Zumwalt

by Larry Berman

  The next morning, the now dissolved beach detachment appeared at the pier, in uniform and with their gear. At 8:10 a.m., the duty officer from the Constellation came down to the dock and advised the group that liberty was over. Only five men returned to the ship, forcing Bud’s hand. He first needed Secretary Warner’s support. Warner now wanted the men returned to the barracks for a cooling-off period and wanted the Constellation out of San Diego because it had become a symbol. Bud vehemently disagreed. In a memorandum to Warner, Bud urged that the secretary rescind his order to detach the grievance group from the Constellation, to permit them to return to the barracks as a group, and to withhold action to take them into custody until he had a chance to implement a new plan. “It is my belief, shared by others . . . that we have reached the point where the basic structure of the Navy as a military organization will suffer grievously, throughout, if action is delayed longer. It is further our belief that delay increases the probability of physical violence with regard to the grievance group and weakens public confidence in the Navy.”48

  Warner ultimately approved the recommendation. The next day, the Constellation departed San Diego. Of the protesters, 120 soon faced disciplinary action; 46 would receive discharges (36 honorable), and 74 would be transferred. Bud Zumwalt now had a target on his back.

  Bud saw little loyalty from Warner. Especially infuriating was that as undersecretary of the navy, Warner “had apparently made numerous commitments to the old guard that when he became Secretary he would reverse the policies that John Chafee and I had articulated in the personnel field. He sought originally to do so by ordering me to stop the dissemination of any further Z-grams. I told him I would resign on this issue and he backed away.”49

  Bud considered Warner to be “one of the weakest characters with whom I associated . . . he has been described accurately in my opinion as a dilettante. He conducted his professional career somewhat along the lines of his marital career, that is, totally without integrity. He had the backbone of a jellyfish and great vanity which was stroked by those who thought to use him.” Bud came to see Warner as “a man who relished the power and perquisites of his office while not facing up to the responsibilities that accompany that office.”50

  Admiral Clarey called Bud to say that the Kitty Hawk was back in Subic Bay and the judge advocate general (JAG) needed advice on whether the commanding officer needed permission to initiate trials of those who had requested civilian counsel. Clarey was also concerned that he was receiving no direction because of Warner’s indecision. In a telephone conversation later that day, Warner told Bud, “We must keep flexible and watch our options.”51

  The buzzards were hunting for larger prey. “People are running around cutting up on you,”52 warned Dan Henkin, the Pentagon’s assistant secretary of defense for public affairs. These critics charged that Bud’s programs had created the kind of permissiveness that led to a breakdown in order and discipline on these ships. Zumwalt and mutiny were used interchangeably. Bud told Henkin that he was aware that he had a few men in uniform who were acting up but he would be damned if he let them turn the clock back.

  Bill Thompson, Henkin, and his deputy, Jerry Friedheim, were the public affairs personnel involved in damage control. Their collective counsel was that Bud should respond to the perceptions of permissiveness with a clear statement that outlined the navy’s policy with respect to minority affairs. They agreed that the perfect setting for this type of speech was already on the schedule—an address to Washington-area flag officers. Bud decided to invite the press to the November 10 event, because “I wanted to put both the racists and those suffering from racism on public notice to follow orders.”53

  In a heartfelt speech to a group of eighty or ninety admirals, the CNO addressed core issues of race and change within the navy and implementation of over two hundred minority programs by the chain of command. Bud spoke of a recent retention study-group report that made clear to him that “the Navy has made unacceptable progress in the equal opportunity area. And that the reason for this failure was not the programs but the fact they were not being used.” The recent racial incidents aboard ships “are not the cause of racial pressures; rather, they are the manifestations of pressures unrelieved.”

  Speaking without the usual jargon and exquisite politeness that traditionally characterized exchanges of this type, Bud made it clear that issues needed to be resolved within the framework of disciplined, efficient, orderly, and ethical military operations. “What we are talking about here is not a call for permissiveness, or a direction to coddle. Let me say again that discipline necessary for good order will and must be maintained.” The issues involved discrimination and self-deception. Many in the chain of command gave only lip service to the words equal opportunity. “The most destructive influence on the resolution of racial problems is self-deception,” said Bud. In short, the navy needed to do better in implementing equal opportunity programs.

  Sounding like part social worker, part Hobbesian theorist, Bud spoke of the fallacy that began by thinking “that the Navy is made up of some separate species of man—that Naval personnel come to us fresh from some other place than our world—that they come untainted by the prejudices of the society which produced them. They do not. It is self-deception to consider all issues involving blacks and whites solely as racial in motivation. They are not. And, finally, it is self-deception to consider the Navy, or any military organization, as free-wheeling—‘to each his own way’—civilian society. In fact, even a civilian society unbounded by military law and tradition can only exist within the system of law and custom. For a military society to fill its purpose every man must know his own role—and live within it. There must be no substitution of one prejudice for another. The prejudice against good order and discipline is as pernicious as the prejudice of race.”

  Bud ordered his admirals to punish any member of their commands who practiced discriminatory practices. He believed that while the incidents at sea were characterized as racial, that was because race was the only visible aspect. In fact, the causes were much more complex and numerous. Men at sea working seven days a week for months on end with aging equipment faced pressures almost inconceivable to those who had never known them.

  “Saying equal means exactly that. Equal.” Bud implored his commanders to understand that true leadership involved returning to the navy’s oldest and most proven motto, “command by leadership.” “You cannot run a Navy, or any large organization, if the top must provide all the solutions. Nor can you bring about any real change by obeying the letter and not the spirit of a program.” Leadership that lacked commitment from “the heart” was essentially obstructionist. “It is my view that these current racial incidents are not the results of lowered standards, but are clearly due to failure of commands to implement those programs with a whole heart.”

  Bud’s speech was the lead story in the next morning’s New York Times, and “Equal means exactly that” was the paper’s quotation of the day. Praise poured in from a wide range of sources. “Congratulations on your message to senior officers at the Pentagon last week,” wrote Senator Hubert Humphrey. “I deeply appreciate your leadership and you can count on me for support.”54 Vernon Jordan, executive director of the National Urban League, wrote to “express my appreciation for the forthright way in which you expressed the Navy’s official policy on equal opportunity. The remarks you made to senior officers last week were truly inspiring, and set an example of firm leadership every American should admire. You have the full support of the National Urban League for your efforts to make democratic ideals come to life in today’s Navy.”55

  Jordan’s next syndicated column, “To Be Equal,” paid tribute to Zumwalt. “Admiral Elmo Zumwalt, Chief of Naval Operations, put it on the line to an unprecedented assemblage of top Navy brass recently . . . shape up or ship out.” Jordan thought Bud’s remarks to admirals and commanders “ought to be required reading” for every government official who “thinks he’s on top of the
racial situation in his office or business.” Pinpointing the destructive impact of self-deception that occurs when regulations are not enforced and command fails to embrace them with a whole heart, Jordan applauded Bud Zumwalt’s courage in admitting that his directives had been sabotaged by lower-level officers. An officer’s future in the navy was going to be tied to how well he embraced equal opportunity.56

  Writing in reply, Bud noted the insidious and debilitating effects of racial disharmony and discrimination. “As I said in Z-gram 66 nearly two years ago, my goal is ‘a navy family that recognizes no artificial barriers of race, color or religion . . . no black Navy, no white Navy, just one Navy—the United States Navy.’ As we draw closer to that goal, I am delighted to know that you and your colleagues will continue to stand firmly and proudly by our side.”57

  Within an hour of Bud’s speech, an Associated Press story spun it that Zumwalt had dressed down his admirals. “I have always thought that story was instigated and planted but could not prove it,” writes Bill Thompson. “Even reading the speech today, it is hard to see how that speech could be viewed as castigating his admirals.”58 For the past few months Bob Salzer had been in a new position as Commander Amphibious Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (PhibPac). “I read the newspaper account and I was absolutely amazed. I sent back for a copy to the text the next day, because I was going to the Marine Corps Birthday Ball and I wanted to see what CNO had really said—with my own eyes, verbatim—rather than trusting to a newspaper leak. What he actually said was considerably distorted in the press accounts.”59 A number of flag officers felt insulted and demeaned. They also resented that the CNO had allowed the press to attend the meeting. By the time Salzer got to the Marine Corps Ball “the room was rife with insubordination.” Salzer wanted to find out who leaked the press accounts: “It was that Goddamn black advisor of his along with his PAO, who was one of those idolators who thought Zumwalt did nothing wrong. I don’t know what they could have been thinking about because it started a fire.”60

  In Key Biscayne, Richard Nixon was still fuming about the black-power salutes at the pier. Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman recorded in his diary for November 10 that “he [President] called later this evening, furious by a Navy episode where Zumwalt had heralded on the blacks that refused to sail on the Constellation. He’s told Henry to have all the men court-martialed and give them dishonorable discharges. Zumwalt, instead, gave them active shore stations and Coca-Colas and ice cream. You can’t have a service without discipline, and he wanted E [Ehrlichman] to tell Zumwalt that the P [President] was terribly displeased; he said you know he’s a McNamara man.”61

  From Key Biscayne, Henry Kissinger called Bud, who had just returned from an overnight trip visiting his ailing father, to say that from their perspective things did not look good. “Kissinger said that he had just finished talking to Mel Laird and that he thought that he should now call me so that I would fully understand how the President feels about the Constellation situation.”62 Nixon would not tolerate negotiating with people who did not carry out orders and still wanted them all dishonorably discharged. Bud tried to explain that “the President wants the most drastic actions taken” and that this was not what the Uniform Code of Military Justice called for. Commander Roberta Hazard was monitoring the call for Zumwalt from Kissinger and thought the latter “sounded like he was outside of his own skin he was so angry over this thing, threatening to have the Admiral fired.”63 Indeed, Kissinger had told Laird to fire Bud if he did not carry out the order. Laird ignored the order. Bud tried explaining that he needed to be “conscious of the need to get on with the problem of integration and this required dealing with the racial problem somewhat differently than one would deal with it if there were not racial overtones.” Kissinger hit the roof, saying that racial policy and mutiny, “which has been occurring too frequently,” were separate issues. “If he [Kissinger] had said, ‘You’re fired,’ I would have told him to have the commander-in-chief call me, because I wouldn’t take it from him. But he didn’t have the guts to say that.”64 Bud assured the hostile Kissinger that all those facing charges would receive appropriate punishment, but it was not possible to discharge all of them. “CNO also told him that he hopes HK and the President understand these things are taking place because of over deployments, under manning because of Congressional action.”65

  Bud and Henry Kissinger had gotten off to a good start. In their first meetings, Zumwalt found Kissinger to be charming and witty, making the new CNO feel as though “I was a person whose advice and assistance he uniquely sought.”66 Bud was more than willing to provide both types of resources. Here is how Bud described the honeymoon period. “Kissinger is a man of great talent and intelligence who is capable of great charm and persuasion. An initial experience with him to the uninitiated is like a delightful seduction. He exudes charm. The listener, particularly in one on one situations, is convinced that he is the most important person in the world to Henry.”67

  Correspondence from Zumwalt’s CNO files reflects a burgeoning relationship. When Kissinger needed the CNO’s barge for a Saturday cruise on the Potomac, Zumwalt was pleased to provide it.68 The CNO gave Henry and Nancy Maginnes (his girlfriend at the time) tickets for the Army-Navy football game, as well as for numerous navy functions in town. Kissinger especially liked attending these navy galas. Kissinger also appreciated Bud’s assistance in assigning Rear Admiral Rembrandt Robinson to his liaison office with the Joint Chiefs.69 Zumwalt even approved the use of secure navy phone channels for communications that Kissinger did not want the State Department to get wind of. Kissinger liked navy channels because they never leaked, and Zumwalt’s assistance was indispensable in the arrangements.70

  As time went on, however, the seductive process became less charming. “This process of disenchantment becomes greater when one begins to perceive the disloyalty and lack of integrity of the man.”71 Bud knew Kissinger lacked line authority to tell him to do anything. Bud would not give dishonorable discharges without a written directive from the president. He was not going to carry out an unlawful order issued by the head of the National Security Council. “As you look through your lifetime, if there is any 30 seconds to pick out, of which you’re proudest, that’s the one I would pick out. When I refused to carry out that order. That’s my highpoint.”72

  As soon as he got off the phone with Kissinger, Bud received a call from Rear Admiral Dan Murphy, Mel Laird’s executive assistant, who confirmed that Kissinger had asked Laird to intercede but that Laird said he would not do so. Murphy reiterated his concern “that the picture the White House” had of Bud was that he was too soft. Murphy and Laird wondered why no one was taking a shot at John Warner. The whole thing was being blamed on Zumwalt. Murphy concurred that “there is simply no way to give them dishonorable discharges. Notwithstanding the direct signal from my commander in chief, I am proposing that we let this thing continue and we will see where the ice breaks.”

  The president did not like Bud’s speech to the flag officers or the New York Times’s coverage of it. Bud worried that the president was holed up watching distorted news coverage; he wanted to get the message out that he was not coddling dissenters. Murphy told Bud that Nixon was “down on the CNO for permissiveness, mod navy and so forth, and he thinks the ice is getting awful thin.” Bud wanted to send the full text of his speech to San Clemente, but Murphy said it would never get to him. “I really think people are out to cut you up.” Murphy explained that in this administration it was impossible to get to the top man. Murphy advised Bud to act like a tough SOB, but Bud feared that “if we go too far there will be the biggest dissension ever because these guys already think the judicial system is stacked against them.”

  Bud was desperate for allies, and his best chance for survival was with Mel Laird, since John Warner was offering little protection.73 Bud felt as if he were walking the plank. He admitted in a phone call with Admiral Clarey, “I am the guy under the gun.”74 He was especially concerned because Warne
r had decided that he and not Bud would be the spokesman for defending the navy’s programs in the race area. Warner “will not make the case of what the Navy has been through—deployments, carrying brunt of things.” In no uncertain terms, Bud told Clarey, “I would feel a lot better if Mel were doing it.”

  The next day, Bud placed a call to Laird in order to review the state of play and solicit advice from the man who had hired him and always stood by him. Laird was in complete agreement on the issue of blanket dishonorable discharges being in violation of UCMJ. The two men discussed having a military man like Alexander Haig explain this to Kissinger and Nixon. Bud sounded desperate, asking Laird if he thought he should fly to Key Biscayne to see the president personally. Laird stopped him in midsentence. “You have to keep cool . . . don’t panic.”

  Throughout the crisis, Laird’s support never wavered. Laird admired what he described as Bud’s “matchless initiative, your great enthusiasm, and your determination.”75 He considered Bud to be “one of the finest officers of this era or any era” and believed the Z-grams “have brought good cheer and improved feelings about service life to countless thousands of navy men.”76 For Bud, Laird’s support amounted to a life preserver. “You have no idea of how reassuring it is to know that your deep commitment to ‘loyalty down’ matches your proper expectation of ‘loyalty up.’ I pledge to you my continuing commitment to your objectives to the full spirit of the goals not merely the letter!”77