. “Nixon hates him!” Warner protested. “He’s a Rockefeller man. Don’t you understand that? He’s a Rockefeller liberal! You can’t have that guy in there! I’m the guy that worked with Nixon for eight years!”13

  Warner was given the position of undersecretary of the navy, with the assurance that he would succeed Chafee. When Chafee departed in 1972 in order to seek public office, Bud wrote him a personal letter saying, “The 22 months we worked together were some of the most enjoyable of my life. I always felt that we were in harmony, and convinced we did good for the Navy. You are a wonderful person to work with. It was fun as well as exhilarating to be with you.”14 All this would change when John Warner became secretary of the navy.

  Bud was instructed to remain at Warner’s home, where that evening Warner told him the details of Moorer’s opposition to the nomination. The next day, Bud was scheduled to meet privately with President Nixon at the Pentagon prior to the announcement of his nomination. After that, Chafee wanted Bud to stay in the traditional quarters for the CNO, known as Quarters A, a stunning 1893 Victorian sitting atop a grassy and wooded hill on the Naval Observatory grounds off Massachusetts Avenue. The home was, of course, currently occupied by Admiral Moorer. Chafee told Bud he was to stay at the home as a visible display of Admiral Moorer’s support of the selection.

  On April 13, 1970, Laird placed a call to President Nixon. “I flew him in and have him hidden away here,” said Laird. Nixon agreed to see Zumwalt “for two or three minutes.”15 The next day, Bud was driven to the basement of the Pentagon and spirited up to the defense secretary’s office, where the president told Bud that his age would be an asset for the job. Bud asked whether Nixon was aware of his ideas on personnel administration. Nixon said he was familiar with the ideas and looked forward to reading even more of them. The two men discussed their childhoods in California. Nixon recalled picking lemons in the town of Lindsay, not far from Tulare. It was all small talk until the president “observed that he was quite concerned about the growing Soviet maritime balance—Soviet maritime capability.” Laird had already told Nixon that Bud possessed a healthy appreciation for the situation. Bud mentioned that he hoped his navy budget would be increased in order to meet this danger. As the meeting ended, Bud noted that as naval advisor to the president, he anticipated communicating directly with his commander in chief. It would be three months before they met again.

  Returning to Warner’s home, Bud requested permission to call his family. The president’s announcement was scheduled for the next day, so absolute discretion was required, particularly because of the secrecy surrounding Admiral Moorer’s appointment as chairman of the JCS. “Therefore, we were selecting a new CNO in secret, but even interviewing other people besides Zumwalt,” recalled Stan Turner, who helped pick the list of candidates. “Thus, the public campaigns and the pressures that come from retired admirals and others were nonexistent at the time.”16

  Mouza was still in the Philippines, unaware that Bud was even in Washington. Meanwhile, in Vietnam, Bud’s aide Mike Spiro thought his boss was in the Philippines with Mouza and their daughters. The phone in Warner’s personal residence was not secure, forcing Bud to speak in code. After informing Mouza that he was in Washington, Bud mentioned that he would be “taking her to the house that Aunt Tina had predicted we would live in.”17 Mouza shrieked with delight, understanding the reference from two decades earlier when Christina Wright, the aunt of their neighbors and dear friends, Jim and Caroline Caldwell, whom everyone called Aunt Tina, had taken them to meet the Marshalls in Pinehurst. A few years after that meeting, CNO Robert Carney’s wife had invited Tina and the Zumwalts to dinner at their home. As the evening drew to a close, Tina said, “I’m so glad that you kids were able to come because I was very anxious for you to see your future home.” Mrs. Carney added, “Now isn’t that a sweet thought.” Mouza understood the code, and yelled out, “Bozhe moy!”—My God! Then, agreeing with Moorer, she said, “Do you realize that that means we have to retire in just four years?”18

  The next day, Bud moved into the guest room at Quarters A. Admiral Moorer was out of town, so that evening Bud was entertained graciously by Moorer’s wife. When Moorer returned the next day, the man who had exiled Bud to Vietnam spoke candidly about his opposition to the appointment, saying it was not personal, just business and in t
he best interests of Bud’s career. He elaborated on each one of his reservations, focusing especially on the fact that Bud’s career in the navy would be over at age fifty-four.

  For the next four years, Bud Zumwalt and Tom Moorer were able to forge a solid although rocky relationship. They were in general agreement on navy issues and budgets, but Moorer was less supportive on social and people programs. They were at their strongest when taking on common adversaries, like the Soviets, Hyman Rickover, Henry Kissinger, and even the president of the United States, and they stood shoulder to shoulder during the crisis over the admirals’ spy ring.

  On April 14, 1970, President Richard Nixon announced his intention to nominate Admiral Thomas Moorer to succeed Earle Wheeler as chairman of the Joint Chiefs and Vice Admiral Elmo Zumwalt to replace Moorer as chief of naval operations. The Washington Post described Zumwalt as the navy’s “modernizing intellectual.”19 The Wall Street Journal noted that “Admiral Zumwalt’s elevation will bring an even more dramatic change in style to Naval leadership . . . he is known as a man of aggressive intellect, a zealot for hard work and long hours, and one who is extremely determined about getting his own way.” The writer mentioned that Zumwalt had a reputation as “something of an upstart in the tradition-oriented Navy, and not all senior officers are his admirers.”20

  Letters of congratulations poured in from old friends and shipmates. In a Western Union message, Andy Kerr joked, “This will look good on your record.” From California, Governor Ronald Reagan offered congratulations: “Your native state is proud of your achievement, and gratified that one of its own will head the world’s largest and finest navy.”21 Former Annapolis roommate George Whistler was so excited that he wrote directly to Admiral Moorer. “Bud Zumwalt was my roommate at the Naval Academy, and I can vouch for his qualifications as your successor. Not only will he be an eloquent and logical spokesman for the Navy in these austere budget days, but, despite his relative inexperience, he will be one of the most brilliant and imaginative naval strategists in the history of our wonderful Navy.”22 In a true act of diplomacy, Moorer replied to “Dear George” by saying, “There is no question with regard to Bud’s qualifications—that is why he was picked to head up the greatest Navy in the world.”23

  One of the first congratulatory cables had come from General Abrams. “The place was buzzing with the news of your nomination. The atmosphere was like a small town where news has come that one of ‘their boys’ has made good. I join with your many friends in acclaiming this selection. More than this I am aware of the awesome burden of leadership that will soon be yours. For this I pray that God will bless you with the health, the patience and the wisdom you will need to fulfill this responsibility.”24 In reply Bud wanted Abe to know that “your thoughtful message was the one I needed most. For 19 months, I have been inspired by history’s greatest combat leader and have sought no greater reward than to be counted on your team. I will leave South Vietnam with regret that I cannot be close to you in your great work. You will always have my support and gratitude.”

  From the University of North Carolina, Bud’s son Jim wrote, “What took so long to do it? You never told me that you were ranked 275th in conduct. . . . I don’t want to sound too corny or anything, Dad, but I can’t express in words how proud I felt when the news came out. I just hope that I will someday be able to become as successful in the career I end up following to make you proud of me.” Bud replied, “There are fewer [sic] things in life closer to a father than to know he has his son’s admiration for his accomplishments. Words are not necessary. I can only add, ‘Keerist, what a sensation.’ . . . As to my standing 275th in conduct, chalk it up to youthful exuberance. After all, one can’t be perfect in every category. ‘All work and no play.’ ”25

  Bud was scheduled to be frocked with four stars on May 15, following the COMNAVFORV change-of-command ceremony in Saigon. The CNO change of command was scheduled for Annapolis on July 1. Rumors were spreading like wildfire that one of Bud’s mandates was to tackle an OPNAV organization that fostered parochialism and internal fighting. Bob Powers wrote that he had already heard “senior gentlemen exuding away,” but there was greater enthusiasm from the “zoomie community.”26 Powers urged his former boss in Vietnam to move quickly on the shake-up, getting rid of the old admirals and getting younger people into these positions. This would mean using his “big broom to sweep away the cobwebs” by altering the daisy chain, leading to the selection of a number of people who were outside the traditional patterns. “He promulgated guidelines that said in essence, ‘I want some iconoclasts,’ ” recalled Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., who was one of those promoted under Bud’s shake-up.27

  A former ministaffer in Vietnam, Captain Dick Nicholson, wrote, “The famous announcement on 14 April, has triggered a new and stimulating fever in the young officer and enlisted rank. . . . A refreshing spirit de corps [sic] will come about now.”28 Dick warned that “the Grand Old Gentlemen are worried, the Big Men will come forward, and the young are in the aisles waiting for the mediocrity to be banished.” He added that “the list of complaints is long and almost all known to you. However the most repeated comment throughout is that we harbor mediocrity in the senior petty officers and officer ranks. Many instances have existed where our people have lost faith in their senior officers because of this mediocrity and sometimes unsat [unsatisfactory] performance. The morale is poor in the surface navy.” Navy leaders had given lip service to the concept of people being their primary resource, but they had no idea how to nurture that resource, because “people oriented” was simply not viewed as the same type of asset as “hardware oriented.” Like so many former members of the Vietnam team, Dick offered to join the cause because “I believe in your thinking and in you as a man, therefore I am available anytime I can serve in any job large or small.” In reply Bud let his loyal aide know that “I have a couple of jobs in mind for you and will be in touch after I take over in July.”29

  Rear Admiral Earl “Buddy” Yates, Commander, Fleet Air, Whidbey Naval Air Station, wrote that “some people are concerned that there will be a mass exodus of the people you were promoted over. Some people feel that your selection as CNO should have been delayed until you had a major fleet command. Some people feel you are too young. But I have heard no one who has suggested that you do not have the capability to handle it with ease. So, in spite of some minor professional jealousy created in some areas, I feel certain that except perhaps in isolated cases, you will have a tremendous amount of personal loyalty and support, probably more than anyone else in the Navy, regardless of rank. Consequently, I feel that you can move into the job with considerable confidence that your policies and actions will be genuinely supported, that your directives will be positively and aggressively followed, and that your power base will be sturdier than any naval officer since Radford. In short, I feel that you will be the most effective CNO we’ve ever had, and not just because of your ability—but a combination of that ability and the unusually strong support you will get both from the officers of all ranks and the civilian echelon. I have always felt that in spite of your great talent and your outward display of confidence, you have worried too much deep down inside that you would fall on your face. Perhaps this is healthy to some extent and keeps one alert, but in the job you have coming up, complete confidence and an inner peace with yourself is essential.”30

  Poignant letters also arrived from Bud’s counterparts in the Vietnamese navy. Lieutenant General Le Nguyen Khang, commandant of the Republic of Vietnam Marine Corps, wrote, “When you leave my country you may go with the knowledge that you have made a great contribution to the welfare and freedom of the people of Vietnam.”31 Admiral Tran Van Chon, whom Bud considered a brother and from whom he had learned to love the Vietnamese people and culture, wrote, “I would like to take this opportunity to assure you that we are grateful to you and your Navy for the sacrifices you have made for us and your assistance in our fight against the Communist aggressors.”32 Chon s
poke of their friendship and the bonds between the two navies. “Your work in our behalf has been truly heroic. You frequently took considerable personal risks to advance our cause. Truly, events have proven that you have always had the larger vision.”

  The Senate Armed Services Committee agreed to schedule expedited confirmation hearings on April 16 so that Bud could return to his command in Vietnam. Chairman John Stennis, who personally agreed to waive the seven-day waiting rule between nomination and hearings, began the hearings by reading into the record the statute bearing on the role of the naval chief: “The Chief of Naval Operations is the principal naval advisor to the President, and to the Secretary of the Navy on the conduct of the war, and the principal naval advisor and naval executive to the Secretary on the conduct of the activities of the Department of the Navy.”33

  A large contingent of supporters was in the hearing room, but noticeably absent from those speaking or present was Tom Moorer. Secretary Chafee told the committee that “other” commitments prevented Moorer from being present, but Moorer was still seething about Bud’s nomination. In an act of pettiness, Moorer was unwilling to allow Bud to select Bob Salzer as his replacement in Vietnam. “I don’t know why. He was also unhappy enough with my own selection that I think he was being a little bit childish about it, and that may have been the main reason why.”34 Instead, Bud was told to offer three or four names, from which Moorer would make his selection. One of the names on Bud’s list was Jerry King, whom Moorer selected.35 Moorer was completely within his prerogative because he was still CNO. This was a case of Moorer’s loyalty downward in promoting an officer with whom he had a strong personal relationship, something Bud did many times throughout his career.