Stalingrad

by Stalingrad- The City that Defeated the Third Reich (epub)

  Before that he’d asked Vinokur to have our representatives drive out to the units. Vinokur said: “Fine, let them go.” He gave him Bukharov.

  Major Alexander Georgievich Yegorov (Chief of the political section): The deputy commander wrote a message telling me that, according to Roske, there were eight hundred people somewhere around here, including two generals, who wanted to give themselves up. I was to go with this German major and get them.

  In came the German major. “I’ll be damned,” I said to myself. “This area has nothing to do with us, it’s the responsibility of the 36th Guards.” And in any case, going on your own to take generals is a bit frightening. I thought, this is a German major, and who knows what might enter the head of a German major at the wrong moment? I decided to take all the grenades I could and go with him. I thought: I’ll let him go ahead, I’ll walk behind. He took me to a bunker. One of our guys was standing there. “What’s going on?” “We just came here, we’ve been under fire. I didn’t know what to do. If I move they’ll kill me. I don’t know where my commander is.”

  “Why are we waiting for the commander? I’m going in.” I let the major go ahead of me. He started yelling something in German at the door, probably so he didn’t get shot. We went into the basement, and the smell was terrible. I saw one of our own dead soldiers. I went in.

  I asked them who shot this soldier. We kept going. There were three dead German officers. Then, a bit farther on, I could hear some rustling. The major opened the door, and there were four girls, good light, and a wine bottle and orange peels on the table, tinned meat, sausage. Two of the girls were completely drunk. I asked who had shot the soldier. He’d been fully armed. One of them pointed: “That one, the fool!”

  “What for?”

  “Because he killed those three.”

  I kept my talk with them brief. I asked the one who still had her wits about her whether anyone else was there. “Nobody, just the three officers.”

  I looked and saw no generals, just regular officers. Officers were of no use to me when I needed generals.

  When we left, the major showed me to another bunker. All right, I thought, let’s go. It was about two hundred meters to the second bunker. It was full of soldiers from the 36th Brigade. Nothing for me to do there. So I didn’t find the generals. We went back. And that was the end of my mission.

  Major General Ivan Dmitrievich Burmakov (Commander of the 38th Motor Rifle Brigade): They distributed the order and reported back. A German officer saluted me and said: “Mission accomplished.” He gave his report through the translator. He asked that we wait until eleven o’clock to allow Paulus to gather his things. Paulus’s officers and staff would be going with him. I said to Laskin: “I ask that you arrange for the Southern Group staff to stay in place until the handover is complete. I would leave Roske until he gives us the complete surrender, and anyway I need to check out the mine fields.”

  I asked Roske to call for his mine layers. They had it all on the map, and I asked that their mine layers clear all of it. Vinokur told me later that the building itself was mined. Roske told Vinokur that, whatever happened, he [Roske] was responsible to the Führer for the safety of the field marshal. Anything untoward and we’d all get blown up. I asked that they defuse all of it immediately.

  He [Roske] asked that he be given his own submachine gunners and his car. Laskin said that the field marshal would be going in my own car, so there was nothing to be afraid of. I said I’d have a car with submachine gunners going just in front of us. Then we set out. We led all of the soldiers out. They showed us the minefields and cleared the mines. The thing about the building being mined was not true. The corridors were mined, and the entrance was mined, but the building itself wasn’t. They entered all the minefields on the map, and at 5:00 P.M. Roske told me that he was ready to go.

  Vinokur brought him from his HQ. He’d asked for two cars, and I had two jeeps. I put him in my car and his officers in a truck. We were polite the whole time.

  By nine o’clock we’d essentially ended all combat operations. Paulus’s capture had completely ended the war in Stalingrad, at least in the southern part of the city. The surrender was immediately followed by a kind of pilgrimage. Representatives of the local authorities were arriving. There were tons of weapons. The men started taking them. By that evening you couldn’t find a soldier without two or three revolvers.

  Many of the Germans had simply dropped their weapons and gone out onto the square unarmed.

  Roske asked for and received permission to say farewell to his officers. I put together a group of officers.

  By the way, one of the men there was the city commandant, a Russian. He’d also been in the basement. Roske’s translator said that there were a number of officers, including the city commandant, and also eight women, all in the basement. One of the women started crying and asked if she could bid farewell to the commandant. They came to me.

  “Comrade Colonel, this bitch would like to know if she can say good-bye to the commandant.”

  “Is she one of ours?” I asked.

  “No, anything but, though she is Russian. The bitch even has the nerve to weep.”

  That really made me mad. All the other Russian prisoners were packed off either to the special section or to the NKVD.

  I’d say Roske is about forty-six, forty-seven. Paulus is older. Roske has five children.

  What was Paulus like? He seemed like a cornered animal. He was obviously very unhappy about all that had happened. He was thin, unshaven, sloppily dressed. I didn’t like him. His room was filthy. Roske’s room was more or less clean. That’s where Schmidt was, the chief of staff.

  When Paulus was leaving, he asked to be taken out through the back gate. As he was driving away, he looked around with such a stupid, pathetic smile. He was clearly upset.

  There was so much filth in the basement, Paulus’s room included. The courtyard was a nightmare. We cleared up the mess.

  I couldn’t believe the filth that Roske had allowed in such a high-level headquarters. I asked him about it. They started talking, and then came the translation: “Your Katyushas and artillery prevented us from going out during the day. We were forced to take care of our bodily functions in the basement. This could only be removed at night, and even then the men were afraid to go out.” He blushed slightly. He was clearly a sophisticated man, a seasoned officer.

  Major Anatoly Gavrilovich Soldatov (Deputy chief of the political section, secretary of the brigade party committee): [ . . . ] it was unbelievably filthy, you couldn’t get through the front or back doors, the filth came up to your chest, along with human waste and who knows what else. The stench was unbelievable. There were two latrines, and both had written on them: “No Russians allowed.” Whether they ever used these latrines is hard to say—the corridors were all one big latrine. There were times when the Germans shot better than us, but we never made latrines out of our living quarters.

  Major General Ivan Dmitrievich Burmakov (Commander of the 38th Motor Rifle Brigade): I was surprised when the German radio said that all of them had committed suicide. I ran over there to take a look. Paulus was there in his room, along with my orderlies. There were two submachine gunners, and the four of us. Everything was in order.

  When I was getting ready to set Roske’s group, I had all of them lay their weapons on the table, Roske included. They all had their weapons until 5:00 P.M. Then they started taking weapons out of their suitcases. They were well able to shoot themselves, and Paulus could even have blown himself up.

  On the contrary, Roske was constantly frightened that he was going to be killed, he kept telling me that he was responsible to the Führer for the field marshal’s life. He was frightened that there might be some mistake. He asked me to have my own car go ahead of his. Comrade Laskin said: “Don’t worry—Paulus will be going in my car.” Then Roske stood up and thanked him: “Thank you, thank you.”

  How could any of them die by their own hand when they’re suc
h cowards? They weren’t brave enough to die.

  I’d just shaved the day before. When I, the commander of the 38th Brigade, was presented as his captor, Roske stood up. He’s older than me. He’s actually only a little bit older. I may look young, but I’m the same age: forty-four. I’ve been in the army since 1918. I was among those who fought for Shchors, the Ukrainian. He blushed a little. “Do you recognize me?” I asked him.

  “Yes, gut gut.”

  He was a brave one, Roske. He came right out and said that he had some bad commanders. He knew our units well. He was asked a question about one commander. He said he’d acted improperly, poorly. This general knows military matters. Roske was commander of the Southern Group. Schmidt was chief of staff of the 6th Army. Roske led the negotiations. Schmidt acted as intermediary between Roske and Paulus. He kept Paulus informed of the progress of the negotiations and the surrender. He passed on Paulus’s personal request that we spare his life, that we not shoot him.

  Roske was also taken to Beketovka. He got angry with me. When he was being driven out, I didn’t show him the proper respect. I could see he was waiting there for me to come shake hands and so on. He waited awhile in the car, twisting and turning, and I waved at him like it was no big deal.

  Lieutenant Colonel Leonid Abovich Vinokur (Deputy commander for political affairs): We sent Paulus away at 11:00 A.M. on January 31, 1943, and at 5:00 P.M. we sent Roske to Shumilov at Beketovka. That’s where Paulus had been taken. The Northern Group surrendered the next evening.

  Major General Konstantin Kirikovich Abramov (Member of the Military Council, 64th Army): I was still in bed when Shumilov called me at six in the morning saying that Paulus was being taken prisoner, that someone had to be sent. I got dressed and went to see Shumilov at the office. We wondered who to send. We decided on Laskin. When he couldn’t be found we sent Colonel Lukin, who was deputy chief of staff and and the chief of the NKVD. He drove off. Then Laskin turned up, and he was sent to Colonel Lukin. By nine o’clock we hadn’t heard a thing. We started to worry. Then I went there myself together with Serdyuk.

  But we didn’t know exactly where the 38th Brigade was, and we didn’t know the city, so we missed the 38th Brigade’s headquarters and came out onto the square at the department store. We drove around in circles for a while before getting worried that they might already have been sent off to our HQ, so we turned around and went back.

  It was about an hour later that Laskin brought Paulus. He delivered him to Shumilov’s office. At first Shumilov drafted a list of questions. [ . . . ] Chief of staff Laskin was walking in front when they brought him in. They drove him over in an Emka.160 Shumilov was there, and so was I, Serdyuk, Chuyankov, and Trubnikov, the deputy chief of the front political administration. The chief of staff reported: “We’ve brought von Paulus, field marshal of the German army.”

  They asked him if he’d like to take off his coat in the hallway. He did. Then Paulus, Shumilov, and Adams came in and shook hands with all of us. Shumilov asked us to sit. We sat. Shumilov asked for Paulus’s documents. Paulus produced his service book. Shumilov looked it over, then asked whether there was a document to show that he was a field marshal. Paulus said he had no such documents, but that his chief of staff would confirm that they had received a radio message saying he was now a field marshal.

  General Mikhail Shumilov inspects the papers of Field Marshal Paulus. Frames from the Soviet newsreel Soiuzkinozhurnal 1943, no. 8.

  Paulus was unshaven, bearded, but he was wearing his iron crosses. Everything was as it should be.

  He’d already surrendered his sidearm. He was questioned. They asked whether he had ordered his forces to surrender. He said that he had, that they were surrendering. They asked why he was surrendering. He said they were out of ammunition and food, that there was no point in resisting any longer. When they were being photographed they shook their heads, as if to say no.

  The whole thing took four or five minutes. Then we decided to get them some food. Laskin and I took them along. Shumilov stayed where he was. We took them along and said: “Sit down, eat.” We talked with them for two hours. Then Shumilov, Serdyuk, and Trubnikov joined us. At first Paulus refused to drink. Then I pushed him to take a glass. He said: “I can’t, I haven’t eaten.” Then he said: “We’re not accustomed to drinking vodka.” Then he drank a glass, then a second. Shumilov arrived. He drank to our health. We’d been talking for a while already, just sitting there. I asked him why he didn’t get out of the encirclement when he was free to leave. He said: “That’s for history to decide.”

  He was asked what his objective had been, how he regarded the destruction of his army. Shumilov told him that we once had the keys to Berlin, but that the Germans had never had the keys to Moscow.161 And now we were again going to have the keys to Berlin, while they would never have the keys to Moscow. He made a face during this but didn’t say a thing. He’s fifty-four. He asked me how old I am. I said I was thirty-six. Again he made a face.

  Schmidt took part in the conversation. He’s an intelligent man, very direct. We didn’t really have anything to ask them about. What they could say about their army meant nothing to us because we had them in our grip. And anyway, they knew less about the current situation than we did. Paulus didn’t ask any questions. I’m sure he thought we were going to have him shot. We asked him why they destroyed Stalingrad. He said: “You did as much to destroy Stalingrad as we did.” We said: “We wouldn’t have been doing anything to Stalingrad if it hadn’t been for you.” He had nothing to say to that.

  Shumilov was discreet. Paulus was nervous, his face was twitching, lips pressed tight. He was an old man, nothing more. [ . . . ] There was something a bit servile and ingratiating about his manner, in the way he praised us, how he smiled and bowed.

  When he came to the dining room, he sat down and asked that no one write anything or take photographs. I said that we weren’t going to, but that there were people in the other room who were recording everything. But there weren’t any photographers.

  Lieutenant General Mikhail Stepanovich Shumilov (Commander of the 64th Army): After Field Marshal Paulus was taken to army headquarters, I let him in, and he gave me some information. After that I asked him for something that would prove that he really was Field Marshal von Paulus. He presented me with his service book, where it was written that he was in the German army and that he was von Paulus, a soldier of the German army.

  When I’d taken a look at the booklet, I asked my next question, saying that I’d just been told that yesterday or the day before that he’d been given the rank of field marshal, and that I’d like to see documentation to that effect.

  General Shumilov in Stalingrad, January 31 or March 3, 1943. Photographer: Georgy Lipskerov

  He told me that he had no written confirmation but that he had indeed gotten a telegram from Hitler saying that he was now a field marshal. His chief of staff and his adjutant, who had been with him the whole time, would confirm this.

  Then I asked him another question: May I report to my government that I’ve captured not a colonel general, but a field marshal?

  He said: “I would ask that you tell your government I am a field marshal.”

  For the next question, the field marshal was asked to explain why the elite German forces were concentrated in Stalingrad while inferior units, such as Romanians and Hungarians, had been placed on the flanks. I asked whether our high command had gauged the situation correctly when they first defeated these flanks and avoided the elite German forces in Stalingrad. He replied: “That was the mistake of the German army.” Incidentally, Paulus never said this himself, but General Roske and the other generals said that after a series of unsuccessful assaults on Stalingrad and Beketovka, Field Marshal von Paulus had asked Hitler for permission to withdraw his forces behind the Don for the winter. Apparently he asked Hitler twice at the request of General Roske and the other generals, but Hitler wouldn’t allow his forces to fall back to the Don. That was near the end
of October, beginning of November. Before the encirclement.

  In answer to the question of whether the surrounded German army could have kept up its resistance, he told me that, after his defenses broke on the Voroponovo––Peschanka—Staraya Dubovka Front, he had thought further conflict was pointless, as their cargo planes had nowhere to land to supply the group with ammunition and food. But, he said, he was a soldier, and he’d been ordered to keep fighting to the last man. Only the complete encirclement of his headquarters had compelled him to surrender.

  As for why he hadn’t committed suicide—that is something I never asked him.162

  The German newspapers said that Paulus kept poison and a revolver in every pocket. A search produced only one of these revolvers, and no poison of any kind was found. Paulus was taken unharmed, he wasn’t wounded, and he didn’t get harassed in any way by our command staff during his capture. He arrived at the 64th Army headquarters with his own car and entourage.

  Captain Yakov Mironovich Golovchiner (Chief of the political section’s 7th Section, 64th Army): Paulus is tall, slightly bent old man, around sixty, with grayish eyes, very dignified, as you’d expect for a field marshal, unshaved. He was depressed, and he looked unhealthy. According to him, his second adjutant had recently come down with something very bad.

  On January 29 Paulus relieved himself of command. On the 31st there was an announcement that the field marshal had turned over command of the Southern Group of forces in Stalingrad to General Roske. Paulus declared himself a private individual via his chief of staff, and he transferred all of his responsibilities to General Roske. [ . . . ] I spoke with Paulus’s staff officers on the road and then here (in Beketovka). They all blamed Paulus for being soft and weak-willed. They said they could have resisted for a substantial amount of time. They still had a lot of men, but he did not show enough resolve. On top of that, they thought, Paulus’s staff had made a series of major tactical errors when they were still some distance from Stalingrad. If it weren’t for those major errors, then they’d have been able to resist more effectively, they said.