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The Pentagon's New Map

Page 50

by Thomas P. M. Barnett


  Navy, Russian, 13-18, 64, 74

  Navy, U.S., 14, 102, 234, 325

  as crisis-response force, 138-54

  good planning by, 362-63

  and Manthorpe Curve, 63-79

  post-Cold War vision, 73-78

  and Tailhook scandal, 72

  Near-peer conflict, 326

  Net-centric war, 327-29

  New Core states, 55-58, 169, 240-41, 374-78

  New economy, 33-34

  New ordering principle

  Big Bang as strategy, 278-94

  the greater inclusive, 267-78

  life out of balance, 247-50

  rise of system perturbations, 258-67

  September 11, 2001, 250-57

  New rule sets, 9-11

  future worth creating, 46-58

  gaps in, 27-34

  for new era, 18-35

  playing Jack Ryan, 12-18

  and WWII vs. Vietnam War, 35-46

  New Rule Sets Project, 46-48, 146, 151, 197-98, 225, 304

  New World Order, 59-63, 157, 194, 271

  New York City Police Department, 353

  New York Times, 136, 216, 236, 263

  New York Times Magazine, 104

  Nigeria, 126

  1920s, 29, 309

  1930s, 28-29

  Nixon, Richard, 38, 42

  Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 321

  Non-Integrating Gap. See Gap nations

  Nonstate actors, 88

  North America, 2, 220

  North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 87, 373, 382

  North Korea, 84, 90, 131, 133, 330, 334, 377, 379

  No-win scenario, 149-52

  Nuclear power, 330

  Nuclear weapons, 39-41, 84-85, 161, 172, 300, 316, 325

  O

  Occupation force, 318

  Office of Legislative Affairs (OLA), 137-38

  Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD), 179-80

  Official developmental aid (ODA), 202

  Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Kagan), 52

  Oil, 182-85, 200

  companies, 215

  flow of, 214-24

  Old Core economies, 55-58

  Old Europe, 143, 288

  Oliver, Dave, 72

  OPEC, 42, 221, 312

  Operation Desert Storm, 42, 64, 81, 117, 310, 318, 329-30

  Operation Iraqi Freedom, 264, 277, 289,310, 318, 329

  Operation Liberty Shield, 277, 317-18

  Overseas Filipino Workers, 212-13

  Overwhelming force, 337

  P

  Pacific Rim, 372, 382

  Pakistan, 188, 235-36, 330, 352, 377

  Paraguay, 134

  Peace, 62

  Peace and Conflict Ledger 2003 (University of Maryland), 351

  Peace dividend, 64, 82, 196, 301

  Peacekeeping operations, 144, 164-65, 314, 319

  Pearl Harbor, 315

  Pei, Minxin, 358-59

  Pentagon, 3-7, 16, 95, 372

  budget planning, 116, 141

  and Bush Administration, 108-10

  and China, 110-21, 152, 172

  exporting security, 313-15

  failure to embrace post-Cold War reality, 59-63, 349

  gear-up for war with China, 225-26

  how 9/11 saved it from itself, 96-106

  insular mind-set of, 193-94

  Leviathan vs. System Administrator “departments” in, 318-27

  new ordering principle of, 269-70

  in post-Cold War era, 23-24

  post-Vietnam internal rebuilding, 80

  Program Objective Memorandum (POM), 115

  vertical thinking of, 110-21

  view of national security, 26-27

  People flows, 206-14, 240

  People’s Liberation Army, 241-42

  Perestroika, 127

  Perry, William, 96

  Persian Gulf, 184-87, 214-22, 277, 309-10, 312, 334, 357, 361-62

  Persian Gulf War, 80, 139

  Peru, 351

  Petrea, Howard “Rusty,” 71

  Philippines, 188, 212-13, 352

  Pipes, Daniel, 187, 254

  Pipes, Richard, 36

  Political will, 204-205, 313

  Population flows, 206-14, 376

  Posse Comitatus restrictions, 321

  Potential support ratio (PSR), 206, 209-11

  Powell, Colin, 168, 194, 280

  Power projection, 299

  Preemption strategy, 35, 42, 167-79, 243, 261, 354

  Press, 344

  Proceedings, 327, 332-33

  Program Objective Memorandum (POM), 115

  Proliferators, 300

  P-3 spy plane, 282

  Putin, Vladimir, 127

  Q

  Qaddafi, Muammar, 306

  Quad Btu, 219-20

  Quagmires, 153, 194

  R

  Racism, 361

  Rag-top option, 72

  Ramstein Air Force Base, 179, 362

  Raw materials, 133-34, 218-19

  Reagan, Ronald, 30, 128

  Realists, 342

  Red Army, 60, 89

  Refugee flows, 164, 313

  Reggio, Godfrey, 247

  Regime change, 215, 314, 375

  Relief operations, 144

  Religious fundamentalists, 187

  Religious-inspired transnational terrorism, 3-46

  Replacement migration, 209

  Reproducible strategic concepts, 19-20, 30

  Reserve currency, 244, 307-308

  Reserves, U.S., 102, 319, 325

  Resources, 199-201

  Ressam, Ahmed, 254

  Revolution in military affairs (RMA), 194

  Ridge, Tom, 256

  Roaring Twenties, 29, 309

  Rodrik, Dani, 131

  Rogue states, 83, 93, 122, 135

  Romania, 112

  Roosevelt, Franklin, 58

  Royal succession, 133

  Rule of law, 127, 130

  Rule-set loss, 203

  Rule sets, 9-10, 82-83, 202-203

  for American way of war, 332-39

  different, for different worlds, 166-79

  economic, 168-79, 197-98, 202-203

  gaps in, 27-34, 88

  lack of, and investors, 132-37

  need for new security, 85, 268

  and New Rule Sets Project, 46-48, 197-98

  resetting, 34, 240, 244-45, 260-64

  Rumsfeld, Donald, 104, 168, 180, 226, 237, 315, 318

  Russia, 68, 100, 131, 169, 264, 352

  bankruptcy of, 199-200

  economic reform in, 127-29

  post-WWI, 143

  Russian Federation, 334

  S

  Sacred terror, 43-46

  SARS superspreaders, 263

  Saudi Arabia, 219, 362, 380-81

  Schaefer, Charlie, 73, 77

  Schwarzkopf, Norman, 64

  Seam States, 188-89, 369

  Seattle Man, 265

  Security

  bilateral, 188-89

  exporting, 179, 303-15, 369

  flows of, 231-45

  fracture of market for, 79-88

  for Lesser Includeds, 149-51

  no rules without, 203

  Security dilemma, 204

  Separatist movements, 348-49

  September 11, 2001, 2, 7, 19, 24

  and Cantor Fitzgerald, 46-48

  change in rule set since, 10-11, 34-35, 88, 92-95

  how 9/11 saved the Pentagon, 96-106

  immediate aftermath of, 256-66

  inability of U.S. to stop attack, 317

  as launch for Big Bang strategy, 281-94

  Serbia, 84, 93

  Show of force, 145

  Shrink the Gap strategy, 305-306, 355, 360, 369

  Siegel, Adam, 138-39

  Sierra Leone, 374-75

  Simon, Steven, 43

  Singapore, 130, 203

  Single crisis response, 138

  Small Arms S
urvey, 86

  Smith, Leighton “Snuffy,” 16-17, 65

  Smuggling, 135

  Social Darwinism, 361

  Somalia, 81, 99, 119, 144-45, 194, 204, 348

  South Africa, 188

  South America, 2

  South Korea, 31, 90, 124, 130, 239, 306, 330, 334, 377

  Soviet republics, former, 330, 352

  Soviet Union, 13

  August coup, 15

  and Cold War, 37-41

  collapse of, 59-63, 349

  Special Operations Forces, 95, 260, 323-24, 337

  Stability, no markets without, 200

  State bankruptcy, 376-77

  State Department, 30, 95, 373

  State-on-state wars, 85

  Stearns, Rick “Sterno,” 78

  Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), 41

  Strategic concept reproducibility, 19-20, 30

  Strategic Policy Analysis Group (SPAG), 13

  Strickland, Mike, 78

  Submarines, 362

  Sub-Saharan Africa, 134, 335, 382

  Sudan, 167

  Suicide bombers, 216

  Syria, 289

  System Administrator, 299-303, 315-27, 371

  System Perturbations, 258-67, 277, 303-304, 371

  T

  Tailhook scandal, 72

  Taiwan, 62, 90, 101, 241-42, 334, 377, 381

  Taiwan Straits crisis, 101

  Taliban, 260, 297, 361

  The Tank, 67

  Tanzania, 167

  Taylor, Charles, 88, 133, 375

  Telecommunications connectivity, 136-37, 374

  Terrorism, 43-46, 84, 91, 93

  Terrorist groups, 165, 187-88, 216-17

  Tharoor, Shashi, 242

  The End of the World As We Knew It (TEOTWAWKI), 118

  Theocracies, 134

  Third World, 80, 91-92, 190

  Threat-identification process, 24

  Tiananmen Square protest, 129

  Tolkien, J.R.R., 368

  Top-down thinking, 367

  Top Secret clearance, 342-43, 345

  Traditional societies, 135-36, 361

  Transitioneers, 69-70, 98-99, 103

  Transnational terrorism, 43-46, 84, 91, 93

  Truman, Harry, 30-31, 170, 364

  “Trust fund” states, 219, 381

  Tunisia, 306

  Two-Major Regional Conflicts scenario, 61

  U

  Über-realists, 342

  Uganda, 306

  Ulam, Adam, 36

  Unilateralism, 177, 313

  United Nations, 178, 190, 300, 319, 336, 352

  High Commissioner for Refugees, 164

  population projections, 206-11

  Security Council, 33, 177, 322, 376

  United States, 31, 229

  American way of war, 327-39

  defense spending, 299

  as empire, 354-66

  foreign investment in, 244

  future military power of, 315-27

  gap in perception with Europe, 52

  as Gap Leviathan, 161, 175-76, 204-205, 283, 294, 299-301, 309

  and System Administrator, 310-15

  as globocop, 350-54

  Iraq invasion, 277

  Latinization of culture in, 209-10

  nationalistic periods in, 123

  preemption strategy of, 167-79, 354

  security export by, 231-45

  sovereign debt of, 378

  U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), 21

  U.S. News & World Report, 183

  U.S. Refugee Committee, 2002 global survey, 164

  USA Patriot Act, 35, 242-43, 256-57

  V

  Venezuela, 351

  Vertical scenarios, 110-21, 250, 262

  Vietnam Syndrome, 80, 204

  Vietnam War, 80-81, 319

  Violence, 85-88, 164-65

  Virtual migration, 211-12

  Vision, 63

  Vlahos, Michael, 42

  Voss, Phil, 15

  W

  Wall Street, 227, 241, 307

  Wall Street Journal, 181-83

  War

  and absence of rule sets, 132

  American way of, 327-39

  asymmetrical, 89-96, 318

  big vs. small, 302

  in Gap states, 164-65

  great-power, 82, 245, 272, 274

  interstate, 84

  just, 326

  main criterion for waging, 300

  net-centric, 327-29

  state-on-state, 85, 95

  on terrorism, 25, 62, 104-105, 108, 158, 168, 187, 192, 256, 306, 324, 353, 378

  without peer, 62

  Warlords, 88

  War zones, 239

  Washington, D.C., 110

  Washington Consensus, 130, 168

  Washington Post, 105

  Weschler, Tom, 303

  West Africa, 351

  West Bank wall, 292-93

  Western Europe, 2, 31, 52, 176

  White paper, 67, 76-77

  Wilkerson, Tom, 72-73, 76-77

  Will, political, 204-205, 313

  Wilson, Woodrow, 364

  Wired, 213

  Wisconsin, 110

  Wolfowitz, Paul, 279-80, 291

  Women’s status, 135-36, 375

  Working brief, 79, 81

  World Bank, 31, 162, 347

  World Health Organization, 263

  World Trade Center bombing, 197, 259

  World Trade Organization (WTO), 55, 129-31, 218, 265, 374

  World Values Survey, 135

  World War I, 143, 309

  World War II, 29-30, 32-33, 58, 245, 297, 301, 309, 383

  World War III, 60, 84, 99, 151

  Y

  Yeltsin, Boris, 15

  Yen, 307

  Y2K, 26, 250-59, 315, 372

  Younger populations, 163

  Youth bulges, 163-64

  Yuan, 307

  Yugoslavia, 145-46, 292, 348-49, 352

  Yukos {oil company), 128

  Z

  Zakana, Fareed, 34, 201, 219, 381

  Zoellick, Robert, 45, 266, 373

  Unofficial Appendix

  Esquire, March 2003

  The Pentagon’s new map

  Thomas P.M. Barnett

  It explains why we’re going to war. And why we’ll keep going to war.

  Esquire, March 2003 v139 i3 p174(8)

  Full Text: COPYRIGHT 2003 ? Hearst Communications, Inc. All Rights Reserved

  Shortly after we wrote about military strategist THOMAS BARNETT in last December’s Best and Brightest issue, he gave the Esquire staff a presentation on his theory of war and globalization, just as he regularly does for government leaders as an adviser to the Department of Defense. We’ll never read the news the same way again. This month, Barnett delivers the same briefing to you in “The Pentagon’s New Map” (page 174), in which he maps out America’s recent military encounters and predicts future ones based on patterns of global economic development. “We’re at a time period not unlike after World War II,” says Barnett, who is also a professor at the Naval war College in Newport, Rhode Island. “We’re trying to ask the same great questions, like: How can a military superpower today influence history for the better? We established this overarching ideology for so long that allowed us to justify anything, and that ideology was containment. In some ways, what I’m trying to argue is a new sort of containment—a containment of the new bad places and the desire to shrink them.”

  Since the end of the cold war, the United States has been trying to come up with an operating theory of the world—and a military strategy to accompany it. Now there’s a leading contender. It involves identifying the problem parts of the world and aggressively shrinking them. Since September 11, 2001, the author, a professor of warfare analysis, has been advising the Office of the Secretary of Defense and giving this briefing continually at the Pentagon and in the intelligence community. Now he gives it to you.

  LET ME TELL YOU why mi
litary engagement with Saddam Hussein’s regime in Baghdad is not only necessary and inevitable, but good.

  When the United States finally goes to war again in the Persian Gulf, it will not constitute a settling of old scores, or just an enforced disarmament of illegal weapons, or a distraction in the war on terror. Our next war in the Gulf will mark a historical tipping point—the moment when Washington takes real ownership of strategic security in the age of globalization.

  That is why the public debate about this war has been so important: It forces Americans to come to terms with what I believe is the new security paradigm that shapes this age, namely, Disconnectedness defines danger. Saddam Hussein’s outlaw regime is dangerously disconnected from the globalizing world, from its rule sets, its norms, and all the ties that bind countries together in mutually assured dependence.

  The problem with most discussion of globalization is that too many experts treat it as a binary outcome: Either it is great and sweeping the planet, or it is horrid and failing humanity everywhere. Neither view really works, because globalization as a historical process is simply too big and too complex for such summary judgments. Instead, this new world must be defined by where globalization has truly taken root and where it has not.

  Show me where globalization is thick with network connectivity, financial transactions, liberal media flows, and collective security, and I will show you regions featuring stable governments, rising standards of living, and more deaths by suicide than murder. These parts of the world I call the Functioning Core, or Core. But show me where globalization is thinning or just plain absent, and I will show you regions plagued by politically repressive regimes, widespread poverty and disease, routine mass murder, and—most important—the chronic conflicts that incubate the next generation of global terrorists. These parts of the world I call the Non-Integrating Gap, or Gap.

  Globalization’s “ozone hole” may have been out of sight and out of mind prior to September 11, 2001, but it has been hard to miss ever since. And measuring the reach of globalization is not an academic exercise to an eighteen-year-old marine sinking tent poles on its far side. So where do we schedule the U.S. military’s next round of away games? The pattern that has emerged since the end of the cold war suggests a simple answer: in the Gap.

  The reason I support going to war in Iraq is not simply that Saddam is a cutthroat Stalinist willing to kill anyone to stay in power, nor because that regime has clearly supported terrorist networks over the years. The real reason I support a war like this is that the resulting long-term military commitment will finally force America to deal with the entire Gap as a strategic threat environment.

  FOR MOST COUNTRIES, accommodating the emerging global rule set of democracy, transparency, and free trade is no mean feat, which is something most Americans find hard to understand. We tend to forget just how hard it has been to keep the United States together all these years, harmonizing our own, competing internal rule sets along the way—through a Civil War, a Great Depression, and the long struggles for racial and sexual equality that continue to this day. As far as most states are concerned, we are quite unrealistic in our expectation that they should adapt themselves quickly to globalization’s very American-looking rule set.

 

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