Stalingrad

by Stalingrad- The City that Defeated the Third Reich (epub)

  Yakov Vasilievich Nebolsin (Senior lieutenant, flagship artilleryman, brigade of river cutters, Volga Military Flotilla): By the end of October the 300th Rifle Division came to defend the east bank of the Volga from Osadnaya Balka129 to Srednye-Pogromnoye130 and started giving artillery support to the 124th Rifle Brigade. On the night of November 1–2, units from the battalion completed a tactical landing at the village of Latoshinka. There were two companies from the 300th Division and one company from the Volga Military Flotilla. By the time they landed, the entire command staff was dead. Their boat went first and was sunk, and all of the battalion commanders died. Leadership on the ground was not established, and the whole landing party was pushed to the northern edge of Latoshinka, where they were rendered ineffective.

  Sergei Ignatievich Barbotko (Senior lieutenant, commander of armored cutter no. 41): On October 30 or 31 there was a landing in the area of Latoshinka and Vinovka. The landing operation, in my opinion, was not well planned. There was a gap between the first landing group and the second. The command staff for the landing was on a ferry that sank before reaching the shore. A tugboat carrying artillery and reinforcements arrived very late, which gave the Germans time to regroup. Afonin, the commander of the 300th Rifle Division, boasted that he had 160 field guns to support us with, but none of them fired a single shot during the operation. AC-41 and AC-14 each fired a single volley of rockets. The operation was a failure. The Germans brought in tanks and artillery—they were shooting point-blank at the landing forces and the boats.

  Vasily Mikhailovich Zaginaylo (Deputy commander of the gunboat Chapayev): The landing party was made up of soldiers from the 300th Rifle Division (Colonel Afonin). The troops landed without any artillery preparation. The landing itself was successful. But instead of having continuous support for the assault, they set a limit on artillery shells. The landing forces had to fight with grenades, without artillery support. The fascists brought in six tanks and artillery, all of which were firing directly at our men. We weren’t in communication with the landing party. We didn’t know what to shoot at. Captain Lysenko went with AC-23 to better support the operation and establish communication with the landing party. An incendiary shell hit the boat on its way to Latoshinka. Lysenko was seriously wounded and died soon after.

  Captain Fyodorov131 was directing the operation from my observation point. He ordered us to fire on the northern part of Latoshinka with timefused shells. I let off about forty shells and ceased firing.

  Pyotr Nikolayevich Oleynik (Petty officer 1st class, deputy commander of armored cutter no. 13): On October 30 we spent all day at Shadrinsky Bay. Well camouflaged. At night we took on about seventy men with weapons and ammunition (we’re rated for nineteen). We got to the opposite shore at half past twelve without drawing much attention. But we ended up two or three hundred meters farther downstream than planned, right under the enemy’s nose. Just as the troops were disembarking, we started taking heavy enemy fire. But since the enemy’s main firing points were on high ground, and we weren’t directly in their line of fire, the shells were all landing astern. But there was a gun firing straight at us from a promontory on our port side. German submachine gunners crept up close and fired at us in the dark.

  The landing force, which consisted mostly of Kazakhs,132 was moving very slowly because they were poorly trained and afraid. We had to force them off the boat. Our sailors unloaded their ammunition. Private Mikhaylov threw nearly all of the boxes onto the bank. It was all unloaded in a few minutes.

  When we started heading back we were being shot at by every kind of weapon: mortars, machine guns, cannons, submachine guns. After leaving under enemy fire, we arrived safely at Shadrinsky Bay. We were well camouflaged there during the day. Enemy aircraft were looking but couldn’t to find us.

  AC-23 (Lieutenant Bytko) was on the south side carrying submachine gunners, but they were unable to land. The cutter took a lot of hits, took losses.

  Semyon Alexeyevich Solodchenko (Petty officer 1st class, chief helmsman of armored cutter no. 11): On October 29 AC-11 and AC-13 went to Shadrinsky Bay and were put at the disposal of the 300th Rifle Division. We’d been told we were taking a battalion-strength landing party to Latoshinka. There were two tugboats in addition to the armored cutters. Moroz was in charge of the operation. We went slowly because we had eighty people on board. When they started disembarking, we started taking fire. But the landing went quickly, and we were finished after ten minutes. We got out of there fast, while firing. When we got back we were ordered to make a second run. This time we encountered heavy fire, which we returned. Nine men from the landing party were wounded during our second run. We brought them back. When we got back we learned that the tugboat had unloaded its soldiers but couldn’t unload the weaponry. The second tugboat, which was carrying the command staff, was sunk before it could make a landing. The next night only AC-13 was in the operation.

  Pyotr Nikolayevich Oleynik (Petty officer 1st class, deputy commander of armored cutter no. 13): The next day we took some submachine gunners that hadn’t been taken on AC-23—sixty-eight soldiers and a communications officer from the 300th Rifle Division, who was supposed to gather information and establish communications between the landing party and the division. It was the middle of the night, but the moon made it bright out—we cursed about this and then left for the west bank. The soldiers didn’t know where they were going or why. They asked us, but all we knew was the landing site. It was a complete mess. And when we’d finished dropping them off and went back we were instructed to “transfer the landing party,” even though we’d completed the operation long ago. The submachine gunners were under enemy fire for about two hours, taking cover behind a wrecked river ferry. The engine wasn’t throttled down right away. We were getting shot at, but the shells and mortars were hitting astern. Lieutenant Vashchenko had them muffle the engine. The Germans quit firing soon after. Apparently they’d gone off the scent. The troops landed, the communications officers were waiting for them, and we brought the wounded on board. We took thirty-six men. One of them was a wounded politruk who was part of the first landing. He said that a lot of the landing force got killed, and some had shamefully surrendered.

  Our divisional commissar Zhurovko133 and Seaman Larin walked the riverbank to check on the wounded who wanted to get on the boat. On several occasions they discovered malingers and deserters who had wrapped bandages around their arms or legs to make it look like they were wounded. We brought some of the wounded, and some were brought to us. They came with weapons and were all signed for. They started the engine. Again the enemy started shelling us heavily. We went back to Shadrinsky Bay at full speed.

  Yuri Valerievich Lyubimov (Senior lieutenant, navigation officer for a detachment of armored cutters, communications officer for Northern Group, Volga Military Flotilla): I think the main reason for the landing operation’s failure was the absence of clear leadership. Captain Fyodorov—who organized the operation—dropped by to give us his “directives” and then left. He didn’t show up again, apparently hoping that everything would work out under the leadership of the commander of the 300th Rifle Division. But the rifle divisional commander was not prepared for this kind of operation. During the operation he often gave the most ridiculous orders, and he’d always back them up with the threat of shooting you on the spot. During the day on November 1, for instance, he gave orders for a cutter to take a communications officer to the landing zone, even though it was perfectly obvious that they couldn’t go there, that the Germans would shoot them, that they wouldn’t make it halfway across the river. And that’s exactly what transpired. On his orders, AC-23 was on its way to the landing zone when it was hit in the middle of the river and sunk before reaching the shore.

  Semyon Alexeyevich Solodchenko (Petty officer 1st class, chief helmsman of armored cutter no. 11): At 4:00 A.M. we got an order to take two communications officers to the west bank and to clarify the situation around Latoshinka. We were met with heavy fire as we app
roached. They were shooting at us with machine guns, submachine guns, cannons, mortars. One of the communications officers said this was probably not a good place to land. “Let’s back off,” he said, “and try upriver.” We took direct fire from there too. We moved even closer to shore. But the communications officer wouldn’t go. On the third time we came right up to the bank, but the officer refused to get off.

  After this refusal we turned around and headed back.

  During this operation we got a lot of holes from shells, mortars, and armor-piercing rounds. When we got back to report the situation to the rifle division’s HQ, they didn’t believe it and blamed everything on the communications officer. At that time AC-23 set down at Shadrinsky Bay. They wanted to send us on the operation, but there wasn’t any more fuel. They sent AC-23. Deputy Commander Zhuravkov was on board. As the boat approached the shore, the Germans unleashed a torrent of fire. (We were watching.)

  They reversed and turned back, all while returning fire. Soon after that we saw that the boat was listing, but it made it to the east bank and ran aground. A half dozen men were wounded. Seaman Kazakov was killed, the chief helmsman, Vasiliev, died quickly from his wounds, and politruk Zhurakov was wounded and had to be taken to the hospital by force. He ran away from there to get back to his unit. (They wrote about this in the papers.)

  Pyotr Nikolayevich Oleynik (Petty officer 1st class, deputy commander of armored cutter no. 13): On the third day AC-11 and AC-13 (Lieutenant Tseytlin was in command of AC-13; now he commands a detachment of two cutters) received the order to pick up the landing force. As we approached the west bank, between thirteen and fifteen tanks appeared. All hell broke loose. It was dark, and we were going in blind. There was such heavy fire when we arrived that there was no way we could get close. The detachment commander ordered us to turn back. We couldn’t turn around because our boat, AC-13, had run aground, and AC-11 was right behind. We’d ended up on a sandbar. But we couldn’t afford any delays. We took a big hit to the aft machine-gun turret. That was our first breach from a shell. We’d had plenty of bullet holes before that. The shelling damaged our steering. The enemy was thirty meters away. AC-11 was also damaged. But everyone stayed calm. Our commander, Lieutenant Vashchenko, ordered me, as chief helmsman, to move to the secondary helm. But that wasn’t working either because the transmission was out. From the outside it appeared that the boat was on fire. The bullets rained down. I told the commander that we’d lost steering. Loza, the chief engineer, overheard me and gave the “full reverse.” The boat shook, jerked back, and broke away from the bank. AC-11 had gotten out just a bit earlier.

  Semyon Alexeyevich Solodchenko (Petty officer 1st class, chief helmsman of armored cutter no. 11): When we got to the boat and had a look, we found that it had been breached three times by shells and three times by armor-piercing projectiles, and there were a lot of bullet holes from machine-gun fire.

  AC-13 also returned and came alongside us. Then this lieutenant colonel from the 300th Rifle Division came over and shouted: “Why aren’t you carrying out your orders?” We were running low on fuel. Moroz answered, saying that he “couldn’t get out.” The lieutenant colonel held a Mauser in his hand as he yelled: “I will shoot you.” Then Moroz gave the order to depart. The boats left. The lieutenant colonel walked along the riverbank with his Mauser. Moroz decided to leave AC-11 at Shadrinksy bay and take AC-13 to Akhtuba.

  Sergei Ignatievich Barbotko (Senior lieutenant, commander of armored cutter no. 41): We lost AC-34 the next morning. Lysenko, the glorious and courageous Northern Group commander, was on board, and he died a hero’s death. The circumstances of his death are as follows: that day Colonel Afonin said that what remained of the landing force should be informed that they were being pulled out. AC-34 and AC-381 left to pick up the remaining troops. Lysenko tried to explain that the landing party wasn’t there and that the boats would be going for no reason. Then Afonin accused Lysenko of cowardice. Not wanting to betray the uniform of a naval officer, Lysenko went out on AC-34 himself. A shell hit and destroyed the steering chain. Without rudder control, the boat ran aground 100–120 meters away from the enemy. The Germans fired incendiary rounds directly at them. AC-41, which was providing cover, fired six volleys, throwing ninety-six shells onto the enemy’s firing positions. They took out a six-barreled mortar (a Vanyusha)134 and a number of emplaced guns.

  Nevertheless, the enemy tanks kept firing on the cutter. The troops taken prisoner during the landing operation had given the Germans the positions of our armored cutters. The next day German aircraft launched a raid on those positions, where the cutters, ammunition, fuel, and the gunboat Usyskin were all located. One dive-bomber attacked AC-41. Several bombs exploded fifteen to twenty meters away. Three men were killed (a radio operator and two gunners). Such were the losses we sustained during the period of combat operations at Stalingrad. The German artillery fire was very inaccurate, which is why it didn’t cause any damage. The mortar fire was more accurate. AC-74, for example, was set on fire by German mortars while it was approaching the bank.

  Yuri Valerievich Lyubimov (Senior lieutenant, navigation officer for a detachment of armored cutters, communications officer for Northern Group, Volga Military Flotilla): A small number of soldiers managed to escape and break through to Gorokhov’s brigade, which also hadn’t started offensive actions in support of the landing. Individual groups from the landing party fought steadfastly against the enemy.

  The fight lasted through November 1 and 2. During the landing operation, boats from the Northern Group were at the ready to provide artillery support for the troops. They were waiting for a signal flare. But there wasn’t any flare, so they didn’t open fire that night. In the morning, when we saw German reinforcements on their way to Latoshinka, we fired at them with Katyushas from the armored cutters and from the guns on the gunboats. The 300th Rifle Division also provided artillery support, not that night, but during the day, when the landing parties were on the defensive.

  Those troops weren’t really trained (they were made up mostly of national minorities, people who couldn’t handle their weapons and lacked discipline).

  [ . . . ] Captain Tsybulsky, chief of staff of the 1st Brigade, came to the Northern Group HQ on November 2. He ordered two armored cutters to go to the landing area at 10:00 P.M. to pick up whatever remained of the landing party, since there was no purpose to their continued presence there. At 12:00 A.M. two armored cutters left Shadrinsky Bay: AC-34 (Lieutenant Glomazdin) and AC-387 (Lieutenant Lukin). The divisional commander, Captain Lysenko, and the detachment commander, Lieutenant Moroz, were both on board AC-34. The boats were caught mid-river by German spotlights, and the enemy immediately opened fire. They concentrated all their firepower on the boats: not only artillery, machine guns, and mortars, but also tanks. They were all firing directly at them. Besides those commanders I already mentioned, and their crews, each boat had five sailors with automatic rifles. There wasn’t any way to suppress the enemy fire. Although the cutters did get support from the gunboats of the Northern Group and from the 300th Rifle Division’s artillery regiment, none of that had the required effect because they were shooting without making adjustments, based only on the Germans’ muzzle flashes.

  The cutters couldn’t go right up to the shore. They couldn’t get closer than fifteen meters, so they were forced to turn back. On the way AC-34 lost control because of a damaged steering chain and ran aground. After seeing this the enemy intensified his fire. The cutter was under direct fire from a close distance. The second cutter (AC-387) tried to pull the first one off the bank, but without success. It was stuck. Because of the heavy enemy fire, nearly everyone on board was either killed or wounded. Captain Lysenko—wounded and bleeding (he’d been hit in both thighs)—told AC-387 to stay put, even while the enemy barrage grew more and more intense. The commander and part of the crew of AC-387 were on board AC-34 trying to rescue those who were hemorrhaging most severely. Detachment commander Moroz was badly wounded by an incen
diary round that was burning him alive. The commander of AC-34 was also badly wounded. They were bleeding to death, but there was no one to bandage them and nothing to bandage them with. Lieutenant Moroz dressed his own wounds using a telephone wire. The other end was still connected to the circuit. While their commander and some of the crew were on board AC-34, the rest of AC-387’s crew started the motor, backed out, and left, abandoning their commander and comrades to their fate. At around 4:00 A.M. on November 3, Tsybulsky ordered me to take a motorboat to our dying comrades on AC-34, take the wounded and the survivors and get them to shore. I was accompanied by politruk Lemeshko135 and Lieutenant Peryshkin (commander of the 2nd Detachment of Armored Cutters).136 The shelling was relentless. When we reached the stricken cutter, we discovered an awful scene of death and destruction. Nearly everyone on board was either dead or wounded, there were pools of blood. Incendiary shells had left some of them covered in blue flames, they were burning alive. Lysenko and Moroz were still alive, but they’d lost a lot of blood. We took them and some of the other wounded onto our boat and gave them first aid. Instead of the recommended six there were fourteen people on our motorboat. We kept getting caught on the riverbed as we moved toward the west bank under constant fire. We promised the ones we left behind that we’d help them soon, that we’d either come back ourselves or send someone else. While we were transferring the wounded from the cutter to our boat, I got hit by three shell fragments in my left arm and leg.